Children's Rights and the Philosophy of Childhood: A Generational Dialogue

Imprint

A GENERATIONAL DIALOGUE

Preface and Acknowledgements

Introduction

The dialogue philosophic Approach

Children’s Rights: Between permanence and change

The mediation and enforcement of children's rights

I & You, static and dynamic childhood development

Questions and Answers at a Glance

Literature

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CHILDREN’S RIGHTS AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF CHILDHOOD

A GENERATIONAL DIALOGUE

Statics and dynamics of humankind

‘I’ and ‘You’ are children of nature and cosmos, for the believers God’s children (Joh 1, 12; LUT)!

Preface and Acknowledgements

The present study was developed as part of a project at a German university and deals with the following the framework topic: Generations – Between Consistency and Change. My focusses centered on the first and second generation of being human , children and adults, and adults as parents. In my attempts to develop a basic scientific discipline, I discovered that there were many disciplines available here. The foundation of my analysis became the philosophy and integration of basic human knowledge of other disciplines of science, such as psychology, sociology, education, and law. In philosophy, I stumbled across a variety of sub-disciplines and I finally chose the childhood philosophy, a young research direction primarily in the American cultural space. In the German-speaking world, the term “child ethics” is commonly used, which refers to the moral behavior of mankind, and is therefore restricted to the general concept of philosophy which was limiting. Even the term “philosophy” in one of its possible definitions refers to the “love of wisdom” and gave me the direction for the following questions: What is love, what is wisdom? and what connects it to childhood in human existence? The framework topic in the project pointed me to a solid relationship, verbal and non-verbal, of generations, and their agility “between permanence and change,” for which dialogue is imperative. The anchor for this was offered to me by the philosophy of dialogue, a predominantly religious-philosophical subdiscipline that differentiates two people, as well as nature and the cosmos. This involves a twofold relationship, that of the ego (the “I”) and the thou (the “You”). It was also of general interest to consider the current legislation on children’s rights. The basic work and concerns here are the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and their application within national constitutions, which only a few countries have implemented to date. It should be noted that the Convention on the Rights of the Child, not only in the philosophical sense, does not meet all the requirements of the child. This will be dealt with more comprehensively in the upcoming study, including a religion-specific view on the example of Christianity.

This project study was restricted to a certain number of pages. The specification was based on about 40 DIN A4 pages. It was extremely challenging for me to limit the content to this page specification and it is not enough that questions arise. I have therefore attached a questionnaire with possible answers for publication. It was also important to me to publish this work as both a German-language and English-language publication, as the childhood philosophy is underrepresented research publications in the German-speaking world.

In particular, I would like to thank the lecturers of the project study for their contributions to the discussion and critics, as well as Dr. phil. Laura Marwood for her assistance in fine-tuning the English translation.

In fond memory of my most recent childhood, I dedicate this work to my beloved Mother and would like to thank the private, state and religious communities for their loyal education experts (Loyal’ here means committed to pure doctrine. This excludes abuse. That should be synonymous with the term ‘education expert’, but the use of a thing carries the risk of abuse). The ‘I’ grows on ‘you’!

Introduction

The philosophic view on children’s rights includes the whole childhood. ‘The philosophy of childhood has recently come to be recognized as an area of inquiry analogous to the philosophy of science, the philosophy of history, […]’ (Matthews/Mullin). When examining the notion of childhood, one must take the various existing theories and cultural understandings into consideration. As David Archard contends, ‘The modern conception of childhood is neither a simple nor a straightforwardly coherent one, since it is constituted by different theoretical understandings and cultural representations’ (Archard 2015 p. 53).

