Mehdi Afzali, Sergey Ryazantsev

Iranians on the Move:
Migration Trends and the Role of the Diaspora

Monograph

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Информация о книге

УДК 316:314.7(55)

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Approved for publication by the Scientific Council of the FCTAS RAS

Reviewers:
Dr. Mohammad Jalal Abbasi-Shavazi, University of Tehran (Tehran, Iran);
Dr. Lana M. Ravandi-Fadai, Institute of Oriental Studies RAS (Moscow, Russia).

This monograph is a study of trends in emigration from Iran and the role of Iranian diasporas in developing the country. The book is based on Mehdi Afzali’s dissertation research, “The contribution of emigration to the socio-economic development of Iran,” carried out under the guidance of Professor S. V. Ryazantsev, as well as materials from other studies of Iranian migration, carried out by the authors jointly in 2017–2021. The monograph proposes a conceptual framework for assessing the contribution of the Iranian diaspora to the country’s development in special geopolitical conditions. The work also summarizes the statistical data on emigration from Iran, presented in various national and foreign sources of information. The book contains sociological studies of representatives of the Iranian diasporas living in Russia and other countries.

The monograph is addressed to scientists, civil servants, social workers, teachers, graduate students, students (demographers, sociologists, political scientists, economists), and all those interested in migration processes in Iran.

УДК 316:314.7(55)

ББК 60.54(5Ирн)

© Afzali М., Ryazantsev S. V., 2022

© Prospekt LLC, 2022

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Today, socio-economic changes, socio-political limitations, and unstable economies have forced millions of people to cross the borders voluntarily or involuntarily. This movement and migration of people positively and negatively affect people, countries, governments, etc. While many countries enjoy the skilled, high skilled, and highly educated workforce at the cost of sending countries, sending countries are suffering the loss of their labor force population who emigrate to pursue a better life for themselves and/or their families. In addition to the labor force and refugees relocating from the countries, the number of international students who can be the future brains or high-skilled labor force has increased. Students emigrate from their countries to have access to better facilities, education, etc., or they migrate to escape from the problems they might have faced in their home countries. Therefore, governments must provide effective migration management, which retains those who intend to emigrate or encourages those who have already migrated to return or collaborate with their home countries because that is how they can benefit from positive aspects of migration.

Since, in this book we are discussing the migration trends of the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI), it is necessary to know that, although Iran has been struggling with the world sanctions for decades, it has hosted millions of refugees and immigrants from the neighboring countries such as Afghanistan and Iraq. It has been a sending country of high educated emigrants and students to America, Canada, and European countries. Persian Gulf countries also have traditionally been one of the leading destination countries for Iranian immigrants. However, with the deterioration of the economy, and socio-political restrictions, the number of people (especially students and wealthy families) emigrating to countries like Turkey, Russia, and Malaysia has increased. In addition to the socio-political limitations and economic instability that have played an essential role in the emigration process from Iran, other reasons such as military service for boys, university entrance examination, and gender discrimination are important factors intensifying the emigration of Iranian people.

Even though emigration of people from Iran is not as intense as many countries such Mexico, India, China, etc. emigration of highly educated and highly skilled Iranians has awakened Iranian governments in the last years to come up with solutions to retain people in Iran, encourage the Iranians abroad to return either permanently or temporarily or at least collaborate with the home country. However, there are many obstacles that policymakers are facing, such as lack of proper and accurate statistics and estimates about the number of Iranians abroad and those who intend to emigrate from the country because those who plan to relocate give us a clear insight of the motives, reasons, factors affecting the emigration of people. The lack of scientific institutes that can specifically analyze the migration trend and provide a scientific report to policymakers has been crucial in the last decades. The misinterpretation and misuse of information have been giving a wrong hint to people in charge to develop a proper solution. For example, the establishment of Iran Migration Observatory as the first research institute that has been formed in the context of the Policy Research Institute of the Sharif University of Technology in Iran, which tries to produce the most up-to-date and reliable data and analysis in various fields of Iran’s migration process has been an essential and promising step towards the migration management system.

