PLATO

All Dialogues Summarized

2nd revised edition with index

Hoshang J. Khambatta

Alvin Wald

Introduction to Timeless Thoughts

Impressum

Address for correspondence: | Hoshang J. Khambatta 291 Audubon Road Englewood, NJ 07631 USA
e-mail: | hkhambatta@nj.rr.com

Library of Congress Control Number: 20155957300

Key Words: Plato, All Dialogues, Dialogues Summarized

CIP – Cataloguing in publication of the Deutsche Bibliothek

Plato, All Dialogues, Dialogues Summarized / ed: H. J. Khambatta / Bad Homburg:

NORMED Verlag. 2016 (1st edition)

2nd revised edition:

©2017 by Normed Verlag GmbH, Bad Homburg, Germany

Normed Verlag, Englewood, NJ, USA

ISBN E-PUB 978-3-89199-013-1

ISBN MOBI 978-3-89199-017-9

ISBN 978-3-89199-018-6 (Bad Homburg)

ISBN 978-0-926592-18-6 (Englewood, NJ)

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Main Description

Plato is one of the pillars of humanity. His dialogues are an important part of our cultural heritage. Yet to read all of Plato’s Dialogues, not only requires ample time, but also a dedication that is beyond most of us. Very few will find the time and commitment to read 1500 pages of Plato’s Dialogues.

This summary of Plato’s Dialogues offers everyone access to the jewels of Western Philosophy still relevant today. Written in modern colloquial English it serves as an introduction to Plato’s work for everybody.

As of now it is the only summary of all of Plato’s Dialogues available in English in one volume. Readers seeking an accessible introduction to Plato need look no further.

Following overwhelming requests from our readers, a comprehensive index has been added to the 2nd revised edition.

The total set of Plato’s Dialogues makes it very sizeable literature. This book is an effective summary of each of the dialogues. If someone wishes to know the views of Plato without going through the vast literature of the dialogues, then this book is for that person.

K. D. Irani, Emeritus Professor of Philosophy

The City College of New York.

Reviews

These are excellent introductions to Plato’s works, and just the thing I ask my students to do when they read difficult texts. Congratulations on this good achievement. I will share this text with my colleagues here, and wish you continued success in your work.

Dr. Larry P. Arnn

President, Hillsdale College

Hillsdale, Michigan, U.S.A.

The book, which summarizes Plato’s Dialogues, is directed at a novice, a teenager who has reached a stage of understanding or an adult? This summary offers everyone an access to understanding Plato and his contribution to western philosophy. It is certainly a “must read” as it is written in modern colloquial English in one volume – an impressive feat by all accounts. Certainly it was no small accomplishment to condense the equivalent of 1500 pages of Plato’s Dialogues in some 250 summarized ones. As of now it is the only summary of all of Plato’s Dialogues available in English in one volume.

Zoroastrian Association of Greater New York

New York, U.S.A.

The total set of Plato’s Dialogues makes it very sizeable literature. This book is an effective summary of each of the dialogues. If someone wishes to know the views of Plato without going through the vast literature of the dialogues, then this book is for that person.

K. D. Irani, Emeritus Professor of Philosophy

The City College of New York.

Contents

Cover

Title

Imprint

Main Description

Reviews

Author Biographies

Dedication

Acknowledgements

Preface

Prologue

Dialogues

1 Euthyphro

2 Apology

3 Crito

4 Phaedo

5 Cratylus

6 Theaetetus

7 Sophist

8 Statesman

9 Parmenides

10 Philebus

11 Symposium

12 Phaedrus

13 Alcibiades**

14 Second Alcibiades*

15 Hipparchus*

16 Rival Lovers*

17 Theages*

18 Charmides

19 Laches

20 Lysis

21 Euthydemus

22 Protagoras

23 Gorgias

24 Meno

25 Greater Hippias**

26 Lesser Hippias

27 Ion

28 Menexenus

29 Clitophon*

30 Republic

31 Timaeus

32 Critias

33 Minos*

34 Laws

35 Epinomis*

36 On Justice*

37 On Virtue*

38 Demodocus*

39 Sisyphus*

40 Halcyon*

41 Eryxias*

42 Axiochus*

Index

* Plato’s authorship not authenticated

** Plato’s authorship not generally accepted

Author Biographies

Hoshang J. Khambatta was born in Bombay (Mumbai), India, and grew up in Karachi, Pakistan, where he obtained his medical degree. After post-graduate studies in Great Britain, he came to the United States of America and joined the College of Physicians and Surgeons at New York City’s Columbia University and Columbia Presbyterian Medical Center. Spending the next 33 years there before retiring. Has published multiple contributions to the medical literature. During his retirement, he has participated in medical missions in Central America, India, and China. Upon totally giving up the practice of medicine, he rejoined Columbia University to read Philosophy.

Alvin Wald has been a longtime, collaborator, colleague and friend of Hoshang J. Khambatta. He is a product of New York City schools and studied in the city from grammar school through the time he received his doctorate. A long time editor of technical publications, he has recently collaborated to produce a philosophical treatise on Plato. Retired now from Columbia University, he spends many hours reading and editing scholarly works.

Dedication

I dedicate this book to my teacher, Professor Wolfgang Mann at Columbia University, for the enthusiasm for philosophy that he generated in me and to my four grandchildren, Fritz, Aliya, Emerson and Zachary.

Hoshang J. Khambatta

A teacher … can never tell where his influence stops.

Henry B. Adams, 1907

The Education of Henry Adams

To Mary Jack, my wife of untallied years. For all her never wavering love and support.

Alvin Wald

Socrates tells Ion (in the dialogue titled Ion) that his prowess in interpreting Homer’s poetry is not because of his mastery of the subject, but because of divine inspiration from Homer’s Muse. Likewise, our interpretation of Plato’s Dialogues are also not because of our mastery of the subject, but because of divine inspiration from Plato’s Muse. Lo and behold, after 2500 years, the Muse is still active.

Hoshang J. Khambatta

“I continue to learn many things as I grow old”

Solon, 630 – 560 B.C.E.

One of the seven sages of Ancient Greece

Acknowledgements

First of all, I (HJK) thank Professor Wolfgang Mann, my teacher at Columbia University in New York City. Professor Mann ignited my enthusiasm for Plato. It was after studying under Professor Mann that I thought about writing a précised edition for young and not-so-young budding philosophers. For those who are not yet familiar with ancient Greek philosophy, I hope to help them appreciate and understand the origins and principles of philosophical thinking.

Next, I (HJK) asked my eldest grandson, 17-years old, Cyrus Fritz Pachmann who is a student at the International School in Frankfurt, Germany (Class of 2016), whether he would read the manuscript, as he is part of the target audience. He agreed and found the book thought provoking and easy to follow. He also made many helpful suggestions for which I am very thankful.

Next, I (HJK) would like to thank my wife Renate, son Gustav and his wife Jennifer, daughter Sonja Khambatta and her husband Thomas Pachmann for their steadfast support during the period it took to write the manuscript.

Next, I (HJK) would like to thank my Editor/Publisher, Franz Reuter, at Normed Verlag for guiding me through the process and humoring me along the way.

We would like to thank Emeritus Professor K. D. Irani of The City College of New York for reviewing the manuscript and for his considered comments and criticisms of our work.

We wish to thank Adjunct Professor of Philosophy Christine Pries, Barnard

College, Columbia University, New York for reviewing parts of the manuscript and for her useful comments.

HJK is fully responsible for interpreting Plato. If there are any errors they are his. AW is responsible for editing.

We perused several English translations of Plato’s Dialogues but finally placed a bigger emphasis on the book used by (HJK) for the course work at Columbia University. John M. Cooper, Editor and D. S. Hutchison, Assistant Editor. Plato Complete Works (Indiana/Cambridge, Hatchett Publishing CO 1997).

We have referred to open source material available on the internet.

Copyright permission courtesy of Branislav L. Slantchev for use of the image of Plato’s Academy Mosaic, from National Archeological Museum, Naples, Italy.

Preface

Plato is considered to be one of the greatest philosophers of all times, and many consider him to be the father of philosophy. He was born in Athens in 427 B.C.E. into a rich, aristocratic family and he died in 347 B.C.E. at the age of 81. In his late teens or early twenties he began to frequent a circle of Athenian thinkers led by Socrates. If Plato is the father of philosophy, then Socrates, who died in 399 B.C.E. when Plato was 28 years old, would be the grandfather. Socrates’ death had a tremendous influence on Plato who then traveled the known world and engaged with other philosophers. No original works of Socrates have survived, and what we know of him today is found in Plato’s writings. In 380 B.C.E. Plato opened a school of higher education in the sacred groves of Academus in the Attic country-side near Athens. He offered lessons in mathematics, politics and philosophy. Under his leadership this academy became a major institution, attracting leading scholars from all over Greece. Aristotle attended as a student in 367 B.C.E. and remained as a teacher up to the time of Plato’s death.

Plato began to write after Socrates’ death and continued for the next 50 years until his own death. These writings are in the form of dialogues. Plato and Socrates are not handing down truth. They are encouraging you to think for yourself by considering the available alternatives. Socrates and Plato did not believe that they had new knowledge to hand down, they wanted readers to reason and think and reflect on how to improve themselves. Truth is attained if one takes time to think; it is not a personal revelation for which a person can claim credit. Plato never appears in the first person in his dialogues. What he writes he credits to others, and he makes no claims to absolute wisdom. Truth must be arrived at by each of us on our own; we must gain the capacity to interpret and reinterpret. This is where Socrates and Plato differ from earlier philosophers, known as Sophists, who made claims to possess wisdom and truth that they would impart to their followers.

We do not have Plato’s work in the original. It is available as dialogues from transcriptions made and compiled by Thrasyllus, who came from the Greek city of Alexandria in Egypt. He was an astrologer and Platonist philosopher in the first century C.E., nearly 400 years after Plato’s death. In essence, Thrasyllus was responsible for the first edition of Plato’s complete work gathered together in one place. For some of the dialogues, the authenticity of Plato’s authorship has been challenged. Thrasyllus included these, even though he called them spurious. We, too, have included them in this volume. In the recent past the authenticity of a few more dialogues has been challenged by scholars, and we have made a note of that in this publication. While we have no knowledge of the order in which the original dialogues were written, Thrasyllus arranged them in a thematic fashion, and we will follow that order. Though we have numbered the dialogues in this volume, there is no chronological significance to the order in which they are numbered and presented. Regards the order we have followed the lead of classical scholars. The numbering has been done for easier access. The first four dialogues are known as the Socratic dialogues and have a theme of justice and legislation. There is then another group in which Plato introduces his theory of Forms. This is the concept of eternal non-physical knowledge that is obtained by abstract thought.

The lessons of Plato and Socrates are just as valid today as they were two-and-a-half thousand years ago. This book is directed at the novice, a teenager who has reached an age of understanding or an adult who has not been exposed to ancient Greek philosophy, but has a desire to learn. We hope that readers of this book will have the curiosity to consult the original texts, albeit in translation. If this hope becomes a reality, then our mission will have been fulfilled. However even if our efforts here only produces an interest in or appreciation of philosophy, we will be satisfied. All of the dialogues in our volume are preceded by a short “overview” to facilitate reading. The overview is then followed by a shortened version of the original dialogue, which is our interpretation, in which we have tried to maintain the feel, and semblance of the original dialogue format.

Hoshang J. Khambatta

December 2015

Prologue

Plato’s academy, a beautiful place in the Mediterranean. Students learning under the olive trees in the warm breeze. What better way than in a beautiful garden is there to question and discuss the nature of friendship, justice, society and science. It is why I chose this image showing Plato with six of his students from the Villa of T. Siminus Stephan in Pompeii, Italy. It shows that though we cannot always choose the gardens where we think, we can nurture our need for answers through questions. Dialogue has not lost its relevance, in fact it has become more vital than ever as our civilization continues to struggle in how we see the world, our society and ultimately ourselves. That is what makes Plato’s Dialogues classics.

Plato’s Academy, Mosaic from Villa of T. Siminius Stephanus, Pompeii

(Photo Courtesy of Branislav Slantchev)

1 Euthyphro

Overview: Euthyphro claims to know all about piety and impiety and also the meaning of pious and impious. So sure of himself is he, that he is prosecuting his own father for the murder of a murderer. When challenged by Socrates he is unable to explain his beliefs. Instead, he talks about prayer and sacrifice to The Gods and about whom and what The Gods love. All his boasting of knowledge comes to naught. It appears that he fears some imagined displeasure of The Gods that he would not have to endure if he prosecutes his father.

We notice that throughout the dialogue, the main line of any inquiry by Socrates is “what is.” He wants a defining answer to his questions. Euthyphro was unable to answer Socrates’s question. Maybe Plato is trying to tell the reader that piety is a person’s ability to become morally as good as possible and not any ability to please The Gods.