‘The conception is a very modern one inasmuch as literature has treated of childhood for only two hundred years, and science one hundred’ (ibid.). Human history has existed in our modern understanding for 100,000 years (Diamond p. 209), and humankind is specifically characterized by childhood and adulthood: ‘Developmental science views childhood as a stage on the road to adulthood, and the nature of the child as impelling him or her to the achievement of the adult capacities […]’ (Archard 2015 ibid.). What we understand by childhood is a permanent relationship, an interaction with adults, and vice versa. The relationship is founded on communication and a dialogue between the child and adult, a dialogue between ‘I’ and ‘You’. Philosophical anthropology serves as a theoretical basis here (Philosophic discipline, in general the anthropology, see Lorenz 2014 in Brandt 2014 p. 470). A key feature is dialogue thinking, otherwise known as the philosophy of dialogue (Definition i.e. Hügli 2013 p. 189 keyword ‘Dialogphilosophie’. All citations from Hügli are translated from the German into English by W. Boesen for the purpose of this study). According to this philosophy, all humans assume both roles. ‘I’ is the active role and ‘You’ the passive (See Lorenz 2014 in Brandt 2014 p. 487). In the ‘I-You-Relationship’ the ‘I’ meets the other that is not only ‘You’ as a human, but can be also an object or God (Defined by Martin Buber, see Gessmann 2009 p. 333 Keyword ‘Ich-Du-Verhältnis’. All citations from Gessmann are translated from the German into English by W. Boesen for the purpose of this study). The knowledge of the experience of ‘I’ and ‘You’ ‘happens in this process empirical at the transition of I-telling in earliest childhood to I-suffering in puberty’ (Lorenz 2014 p. 489, translated by the author, German text: Das Wissen um die Erfahrung des Ich und Du ‘geschieht dabei empirisch beim Übergang vom Ich-Sagen in der frühen Kindheit zum Ich-Erleiden in der Pubertät). A precondition for ‘I’ and ‘You’ is rational behavior that is ‘documented in reciprocal delimitation [...] especially with rationale competencies’ (ibid. p. 478). Hence the child needs an adult as a reliable advocate. Where reliability and obligation involve risks of failure, this must be hedged by public law and observed by legal authorities. The following discussions deal with different childhood phases in dialogue context and will attempt to shed light on the main important dialogue-philosophical legal positions in the relation of childhood and adulthood. The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child will serve as the basis for a comparison of legal positions (Commonly abbreviated to UNCRC.). Archard offers an analysis on this subject in his work with ‘Children: Rights and Childhood (‘[…] widely regarded as the first book to offer a detailed philosophical examination of children’s rights’, Archard 2015, first page after cover).’ The Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany is briefly discussed in relation to philosophic anthropology (see Lorenz, Kuno (2014) in: Brandt 2014 pp. 470 ‘Philosophische Anthropologie’…in general “Doctrine from mankind‘, p. 470 …reactive und reflexive discipline p. 471) and Dialogue Philosophy (See Hügli/Lübcke (2013): Dialog philosophy description for ‘dialogic thinking’ p. 189). A view on the 100,000 years of human history will indicate the archaic understanding of childhood. This study will finally explore the dynamic view of childhood based on the writings of late 18 th -century German philosopher, Immanuel Kant (main important German Philosopher, 1724-1804, see Gessmann p. 375)

The dialogue philosophic Approach

The dialogue philosophy (also known as ‘dialogicalism’ or ‘I-You’ philosophy) refers to the dialogue to the ‘You’ (Gessmann 2009 p. 168, Hügli 2013 p. 189). The ‘I’ is formed by ‘You’ (Gessmann ibid.). This relationship has essential importance and constitutes a fundamental experience of human life (ibid.). A human becomes a person through the ‘integration of I-role and You-role […]’ (Lorenz 2014 p. 476).

Dialogue philosophical basic concept

The word ‘dialogue’ and the personal pronouns ‘I’ and ‘You’ are the initial conditions of dialogue philosophical analyses.

The dialogue

The word ‘dialogue’ derives from the Greek and refers to a ‘communicative relationship between two persons […] to reach wisdom , […]’ among ‘persons who are aware of themselves […]’ (Hügli p. 189). Originally, dialogue describes the ‘literary art form as a representation of the Socratic dialogue Art’ (Gessmann p. 167).

A communicative relationship is more than a mere conversation. Communication means ‘doing together, taking part in something, talking’ (Hügli p. 488). It is necessary to differentiate between verbal and non-verbal communication, the first of which refers to the spoken word and writing, whilst the second form comprises non-written forms (ibid.). A dialogue always includes two or more persons. The word ‘person’ is used ambiguously (‘lat.persona, mask, character, role’, ibid. p. 681), and means ‘identification for the ‘I’, […] insofar beside consciousness […] owns a body […] has an individual history, […] develops into an own personality […]’ (ibid.). In addition to consciousness and physicality, there is relationship to a person from body and soul and the other minds (ibid. part 3). ‘Other minds’ are conscious states that belong to ‘other persons or animals’ (ibid. p. 303). ‘Person’ refers also to a collective, such as a society and state, called legal person, ‘insofar they have rights and duties’ (ibid. p. 681 part 2). Furthermore, ‘person’ can be used in an abstract sense, which is known as ‘personification’, such as the term ‘mother earth’ (Meyer/Regenbogen p. 490/491).