However, one of the main reasons that policies are not enforced, or they are enforced improperly, is the willingness of the Iranian government to have active collaboration with the Iranian diaspora or wanting them to return. The authorities’ decisions regarding networking, recruitment, and exploitation of the Iranian diaspora have always been unclear. The wrong ideology of calling Iranian diaspora «Westernized» and considering them as threats to national security discourages Iranians from returning and prevents them from collaborating. Given the potential of Iranians abroad, their facilities, capacity level, social class, and the need to present a positive image of the country at the international level, the government of Iran with the wrong policies is being failed. Although, we should not only blame the Iranian government since the international sanctions too have been a big issue in terms of collaboration with the home country for Iranians abroad, forasmuch as the transfer of capital, technology, and scientific experiences which are necessary for the development of the country have been forbidden.

Therefore, to increase the effectiveness of positive aspects of emigration from the country, Iran needs to replace the process of brain gain with brain exchange; because with the technological advancement and expansion of the internet in the world, the physical presence of specialists in countries is not so significant as the relevance and usefulness of their knowledge and experience. And given all the problems existing in Iran’s situation, this seems a more feasible option. Cooperation program with Iranian specialists and entrepreneurs abroad done by Iran’s National Elites Foundation to use the scientific and professional capacity of Iranian researchers and specialists and establish relations with selected scientific, technological, and industrial centers of the country has been a significant step towards the brain exchange. According to the latest statistics, more than 120 specialized partner sites have joined the program so far, including the best universities, research institutes, and knowledge-based companies in the country. This program was able to satisfy 1,242 postdoctoral students and 118 visiting professors to meet the goals of this program and has led to 6,500 successful collaborations in the form of seminars, conferences, and workshops. This cooperation leads to the development of science and technology in the country by using the experiences of Iranians living abroad, and the capabilities of other countries.

Moreover, other government agencies, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Organization of Islamic Culture and Communication, the Supreme Council of Iranians, and several others, are working and communicating with Iranians abroad. Still, in practice, their work has meager positive results. Because firstly they are mainly focusing on attracting the capital and investment in Iran by Iranian diaspora, and secondly, the Iranian diaspora and the Iranian government do not accept each other’s existence, since the Iranian diaspora formed abroad is very political and the government of Iran tries to take some distance from westernization. Besides, we should not ignore the sanctions, lack of investment incentives, and economic instability that negatively affect the investment process.

In the end, besides the immediate socio-political and economic changes and reform of migration management system that can reduce the emigration of Iranians, identification of diaspora and improving the interactions between the home country and diaspora needs sacrifices from both Iranian diasporas abroad and the Iranian government. Since the policy is against the so-called westernized people, the collaboration between the Iranian diaspora and the home country is limited. And with the internal socio-political and economic restrictions, Iran will continue to experience the loss of human capital. Improving the country’s image and eliminating the sense of Iran-phobia must be one of the main goals of Iranian governments to encourage at least the visits of Iranians or those of Iranian descent who live overseas. Reforming the university entrance examination and military service for Iranians must be one of the first considerations to retain Iranian students, researchers, and professors in the country and encourage them to return to Iran while studying, working, or after their graduation. All these will not happen unless Iran is willing to collaborate and creates a successful and modernized migration management system, which controls and monitors migration, and encourages collaboration.

INTRODUCTION

Although Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) has a very specific situation in the world due to the international sanctions, socio-political limitations, and economic restrictions, its borders have always been opened to people to enter or exit. Iran has always been one of the main host countries for immigrants from neighboring countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, etc. and since the 1979 Islamic revolution followed by the Iran-Iraq war in 1980 it is experiencing emigration of many highly skilled and skilled laborers and students because of the socio-political limitations and unstable economy. Problems such as high unemployment, high inflation rate, human rights violations, freedom restrictions, and problems within the education system are considered the main factors of emigration from Iran which takes place in four main directions:

1) USA and Canada,

2) European countries,

3) Persian Gulf countries,

4) Countries such as Malaysia, Russia, Turkey (relatively new direction)

In today’s rapidly changing socio-economic conditions of the world in order to increase the effectiveness of positive aspects of emigration from the country, Iran needs a modern migration system and tools to aim at 1) providing effective migration management organizations, 2) identification of diaspora and improving the interactions between the home country and diaspora (because today’s technology provides us with this chance), 3) encouraging the investment and proper use of remittances by Iranian Immigrants, 4) encouraging return migration either temporarily or permanently, and 5) retaining of those who intend to emigrate from the country. In addition, Iran needs an immediate socio-economic and especially political reform of the present migration process that increases the human capital flight and financial loss.

In order to create a successful management system to control, monitor, and achieve positive results from the emigration, the actions and the existing tools should be developed, changed, or modernized, and new tools should be provided based on the capabilities of the country’s socio-economic and political environment. Insufficient, inappropriate, and imprecise information and statistics about the emigration from Iran have made it difficult for us to understand Iran’s position in the world’s migration process. Therefore, obtaining new information, identifying the characteristics of the Iranian diaspora, accurate statistics and data, studying the features of the migration management objects, the influence factors, and the relationships between them, support the theoretical justification of the principles and directions of national socio-economic policies of Iran in the interest of creating an atmosphere which encourages the return migrants as well as maintaining them and those who intend to emigrate from the country.

To provide such an atmosphere to be able to use human and financial capital stored outside the borders of the country, Iranian policymakers need a correct and clear understanding of the emigration process. Organization and management of a system for identification of diaspora and interaction with them is an important action that should be taken, which can be achieved through effective management. By having effective governmental and scientific organizations, accurate and precise information, and statistics about the socio-economic and demographic status of Iranian immigrants around the world, policymakers will be able to develop and optimize migration policies and actions. Moreover, direct connection with the diaspora creates a situation that information, knowledge, technology, and capital as important factors in the modern economy can be transferred easier and faster, which in turn develops the scientific and technical opportunities in Iran.

Iran also needs to develop new approaches to improving the image of the country for Iranian immigrants in the world and those who are of Iran descent. Governmental actions towards Iranians who live outside the country and those who have dual citizenship (imprisonment of many Iranians with dual citizenship) have created an Irano-phobia atmosphere that discourages the visits and jeopardizes the trust between the immigrants and the home country. In addition, the process of the visits for Iranian immigrants should be easier than it is, for example, military service for boys has been found to be one cause of emigration and an obstacle to entering the country. Besides, encouraging return migration should be one of the main considerations of the Iranian government. Socio-economic incentives help the return migration, supporting professors and researchers, giving them research freedom, positions in the universities, financial support in the required research field, etc., encourage the interaction and visits of Iranian scientific elites to the country. In addition, knowledge-based companies and business ideas from Iranian immigrants must be welcome and encouraged. In countries like Iran, with lower chances of return migration, the return can be substitute with interaction and exchange of knowledge and information. Because with today’s improvement and access to the internet, the interaction of the diaspora and migrants with the people and government of the home country is cheaper, easier and faster.

Because of the sanctions, using the financial capital of Iranians outside the borders of the country is a very challenging task. Transferring money and capital to Iran due to the sanctions is very limited. Nevertheless, there are still possibilities to send remittances to the home country and regardless of how it is spent, it can have a multiplier effect on Iran’s economy since it is considered an external source of financing. The investment of Iranians who live abroad must be encouraged through incentives given to them and they must enjoy incentives similar to those provided for foreign investors, not as a local Iranian investor. In the end, Retaining Iranians inside the country is a very important action to be taken. Besides the main national socio-economic problems such as high unemployment and inflation rates, low salary and wages, currency exchange rate devaluation (that encouraged the labor emigration from Iran in the last years), freedom and human rights, other problems such as inappropriate education system, university environments, university entrance examination, and military service have caused many students to leave the country not only for the developed countries but also the countries which do not have high socio-economic indicators.