Socrates and Euthyphro run into each other near the Athens magistrate’s office. Euthyphro appears to be confused and surprised, asking Socrates if some one is indicting him or the other way round. Socrates says that, indeed, a young Athenian by the name of Meletus is indicting him for corrupting the young and for creating new Gods while not believing in the existing Gods, and therefore of impiety towards The Gods, whose displeasure will then fall upon the city. Socrates asks Euthyphro what brings him to the magistrate’s office? Euthyphro replies that he is prosecuting his own father for murder, which is a pollution and therefore displeasing to The Gods. Socrates inquires whether the victim of this crime was a friend, a relative or a stranger. Euthyphro answers that the relationship was not important; it only matters if the killer acted justly or not. Euthyphro explains that the victim had killed one of his father’s slaves while working on the family farm. Euthyphro’s father had gotten very angry and had the victim bound and thrown into a ditch. The father then sent a messenger to Delphi to ask what should be done next. However, before the messenger returned, the victim died. Now, all of Euthyphro’s relatives are angry with him because he is suing his father even though the victim was a murderer and his father had not deliberately killed him. Furthermore, they point out, it is impious to prosecute one’s father. Euthyphro feels that his relatives’ ideas of piety are wrong. His father is responsible for the victim’s death, and this should be avenged to please The Gods.

Socrates and Euthyphro then discuss how The Gods constantly fought amongst themselves as portrayed in the epic Greek sagas and poems of old. They talk about Zeus, the most just amongst The Gods. Euthyphro reminds Socrates that Zeus pursued his father and castrated him because he unjustly swallowed his sons, but now some people are upset that he, Euthyphro, is prosecuting his own father.

Socrates then asks that, as Euthyphro knows so much about the pious and the impious, whether he can explain what a person should do in such a situation. Euthyphro says that his action in suing his father is the pious thing to do, and that it does not matter that he is his father’s son. Socrates says that he, too, finds some of the conflicting things said about The Gods to be confusing. He says that such confusion may be the reason why Euthyphro is prosecuting his father. Socrates then inquires about what makes an action pious or impious. Euthyphro answers that what is dear to The Gods is pious and what is not dear is impious. Socrates rephrases the statement, saying that actions or persons dear to The Gods are pious and the opposite are impious and Euthyphro agrees to this interpretation. Socrates then reminds Euthyphro that they had agreed earlier that The Gods often disagreed with each other. Therefore, the two of them should try to figure out what causes those disagreements. Here Socrates concludes that what some Gods consider beautiful others find ugly and that different Gods find different things good or bad. Similarly, The Gods are discordant about justice and injustice, furthermore, some Gods hate or love other Gods. By this thinking, Euthyphro’s punishing his father may be pleasing to Zeus but displeasing to Cronus. Other Gods may have differing views on this matter.

Euthyphro then adds that no person or God says that someone who has done wrong should not be punished. Rather, both man and The Gods agree that the first thing to be determined is who has done wrong. The matter centers on whether the deed in question was just or unjust. Socrates asks Euthyphro to show him if any of The Gods would call his father’s action unjust, Euthyphro agrees that this is a difficult question but then asserts that piety is what all The Gods love and the converse, namely impiety, is what all The Gods hate. Socrates turns this definition around and asks whether that which is pious is loved by the Gods because it is pious or it is pious because it is loved by The Gods. Euthyphro is unable to answer this question and Socrates gives more examples of this paradox. There is a difference between something carried and something carrying, something led and something leading, something seeing and something seen. Socrates adds that something loved is different from something loving. Hence, we would say that an action is loved because it is pious but not pious because it is loved. Socrates argues that what The Gods love does not make action pious, nor does being pious imply being loved by The Gods. After this round of circular reasoning, Socrates again asks what piety is. He asks whether all or some of that which is just is pious, or whether all or some of that which is pious is just?

Here Socrates digresses a little and quotes an ancient poet who said that “where there is fear there is shame.” Socrates notes that he disagrees with the poet, explaining that men fear illness or poverty but that there is no shame in this fear. Someone who feels shame or embarrassment fears a ruined reputation. So shame is the more encompassing. Where there is shame there is fear, but the reverse is not true. Socrates is trying to show that where there is piety there is also justice, but that where there is justice there is not always piety. Euthyphro adds that the godly and the pious are part of the just who are concerned with the care of The Gods, while the care of man is the human part of justice. Socrates asks Euthyphro to explain what he means by the concern of The Gods and adds that so far Euthyphro has failed to explain what piety is. Euthyphro replies that man knows how to say what is pleasing to The Gods by prayer and sacrifice. These are pious actions, pleasing both to The Gods and to the state. Socrates replies that prayer is begging from The Gods and sacrifice is giving gifts to The Gods. Hence, piety would mean, having the knowledge of how to give to The Gods and how to beg from them. Socrates calls this piety a kind of give and take trade with The Gods. In such trade, men receive blessings from The Gods in return for piety. This definition means that piety is what is pleasing to The Gods, not necessarily what is beneficial to them. Socrates bemoans the fact that he has not yet learned what piety is. He adds that Euthyphro has no clear knowledge of what is piety and impiety but that, if he had such knowledge, he would not have tried to prosecute his own father. It is on his fear of The Gods and the risk of offending them and not piety, that he has based his decision to prosecute his father. Euthyphro should have a clear knowledge of what piety is if he intends to prosecute his own father. At this point, to escape further questioning, Euthyphro claims a prior engagement and departs.

2 Apology

Overview: Though this dialogue is known as Apology, Plato is not making an apology to anyone. The Greek word Apologia in the original title refers to a speech made in a court of law, by a person defending himself. Plato is relating the trial of Socrates for impiety and corruption of the young. Though there is no record of the actual speech Socrates made in his defense, this is Plato’s representation of that speech. Though Plato was present at the trial, there is no way of knowing how closely it conforms to the original.

Socrates is charged with impiety for not believing in The Gods of Athens and for corrupting the young. Socrates uses Apollo’s representative on the earth, the Oracle of Delphi, in his defense – and states that wisdom cannot be taught by a teacher. He emphasizes that, just because someone is an expert in a particular subject, this does not necessarily make him knowledgeable in anything else. He asks people to recognize when they do not know what they think they know. He contends that death is better than living as a coward. Socrates never personally cared much for poets or ancient Greek myths, but he did use them in his defense.

Socrates could perhaps have saved his life by using a more humble tone, but he refuses this defense. He suggests that men should care less for their bodies or wealth and more for their souls, repeating that it is better to die than to live as a coward. He implores the members of the jury to think for themselves and judge him by the facts.

The court was comprised of 501 Citizens of Athens from different walks of life. The court acts as both judge and jury and determines the innocence or the extent of guilt and specifies the sentence if the defendant is found guilty.

Meletus has pressed charges of impiety and of corrupting the youth of Athens against Socrates. These charges were presented in flowery language that asked for a sentence of death. Meletus also warns the jury not to be swayed by Socrates, as he is an accomplished orator.

Socrates, on his own behalf, declares that he is 70 years old and has never before been in a court of law. Furthermore he is not accustomed to flowery speeches. Rather, he will simply speak in his normal manner, using the everyday language of the market place. He emphasizes that he will speak the truth and hopes that the citizens of Athens will think clearly and judge him on the facts. If Meletus thinks that speaking the truth makes him an accomplished orator, then indeed he is one.

Socrates starts his defense by asserting that Meletus and his associate accusers are lying. They have accused him of studying things in the sky and things below the earth. They have said that he converts poor arguments into strong arguments and teaches this technique to others, thus corrupting the young. This teaching is an impiety against the Athenian Gods, whom the city holds dear. Meletus is lying Socrates repeats. Unlike other philosophers, he charges no fee from his listeners, as he is not teaching anyone for a fee. However, when he talks people are free to listen if they wish, and then make up their own minds.

Socrates, in his usual manner, puts a question to himself. If he has done nothing wrong then why are there so many rumors against him? He answers himself by saying that his troubles began when he tried to find the wisest man in Athens. During his search he found that, just because an individual was wise in one field, that person assumed that he was equally wise in everything. Socrates proved such wise men wrong in their assumptions, and this was how he made enemies. The young people who followed him asked similar questions, which upset more people, creating still more enemies who then charged that Socrates was corrupting the young.

Socrates then talks about his friend Chaerephon, who had died but was still well known to the citizens of Athens. The two of them went to Delphi to ask the oracle who the wisest of men was. The oracle identified that that man as Socrates and announced that there was no one wiser. Socrates had found this reply very puzzling and then tried to find out what the oracle meant.

Socrates felt that he was not the wisest of men. If he was not, however, then what could the oracle mean, as the oracle does not lie. In his inquiries he went to a political public figure of note, whose name he withholds. This political figure appeared to be wise to many people and thought himself so as well. Socrates showed him that, though this man thought he was wise, in reality he was not, and for this reason this unnamed individual disliked Socrates. It was then that Socrates came to his conclusion that neither he nor the prominent politician knew anything worthwhile. However, the difference between the two was that, when the prominent politician thought he knew things that in reality he did not, he believed that he did. On the other hand, “when I,” Socrates explains, “do not know something, I do not think that I do. Hence, to a certain extent I am likely to be wiser than the politician, in that I know what it is that I do not know.” Socrates says that he has repeated this line of argument with many people and so has ended up making many enemies. This was when Socrates realized that he was becoming very unpopular with the Athenian people. Nevertheless, he had felt that what the oracle had said was true, and that his investigations were in the service of The Goddess at Delphi. Socrates had thus concluded that those who had the highest reputation were usually the most deficient in knowledge, while those who thought they were inferior were, in reality, more knowledgeable.

Socrates then explains that he continued his examination in fields other than politics. He asked the poets to explain their poems and found that they could not. Instead the common folk were better at explaining them than the authors themselves. From this finding, Socrates states, he concluded that poets had talent and inspiration and said fine things, but they did so without understanding their own works. Because of their poetry they thought that they were wise in other matters as well, but in reality they were not.

Socrates then notes that he has examined people in other walks of life. He has found that craftsmen knew many more things about their craft than he did. However, these craftsmen then felt that, since they knew so much about their craft, they must also be wise in other things as well. Demonstrably they were not.

Then Socrates, on behalf of the oracle, asks himself whether he should prefer to be what he is, neither wise nor ignorant, or whether he should admit to being both. The answer he gives to himself and to the oracle is that it is to his advantage to be what he is. This conclusion Socrates proposes, has resulted in his making many enemies.

Socrates believes that the oracle was correct in saying that “human wisdom is worth nothing.” He understands that wisdom is worthless. The young people who follow Socrates question others who think that they are wise and try to prove them wrong. Because of such followers, Socrates has collected many enemies who say that he corrupts the young. However, when he has turned around and asked his enemies how he corrupts the young, they have been unable to answer him. These critics fall back on the spurious accusations hurled at all philosophers who maintain that philosophers inquire: “about those things in the sky and things below the earth” and then assert that: “they do not believe in The Gods and make the weaker argument more appealing than the stronger argument.” These accusers will not accept that their claim to knowledge is bogus.

Meletus has accused Socrates on behalf of poets, craftsmen, and orators. Socrates reiterates that he has told the truth and hidden nothing and that his self-defense must then be what makes him unpopular.

As for the other charges brought against Socrates by Meletus, the deposition says that Socrates was guilty of corrupting the young and not believing in The Gods of Athens. Instead of directly defending himself, Socrates promotes new spiritual ideas. He turns this argument around telling Meletus that he is irresponsible for bringing people to court and professing to care for things that he has never cared about before. Socrates points out that as Meletus seems to know only those who corrupt the young, why can he not say who improves them? At first Meletus remains silent, but on further prodding he answers this question with a brief response – “the laws.” Socrates accuses him of evading the question and asks who has knowledge of the laws? Socrates continues, stating that it appears that everyone improves the young but only Socrates corrupts them, an argument that he finds preposterous. He asks Meletus if it is better to live amongst good or wicked fellow citizens? “Don’t the wicked do some harm and the good provide some benefits?” Meletus agrees to this hypothesis. Socrates then asks whether a man would rather be harmed or benefited. Is there any man who wants to be harmed? Meletus agrees that there is no such man. Socrates continues his questions, asking Meletus if he believes that Socrates corrupts the young deliberately or unwillingly? Meletus replies: “deliberately.” Socrates then asks whether Meletus believes that he does not believe in The Gods at all and considers him to be an atheist? Meletus replies that indeed, he thinks that Socrates is an atheist. Socrates replies that, just as other people do, he believes in the sun and moon as Gods. Meletus refutes that statement. Socrates turns the question around and asks Meletus whether he is also prosecuting Anaxagoras, the astronomer? Does Meletus know that people can buy books by Anaxagoras for a small sum and learn all about The Gods, without any help from Socrates? Socrates then questions Meletus further about the so-called “spiritual things.” They both agree that if Socrates talks about spiritual things, he must believe in spirits. Now, Socrates points out that spirits are either Gods or children of Gods and thus if Socrates believes in them he cannot be an atheist and so Meletus is contradicting himself. Socrates agrees that he is unpopular with many people and that this reputation might be his undoing. He allows that some would question him about following an occupation that puts him in danger of death, but he asserts that death is better than disgrace. If a person’s actions are correct, then his death is of no consequence. He reminds the jury that, during the battle of Troy, Achilles, is prepared to kill Hector to avenge the death of his comrade, Patroclus. The Goddess Athena has warned him that, if he kills Hector, his own death will soon follow. Achilles replies, saying that he despises death and danger, but is afraid of living as a coward if he does not avenge his comrade’s death. Socrates underscores that Achilles was prepared to die rather than live, saying that death may be the greatest blessing and men should not fear it.