In strong relation with person, the term ‘personal identity’ is often used frequently (Hügli. p. 682 part 4 ‘persönlichen Identität’): ‘persons are changing, […] what does it mean if they are still the same person? What connects the adult with the child they once were before becoming an adult?’ (ibid). Does it mean in the dialogue the child acts in the person? The person is placed on an ‘immaterial substance (i.e. the soul)’ or memory despite of memory gaps or illusions (ibid.). The child has no relevance as person. Especially for very young children, the term person is clearly irrelevant, ‘[…] since typical criteria of some humans for defining a person (i.e. very small children […] are missing’ (Gessmann p. 544). The constraint only applies to very young children. Children are not generally excluded from being a person. The term ‘person’ is not fully describable and gives only an orientation that is normative in nature (ibid.). The term ‘rationality’ is also significant (ibid. p. 545). Due to typical missing characteristics describing human beings as people, it is helpful to ‘have an appropriate representative, […] for related regulation matters’ (ibid. referring Jürgen Habermas 2005, philosopher and social scientist, born 1929 Düsseldorf, see Gessmann p. 287). ‘Cultural norms that create solidarity also among strangers need to be accepted generally. We need to admit discourses to evolve such norms’ (Habermas p. 21, German text: ‚Normen des Zusammenlebens, die auch noch unter Fremden Solidarität stiften können, sind auf allgemeine Zustimmung angewiesen. Wir müssen uns auf Diskurse einlassen, um solche Normen zu entwickeln‘.).

The dialogue is personal in nature, ‘In a conversation, I will talk to another person who is addressed as You, and who also addresses me as You’ (Hügli p. 189). The conversation is also self-talk,’ […] if the individual is conforming to the attitude of the other, especially if these attitudes are shared by a whole group […]’ (Mead p. 79). In addition to personal dialogue, trans-subjective dialogue is also possible. ‘Trans-subjective’ means ‘beyond the subject (the ‘I’), also beyond consciousness, not belonging to a conscious process’ (Meyer/Regenbogen 2013 p. 671). This is a widespread view in the philosophical doctrine of personalism, which ‘considers humans […] primarily as active and evaluative persons’ (Hügli S. 683) and appreciates humans as ‘persons contrarily to a kind of potential objectification […] especially turns against any forms of reification of a human being’ (Gessmann p. 545). While personalism focuses on a person, dialogue philosophy acts on the relationship between persons, and accentuates the ‘direct character of these relationships’ (Hügli p. 684). An extension is made in theology, whereby personalism is explained with ‘a conversation between God as a person to humans insofar a human is facing each other and will be You for God’ (ibid.). God is ‘in general, an expression for a supernatural, attractive and challenging power that is either delimited or all-embracing and mostly imagined personally’ (Gessmann p. 278). The personal imagination of God is transcending personal reality and can therefore be called transpersonal. While in philosophy, the term ‘trans-subjective’ is commonly applied, the term ‘transpersonal’ is known from transpersonal psychology (Walach 2014). A main area in transpersonal psychology is ‘to explore and find those dimensions beyond self-development, also the spirituality that transcend sense and experiences like Being and Time’ (ibid.).

‘Spirituality’ means ‘intellect’ (Meyer/Regenbogen p. 623) with higher beings or something like soaring flights of intellect, and is a ‘popularized expression for the goal of searching not commonplace meaning […] also providing meditation and soft forms of religious enlightenment’ (Gessmann p. 681). The dialogue serves for achieving the truth that is the ‘description for the goal of everyone’s ambition for Knowing and knowledge and also a title for imposing a demand at least predetermined on any thesis’ (Gessmann p. 749). In general, truth is also a ‘determination of what is called truth in opposite to wrong’ (Hügli p. 935). There are numerous different descriptions of truth and truth theories (ibid. pp. 935-937, also Gessmann pp. 750-752). According to the truth theory of pragmatism, something is true ‘if it is fruitful or beneficial – be it from the point of life or science’ (Hügli p. 937). Furthermore, the consensus theory of truth expresses that something is true ‘if a potential endless big quantity of humans under ideal communications conditions will agree to a thesis’ (ibid.). This applies generally to national bodies of laws, such as constitutions. But these laws are also changeable. In summary, a dialogue is a verbal and non-verbal communicative relationship between the personal and transpersonal ‘I’ and ‘You’ with a view to reach truth.