In this book, in order to explain and assess Iran’s emigration process, dynamics, scale, direction, and position in the world we analyze and summarize the theoretical aspects and current trends in the study of emigration, taking into account the influence of pull and push factors in the migration process. We describe Iran’s emigration process with a structure to understand the migration management system of Iran, we have tried to show the differences between the real statistics and statistics provided by different local and international organizations, and in the end, we formulate recommendations on providing an effective migration management system to deal with emigration. This book is determined by the fact that the work presents: a comprehensive and conceptual approach to identifying the emigration process of Iran and its features in the context of globalization and the impact it has on the socio-economic development of the country. It has been tried, like the previous theories to look at this process from positive and negative points of view. Theoretical provisions developed in this book can be used for the further development of economic and social theories in terms of emigration and its role in development.

The materials, results, conclusions, and suggestions contained in this book can be taken into account and used by scientific and government bodies of any country in the world when developing migration policies especially for emerging, developing, and underdeveloped countries, the main provisions of the book can be used for educational purposes to prepare lecture courses and practical classes in disciplines (international economic relations, sociology, migration, politics, etc.) taught at universities in different countries, especially universities in Iran. And it is useful for governments and decision-makers to improve the migration management system and increase the efficiency of their action towards the problems of emigration.

1. THEORETICAL ASPECTS OF THE CONTRIBUTION OF MIGRATION AND DIASPORAS TO SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

1.1. Brief theories on migration

From the beginning of man’s history migration has been an inseparable part of his life. People migrated because of food, shelter, safety, a better quality of life, etc. They either voluntarily left their homes for different economic, social, political, and other reasons, or were forced to leave because of war, famine, lack of food resources, etc. Therefore, migration can be considered as a mechanism which aims to provide human with better future and life. Based on the International Organization for Migration the terms “Migration” and “Migrant” are defined as¹:

Migration

“The movement of persons away from their place of usual residence, either across an international border or within a state.”

Migrant

“A person who has moved away from his place of usual residence for a variety of reasons within a country or across the international border for different periods of time, either temporarily or permanently”

The number of international migrants has continuously been on the rise and in 2020 it is estimated to be 272 million (52% international migrants were male and 48% of international migrants were female) that is 3.5% of the world’s population, which has already surpassed the projection made for 2050: an estimated number of 230 million international migrants. This clearly indicates how difficult it is to predict the growth of international migration². The growing number of migrants and their mobility shows that today migration has become a global issue related to global economic, political, social, and technological transformation, which is why it is counted as a part of globalization, and as long as globalization expands, relevant changes will increasingly affect our lives.

General migration theories

The neo-classical equilibrium

In the 19th century, two articles published by a geographer called Ravenstein formulated the law of migration; he believed that migration was mostly because of the economic changes and considered it essential to development³. Furthermore, according to studies done by Skeldon (1997:19) migration was influenced by distance and population density and he believed that the movement is typically from lower to higher end income zones and from heavily populated areas to less populated ones⁴. These beliefs are considered to be the underlying assumptions of a push-pull theory which purports that migration movements are towards economic equilibrium. The neoclassical economic theory defines migration on two levels: Macro-level and Micro-level. At the macro-level, it explains the supply and demand factors for labor in different geographical areas arising from the differences in wages, which motivates the workers to move from low-wage regions to high-wage regions with the scarce labor force. At the micro-level it explains migration from migrants’ point of view as individuals who decide to migrate based on the cost-benefit calculation; they consider their skills; find information about the places they expect to be more productive and earn higher wages and freely choose to migrate.