Socrates summarizes his defense by saying that, if he had to promise never to practice philosophy again to spare his life, he would reject that offer. He goes on to say that he would continue to persuade young people to care not for their own bodies or for wealth, but only for their souls. Wealth does not bring excellence, but excellence brings wealth. Whether the jury passes the sentence of death or not, Socrates states, what he said earlier will be his course of action. He further adds that if they do sentence him to death they will do more harm to themselves than to him. He says that Meletus and the others can put him to death but they can not harm him. Socrates ends his defense and refuses to plead for any favors or for his life.

The jury finds Socrates guilty, and Meletus asks for the death penalty. Socrates comments that he is not angry with anyone but that he is surprised that he was convicted by such a very small majority. Despite the verdict he still does not consider himself guilty of any of the charges.

Some members of the council try to assess a fine rather than the death penalty. Socrates comments he has no funds to pay a fine. Some citizens offered to pay the fine for him, but the jury declines to assess a fine. The sentence of death cannot be carried out for about a month because the state galley is on a religious pilgrimage to the Island of Delos and the law forbids carrying out the death sentence when the ship is not harbored at Athens. During this delay his friends offer to bribe the jailors to free him so that he can escape but once again Socrates refuses their help. He avers that, as a citizen of Athens, he was tried and found guilty. He will obey the laws of the city. When the time comes to depart from this life, he will go on to die, and they will go on to live without him. Who goes to a better place is only known to The Gods.

3 Crito

Overview: Socrates’s friend Crito argues that the state was wrong in convicting him and sentencing him to death. He proposes to pay off the jailors to allow Socrates to escape and live in exile elsewhere. Socrates presents numerous arguments to the same point, that doing one wrong to correct another wrong is never right. Socrates tells Crito that as a citizen he enjoyed all the privileges that Athens offered him and his family, and that in return he must observe the laws of the city and must accept the city’s judgment. Finally, they both agree that this outcome is also the will of The Gods. Elements of Plato’s arguments can certainly be found in Christian philosophy, for example, “turning the other cheek.”

Socrates has been found guilty and sentenced to death. However, the death sentence cannot not be carried out as the laws require that the Athenian state galley must be in port when an execution is carried out. This ship is now on an annual religious mission to the island of Delos.

Socrates’ friend, Crito, visits him in prison early one morning. Crito informs him that he has some very bad news: The state galley will arrive the next day, and therefore the death sentence will be carried out on the following day. Socrates tells Crito that he is ready for death.

Crito tells Socrates that he has enough money to bribe the jailor, and two other friends have promised more funds to help free him so that he can escape to another city. Crito adds that people might think that, if he did not offer help, he valued money more than his friend. Socrates advises him that he should pay no attention to the opinions of other people. Crito then expresses concern that some informers would let the authorities know of such an escape plot. Such an accusation would subject all of the friends to a court case, confiscation of their property, and imprisonment, but they still urge Socrates to escape. Socrates tells Crito that he has thought about this possibility as well as many other things. Crito replies that he has friends in Thessaly who would be glad to welcome Socrates, and implores him not to give up his life. Crito reminds Socrates that he has young sons to bring up and educate, and without their father they will become orphans. Socrates tells Crito that he very much appreciates his eagerness to help but that in his usual manner he would like to examine all the alternatives and come to a decision on his own. Socrates tells him that he values the opinions of all men. Good opinions can come from wise men and bad opinions from foolish men. A person should consider opinions only from men who are well versed in the subject.

Socrates now begins to examine the question of escape. Should he go against the wishes of the Athenian people as expressed by the jury that convicted him? First, he asks Crito if he would agree that no one should ever willingly do a wrong or, he adds do a wrong thing in one instance and not in another? He emphasizes that what ever the conditions, doing wrong is shameful. Crito agrees with this philosophy. Socrates then rephrases his argument: while a person must never do wrong, but, if a wrong is done to someone then that individual must not retaliate by inflicting wrong on the perpetrator of the original wrong. Crito again agrees with this moral judgment. Socrates then asks Crito to consider carefully whether his beliefs allow him to agree with these principles. He points out that many other men would not agree, as they hold opposing views. Socrates states his contention that a man should never consent to doing wrong or to return a wrong in response for a wrong to himself. Crito once again agrees. Socrates tells him that if he does agree, then he should always follow this principle and not just on occasions that suit him. After Crito agrees to everything that Socrates is telling him, Socrates asks him, how he would answer the Athenian state if Socrates goes against the jury’s verdict and escapes from the city. As Socrates could not say that the verdict was unjust: “therefore I, Socrates, would respond with another wrong.” Socrates repeats that he is duty bound to follow the laws of the city under whose protection he has lived his entire life, enjoying its comforts, and bringing up his children. This viewpoint is his moral contract with the city. Thus escaping from the jail and seeking asylum elsewhere would be doing wrong. Furthermore by living in exile a person becomes subservient to a different set of people. Finally, Crito concedes to Socrates’ arguments and Socrates replies that The Gods are showing him this path.

4 Phaedo

Overview: Phaedo is not so much a dialogue, but a retelling of the last day of Socrates’ life, as narrated by the principal character, Phaedo, to a group of friends in the Greek city of Phlius. Phaedo mentions by name several friends of Socrates who were present for his final hours. However, he makes a point that Plato was not present because he was taken ill that day. It seems worth considering whether Plato is perhaps trying to dissociate himself from what he makes Socrates say in this dialogue. First, Phaedo explains why it took more than a month for the death sentence to be carried out, relating the legend of Theseus and the monster Minotaur, which was relevant to the reason for the delay.

Phaedo follows with Socrates’ theory of how opposites seem to follow one another. For an example, Socrates cited the feeling of pleasure that followed the removal of the chains, which had caused so much pain in the legs.

Phaedo relates how Socrates suggested that the sophist Evenus should follow him soon (presumably in death). Socrates, Phaedo notes, had explained to him how a philosopher truly prepares for death all his life, so he should not be afraid of dying when his time comes. At death, according to Socrates, the body which is mortal, disintegrates, but the soul, which is immortal, lives on forever. Phaedo says that Socrates explained the belief that after death the soul is born again in a new being. Furthermore, if a person has led a virtuous life, then the soul may reside in Hades forever or be reborn in another person. If the life led was not virtuous, then the soul will be born again as an animal or as some lower form of life, depending on how lacking in virtue the life was.

Phaedo then discusses Socrates’ views on recollection and learning, which maintain that learning is only recollection of past memories, exemplified in this case by a lover seeing a garment belonging to his loved one. This object brings on a recollection of the loved one, even though that person is not physically present.

Then, Phaedo notes that Socrates talked about Forms. As an example, Socrates asserted that Beautiful is a Form and notes that the various features that comprise the Beautiful are only attributes of that Form.

Similar, he maintained, is the concept of odd and even numbers: Number 3 is an odd number, but 3 is only an attribute of Oddness.

Finally, according to Phaedo, just before his death, Socrates made a point of asking Crito to sacrifice a cock to Asclepius (The God of Healing). This sacrifice, Phaedo infers, suggests that death is actually a cure for the ills of Socrates’ life. This final request is based on the practice of the sacrifice of a cock by people who slept in the temple of Asclepius while seeking a cure for their illness.

This dialogue, as narrated by Phaedo to Echecrates, describes the conversation among a group of Socrates’ friends on his final day of life.

Phaedo, on his way to the city of Elis, stops at the city of Phlius where he is met by Echecrates. Echecrates asks him whether he was present when Socrates swallowed poison, and if he was there, what Socrates’ final words were? Phaedo assures him that he was with Socrates on that final day along with Socrates’ wife, Xanthippe, their baby, and several friends who he names. He reports that Plato was not there, as he had taken ill that day. Echecrates says that everyone in Phlius wondered why the death sentence was only carried out so long after the trial ended. Phaedo explains that this execution day was chosen by chance and, as explanation he relates the story of the King of Crete, Minos, who had defeated the Athenians in a battle. Each year, as tribute, the Athenians were obligated to send seven youths and seven maidens to be sacrificed to the monster Minotaur who dwelled in the labyrinth at Crete. One year, Theseus who was one of those sent to be sacrificed succeeded in slaying Minotaur. To commemorate this triumph, the Athenians vowed to send the ship every year on which Theseus had sailed, on a pilgrimage to the island of Delos. The ship was crowned with garlands just the day before Socrates’ trial ended. Once the ship was crowned for its voyage, Athens had to be kept pure. Because of this restriction, no one could be put to death until the ship returned home.

Echecrates then asks for more details about Socrates’ confinement. Phaedo says that initially all visitors were asked to wait outside until the guards removed the chains from Socrates’ legs. The visitors then were led to his cell. Very soon, Xanthippe, Socrates’ wife, began to cry and Socrates asked Crito to arrange for someone to take her and the baby home, which was done.

Then Socrates put his feet on the bed and gently rubbed them, saying how good it felt to be free of his chains. He wondered, Phaedo relates, about what men call pleasure, noting that it is interesting that opposite always follow each other, such as pleasure follows pain. Socrates contended that man cannot have both pain and pleasure at the same time, but if he pursues one, then the opposite soon follows. He wondered whether Aesop, the writer of fables, had noted this constraint. If Aesop had, Socrates reasoned, he would surely have written a fable about it. The Gods, Socrates averred, could not reconcile these two opposite reactions, and therefore they joined them together. Thus, according to Socrates, Phaedo reports, that when man has either pain or pleasure, the other soon follows. That is what was happening to him. The chains had caused pain in his legs and now pleasure seemed to be following their removal.

At this point, Phaedo reports, Cebes intervened, saying that Evenus, the sophist and teacher, had requested that he ask Socrates what induced him to write poetry after he was confined to prison, as Socrates had never done this type of writing before. While in prison, Socrates had put Aesop’s fables into verse and had also composed a hymn to Apollo. Socrates answered Cebes, saying that he should tell Evenus that he did not do it to rival Evenus, as that would not be easy to accomplish. Instead, he had tried to find the meaning of the recurring dreams he was having. The dreams were concerned with which of the arts he should practice, so he had written poetry to satisfy his curiosity. The dreams told Socrates that he should practice and cultivate the arts. In the past, he had thought that to practice the arts meant practicing the art of philosophy. Following his trial and the delay in executing the sentence, he thought that the dream might mean practicing the popular arts such as poetry. Phaedo relates that Socrates continued: “Tell this to Evenus, wish him well and tell him to follow me soon.” Here Simmias interrupted, questioning this advice, and saying that he had met Evenus often and that he was not likely to willingly follow Socrates soon. Socrates asked: “Why this should be so, is Evenus not a philosopher?” According to Socrates, Phaedo explains: “A philosopher is never afraid to die.” Simmias agreed that Evenus might agree to follow Socrates in death, but he would not take his own life. Socrates then told Simmias that men practicing philosophy are never afraid to die and are hopeful that they will attain greater blessings yonder. Hence, if this belief held true, after being eager all their lives for death, to resent death when it does come would be strange indeed. But, Socrates advised, a man should not commit suicide unless it is absolutely necessary. Then, all of the discussants asked whether there is such a thing as death. They all agreed that death is the separation of the soul from the body. Phaedo then relates that they discussed whether a philosopher should concern himself with the pleasures of the body, such as food, drink, sex, and fancy clothes, along with bodily ornaments. They agreed that a philosopher must despise all of these pleasures and instead strive to separate body from soul. They all were in accord that it is the body and its desires that cause so many of mankind’s problems such as war, civil discord, and immoderate desire for the acquisition of wealth. Ultimately, it is the body that prevents men from seeing the truth.

To have pure knowledge, the group concurred, men must escape from the body and see everything with their souls. However, only when dead can men attain this viewpoint. Hence, Phaedo concludes that it is only he who practices philosophy in the correct manner who most wants to free the soul from the body. Thus a philosopher is never afraid of dying. Phaedo notes that Cebes interjected that Socrates’ idea of the soul separating from the body might be true, but he thought that many people believe that when a person dies his soul also disintegrates. Socrates agreed to discuss this point. Socrates asked whether, when a person dies his soul exists in the underworld or not? The conventional theory is that the souls arriving in the underworld are from the dead, and if the souls arrive, they must, therefore, exist. Then the living must come from the dead, for, if this were not the case, how could it be that they can be born again. Socrates went on to several more examples. Hence the living Socrates posited, are generated from the dead through birth, and the dead are generated from the living by dying. Thus the cycle of life is perpetuated.