The I

‘I’ is a personal pronoun and relates to the person using it. In a philosophic sense, the word ‘I’ is synonymous to the word ‘Self’ and has ‘no significant nuclear’ (Hügli p. 414). The ‘I’ is separate from ‘Not-I’, which is ‘a basic concept in the science teachings of Johann Gottlieb Fichte, (German philosopher 1762 – 1814 Gessmann p. 225), '[…]. In contrast to ‘I’, the world (meaning the transcendental external world of I) is built with setting of I’ (Meiner p. 454). ‘I and Not-I are terms of a consistent process, and in this process, there is a subject-object-relationship, in which both terms determine each other’ (Mead p. 53). The alternative condition is expressed on the personal base in ‘I’ and the other, the ‘You’. ‘For rational behavior, it is essential that the individual […] can also accept an impersonal position to become a counterpart as an object’ (Mead p. 266). Thereby, the other is addressed as both a subject and object. ‘It cannot act intelligently or rationally without being an object factor’ (ibid.). Other synonymous terms for ‘I’ include ‘consciousness, person, subject or mind’ (Hügli ibid.). The word ‘I’ serves to address other human beings, who possess consciousness, rationality and are understood as both a subject and mind. While subject is related to consciousness, mind is more complex and difficult to determine (Hügli p. 315, pp. 861-862 Subject).

Mind is ‘the universal principle, creating a relationship between human, God and the world. As a mind, a human goes out of the very natural being’ (ibid. p. 315). The word ‘I’ is therefore used both personally and impersonally. Cognition is needed in both ‘I’ and ‘You’. If a human cannot realize the own ‘I’, it is ‘You’ for the community. In the womb, an undeveloped being cannot recognize that ‘I’ refers to the self, and ‘You’ for mother and father, the family, the state, community, or faith. The term ‘Not-I’ is misleading, since an unborn child is already an individual. In the pre-natal phase, there are two individuals in one individual. Yet after birth, it takes time for a human to be able to recognize the own ‘I’. In psychology, the term ‘infantile amnesia’ refers to ‘the difficulty experienced by adults to recollect memories from the first two and three years of life’ (Knopf 2017). This phenomenon remains a mystery, since in long-term memory already exists in the pre-natal phase (Pinquart et al. 2011 p. 116). Potential reasons may include ‘a given underdevelopment of the brain, […] in early childhood with no relation to other brain content for a developed Self’ (ibid.). Even though the ‘I’ cannot fully recognize or is able to think rationally, it is existent in the sense of human being. ‘The ‘I’ arises from the social process itself and is not independent from this kind of experience’ (Mead p. 270). The ‘I’ can be defined as human being formed by many ‘You’. The ‘I’ of human being start with the ‘You’, I am You . As soon as I recognize myself, this sentence can be enlarged to: I am You and I am I.

The You

‘You’ is personal pronoun and identifies the other, also called ‘foreign I’ (Hügli p. 37 Andere, der, p. 198 Du). ‘You’ is a central term in dialogue philosophy and in the thinking of twentieth-century philosopher Martin Buber (Gessmann p. 179, Information on Martin Buber can be found here: http://buber.de/en/index (accessed 20.04.2018). With ‘You’, the other is not totally meant but as partner and ‘addressed in conversation’ (Hügli p. 198), as ‘recognize each other in the other’ (Lorenz 2014 p. 478). ‘You’ relates also to an impersonal view, addressed in God (Hügli p. 37). Through ‘You’ in dialogue, the ‘I’ is established. ‘You’ is also ‘I and You’. The following sentence can be build: ‘ You’ are ‘I’ and ‘You’ are ‘You’ .