Moreover, neoclassical migration theory considers urban-rural migration as part of the development process maintaining that the surplus workers in rural areas supply the required number of workers needed by the urban industrial economy⁵. There is an economic fact that explains the gradual transfer of economic agents from rural and agricultural areas to modern industries in urban areas. Harris and Todaro (1970) came up with a rural to urban labor migration model which ever since has been a basis of the neoclassical model of migration⁶. They believed that the movement has been caused not only by the wage difference but also by the rural to the urban probability of employment. Therefore, in the long run, while the rural-urban income difference covers the risk of becoming unemployed, the higher income will attract more rural migrants. Meanwhile, wages should be balanced against other costs of migration such as opportunity costs, cost of travel, psychological costs, etc.⁷ In the international migration market migrants can choose the destination of their choice with cost-benefit calculation. Therefore, although the Harris-Todaro model was developed for the internal market, it can be applied to international migration⁸.

Furthermore, neo-classical migration theory presupposes that the likelihood of emigrating is also related to the human capital characteristics and depends on the market structure and segmentation of labor and the chance of employment. But why do economic forces tend towards an equilibrium? That is because they deny the market imperfections. People usually are aware of the costs and benefits of migration⁹ and in many developing countries capital and insurance are far from perfect, which is why it is difficult to explain migration patterns with a neo-classical model with a major focus on income. The neo-classical model does not deal with government policies on migration, and it is criticized for being Eurocentric about migration; while, in developing countries migration may have a different pattern¹⁰. Thus, we needed a Human capital theory to focus on the individuals and explain migration beyond the costs. This theory separates the individuals from the community they come from and assesses individuals’ capitals based on their skills, knowledge, age, sex, education, physical abilities and so on that might lead to an increase in economic production. The type of labor demand in the market usually dictates that migrants be selected based on their skills and education. That’s why, for example, migrants who are older are less likely to be chosen and individuals with higher education have a higher migration propensity. Therefore, wages and employment differences should not be the only factors to pay attention to; rather, the structure of the labor market, capital, and socio-economic characteristics should be considered as well¹¹.

Historical-structural theory

In 1960 historical-structural theory was differently interpreted as being intellectually founded on the Marxist doctrine of political economy as well as world-system theory¹². However, the contemporary historical structural theory emerged in response to the neo-classical theory and its lack of negligence of the development factor. This theory explains that developed and underdeveloped countries have unequal economic and political capabilities and people have unequal access to resources; moreover, capitalism growth has influenced these inequalities. Underdeveloped countries are unfavorably trapped in global geopolitical structures because of their disadvantages, and they are not moving towards economic development and modernization. Historical structuralists perceived migration as a result of capitalism and consider it as an imbalanced trading relationship between the less developed countries and their developed counterparts¹³. Neoclassical migration theory is criticized by the historical structuralists stating that individuals do now have a free choice, but they are a part of the global political and economic systems and are forced to move by the system rather than freely. That is why rural areas are losing their population as this population is becoming part of urban areas to the advantage of those who care about cheap labor. Based on the dependency theory by Andre Gunder Frank¹⁴ as the frontrunner, not only is migration viewed as harmful to the economy of underdeveloped countries but also it is considered as a root of their underdevelopment rather than being a path towards development, according to this view, migration damages the economy and society and negatively influences the population. Historical structuralists were also criticized for their perception of individuals as victims and being too deterministic. Many of their ideas and models have been rejected because many developing and labor exporting countries have achieved sustainable economic growth due to the tight connection with capitalism¹⁵. Thus, capitalism alone should not be blamed as the cause of underdevelopment because embracing global capitalism may prove to affect different people and societies differently. Moreover, migration too can’t be defined as a desperate measure induced by misery, because from a different viewpoint migration can increase the remittances, knowledge, culture, etc.

Push-Pull Theory

In reality, neo-classical and historical structural theories were unable to explain why some people migrate within a certain country between particular places, but others do not¹⁶. In 1966, Lee revised Ravenstein’s 19th-century law on migration and proposed a new theory¹⁷. In this theory he explains that individuals’ decision to migrate depends on three factors:

1. Factors related to home countries

2. Factors related to their target countries (mediating factors including immigration regulations, distance, and physical obstacles among others)