Socrates then talked about recollection and experience. Recollections can come from similar or dissimilar events. Learning, Socrates said, is the same as recollection. He presented an example: when men are questioned in the right manner they always give the right answers, which they could not do if they did not have the correct knowledge inside of them. Socrates then went on to explain his point. They all agreed that if someone recollects anything, he must have known it before. So this knowledge is recollection. He further explained this viewpoint by pointing out that, if, a lover sees a piece of clothing that belonged to his beloved, the image of the beloved comes to mind just as if the lover were seeing that person instead of the item of clothing. If a man sees a picture of a horse, Socrates continued, he may recollect the man who has ridden that horse. Hence, as those in the group had said earlier, recollection can be caused by things that may be similar or dissimilar to the event. They agreed that these recollections derive from seeing, or from hearing, or from another of the perception senses, with all of these senses being similar. Given the notion that people begin to see or perceive immediately after birth, it stands to reason that the knowledge of those perceptions must have been acquired before birth. Thus, if they retain this knowledge it has not been forgotten. Phaedo says that Socrates claimed that a person acquired the relevant knowledge before being born, but then loses it at birth. By using the senses people reacquired this knowledge, so the argument went. Learning is thus the reacquisition of this knowledge, which is actually recollection. Hence souls would have also acquired knowledge before birth and, therefore, the soul must have existed apart from the body before birth. Socrates explained that when the soul and the body are together, nature orders the soul to rule and be the master, while the body is to be the subject to be ruled. This natural aspect, Socrates inferred, leads to the conclusion that the soul has multiple desires and is deathless, while the body is human and mortal. Thus, when a person dies, the body eventually disintegrates, and the soul goes on to the underworld – Hades. That soul will be reborn as an animal or another person, depending on the life led previously. If life were lived badly, the soul will be reborn as an animal, but, if the life was lived well the soul will then be reborn as a human.

Socrates, Phaedo relates, then told everyone that when he was young, he was keen on natural science. Socrates claimed that he knew the causes of each thing, when it came to be and when it perished. He had wondered if the brain provided the senses of hearing, sight and smell, from which people get memories and opinions that then become knowledge. He soon realized, however, that he had no natural aptitude for these questions and so gave up this line of reasoning. Then, one day, when he was reading a book by Anaxagoras, he came to understand that it was the mind that dictates, which is the cause of everything. His hopes were dashed, however, when he found that man made no use of the mind and gave it no role in management of the body.

Socrates then asked questions, such as, whether there is anything more beautiful than Beautiful itself? He answered his own question with the observation that something is beautiful for no other reason then that it shares in that concept of the Form of Beautiful. So, if someone says that something is beautiful because of a certain shape or color, Socrates said that he agreed with all that reasoning and relied on the objects relationship to the Form of Beautiful. Beautiful is a Form, Socrates asserted, and we are just describing attributes when we talk of a beautiful object. Likewise, he pointed out, Bigness and Smallness are Forms and what makes things bigger or smaller are attributes. When one thing is divided in half it becomes two. So what matters are the Forms of Oneness and Twoness. Here, Socrates established the theory of Forms, such as Beautiful, Small, Big, et al. Thus, he concluded, when I say that Simmias is taller than Socrates this statement does not assert the truth or falsity of the matter. It is not in Simmias’ nature to be taller, but it is so because of the attribute Tallness that he happens to have. At the same time, Simmias is shorter than Phaedo. So Simmias is both taller and shorter. Then Socrates gave another such example where they all agreed that there is hot and cold. Then Socrates asked if these attributes were the same as fire and snow. All those assembled disagreed with this comparison. So hot is different from fire and snow is different from cold. Socrates gave the example that if fire and cold approach each other, they both either have to retreat or both will be destroyed. Such an outcome is true of many other opposites as well. Hence, Socrates asserted that only a Form deserves its characteristic name. Some thing else that is not the Form, but has the characteristics of the Form, does not deserve its characteristic name. Another example that Socrates alluded to was odd and even numbers. Odd and Even are Forms. Number 3 is odd. So it can be called by its Form. Hence, 3 has the nature of Odd.

Socrates then asked if it is the soul that makes the body alive? Everyone agreed that this is always so. Furthermore, the opposite of life is death, but the soul can never consent to the opposite of what its being is. So if soul does not admit death, then it is deathless, which proves that the soul is immortal. Phaedo reports that Socrates concluded that when a man dies, the mortal part of him, that is the body, dies. While the soul, which is deathless, goes away safe and indestructible, and will dwell in the underworld. People who have lead a good life will have their souls live forever in the underworld. However, a person who has lived a less than a virtuous life will be punished according to the degree of his misdeeds and he will be reborn in a lower life form.

At this point they all agreed that there was nothing more to discuss. Socrates took his final bath before swallowing the poison. At that moment, Crito asked if he had any final instructions. Socrates replied: “Nothing new, but take good care of yourself in whatever you do”. He then swallowed the hemlock poison and lay down in his bed. Just before the end he uncovered his head and told Crito that he owed a cock to Asclepius, The God of Healing, and asked him not to forget to make the offering.

Such was the end of their friend whom they all know as the best and the wisest of men. Phaedo relates, the legend that has it that sick people who slept in the temple of Asclepius hoping for a cure sacrificed a cock to him to help in their recovery. By this final request, Phaedo interprets, Socrates made the point that death was a cure for the ills of his life.

5 Cratylus

Overview: This dialogue is about the study of language and the giving of names to things. The discussants are trying to determine what the source of the name’s correctness is, when an item is named. This was a very popular field of inquiry during Plato’s time, though it is not much discussed in present-day Western philosophical circles. The dialogue here is between Hermogenes and Cratylus, but Socrates does much of the talking. Plato has Socrates considering etymological examinations of a long list of names of Gods, humans, and things in order to discover the ultimate truth about things through their names. This dialogue demonstrates that Socrates was an expert in this crowded field of study.

Hermogenes is the conventional linguist. He believes that any local or national convention determines the name of a thing. He feels that the same thing can be called by a different name if people can agree. Cratylus is a naturalistic linguist. He believes that names cannot be chosen arbitrarily. The name must belong to a thing and must have specificity.

Hermogenes and Cratylus are having a discussion about names and ask Socrates to join in. Why is an item or a person called by an assigned name? Cratylus believes that there is an etymological derivative for all given names, whereas Hermogenes believes that a name is anything that a community wishes to call something. Hermogenes first asks Cratylus whether his name is Cratylus, to which Cratylus replies affirmatively. Then Hermogenes asks Socrates whether his name is Socrates, to which Socrates also replies affirmatively. Then Cratylus jokingly says that he himself is called Hermogenes by everyone. When Hermogenes challenges Socrates about Cratylus’ remark, Socrates does not give a straight answer. He explains that there is an ancient proverb stating that fine things are difficult to explain. Socrates tells Hermogenes that Cratylus is only making fun of him. It was a pun on his name. Hermes is the God of profit and Hermogenes means son of Hermes. Socrates points out that Hermogenes was not making much money giving speeches.

Hermogenes says that he has often discussed names with other people who contend that the correctness of a name is determined by usage.

Any name someone gives becomes the correct name by usage. If an object or person gets a different name, then that new name becomes the proper name. Hermogenes gives an example of a domestic slave who had a previous name but was then given a new name. The new name becomes his true name. Socrates then asks if he should decide to call a man – a horse and a horse a man – whether that would be acceptable? The three of them discuss how even in Greece, different communities have different names for the same thing. Socrates then quotes Protagoras, a fellow philosopher, who has said that “man is the measure of all things.” and “that things are to me as they appear to me and to you as they appear to you.” Socrates then asks: “Do you believe that things have a fixed being of their own?” Hermogenes replies that he does not always agree with Protagoras, however, sometimes, even when he does not believe in him he accepts Protagoras’ ideas. They all then agree that there are both, men who are good and wise, as well as men who are bad and foolish. If names for each person are as he believes them to be, then it is not possible for one person to be wise and another foolish. Therefore, what Protagoras says cannot be true.

Socrates and Hermogenes discuss how they should go about properly naming things. Socrates suggests that perhaps Hermogenes should ask his brother Callias what he has learned from Protagoras after paying him such huge fees. Hermogenes declines this suggestion, as he does not believe in what Protagoras has to say. In that case, Socrates suggests, that Hermogenes may want to fall back on what Homer has said on the subject. They discuss multiple examples from Homer that describe names. Homer describes two names given to Hector’s son; men call him Astyanax, and women call him Skamandrios. Men were wiser. When one looks at the roots of the two names, astu and anax, both mean lord of the city. Homer also gave Hector his name. Hector means possessor. This discussion goes to show that Homer was well versed in connectedness in giving names. Socrates gives many more such examples of the correctness of names. He considers that some people’s names are deceptive. Sometimes these names are given to people because their ancestors had them. At other times the names are given in hopes that they will prove to be appropriate for the recipient. As examples he cites Eutychides – son of good fortune, Sosias – savior, and Theophilus – beloved by god. However, these names can be very misleading in describing the so named person.

Their discussion continues about how The Gods were named. The first inhabitants of Greece believed that the sun, moon, earth, stars, and sky were Gods. As these celestial bodies seemed to be always moving or running, they were called, theoi, from thein, to run.

Next, the meaning of daemons, heroes, and humans are discussed. Socrates asks as to what is the correct derivation of the word, daemon? He quotes the poet Hesiod who defined them as “they belonged to the Golden Race of men, the first human race.” They were good and beloved by The Gods and the children of The Gods. According to Hesiod when a good man dies he goes on to a great destiny and with great honors and becomes a daemon, a title then given to him. Hermogenes asks the meaning of the title, hero? Socrates replies that that is easy to explain. Heroes are born out of love, eroes and are thus demigods. They are the children of Gods and mortal women or, conversely, from mortal men with Goddesses. He points out that considering the old Attic dialect, makes it clear that hero is only slightly altered from eros. He notes that sophists who make clever speeches are called rhetores and skilled questioners are called eroten. Socrates asks why members of the human race are called human anthroepoi. He says that we often make small changes by adding or subtracting letters or alter the accents in order to change a phrase into a name. He gives as an example, Dii Philos, which means friend of Zeus. To change this into a name we drop the second i and join the words to make the name Diphilos. Another example Socrates puts forth is that among all of the animals, only humans observe things closely, hence the word anthropos meaning one who observes closely is used to define humans.

They also discuss how The Gods were named, and conclude that they were named for the powers they command. They illustrate with the names of several Gods based on their powers.

The discussion next turns to the correctness of the names of several virtues, such as wisdom, comprehension and justice. The three conclude that wisdom is the understanding of motion as it constantly flows. Judgment expresses that to judge is to examine and study and that is how the virtues were named. They examine the roots of the Attic dialect for derivation of the names for all the virtues and vices. Socrates adds that in his view all names are derived from a thought. Hermogenes agrees with this derivation.

Next they considered how that slight changes made to a name can reverse its meaning. Finally, they concluded there is only one type of correctness in all names, namely to express the nature of a things. The question arises of how someone without a voice or tongue could express names. They conclude that it would be by gesture of hands, head, or the whole body. Socrates says that the correctness of a name is displayed by its nature, an assertion to which Cratylus agrees. Socrates adds that names are spoken in order to give information, and they all agree with this definition. They also agree that the craft of naming things or a person is performed by those we call the rule-setters. Some names and their rule-setters are better than others. Cratylus disagrees that some rule-setters create better names, and also that some names are better than others. He believes that all names have been correctly given and that therefore, all objects have well-given names. Socrates asks if Cratylus believes that names are conventional signs that express things, or if they represent ideas to those who already know these things, or if they were ideas before conventions were established? Socrates contends that the correctness of a name lies in its conventionality. Cratylus insists that a name that expresses something is superior to a name given by chance. He adds that anyone who knows a thing’s name also knows that thing. Socrates contends that anyone who investigates things by considering only their names as a guide may be deceived. The name-giver might have given the thing a name based on a mistaken conception of the thing. Cratylus disagrees, saying that the name-giver must have known the thing before deciding on a name for that thing. Socrates does not agree. He argues that, if things cannot be learned except from their names, then how did the name-giver give the first name before he knew the thing. Cratylus acknowledges the point and adds that more than human power gave the first names, and so they are necessarily correct. Socrates predicts that there will be civil war between names given by humans and those by Gods. They all agreed that it is better to investigate things and learn about them through themselves, rather than to do so through their names.

6 Theaetetus

Overview: The dialogue can be dated as it mentions the return of the mortally sick and wounded Theaetetus from Corinth after the Peloponnesian War, on his way to Athens. This dialogue is being read by a slave from a book written by Euclides. The book is a transcription of the conversation many years ago between Theaetetus, Theodorus the geometer, and Socrates. It is a primary dialogue on epistemology, which is the study of what knowledge is. Epistemology was a main preoccupation of the ancient philosophers and this, perhaps, is the greatest work ever composed on the subject. Most of this book is in the form of a question and answer dialogue between Socrates and Theaetetus. They wish to understand the nature of knowledge. Socrates likens himself to the midwife who helps women deliver their babies. In this dialogue he will again act as a midwife and help Theaetetus deliver his thoughts on what is knowledge. First they look at various crafts as knowledge, but reject this approach as it describes knowledge “of ” rather than what knowledge “is.” They then put forward three significant hypotheses. First, perception is knowledge. Perception is obtained from the senses, but maybe perceived differently by different people. Thus, perception cannot be knowledge. Another possibility is that true judgment is knowledge. This definition, too, is rejected because, as with perception, judgments may be due to sensory awareness. Sensations are the source of all belief, but as true or false beliefs cannot be determined, true judgment is difficult to define. Thus true judgment cannot be knowledge. Finally knowledge is defined as true judgment with an account. This proposition is also known as Socrates’ Dream Theory, as he narrates it as a dream that he has had. This definition is also rejected as there cannot be an account for false belief. All three suggestions are discussed in detail, but eventually all are rejected. In the end, in frustration, Socrates concludes that all they have produced is “wind – eggs.” It was an aporetic discussion. Meaning that it ended in an inconclusive impasse, as all the suggestions offered were ultimately inadequate. Plato does not provide an answer to what knowledge is, though he does show what it is not.