The ‘I-You’-Relation

‘I’ and ‘You’ have mutual communicative relations and are interdependent. Particularly in dialogue philosophy, the ‘I-You’ relation is ‘a description for accented dependence of I self-experience from the experience of facing another as You that can be, according to M. Buber, a thing, a human or God’ (Gessmann p. 333). Alongside self-recognition, the subject of language is also pertinent: ‘the relation is existing within and through language’ (Hügli p. 190 dialogue philosophy). For the dialogue, the aim is to reach truth. While ‘I’ and ‘You’ constitute different persons, the ‘I-You’ relation can be understood in the following terms: I am You and I am I and You are I and You are You! This sentence exists for life events. In the case of death, the sentence can to be shortened to: I am You and You are You. The bereaved will remember me. The relation between ‘I’ and ‘You’ is thereby both a finite state and an infinite one. ‘ I’ and ‘You’ constitute an infinite relationship , personal and impersonal. Furthermore, the ‘You’ is not only a person, there are the bereaved and friends, for the believers also God. When one speaks of ‘You’, at least two persons are being addressed: myself and the other. The relationship signifies togetherness. And yet that isn’t all. Two beings are involved in the procreation process, man and wife. Both sexes create new life, whose composition is determined by nature, for the believers by God. According to this notion, ‘You’ therefore addresses three humans. While parents with children are connected through social community, other individuals can be addressed. At a minimum, it is a foursome, meaning plurality of persons. The question of how many ‘Yous’ are implicated is a result of the co-action between ‘I’ and ‘You’ (For an analysis of the number of Yous, see Boesen 2016 ‘Wer bin ich und wer bist du?). This notion is explained by Klaus Hurrelmann (social scientist, born 1944, focus on Youth, learning- and health research, see i.e. https://www.hertie-school.org/de/ueber-uns/profil/person/hurrelmann/ ): ‘A whole village is needed to make a child strong for life‘ (Hurrelmann p. 26). This African conventional wisdom ‘relativized the influence of parents without questioning it. This conventional wisdom makes clear the very importance […] of the responsibility for a child’s development that will be a […] collaborative one and not only a private one for father and mother’ (ibid.).

The ‘I-You’ relation is influenced through general life risk, despite the fact that the inevitability of death is mostly suppressed. Besides death, the emotional world encounters other serious losses. ‘Emotion’ can be understood to mean ‘a conscious state (or conscious act) […] in contrast to thinking (imagination, watching) […]’ (Hügli p. 313). Within the ‘I-You’ relation, the term ‘sympathy’ or ‘pity’ is used. ‘Pity’ is ‘determined as an effect, namely as distressed in view of an evil that happens to another person without actual fault and that could happen to oneself or others close to me’ (Gessmann p. 493). ‘Pity’ does not mean that I have pity for myself, but that I can feel the pity of the other (Celikates/Gosepath 2013 p. 246 in relation to Arthur . Schopenhauer, German philosopher 1788 - 1860, see Gessmann p. 651). In this regard, the term ‘sympathy’ is more fitting (ibid p. 23 emotional ethics ‘Gefühlsethik’). The ‘I-You’ relation considers the whole human view, as well as finding beside truth the sympathy.

The generation concept in ‘I-You’ relation

In dialogue philosophy, the generation concept is not known. In a philosophical context, the generation concept ‘will become a historical term for a description of common ground in a culture within a time period’ (Meyer/Regenbogen 2013 p. 250). The commonalities belong to ‘all humans simultaneously and those who were formed with same circumstances and tendencies at the time’ (ibid.). This definition is linked to the term ‘cohort’ (Alwin/McCammon 2003 p. 26).

Within the generation concept, the sociological term is often addressed, as well as the familiar and community relation. An extensive analysis of science- and culture of history from generations, see Parnes et al. 2008 ‘Das Konzept der Generationen’). There is difference between the ‘familial’ and ‘social’ generation concepts (Deindl et al. 2014 p. 300 referring to Szydlik 2000). The ‘familial’ relation belongs to the whole line of succession; i.e. in the context of grandparents to parents, the parents are the children. ‘The relation to someone – parents are always also children – is a question of perspective’ (ibid.). In this sense, the term ‘children’ needs to be précised in case of the analysis of children’s rights to the term ‘childhood’ (Archard 2015 p. 19 The concept of childhood) and means ‘first generation’. Parents called second generation related to adulthood (ibid. p. 20, ‘Childhood is normally distinguished from adulthood…’). When it comes to ‘childhood’ and ‘adulthood’, the social relation is addressed. To define a social relation, it is necessary to have a common location (birth time), a common fate (‘generation coherence’) and a common consciousness (Deindl et al. 2014 p. 300). Referring to UNCRC, the time before birth is also called childhood, in a philosophic senses the beginning of life to becoming human. In our current understanding, the childhood generation comprises a time period of approx. 20-25 years, depending on the view 30 or more (Parnes p. 23). According to the UNCRC, childhood ends when the child turns 18. Here the generation concept is not used.