3. Personal reasons

Lee argues that migration happens not only because of the opportunities at the destination but also because of the information that passes from destination to home country, which facilitates the movement of the future migrants. It explains that migrants are not representative of their community at the place of origin and migration is selective with respect to individual characteristics, which seems to be consistent with neo-classical theory. Lee himself never used the term push-pull model¹⁸. This model is based on individual choice, and it is consistent with the equilibrium model and neoclassical theory. This theory has gained popularity in many migration studies and is widely used by researchers. Many researchers who have used this model believe that demographic and economic factors are the main determinants of migration decisions. There are two main factors that shape the push-pull model¹⁹:

1. Rural population growth and pressure on agricultural resources that push people out of the rural areas.

2. Higher wages and good economic conditions attract people into cities and industrialized countries.

This theory seems to be very useful and attractive as it deals with all aspects crucial to any decision-making in the area of migration and it has been argued that the broader perspective of labor force migration can be best perceived through a push-pull model²⁰. However, it is yet hard to consider this model as a theory at all because it looks more like a descriptive model that deals with different factors influencing migration. The push and pull factors are entwined and together they show the difference between origin and destination; however, they have limited exploratory value²¹. Besides income and wage differences, many other factors such as population, demography, or environment can be considered as reasons for migration²². People usually move because they expect to be able to have a higher quality of life and to make a more satisfying living elsewhere rather than just hoping for a more pleasant location. People tend to live in populated cities because, in spite of being crowded, they provide better a quality of life in terms of safety, education, health, etc. That is why this model has limited capacity to correctly explain migration. The push-pull model is also criticized because of the assumptions it makes. It unrealistically considers migration solely as the result of the cost-benefit calculation of individuals and does not pay attention to the structural limitations. Moreover, it is based on the assumptions that all individuals have unrestricted and similar access to both capital and information, which may not be true. It is also unable to explain the return migration or the impact of migration on society’s organization whether in the country of origin or in the country of destination.

Optimistic and pessimistic views of migration and development

Migration theories usually do not consider the impact that migration has on development in home countries. The impact of migration on countries of origin in the last decades has been one of the favorite topics among researchers. There are two distinguished approaches: “balanced growth” or “migration optimists” and “asymmetric development” or “migration pessimist”²³. The following table shows the two approaches in brief:

Table 1–1. Two approaches to migration and development

Migration optimists

Migration pessimists

Functionalist

Structuralist

Neo-classical

Neo Marxist

Modernization

Disintegration

Net north-south transfer

Net south-north transfer

Brain gain

Brain drain

More equality

More inequality

Remittance investment

Consumption

Development

Dependency

Less migration

More migration

Source: de Haas, Hein: Migration and Development: A Theoretical Perspective, Bielefeld: COMCAD, 2007(Working Papers — Center on Migration, Citizenship and Development; 29

Developmentalism and neo-classical theory both believe that migration has positive impacts on the development of home and host countries. The optimistic view believes that through capital transfers and industrialization, home countries would experience economic growth and modernization. Because the combination of policies, remittances, and aids can boost economic growth and stimulate the investments by migrants²⁴. Remittances are the main source of currency and migration would improve migrants’ economic situation. However, optimistic view proponents’ expectation from the migrant workers is high; they believe that migrants will play an important role in the industrial development of their country by investing large sums of money in industrial companies²⁵. In addition, developmentalists believe that migrants mentally, physically, and financially play an important role in development: they bring back innovation, ideas, knowledge, attitude, and not just money, and therefore they are effective in the modernization of the country.

Furthermore, labor migration is exactly the opposite side of capital flow. Labor migration is believed to be a part of economic development and free movement of workers causes scarcity of labor in home countries. This can increase the wage level and marginal productivity of labor and eventually result in the equality of the price factor across home and destination countries, thereby rendering such migration futile. In the neoclassical approach “Factor Price Equalization” is the main theory that considers the role of migration in development. It ignores the migrants’ attachment to different social groups such as families and communities and assumes them as income maximizing individuals. In addition, it does not pay attention to the gain that non-migrants would receive, and the only gain is limited to the wage increase because of the labor scarcity in the home country²⁶. That is why Developmentalism, and neo-classical theories are the source of inspiration for optimists. They believe that migration will bring capital (remittances and investments) and knowledge to the home countries and these, in turn, can result in investment and stimulation of development and modernization. Moreover, those migrants who return to the home countries are believed to be effective in economic growth²⁷.