Euclides and Terpsion meet at the market place in Megra. Euclides reports that he was at the harbor where he met Theaetetus, who was being taken to Athens from his camp at Corinth during the Peloponnesian War. He was badly wounded on the battlefield but felt worse now, as he was also suffering from dysentery. Euclides related that he had heard people singing Theaetetus’ praises because of how valiantly he fought. Terpsion comments that he would have been more surprised had it been otherwise. Euclides says that he tried to persuade Theaetetus to stay in Megra until he had recovered from his illness, but Theaetetus was in a hurry to get home to Athens. Euclides then reminisced about Socrates having met Theaetetus when Theaetetus was a young man. After a discussion with Theaetetus, Socrates predicted that Theaetetus would have much to say when he was grownup. Terpsion concurs that Socrates was correct in his assessment of the young Theaetetus and asks what Theaetetus had discussed with Socrates that was so impressive. Euclides says that he wrote down the whole discussion from memory in a book and then checked the details with Socrates whenever he was not sure of his own memory. This discussion was between Theodorus the geometer, Theaetetus and Socrates.

Euclides then has his slave read the book to them. In this book Socrates begins by asking Theodorus if he has come across any students worthy of note? Theodorus replies that he has indeed. He speaks of an extremely gifted young man called Theaetetus who has facial features very similar to Socrates’. While the two men are conversing, they see Theaetetus walking towards them. Socrates has Theodorus ask Theaetetus to join them in conversation.

Socrates tells Theaetetus that, because Theodorus told him that Theaetetus’ face looks like his own, he would like to see what sort of face Theaetetus has. They agree that it is necessary that they look into this claim. Socrates adds that Theodorus has never praised anyone as he has praised Theaetetus, so they must look into that as well. Socrates begins by asking Theaetetus if he was learning geometry from Theodorus. Theaetetus replies that this is indeed so and adds that he is also being tutored in astronomy and arithmetic.

Socrates then confesses that he has some difficulty grasping a few things. For example, he notes that it is said that to learn is to become wiser about the things one is learning and that what makes people wise is wisdom. Therefore, he asks whether wisdom is the same thing as knowledge. To this remark, Theaetetus replies in the affirmative. Socrates now counters that he has difficulty in understanding what knowledge is, and asks whether anyone can explain that to him in a few words. Theaetetus tries to explain that what Theodorus teaches is knowledge such as geometry and all the other subjects. He adds that there are crafts such as cobbling that are also knowledge. Socrates tells him that he had asked for a simple explanation but that all that he received was a variety of examples. Theaetetus responds that he is unable to follow Socrates’ logic. Socrates tries to explain by asking whether talk about cobbling means just the knowledge of shoe making. Theaetetus replies that that is all he means. Socrates asks whether talking about carpentry, means the knowledge of making furniture. Once again Theaetetus says yes. Socrates then states that in both these examples Theaetetus was putting into his definition that which the knowledge encompasses. Theaetetus agrees with this proposition. Then, Socrates tells him that he had asked for something different. He explains that he did not ask what a person can have knowledge of; but he wants to know what knowledge itself is. Theaetetus says that he understands, prompting Socrates to give another example. He points out that if he had asked what clay is, and Theaetetus had answered the clay of potters, and the clay of brick makers, and the clay of the stove makers, those responses would be absurd. Theaetetus hesitantly agrees with this conclusion by Socrates. Socrates then emphasizes his response, saying that the person would not understand anything when he does not know what that thing (in this case, clay) is. Therefore, listing all the users of clay does not help in understanding what clay is. Thus, it follows that a man who does not understand what knowledge is will not understand the knowledge of shoes either. Furthermore, a man who does not understand what knowledge is will not understand what cobbling, or indeed any other craft, is. Socrates further emphasizes that when the question at hand is what knowledge is, to reply by naming one of the crafts is absurd. Such an answer points out something about what the knowledge might encompass, but does not answer the question of what knowledge is. Socrates adds that the best way to answer a query about the nature of clay is to say that it is a mixture of earth with liquid and point out whose clay it is.

Socrates persuades Theaetetus to try to come up with an answer to the question of what knowledge is. Socrates likens himself to a midwife. As a midwife delivers babies, he is helping Theaetetus deliver answers. After much persuasion, Theaetetus comes up with an answer. A man who knows something perceives what he knows which defines knowledge simply as perception. Socrates is pleased with this reply as a frank answer, and therefore suggests that they must continue to discuss it. Socrates then points out that the sophist Protagoras also believed this definition by repeating Protagoras’ famous quote. “Man is the measure of all things, of the things which are, that they are, and the things which are not, that they are not.” This saying means that things that appear to me are true for me and things that appear to you are true for you. Theaetetus agrees with this explanation. Socrates adds that Protagoras, who is now dead, cannot defend himself, but having been a wise man, he was unlikely to have talked nonsense. Therefore, the statement requires further discussion. Socrates starts by giving an example of blowing wind. One person will feel cold but another will not. Thus, the same blowing wind appears to have a different effect to each individual. He explains that appears means as perceived by each of us and perception should be unerring, as befits knowledge. However, in this case each person has perceived the same thing differently. Socrates suggests that perhaps Protagoras put his statement out as a riddle for the common folk, but revealed the meaning in his book entitled Truth, in which he claimed that nothing in itself is just one thing. For example, calling a thing large overlooks the fact that it will be small in comparison to something larger. Likewise, something that might be judged heavy may be light in comparison to a yet heavier thing. Nothing is only one of anything or one of any kind of thing. Therefore, it comes down to this: When a person says that things “are,” they are consequently in a process of coming to be as a result of change. Socrates adds that this theory shows that being and becoming are products of motion, while not being and passing away originate from a state of rest. He goes on to say that heat is fire, and heat is generated by movement such as friction. Movement and motion generate everything. For example resting degenerates the body, whereas, in contrast, constant motion strengthens the body. This same difference applies with the condition of the soul. Learning and studying are motions; therefore the soul gains knowledge and thrives. In the state of rest, when the soul is not learning anything, a person not only fails to acquire knowledge but also forgets what he has previously learned. Thus, one can conclude that motion is beneficial for both body and soul. Socrates adds that what is perceived and its’ perception are similar. He concludes that perhaps the words “to be” ought to be abolished because there is continuous motion. This constant flux means that nothing can be said to be, but rather that everything is “coming to be.” Socrates once again wants to consider whether knowledge and perception are the same or different. He asks, whether a man who has learned something can be capable of not knowing it when recollecting it. Theaetetus says that this cannot happen. Socrates points out that seeing is perceiving and that sight is perception. Therefore a man who has seen something has come to know what he has seen. However, there is also something called “memory” to consider. So once something has been seen, it can be recalled at any time. It can be recalled even with the eyes shut. This situation, then, is different from what was discussed previously. A man who sees something has acquired knowledge of what he sees. Therefore, sight perception and knowledge are the same thing. Once a man has acquired knowledge of the object seen, he can remember it with his eyes shut. To say that he does not see it is to say that he does not know it, so if he sees, he knows. Socrates says that what all this means is that a man who has come to know and remember something, knows it even though he does not see it. This knowing is impossible when knowledge and perception are taken to be the same thing. Hence, it turns out that knowledge is one thing and perception is another.

Socrates now poses another riddle. Is it possible for a man to know something and not to know this thing which he knows? Theaetetus replies that such a contradiction is impossible. Socrates asks what justification is there for saying that: “seeing is knowing.” In this fashion, Socrates scores several debating points over Theaetetus, who equated perception with knowledge. Socrates argues that the mind makes use of a range of concepts that it could not have acquired by observation and that do not operate through the senses. Hence, there is a part of knowledge that has nothing to do with perception. Thus, knowledge is not perception.

Socrates notes again that Protagoras is dead and can not defend his statement that “man is the measure of all things.” Instead, he will try to defend the statement and offers a long monologue to this end. He adds that instead of him tormenting the young Theaetetus, perhaps Theodorus should join him in the question-and-answer debate. Theodorus agrees to this proposal and he and Socrates further discuss Protagoras’ statement. Socrates starts by stating that, according to Protagoras, things are for every man what they appear to be to himself. Theodorus agrees with this supposition. Socrates then points out that this insight means that all men express judgments of mankind. Socrates continues pointing out that all men agree that in some matters they are wiser than others, but that in other matters other men are wiser than they. This conclusion is more so in emergencies and in difficult situations when people look to other men as well as to The Gods for help. This activity takes place because the men who are called upon to solve the difficulty are superior in one thing that is knowledge of the situation. This conclusion, then, equates to the notion that men believe in the existence of both wisdom and ignorance amongst themselves. They believe that wisdom is true thinking, and that ignorance leads to false judgment. Theodorus also agrees with this conclusion. Socrates then asks what should be made of Protagoras’ argument. Can it be said that on every occasion all men correctly judge what is true? Or do they sometimes judge truly and sometimes not? If the latter is true, then human judgment is both true and false. Would anyone from Protagoras’ school be prepared to say that no one ever thinks that his neighbor is ignorant or judges falsely? Theodorus agrees that such a statement is unlikely. Socrates proposes that Theodorus come to a decision in his own mind and express his own judgment about it. Socrates continues, saying to Theodorus: “as per Protagoras, your judgment is true for you, but what about others who may disagree?” It is inevitable that people have to accept that Theodorus’ judgment is always true? What about all the others who think the opposite? Socrates continues, stating that in such a situation, Theodorus would want everyone to accept his judgment as true, even though thousands may disagree with it. Socrates adds that Protagoras admits to a contrary opinion when he says that all men judge what is. Thus, by admitting to a contrary opinion, Protagoras has admitted to the falsity of his own opinion. In the end, even Protagoras would have to admit that no man is the measure of anything. Therefore, this so called truth of Protagoras is not true for anyone, including Protagoras himself. The conclusion is then that some men are wiser than their fellows and that some other men are more ignorant. Socrates once again takes up Theaetetus’ explanation that perception is knowledge and asks him how a man sees colors or hears sounds. One could answer with that of course seeing is done with eyes and hearing is done with ears. Socrates asks whether a more precise wording would be by the use of words which would explain that people see through their eyes and similarly hear through the ears rather than with the eyes and ears. Theaetetus answers that “through” would be a more precise word here. Socrates concurs, pointing out that otherwise it would seem that people have a number of perceptions inside of themselves and that there is not one single form through which all of them converge, call it soul, or whatever. Socrates argues that knowledge is found not in the expression of things but in the process of reasoning about things. Therefore, knowledge and perception can not be the same. Socrates reminds Theaetetus that they did not start the discussion to find out the negative, what knowledge is not, but rather to determine what it is.

Socrates says it may be necessary to look for knowledge in what we have called activity of the soul. Theaetetus replies that such an insight might be theirs’ and others’ own judgment. To this explanation, Socrates says that if such were the case they would have to start the inquiry all over again. Theaetetus tries to clarify his statement that it is not possible to say judgment in general, as there is both true and false judgment, but knowledge is true judgment. Socrates says that he has some difficulty with the experience of judging that is false. Socrates claims that false judgment can occur. One man judges falsely, while another judges truly. One either knows something or does not know it. When a man judges, he does so about something that he knows or something that he does not know. When a man judges falsely is he thinking that what he knows is not these things but other things, or is he ignorant of both? A man can not think that things he knows are things he does not know. So how can false judgment be possible? If everything is either something we know or do not know, false judgment is impossible.

At this point Socrates suggests that they take up a different line of inquiry. Instead of knowing and not knowing, he proposes that perhaps they should move to being and not being. Theaetetus asks for further clarification of this distinction. Socrates says that when a man judges things that are not there, then he is judging falsely. As an example, a man sees something, yet sees nothing. Theaetetus questions the meaning of that statement. Socrates answers that a man who is seeing anything is seeing something that is. Theaetetus agrees. Socrates goes through similar examples of hearing, touching, etcetera and concludes that a man who is judging one thing is judging something that is, therefore, he is not judging nothing. However, a man who is judging nothing is not judging anything at all. Therefore, it is not possible to judge what is not, either about a thing that is or is just by itself. Hence, false judgment is something different from judging things that are not. Socrates adds that there is false judgment when, in place of one of the things that is, the person substitutes his thoughts with another thing that is, and then asserts that substitution by his own thoughts is correct. In this way that man is always judging something that is, but really he is judging one thing in place of the other. Hence, having missed the thing that was the object of his observation he can be seen to be one who judges falsely. Theaetetus verbalizes Socrates’ argument that when a man judges “ugly” instead of “beautiful” or the other way around, he is truly judging what is false. Socrates asks if he approves the suggestion that false judgment is “other judging” and asks if it is possible to have in one’s thoughts the other thing and not the thing itself. Theaetetus answers positively, so Socrates asks whether a man should be thinking of one or of both of these things? Theaetetus replies that it is essential to consider either both things together or each in turn. Socrates asks Theaetetus if he agrees that his idea of what thinking is, is the same as his own? Theaetetus requests some clarity here. Socrates says that he believes that when a soul thinks, it asks itself questions and then answers them. This question-and-answer affirms a desire, and that is called judgment. Thus, to judge is to make a statement that is addressed to oneself. When a man judge’s one thing to be another, he is telling himself that one thing is the other. Socrates asks Theaetetus if he has ever tried to persuade himself that one thing is another thing: something like “a cow must be a horse.” Theaetetus replies in the negative. No one judges ugly to be beautiful, when someone has both things in his mind as he judges. He cannot possibly say that one is the other. Socrates says that he realizes that false judgment occurs, not in relation to a perception or thought of one thing in relation to another, but in the connecting of perception and thought. Socrates suggests that false judgment is other than misapplication of thought to perception, but that, too, is a problem. At this stage of their discussion, there is either no such thing as false judgment or a man may not know what he knows. Socrates notes that this conclusion shows that those who do not know what knowledge is, should not make pronouncements about what knowing is.