‘I’ and ‘You’ concretized with the generation concept of childhood (first generation) and parenthood (second generation). Relation to ‘I’ and ‘You’ is on both sides, meaning every person or perceivable human identity. According to this theory, the child and parents always have both roles, one rather ‘active I-role and the passive You-role’ (Lorenz 2014, referring to Brandt 2014 p. 487). On the road to adulthood, several different development phases are distinguished (Archard 2015 pp. 19). ‘Roman Law at the time of Justinian specified three age-periods of childhood: infantia […], tutela impuberes […] cura minoris“ (Archard p. 38). ‘Infantia’ refers to the time when ‘children are incapable of speech‘ (ibid.). ‘Tutela impuberes’ means ‘children required a tutor‘ (ibid, time prior to puberty). ‘Cura minoris’ refers to the time after puberty, when ‘young persons had not yet reached their maturity and required the care of a guardian‘ (ibid.). Childhood was understood as the time from birth to adulthood. Every childhood phase has other characteristics. From a philosophical perspective, it is important to address the characteristics of philosophy to a childhood phase, namely the love for wisdom, and love and wisdom themselves (Philosophy (Greek.), is translated to ‘Love for wisdom’ (Gessmann p. 552). ‘There is no commonly accepted definition of word philosophy … When focusing on action, philosophy can be understood as quest for wisdom’ (Hügli S. 692)). Therefore we need to know where love and wisdom can be found in human beings.

The UNCRC includes care also with the time before birth (ibid. p. 110). Within the German Civil Code (BGB), the right of succession starts with procreation (§1923 Legal capacity to inherit BGB section 2, BGB = German Civil Code called Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch: §1923 chapter 2 (2) see https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bgb/__1923.html (Accessed 03.08.2017). The unborn child is already ‘You’ within the context of state community. From the perspective of dialogue philosophy, the ‘I’ starts with procreation. The nature, for believers of the supernatural power mostly called God, limits the earthly being with death. The point in time of death will be open. Life and death is the self-concept of nature and universe. This sense, the human has already with procreation the life risk, and death cannot be excluded by nature and God’s will. Typically, maturation until birth takes nine months. Also, directly after birth, the child cannot recognize the own ‘I’ but experiences the physical contacts like warmth, coldness and sensations such as hunger. On account of the natural sucking reflex, the baby can identity its best food source, and if its hunger cannot be satisfied, the child will cry. Nature regulates food intake in a self-determined manner. Other examples include when the child first crawls, can stand up and walk unaided. The healthy body cannot be directed in another way. The body belongs to the ‘I’. When the child begins forming memories in the infantile phase, the ‘mental I’ is recognized. The first development phase after birth can be determined until the third year of life. Following the recognition of ‘I’, many other ‘You’ will be mentally differentiated and those, who I loved most. Between the years of four and six, we experience the first sensation of love and we will fall in love with one parent, mostly the parent opposite to our own sex (Levine 2011 pp. 88-89). The now loved ‘You’ shall be mine, the ‘I’ is ‘You’. This loving phase will mostly always be forgotten (ibid.) and the ‘I’ recognizes that nobody can be possessed, and that ‘You’ is ‘You’. After this love phase, the middle childhood phase begins around the age of six to twelve, also called the pre-pubescent phase (Archard p. 38). At age six in Germany, compulsory education starts (or the right to participate in education). Around age 12, the child begins to prepare for the phase of adulthood and with rising independence. The child seeks less physical contact with its parents, and sexual maturation will be possible with another loved human. (see Morris 1978 p. 367, Behavioral researcher, zoologist, born 1928, see http://www.desmond-morris.com/ (Accessed 01.08.2017. In the dialogue philosophic sense, the following childhood phases can be observed:

The pre-natal phase (the ‘You’)

The infant and infantile amnesia, age between 0 and 3 (physical ‘I’, mental ‘You’)

The little child, first fall in love, age between 4 and 6 (‘I’ and ‘You’)