On the other hand, migration pessimists are highly inspired by structuralist social theory and neo-Marxist beliefs. Neo Marxists believe that the only positive effect of migration is for the migrant himself and his family’s welfare for the short run²⁸. According to historical-structuralist theory, migrants move in order to escape misery and many researchers believe that migration is the root of underdevelopment in home countries, because migration will decrease the number of dynamic, productive, and healthy manpower of the country²⁹. Structuralists believe that receiving countries are those who need cheap labor, thus they are the ones who win by attracting the cheap immigrant labor, but for migrants themselves, it is dangerous to be dependent on the remittances, because when they return home the amount of their income will decrease.

There exists certain skepticism about the use of remittances in the home country. Although remittances are sent back home, there is no clear understanding of how this money is used and where it is invested. Around 90% of the remittances are either spent on consumption or placed fourth in families’ financial planning³⁰. Several researchers have shown their concerns about this threat in their development studies. Lack of information, creativity, and innovation create a “me-too” effect leading them to invest their money in overcrowded sectors such as restaurants or grocery stores, which not only do not contribute to the actual economic growth and development but also increase the dependency on the outside world³¹. Hence, when money is sent back to the home country, few results come up:

1. It increases consumption and provokes inflation, which causes suffering to the non-migrants and results in more inequality³².

2. Domestic production would decrease because many items such as household appliances, clothes, fabrics, etc. will be imported.

3. Main investments will be in urban areas and this increases regional disparities in wealth³³.

Although remittances are recognized at the national level, there are concerns over the emigration of highly skilled and educated individuals from the country, which is called brain drain. Some may consider brain drain as one of the factors of development, but it dispossesses the poorer countries from their valuable educated and skilled workforce in which they have invested many years of education³⁴. The emigration of young, highly educated, and highly skilled men and women can negatively affect domestic production as a result of the shortage of labor force³⁵. Lipton in 1980 showed that in spite of the usual perceptions the poorest and the most miserable individuals are not the ones who emigrate, because it needs a certain amount of money to overcome the costs and risks of emigration³⁶. Furthermore, in sending countries, migration increases the inequality at the regional level, because migration is selective in nature and migrants do not represent the places from which they come. Migrants are already believed to be employed and those who are relatively better and more entrepreneurial and open-minded are those who will be better off³⁷. This means that socioeconomic inequalities again raise and the remittances will go to those who are better skilled and prepared while those who lack such skills and abilities will continue to stay in poverty; meaning that the deprivation of non-immigrants will continue³⁸.

In addition, the socio-cultural effects of migration have been one of the concerns of researchers. The ideas, knowledge, innovation, and attitudes that they bring back may change the taste of the place of origin. They might induce an attitude of consumerism, lack of productivity, and dependence on remittance among nonimmigrants. It may also increase the demand for foreign goods rather than domestic goods which can inevitably increase the cost of living for migrants themselves and those who did not emigrate. Last but not the least, solidarity and socio-cultural integrity will be influenced by migration³⁹.

In developing countries, unequal access to resources, employment, education, market, and power is a daily struggle, and people lack the capacity and resources to overcome poverty. None of the theories whether neo-classical or structuralist pessimists can give a clear understanding of the complexity of real-life migration. Because they either underestimate or overestimate the value of structural constraints. What seems to be missing is a clear, general, political, economic, and socio-cultural context about migration. Then the question is that who is right? Structuralist pessimists or optimists? The answer is neither one. Because migration is much more complex than what these theories capture, and we are unable to determine this complexity with theoretical schemes. There is no proven mechanism to enable us to firmly claim that international migration, remittances, and investments can result in the development⁴⁰.