Socrates offers further examples. How can people say: “we are acquainted with” or “we are not acquainted with,” “we know,” or “we do not know,” if they are still ignorant of what knowledge is? When people say that they know something, it means that they have the knowledge of it. Socrates says that he would like to change this declaration to: “possession of knowledge.” Theaetetus questions how these two statements are different? Socrates explains that to possess is not the same as to have. He adduces the example of a man who buys a coat but is not wearing it. In that case it can be said that he possesses the coat but does not have it with him at that time. The same concept applies to knowledge. To possess knowledge is one thing, but to have knowledge is another thing. It is impossible for anyone not to possess something that he has possession of. In the same manner he cannot not fail to know something that he knows. Nonetheless, he can still make a false judgment about that knowledge because he may not have the proper knowledge of it. Socrates concludes that it is therefore impossible for a person not to know what he knows, the same way that it is impossible not to possess what one possesses. Therefore, false judgment is merely a matter of interchange of pieces of knowledge. Socrates gives another example. Suppose a jury has been persuaded on some matter that only an eye witness could have known. Then the jury comes to a decision on hearsay evidence, forming a true judgment. Albeit that the jury has decided without knowledge even though they were persuaded to come to a correct decision and did their job well. However, if true judgment is the same as knowledge, then the jury could not claim to have done well. Even the best juryman cannot form a correct judgment without knowledge. So Socrates concludes that true judgment and knowledge must be different. Once again the discussants are left at an impasse.

Theaetetus says that he once heard someone say that knowledge is true judgment with an account, while judgment without an account is not knowledge. Socrates replies that the problem is how to distinguish between the knowable and the unknowable. He begins to describe a dream he had. In his dream he heard that the primary elements from which everything in the world is composed have no account. It is not possible to say anything else about these elements except their names but, when things are composed of primary elements they become complexes of names. Therefore the elements are unaccountable and unknowable, but they are perceived just the same. However, the complexes are both knowable and expressible and therefore can be objects of true judgment. Theaetetus agrees that this distinction was just what he had heard. Socrates now asks Theaetetus if he agrees with the statement that knowledge is true judgment with an account. To this question Theaetetus replies in the affirmative. Socrates responds that he is surprised that they have found an answer to what wise men have been seeking for years and adds that there is one point with which he does not agree. It is that the elements are unknowable but the complexes are knowable. He continues, pointing out that when these statements were made, they were used as models, letters, elements language and syllables i.e., complexes. Socrates and Theaetetus then decide to examine this point. First, Socrates confirms that they have agreed that they can give an account of the syllables but not the letters, Theaetetus concurs. Next, Socrates asks what the first syllable of his name is. Theaetetus replies SO. Socrates asks what SO is? Theaetetus replies S and O. So that is an account of a syllable. Socrates then asks for an account of the letter S. Theaetetus replies that such an account is not possible, as it is merely a letter and hence unaccountable. Socrates says that they have proved the point that a syllable is knowable but not a letter. Now Socrates asks what people mean when they speak of a syllable. If a person knows the first two letters of his name then he must know both of the letters. The person can not be ignorant of each letter and yet know the two of them without knowing either. This restriction then proves that their initial theory was wrong. Socrates suggests an alternative condition. He proposes that a complex be considered as a single form resulting from a combination of several elements or things. Thus a complex cannot have parts, otherwise the whole thing will be different from the sum of its parts. Socrates comes up with another example, this time the number six. Five plus one, two plus four, two times three, they all equal six. Then he asks whether speaking of six means speaking of it as a sum of all these numbers. In that case there is no difference between a sum and part of a whole number. This means that the result of their initial discussion concerning letters and syllables was wrong. The two of them conclude that anyone who says that something that is a complex and that can be known and expressed, but has unknown elements is therefore wrong. Socrates now wants to go back to the original question as to what the addition of an account to true judgment means? He suggests that there are three possibilities for what is meant by account. The first would be expressing someone’s thoughts. Here, a man expresses the image of his judgment. Theaetetus agrees, but then Socrates says that anyone who makes a correct judgment will turn out to have combined it together with its account. Hence, correct judgment without knowledge will not be found anywhere. The second possibility is that an account means that a man has knowledge of a thing when he believes that same thing to be part of one thing or part of something else, or when he judges that one thing or some thing different that belongs to the same object. Socrates gives the example, that when a student is learning to write and is asked to spell Theaetetus’ name, the student thinks and then begins to write THE. When asked to write Theodorus’ name, he thinks and then starts with TE. If this is the case, Socrates asks, can it be said that the student knows the first syllable of Theaetetus’ name? Theaetetus answers that anyone at that age does not have the knowledge of spelling the name correctly. So this young person is writing with correct judgment but without knowledge. Hence, the person is writing while possessing an account along with correct judgment. This dichotomy is an instance of correct judgment with an account that cannot be called knowledge. Such a conclusion brings Socrates to his third possibility. A person could be able to mark an object with the characteristic by which it differs from all other similar objects. Theaetetus asks for an example of this condition. Socrates offers the sun as such an example, and asks whether Theaetetus would be satisfied if he were to say it is the brightest body that moves about the earth and the heavens. The point is that, if someone can get at a difference that distinguishes a thing from everything else, then that contrast provides an account of that thing. Socrates gives another example of someone looking at a shadow painting. Anyone close up to the painting cannot take it all in with a single view, but if the observer stands back, the picture will appear to have some meaning. Putting it another way, Socrates proffers the theoretical situation in which he forms a correct judgment about Theaetetus if he can also grasp Theaetetus’ account, then he can say that he knows Theaetetus. If he cannot understand Theaetetus’ account, then he is merely judging a young man. An account is a matter of showing differences. So Socrates would have to know some features that belong to Theaetetus only, such as the shape of his nose. For someone to say that it is Theaetetus who is before him, he must know these definite features about him to make such judgment. Thus, correct judgment is also concerned with differences in what the judgment is about. This type of reasoning goes round in circles because the answer to the question of “what knowledge is” is “correct judgment accompanied by knowledge of differences.”

Socrates says that, in the final analysis, knowledge is not perception, nor is it true judgment, nor an account added to judgment. What knowledge is remains an unresolved question. Socrates advises Theaetetus that he will be a better person as a result of this inquiry, but he must be modest and not think that he knows what he does not know. Socrates admits that he does not know any of the things that other men claim to know. In utter frustration Socrates concludes that all they have produced is “wind-eggs.” After this discussion he takes leave of Theaetetus to go to court to hear the indictment that Meletus has brought against him.

7 Sophist

Overview: The question raised in this Dialogue is: “What does the title of Sophist imply?” The word sophist is derived from Sophia, which means wise in Greek. Therefore, a sophist is one who teaches wisdom. This is one of the few Dialogues where Socrates does not play a major role. Socrates is present at the start when the dialogue is arranged between a man known as the Visitor from Elea, and Theaetetus. Elea is a Greek city in Southern Italy that is the stronghold of the sophist Parmenides and the logician Zeno. It would appear that by not giving Socrates a major role – Plato’s spokesman in other dialogues – Plato is down-playing the sophist Parmenides who claims to teach virtue. Plato consistently maintains that virtue cannot be taught; it is learned by experience. Though the sophists claim the high ground of teaching virtue, all they are doing is teaching how to debate. A sophist is a juggler of words and a very good imitator of someone who claims to be all-knowing. He may be an expert in one thing, but he claims to be an expert in everything. He projects cleverness but he is a cheat and knows how to flatter his rich young students with a play of words; his only goal is collecting fees.

Theodorus, Socrates, and Theaetetus meet together as previously planned. Theodorus informs them that he has brought along a visitor from Elea, a Greek city in Southern Italy. This man is a member of a group of philosophers that gathers around the great sophist Parmenides and the logician Zeno. Socrates inquires what title the Visitor uses, for example Sophist, Statesman or Philosopher. Theodorus replies with a question as to what makes him ask this question. Socrates replies that he wonders whether the Visitor thought that all these titles were considered to be the same or different? Theodorus suggests that perhaps the Visitor can answer that question himself. The Visitor replies that he would be glad to explain. Socrates asks if he would like to explain with a long speech or use the question-and-answer format as Parmenides does. The Visitor selects the latter. Socrates suggests that Theaetetus will be able to answer the questions and thus it is settled with the two of them, namely the Visitor and Theaetetus, holding the discussion. They first plan to obtain a clear account of what a Sophist is. The Visitor adds that it is not easy to describe what a Sophist is. Instead, he would like to start with a simple example and then advance further. Both agree to this mode of examination. The Visitor suggests that they start with a simple subject, such as an angler. The Visitor divides every answer into two parts. He asks whether they should call the angler an expert or a non-expert. Theaetetus says that he is obviously not a non-expert. The Visitor replies that expertise also falls into two categories. One kind would be an expertise in producing things such as farming and construction, while the other type relates to learning while not creating anything, such as commerce or hunting. The former takes things that have come into being, which is known as acquisition. So possession is either through production or acquisition. Therefore, he asks, which mode the angler employs. Theaetetus replies acquisition. The Visitor replies there are two types of expertise in acquisition. One type is a willing exchange through gift or purchase, while the other will be acquired by actions or words. The Visitor further divides possession into two categories; one done openly as by combat, the other done secretly as by hunting. He further divides hunting into two parts, hunting living things or lifeless things. Thus, the Visitor divides all the answers into two, constructing and deconstructing.

The Visitor suggests that they use this model to understand what makes a sophist. He asks whether the sophist is an expert. Theaetetus asserts that as the name sophist suggests being wise, it implies some type of expertise. So both the angler and the sophist have knowledge. The Visitor suggests that both the sophist and the angler appear to be hunters. After multiple such deductions, the Visitor claims that the sophist will be classified as a wage-earner. He is agreeable to people and earns wages by what could be called flattery. When this kind of wage earning teaches virtue to people, the teacher could be called a sophist: a person who deals with knowledge, its acquisition, and sale. A sophist has expertise in debating and appears in many different forms. Examples include a hunter hired by a group of rich young men, a wholesaler and a retailer of learning about the soul, a seller of his own learning, and an expert in verbal combat called debating. The sophist cleanses souls of beliefs that interfere with learning. No one can know everything, but sophists know about things that they dispute. To their students they appear to be wise about everything, without actually being wise. So the sophist has belief and knowledge about everything but does not possess truth. Thus, he must be regarded as a cheat and an imitator.

The Visitor continues, saying that a sophist is deceptive about appearances and so is an expert at deception. He is an expert at cheating and telling falsehoods. The sophist can make young people believe that they are wiser than everyone else. The sophist says this because if they did not look wise, then no one would be willing to pay to listen to their wisdom. If a person is expert in only one thing, but promises to make everything clear, then he is trying to fool everyone. Thus, he is one of those people who play games. He is a cheat and an imitator. At this point the Visitor divides the sophist’s actions into two parts, likeness-making and appearance-making, a difficult distinction. Examples of this distinction include appearing and seeming but not being, saying things but not true things, and uttering these things without being caught up in verbal combat. The Visitor then asks Theaetetus how a person would employ the words: “that which is not.” Theaetetus finds the question confusing. The Visitor replies that it is obvious that: “that which is not” cannot be applied to that: “which is”. He further says that this terminology cannot be applied to “that which” and thus it will not be right to apply it to: “something.” This “something” is always applied to a being, so a person saying something must be saying the same one thing. Someone who does not say something is not saying anything at all. Such a person speaks but says nothing. The Visitor then goes into a long exposition delving into the concepts of: “that which is not and those which are and also of being and not being”.

In the end, all those present conclude that a sophist only imitates the production of contrary speech. He is insincere and unknowing. He is a juggler of words. He is human and not divine, earning a living by clever debating.

8 Statesman

Overview: This dialogue follows the one called Sophist. The whole dialogue, if it can be called a dialogue, is dominated by the Visitor from Elea. As in the Sophist Dialogue the Visitor remains unnamed. In those times, Parmenides was the principle sophist in the City of Elea and it appears that Plato did not always agree with him. The interlocutor, called young Socrates, is very much like the student Theaetetus in the Sophist dialogue. He always agrees with the visitor and never once asks an intelligent question.

A statesman is a person who, by virtue of his knowledge, governs the City-State. Statesmanship requires knowledge to govern wisely, but none of the three modes of government prevalent at that time namely: kingship, aristocracy, or democracy, brings out the true statesman. None of the city rulers of Greece at that time possessed that quality. The best that citizens could hope for was a government based on a set of written rules, e.g., a constitution. When such rules are disregarded, as they often were in those times, then the government becomes a tyranny.