The pre-pubescent phase, age between 6 and 12

Adolescence, second fall in love, age between 12 to 17

Maturity

Besides the personal view, the transpersonal one must also be taken into account. An understanding about infiniteness of human beings emerges within the third childhood phase around the age of fourth to six (Wittkowski 2017). At the stage of first falling in love, a potential death or fear of death is discernable. The understanding for death similar to an adult will come up ‘mostly between age 9 or 10’ (ibid.). After the age of 10, there will be ‘a developing of a complex and up-to-date death concept that […] involves the possibility of a continued existence on grounds of philosophy or spirituality’ (ibid.). It will be undetermined when exactly death will occur that personally affects the individual, and death with mourning will occur later. Besides loss of a loved person, other serious losses could lead to mourning, such as loss of bodily functions, or a loss of bodily autonomy (Caused i.e. by bodily violence or sexual abuse), a loss of homeland etc. (Boesen 2016 p. 37). Despite the fact that such losses can occur in the phase of infantile amnesia and can not be remembered afterwards, they will leave their marks in the bodily ‘I’. The development phases of childhood point to particular protection. The parents have the natural authority for the child’s upbringing. They are not alone and integrated in communities. Therefore the state also has interests on an appropriate development from a child to an adult. From a state perspective, a legal framework is necessary. This requires equal legal positions for every human within a state. A state is a legal system. As Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (German philosopher 1770 – 1831) emphasized in the 19th. Century, love is […] a feeling […] within state not existing; there is needed consciousness about the unit of laws, the content must be rational, and I need to know it’ (Celikates/Gosepath p. 242 referring Hegel 1986). The children’s rights are determined by the adult world and will be found in human cooperation and written laws.

Basic rights in I-You-Relation Child - Parents

Moral and legal rights can be differentiated (Archard p. 57 ). The transition can be congruent. ‘One and the same right can be both a moral and a legal right’ (ibid.). Moral rights derive from a moral theory. Legal rights are formulated in state laws, also called positive rights (ibid.). In contrast to the term ‘positive right’ instead of the term ‘moral rights’, the term ‘natural justice’ or ‘natural law’ is chosen and referred to the natural original state, where there is ‘[…] no differentiation between right and injustice and therefore none injustice. Under such conditions everyone has the right to do everything’ (Celikates p. 118 referring Hobbes Leviathan). The assumption about that natural original state means ‘a war against all’ and is inacceptable ‘because it is not possible to have any security for own life and own interest tracking’ (ibid. pp. 118-119). There must be self-interest to have in cooperation ‘basic game rules (Hobbes called it the natural laws) that are constitutional principles of a cooperative socially practice’ (ibid. p. 119). Another representative of Natural Law thinking describes: ‘The human is thus […] mostly self-preserved […] but being alone totally helpless […] not able to survive without his peers […]’ (Celikates p. 139 referring Samuel Pufendorf (historian and jurist 1632-1694 Celikates p. 137, All citations from Celikates are translated from the German into English by W. Boesen for the purpose of this written work). It follows: ‘The bid of natural law is everything that is needed and useful within community for life, whatever disturbs and causes harm is forbidden’ (ibid.). This formulation can be taken as a given. ‘Nobody should do harm to the other. This is the most comprehensive of all duties […]’ (ibid. p. 142). This is relevant, especially in child-parent relationship whereby natural affection and care for the children is imperative (ibid. p. 168 referring David Hume, Scottish philosopher, 1711-1776 ‘An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals). To establish a functioning community, it is necessary to have education, it ‘is needed a part of human nature proper education […]’ (ibid. p. 194 referring Jean-Jacques Rousseau, French philosopher, 1712-1778 'Emile or about education (1762)’). The right to do so is primarily with the parents, formulated also in Article 6 of the Constitution of Federal Republic of Germany. It is equally a moral right. The parents as two persons are required to raise a child. The parents are in natural law enforcement natural authorities. The term authority means ‘[…] having significant influence to the other cause of […] tradition or charisma. In education parents and teachers claim authority about the children […]’ (Meyer/Regenbogen p. 88).

Education is considered obligatory. The legislator reserves the right to intervene in education, as it is also a duty for children to meet state requirements. This is the case when the Article 6 of the Basic Law Clause 1 provided parents composite disintegrates and then accesses for the state sentence 2. As parents then acting surrogate or foster parents with same rights and duties like natural parents. According to UNCRC Article 7, the child