The discussants in this dialogue start with the original intention of finding out what specific knowledge a sophist, statesman or philosopher has. It is interesting that Plato never wrote the third dialogue about what defines a philosopher and so the question remains open, why he did not do so? It may be that he left it as a challenge for the reader to decide what qualities are required to be a philosopher.

Socrates, Theodorus and the visitor from Elea meet again to continue their discussion of what is implied by the titles Sophist, Statesman, and Philosopher. Along with them are young Theaetetus and the young Socrates, a namesake of the elder. Having completed their discussion regarding sophists, they consider what they should discuss next. They leave the choice to the Visitor, who chooses to discuss the statesman. The Visitor suggests that they should let Theaetetus rest this time and have young Socrates answer the questions. Everyone in the group agrees.

The Visitor begins by asking if they should consider the statesman to be someone possessing knowledge or whether they should start with a different assumption. Young Socrates proposes that considering a statesman as someone possessing knowledge is a good starting place for their discussion. The Visitor suggests that they should consider different sorts of knowledge as they had done when discussing the sophist.

The Visitor starts by claiming that arithmetic is a type of expert knowledge. It does not involve practical action but only provides knowledge. Skills such as carpentry involve an expert knowledge, but they also require a practical knowledge in the creation of objects. Based on this condition, the Visitor suggests that they divide knowledge into two classes, theoretical knowledge and practical knowledge. Young Socrates agrees that these two divisions are parts of the single concept of knowledge. The Visitor asks if it is appropriate to say that the statesman and the king on the one hand and the slave-master and the household manager on the other are also one thing. Young Socrates questions why the Visitor makes this division. The Visitor asks that if a person who is in private practice advises a doctor who is in public employment, should both be called by the same professional title? Young Socrates believes that this would be proper. The Visitor proceeds to ask that if this is so, then someone who is himself a private citizen, but is clever enough to advise the king, (although the king should have had that knowledge by virtue of his position), then is that person who passes that knowledge, whether private citizen or king, an expert on kingship? Once again young Socrates concurs. The Visitor then adds that, similarly, the household manager and the slave-master are the same thing. Likewise, there should be no difference between the ruler of a large household and the ruler of a city. Once again young Socrates agrees. The Visitor then summarizes that there is only one sort of expert knowledge, whether it is knowledge of kingship, or of statesmanship, or of household management.

For the king to maintain power, does not require the use of his hands or body, only the use of his mental powers. A king’s powers, thus, are more aligned with theoretical knowledge than with practical knowledge. The statesman, too, will fall into the same category, namely as a possessor of theoretical knowledge. The Visitor now wants to discuss what theoretical knowledge is. He reminds his listeners that they have already agreed that there is such a thing as calculations, to which young Socrates also agrees. The visitor then adds that such calculations would be part of a theoretical type of expertise. Once one recognizes the differences among the various numbers, there is not much left to do with or discuss about them. Master builders do not function as workers but rather they manage other workers. A master builder provides the understanding but not the labor, and therefore possesses theoretical knowledge. The Visitor categorizes two types of knowledge, one that makes judgments and one that serves to direct others in their activities. The Visitor asks whether kingship would fall in the category of making judgments or in that of directing others. Young Socrates chooses the later. Now the Visitor wants to examine the concept of directing others, which he further divides into two categories. He gives as an example, a retail dealer who sells goods manufactured by others and a dealer who sells self-produced goods. A king, he claims falls into the class of those who sell self-produced goods.

The Visitor continues, giving several examples that divide all new answers into two subdivisions. He also wants to consider the two aspects of a person who cares for humans, whether doing so is enforced or voluntary. If such service is enforced, it would be the result of tyranny, while if it is voluntary it would more likely be the result of statesmanship. The Visitor notes, and young Socrates agrees, that it is a universal experience that not recognizing something makes it appear to be strange. The greatest magician of all, the sophist, who plays with words, is the most versed in this art.

The Visitor says that monarchy is one variety of knowledge that rules the cities. Young Socrates agrees. They then discuss a variety of governmental knowledge that arises in situation in which power is held by a few wealthy people. This type of governance is an aristocracy. Finally a third type of knowledge, the exercise of power by the masses via a ballot, called democracy. Monarchy may be tyrannical or benevolent. Power which is held by a small group of wealthy men may be an aristocracy or an oligarchy. Democracy managed by the masses may be by force or general consent. These are the three modes of ruling. As was discussed previously, kingly rule is based on some sort of expert knowledge and not on power, wealth or general consent. The Visitor asserts that no large collection of people is capable of acquiring any sort of expert knowledge. Thus, he notes, if some sort of kingly expert knowledge does exist, then for example a collection of people such as the wealthy, or all of the common people acting together, can acquire expert knowledge or statesmanship. One man with expert knowledge, ruling alone, must never do anything contrary to the written laws. If the rich follow this principle, then the state is called an aristocracy, while if they take no notice of the law the state will be called an oligarchy. When one person rules according to the laws, he imitates a person with expert knowledge and we call him king. When that ruler does not act according to the laws he is called a tyrant. The Visitor then presents another suggestion. If everything were performed on the basis of the written laws, and not on various sorts of expert knowledge, then the person selected to enforce and follow those laws rules accordingly. If that ruler were to ignore these precepts he would commit a great mistake and injustice. The person who possesses the art of statesmanship may do many things without taking notice of the written law, based on the concept that it is better for those who are ruled to be doing what a true expert on the laws should do. Thus if such kingly expert knowledge does exist, then neither the collection of rich people nor the masses will ever acquire such knowledge. Only the one person who possesses the expert knowledge will be called king.

The Visitor asks which combination of traits will be the best for the people. He presents the three possibilities again: rule by monarchy, rule by a collection of wealthy people, or rule by a collection of the masses. The Visitor again goes through his process of dividing every thing into two classes. This discussion leads to the conclusion that the one who possesses the art of kingship, is a statesman and lives by the written laws. However, it is not easy to find such a person. In other words, it is difficult to find a statesman.

9 Parmenides

Overview: This dialogue is one of the most difficult of all Plato’s body of work to understand. It has confused and confounded philosophy pundits for centuries. Perhaps the concepts behind it are no longer an active part of the human experience. Even Aristotle, Plato’s most famous pupil, refuted Plato’s Theory of Forms.

The dialogue, Parmenides, is presented as an account of a meeting thrice removed. The initial meeting takes place at Pythodorous’ house. Here, Zeno reads his new book on Unity and Plurality in the presence of Parmenides, Socrates and a young man named Aristotle, who is not the philosopher we know. Rather, he is the one who later in life became one of the Thirty Tyrants who ruled Athens after the Peloponnesian Wars. The venerable Parmenides is sixty-five years old and Zeno, his protege, is forty years old; both are from the city of Elea. Socrates is twenty and Aristotle is younger still. The book under discussion, the “Theories of Unity and Plurality” is now lost to us. The discussion was memorized by Pythodorous, who then recited it to Antiphon, half-brother of Plato. In turn, Antiphon has memorized it and then recites it to Cephalus for the present dialogue.

In this dialogue, Parmenides rather than the usual Socrates, who is described as young and not mature enough, is Plato’s spokesman. Here, Plato describes his Theory of Forms. Zeno has argued that, if there are many things, then all of them will be both alike (similar) and unalike (different), but such a condition is an impossible contradiction. This uncertainty disappears if one separates, on the one hand the Form of sensible things, from, on the other hand, both the Forms of alike and unalike things. So the same things can be both alike and unalike by being both in the Forms of alikeness and unalikeness. Here is a brief description of Forms: A chair is a Form but there are wooden chairs, leather chairs, metal chairs, four-legged chairs, and three-legged chairs. In one sense these types of chairs are all unalike, while in a contrary sense they still are alike, as they all are chairs, objects used to sit upon. Parmenides points out that Socrates has made the distinction between Forms and Sensibles. Socrates says that he can recognize mathematical, ethical, and aesthetic Forms such as Unity, Plurality, Goodness, and Beauty. However he is unsure about the Forms of Man, Fire and Water and those of objects such as hair, mud and dirt. Socrates is brushed aside by Parmenides as being too immature to understand.

The discussion continues with several arguments put forward with regards to the concept of Forms in Unity and in Plurality. For example, existence in a single Form for, Largeness or Smallness. Such categories suggest that each Form is a thought existing in a soul. If this placement is correct, then a thought must be considered as something that is a Form. The argument changes as Forms are taken to be patterns in nature. Later, Parmenides says that Forms exist only in their relationship to each other. Socrates is unable to follow all these arguments, but Parmenides brushes him aside and blames his lack of understanding on his immaturity.

The second part of the dialogue presents Aristotle as Parmenides’ interlocutor. The two of them consider the subject, “if oneness is.” If one has no beginning, center, or end, then oneness is part of all being and vice-versa. Now, if oneness is not a separate entity then it participates in everything different from an entity. So everything is partially one.

Scholars over the years have been unable to satisfactorily characterize this dialogue. No credible understanding is available, though the topic of Forms as the theory of Unity was very dear to Plato.

Cephalus arrives in Athens from his home in Clazomanae, and meets Adeimantus and Glaucon in the marketplace. Adeimantus asks Cephalus if there is any thing he can do for him. Cephalus answers that the real reason he made the trip was to ask for a favor from him. They talk about Antiphon, who had met a friend of Zeno’s called Pythodorous. Pythodorous can recite from memory the discussion Parmenides, Zeno, Socrates, and Aristotle once had, as he had heard it many times from Pythodorous and now Antiphon can also recite it from memory. Cephalus says that he would like to hear about that discussion. Adeimantus replies that this request should not be difficult to fulfill, and they all walk to nearby Antiphon’s house. After some initial hesitation Antiphon agrees to the request.

Antiphon tells them that at the time of the discussion, Parmenides was about sixty-five years old, Zeno was about forty, and Socrates was twenty. All three gathered to hear about Zeno’s book, The Theories of Unity and Plurality. They also had the namesake of Aristotle in their company, the youngest of them all; the man, who later in life, after Athens lost the war with Sparta, became one of the Thirty Tyrants who ruled Athens. Parmenides was initially outside the room when Zeno started to read his book out loud but joined them later. After Zeno finished reading his book, Socrates asked him to repeat his first argument. Then he asked Zeno what he means when he says that things that are many must be both alike and unalike. Socrates states that such a classification is impossible because things that are unalike cannot be things that are like each other, nor can things that are alike be unalike. Socrates asks Zeno whether he had misunderstood his statements. Parmenides intervenes, observing that actually Zeno is saying the same thing that Socrates had previously said, only changing it around a little. Parmenides adds that Socrates, had said before, that all is one, and he gives an excellent proof for that proposition. Zeno says that this proof is not sufficient and gives several proofs of his own. Hence, Parmenides argues that with one thing being “oneness” and the other “not many,” they both in essence mean the same thing. Socrates then asks if there is a Form that is itself-byitself. A thing is itself-by-itself if it is separate from other things. If that is the case, then itself, means apart and on its own. In another sense itself-by-itself also means responsible for its own being, independent of other things. Thus, itself means because of itself and that there is one Form, itself-by-itself of likeness, with an opposite Form for what unalike is. Therefore, of the things called many they get a share of both alikeness and unalikeness. Socrates adds that it would not be astonishing if he says he is both one thing and many things at the same time: When I want to show that I am many, I point out that my right side is different from my left side and that I have upper and lower parts. On the other hand, when I want to show that I am one, I note that I am one of the seven of us now present in this room. This analysis shows that I am both one and many. Hence, both of you apparently mean practically the same thing, but it appears that what you have said is not understood by some of us.

Zeno claims that the book is in defense of Parmenides’ argument against those who make fun of it, as many absurdities result from the argument “if it is one”. Socrates tells Zeno that he accepts this point, but then asks if there is a Form itself-by-itself of alikeness, a Form that is apart on its own. Also another Form opposite to this, which is what unalike is. He further asks how what is called “many” can get a share of these entities. When Socrates finishes his question, Parmenides praises him for his understanding. Parmenides also distinguishes certain Forms being separate, which also separate the things that partake of them with alikeness itself being something separate. Parmenides asks him if there is a Form, itself-by-itself, of the Just, the Beautiful, the Good and other such things. Socrates replies in the affirmative. Then Parmenides asks about human beings and whether there is a separate Form for them or for all those others similar to them? He extends this question and asks whether there is a Form itself of Human Being, or of Fire, or of Water? Socrates replies that he doubts that such a Form exists or that he would talk about Form in this context in the same way.

Parmenides further asks about things that at first may seem absurd, such as hair, mud, or dust. Does Socrates doubt whether there are separate Forms for each of these? Socrates replies that he has no such doubts. He adds that these Forms are just as we see them, if it is not so, he avers that he might fall into a pit of nonsense. Parmenides responds that this interpretation is correct, but, because Socrates is still young, he will take notice of it when he is older and will consider nothing beneath his notice. Parmenides then asks Socrates whether he still believes that there are certain Forms that derive their names from having a share of alikeness, for example the Form of the Large by getting a share of Largeness, and the Beautiful Form by getting a share of Beauty? To this question Socrates replies in the affirmative. Parmenides adds that all characteristics are what they are in relation to the controlled and have their being in relation to themselves but not in relation to things that belong to us. It is by people partaking of these that they get their various names.

All those present are confounded by this discussion and ask Parmenides to go through the whole of his argument again, so as to explain his theories. After much hesitation Parmenides eventually agrees to do so. The group selects the youngest amongst them, Aristotle, to be his interlocutor.

Parmenides starts by declaring that, if an object is one, then one can not be many. Aristotle agrees with this hypothesis. Parmenides continues, saying that, if this is so, then there cannot be a part of the object nor can the object be whole, a conclusion that Aristotle questions. Parmenides then poses the query, if a part is a part of the whole, then what is a whole? He answers his own question. It would be something from which no part is missing. Therefore, in any case, the one thing would be composed of parts, both if it is whole and/or if it is composed of parts. Aristotle agrees with this definition. Parmenides then says that in both cases the one would be many rather than one. Aristotle also agrees with this definition. Parmenides adds that nonetheless, it must not be many but one. Therefore if one is to be one, then it can be neither whole nor have parts. If it does not have parts, then it cannot either have a beginning nor an end nor a middle, as these would be parts. Furthermore, a beginning and an end are limits, so as it can have neither, such an object would be unlimited. Therefore, it would be without shape, as it is neither round nor straight. This then also means that it would be nowhere.

In a similar manner Parmenides continues this line of argument over the supposition “if oneness is” for a considerable time. Parmenides attempts to sum up the argument by saying that “if oneness does not exist,” then things other than the one do exist. Others things will not be one and surely they will not be many unalike, since oneness would be present in things that are many. If none of these is one, he continues, they are all nothing, so they also cannot be many. If oneness is not present in others, they are neither many nor one. Neither are they one of many. They do not belong to any Form as they have no parts. So if oneness does not exist, none of the alike can be one or many, since without oneness it is impossible to conceive of many. Therefore, if oneness is not, otherness neither is, nor is conceived to be one or many. Hence they are neither alike nor unalike. To sum up, “if one does not exist, then nothing does.”

10 Philebus

Overview: Readers of this dialogue will find that they start in the middle of the discussion that Socrates is having with Philebus. As the reader enters, Philebus gives up his place in the ongoing discussion with Socrates to Protarchus. Later, when Socrates and Protarchus end the discussion, Protarchus remarks that they have not finished, and there are points he wants to discuss further at a later time. The modality where the thread of the dialogue is picked up in the middle is known as “in mediis rebus” or “in medias res.” The dialogue both begins and ends in the same fashion.

The subject of the discussion is how a human being can lead the best possible life that constitutes a good life. During this discussion, both Philebus and Protarchus choose the life of unbounded pleasure, whereas Socrates advocates a life of knowledge, reason, and intelligence. The three of them go on to discuss the nature of unity and plurality of both pleasures and knowledge. Socrates insists that there are different kinds of knowledge and different kinds of pleasures. They all agree that this plurality needs to be discussed, before they can discuss the nature of pleasure and of knowledge. They also discuss false pleasures and the comparison of freedom from pain as pleasure.

Finally, they agree that perhaps a combination of pleasure and knowledge might lead to the best chance for a happy life. Also included in their discussion is whether only pleasure or only knowledge would offer a second best choice for a happy life. They analyze this choice at considerable length, considering multiple possibilities. However, they are unable to come to a satisfactory conclusion. At this impasse Socrates suggests that they end the discussion. Protarchus refuses to stop, preferring that they continue to discuss a few more points that he has in mind. Thus, the dialogue for the reader ends in the middle of the discussion, that is the way it started. Perhaps Plato is leaving further conclusions up to the reader to think about and decide.

Though we know of no person by the name of Philebus in antiquity, the word Philebus in Greek means young lover. Perhaps Plato is trying to signify a life of pleasure by using this name.

In the company of a group of young men, Socrates discusses with one of them, Philebus, what constitutes a good life. In the middle of the discussion, Protarchus joins replacing Philebus. At this point Socrates sets out to inform Protarchus about the premise of their discussion. Socrates tells Protarchus that Philebus has argued that what is good for a person is to be pleased and delighted by pleasures and by whatever else goes with enjoyment. Socrates believes that knowledge, knowing, understanding, and what these traits engender are better than pleasure for both those now alive and for future generations. Protarchus agrees with Philebus and takes over further discussion of these divergent hypotheses.

Socrates comments that they will have to prove what will render life happy for all human beings. Both Philebus and Protarchus say that pleasures are what will make all humans happy, while, according to Socrates, knowledge is the key to happiness. Socrates brings up the possibility that there might be something in between pleasure and knowledge, and asks Philebus for his opinion. Philebus answers that for him pleasure always wins. Protarchus interrupts, stating that he has taken over from Philebus, and Philebus no longer has any say in the discussion. Philebus agrees and calls on the Goddess Aphrodite as the witness for his views.

Socrates says that, according to Philebus, though the Goddess is called Aphrodite her real name is Pleasure. He adds that he is always anxious about what name to use when referring to a God. He is willing to call Aphrodite by whatever name pleases her, but Pleasure is a complex title and must be considered carefully.

Socrates asks the group to consider that a debauched person gets pleasure from debauchery, while a sober minded person takes pleasure from sobriety. A fool may get pleasure from foolish opinions, whereas a wise man takes pleasure in his wisdom. He states that no sensible man can say that these different types of pleasures are alike. Protarchus agrees that pleasure can come from diverse and even opposite sources, but that such experiences are not contradictory to one another. How can pleasure from whatever source, not be simply unmitigated pleasure?

Socrates points out another anomaly. He says that a color is most like color. All colors are colors, but black is not only different from white but is opposite to white. In the same way different shapes are all very different. However, there is a type of unity of all things that are opposites. Likewise, some pleasures are contrary to other pleasures. Protarchus agrees with this interpretation, but he questions how it affects the argument in general? Socrates responds that the effect is present because all of these pleasures are called by different names. For example, all pleasant things are called good, but in some ways there are some good things that are bad. He then asks, if there is a common element that allows him to call all pleasures good? Protarchus does not accept that some pleasures are good while others are bad. Socrates tries to have him explain this statement by reiterating that some pleasures are unlike each other and some are opposites of each other. Protarchus maintains that this distinction does not apply in so far as they are all pleasures. Socrates concludes that this discussion has reached an unacceptable impasse. If he, for instance, says that wisdom, knowledge, and all similar things laid down at the beginning of the discussion are good, would not his answers have the same consequences as Protarchus’ arguments? Protarchus asks how this could be so? Socrates answers that branches of knowledge seem to be a plurality, but then some branches turn out to be opposites. Socrates notes that if he were to deny such a distinction, the whole discussion would be an absurdity. Protarchus agrees that they can not let such a contradiction occur. He also agrees that there are many different types of both pleasures and knowledge. In this fashion they hold a lengthy discussion of the knowledge of letters, numbers and music. They include a discussion of the metaphysics of unity and plurality and of sameness and opposites. Protarchus suggests that Socrates has plunged them into a considerable problem by leading them around in circles. Socrates seems to be asserting that there are different kinds of pleasures. Furthermore, Socrates has not elucidated how many or what sort of pleasures do exist and that there are, he claims, similar sets of questions about knowledge. All present would like to have Socrates complete the discussion. Socrates says that he suddenly remembers something from the past. He had a dream that neither pleasure nor knowledge leads to the good life, but that there is a third concept that is different from and superior to both. If this is so, and the three people involved in the discussion consider that pleasure is not good, then pleasure is no longer the victor. Thus they will not have to consider different kinds of pleasures. Protarchus urges them to continue this discussion. Socrates says that they must first decide whether good is perfect or imperfect and whether it is sufficient for the good life. Socrates suggests that to resolve the question, they should put “a life of pleasure” and “a life of knowledge” on trial and reach a verdict by looking at each of them separately. Protarchus is confused about how to conduct such a trial. Socrates suggests that there is either no knowledge in the life of pleasure or no pleasure in the life of knowledge. Therefore, if either one provides for a good life, nothing additional will be necessary. Both discussants agree with this conclusion.

Socrates continues by asking Protarchus if he would find it acceptable to live his whole life in enjoyment of pleasures? Protarchus replies with a definite affirmative. Socrates asks again if Protarchus would have any need for knowledge? Protarchus replies that if he has pleasure, he has all he needs. But then Socrates points out that, if he has no knowledge, memory, or reason, how can he know whether he is happy when he is devoid of all intelligence? Socrates continues in this same direction. He points out that with a lack of memory he would never remember that he had enjoyed himself or that he had pleasure. Likewise, by not possessing judgment he would not realize that he was enjoying himself. Furthermore, being unable to calculate, he would not be able to figure out future pleasures. In the end, lacking such characteristics would be like leading the life of a mollusk that lives in the sea. Finally, Socrates asks again whether such a life is worth choosing? Protarchus admits that after hearing these arguments he is left speechless. Socrates now poses a deeper question. Suppose a person chooses a life that is in possession of every kind of knowledge, reason, memory, intelligence, and all similar concepts, but is without pleasure or pain? Protarchus replies that neither of these two offered states seems to be a worthy choice. Socrates asks whether a combination of both would be preferable? Protarchus agrees that this possibility does seem to be a worthy choice. Socrates admits that this turn of events has upended their whole discussion. Protarchus agrees that of the three choices of life offered so far, two of them – namely either a life of pleasure only or a life of knowledge and reason only, are not worthy of or sufficient for man.

Thus, having decided that the first choice for a good life should go to the combination of knowledge and pleasure. They then address the matter of which of the two choices with which they started should get second place. Socrates proposes that knowledge be given this position, whereas Protarchus proposes that pleasure should be the choice. As they have failed to agree on this ordering, Socrates suggests that they should restart the discussion with a new starting point. Protarchus asks for a clarification of this suggestion. Socrates responds that everything that exists can be divided into two categories: limited and unlimited. In this fashion, Socrates continues the divisions and subdivisions, but after considerable effort he fails to reach any agreement with Protarchus.

Socrates then suggests yet another approach. He states that they did agree that a life that combines knowledge with pleasure is to be preferred. Therefore they should look to see what life is. Protarchus agrees with this notion that the choice of life be assigned to a third category, the other two categories being life of pleasure and life of knowledge. He points out that life is just not a mixture of pleasure and knowledge, but also includes the idea that all that is unlimited is also tied down by limits.

Socrates asks, whether pleasure and pain have limits? Philebus replies that pleasure has no limit, it is so good that by nature it is boundless. Socrates continues this line of questioning by asking in which category the qualities of knowledge, reason and intelligence should be? Socrates and Protarchus agree that neither reason nor pleasure has beginning, middle, or end.

The discussion continues and turns to what causes pain and how the relief of pain leads to pleasure. Socrates says that it seems that pleasure and pain arise together. He observes that by continuing this discussion, they would end up with three types of life, namely a life of pleasure, a life of pain, and a neutral life. However, to be free of pain would not be the same as to have pleasure. Socrates asks, what happens if someone says that the most pleasant thing of all is to live life without pain? Protarchus replies that such a person would experience pleasure from the absence of pain. Socrates objects, saying that this approach creates a false conclusion that pleasure is freedom from pain. Both pleasure and pain, each have a nature of their own. Socrates next poses the question of what they should decide, as people with a reputation in natural science say that everything called pleasure is freedom from pain? Socrates thinks that this point of view rests upon a hatred of the power of pleasure, which he would now like to discuss. Protarchus agrees with this observation. They then discuss the force and intensity of pleasure. Protarchus says that moderate people follow the maxim, “nothing in excess and the foolish give into debauchery.” Socrates replies that if that is the case, then it is a certain state of soul and body and not nature that is the source of pleasure and pain. They then decide to look into the characteristics of pleasure and pain, and to continue their discussion. They talk about lamentations and longings when pleasure is mixed with pain.

Socrates suggests that they should similarly discuss knowledge, as there are differences amongst different kinds of knowledge just as there are differences amongst different kinds of pleasures. Protarchus says that while discussing knowledge, he has heard Gorgias insist that the art of persuasion is superior to all other arts. This outcome is because a persuasive argument enslaves others with their own consent. This outcome is not accomplished by force, and is therefore the best of all arts. Socrates cautions this conclusion b pointing out that their job is not to find which art is the greatest but the knowledge of which art aims best for clarity.

Socrates tries to sum up the discussion. According to Philebus, he notes, pleasure is the best goal for all living beings and at the same time it is good for all things. So good and pleasant are really the same thing. Socrates continues saying that he believes that good and pleasure have different natures, with intelligence having a greater share in good than in pleasure. Protarchus disagrees with Socrates about this belief. Socrates adds that they should not seek the good in an unexamined life, but rather in a life that includes the consideration of numerous facets. He then queries whether mixing every kind of pleasure with every kind of intelligence would lead to an amalgam that would be as good as it can be? Protarchus answers with an ambiguous: “Maybe.” They then discuss, at length, the admixture of the two viewpoints. Socrates says that any type of mixture that does not explain the proportions of each viewpoint would just be an unconnected medley. Protarchus agrees and they discuss various proportions in the admixture.

Socrates repeats that he maintains that reason is far superior to pleasure and is more beneficial to human life. However, he agrees that both reason and pleasure have lost any claim to being good in and of themselves as each lacks self-sufficiency and perfection. At this point, Socrates asks whether they should now end the discussion? Protarchus claims that something still is missing and that their discussion is not over. He promises to remind them later of what is left to discuss.

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