Findings from different studies on this subject seem to be quite contradictory to the point that some show that migration can have a positive impact on socio-economic developments, some maintain that it may have no effect, and still others indicate that it even has a negative impact⁴¹. Therefore, the link between migration and development is uncertain because there are two possible views of migrants. One view is that the migrant is unemployed at home, then finds a job overseas and sends back home remittances which can reduce poverty and be invested to boost the economic growth in what is called “virtuous circles”. The other view maintains that migrants are employed in a home country like teachers, nurses, and engineers, then they find jobs overseas which increases the quality of their lives. However, this process also creates a shortage of workers, and the quality of services falls in the home country and migrants do not spend significant amounts of remittances home, and even if they do so, they increase inflation. Moreover, if they do not return to their home countries, ideas, innovation, and knowledge will not be transferred as well, which is called a “vicious circle”.

1.2. Diasporas and development: theoretical aspect

Terminology of diaspora comes from Greek language and translation of the Hebrew term ‘galut’ into Greek ‘diaspeiro’ which in turn consists of two parts: dia meaning over or across and speiro meaning I sow, or I scatter. In ancient Greece, this word referred to colonization and migration. So, based on the story of Jews outside Palestine, after the Babylonian exile, there seems to be a broader definition of people who are settled away from their ancestral homelands⁴². Many definitions have been offered to describe “diaspora” as transnational communities who have experienced movement from their homeland and share common myths, culture, and ethnicity, and there is a network of social relationships with group members⁴³. From the classical point of view, diaspora is defined as a group that is in solidarity and categorized based on ethnicity. But William Safran describes diaspora as those who⁴⁴:

– are dispersed from one or many regions including foreign regions

– maintain a collective memory or vision

– consider homeland as the final and ideal destination and share a feeling of belonging to it

– are fully sure that full acceptance by the host country is impossible

– are committed to the safety and prosperity of the homeland

In classical writings, Armenian, Greek, and Jewish experiences are widely discussed to explain diaspora. In addition, in dictionaries diaspora is usually defined based on the Jewish experience⁴⁵. But in these definitions, diaspora is described based on two facts of dispersal and common ethnicity. It does not provide room for going beyond ethnicity, myth, and common identity. Therefore, the classical point of view on diaspora mainly focuses on the reasons for dispersal, connects people with the same ethnicity together, and doesn’t explain how and where they lived before or what they have brought with themselves as a common culture. Hence, many believe that the concept of diaspora is not useful and can only be used as a socially constituted formation⁴⁶. Because they believe that the definitions represent the actual community, while those who are part of diaspora usually do not act in unity and they may even have more common views with people outside the diaspora group than inside⁴⁷. Anyway, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) describes diaspora as:

Diaspora

“Migrants or descendants of migrants whose identity and sense of belonging, either real or symbolic, have been shaped by their migration experience and background. They maintain links with their homelands, and to each other, based on a shared sense of history, identity, or mutual experiences in the destination country.”⁴⁸

To sum it up, diasporas’ characteristics are presented in the following diagram:

Table 1–2. Characteristics of diaspora

Migration

Collective memory

Connection

Group consciousness

Kinship

Migration from a country of origin in search of work, trade, or to escape confilict or persecution

An idealized, collective memory and/or myth about the ancerstral home

A continuing connection to a country of origin

A strong group consciousness sustained over time

A sense of kinship with diaspora members in other countries

Source: IOM’s GMDAC, 2018, migration data portal

Diasporas are potential in developing their home countries and their role in development is not limited to remittances or financial help; knowledge, ideas, innovation, and opinions can also positively influence development policies⁴⁹. From an optimistic point of view, diasporas are one of the important factors of development that can bring about new strategies for developing the home countries⁵⁰. improvement in technology and easy access to satellite, telephones, internet, television, etc. have created an easy way for diasporas to be in contact with each other wherever they are. Although the vital role of diaspora in development is clear, policies and implementation of those policies are not straightforward and different governments have different opinions about the diasporas. Some governments may see them as harmful to national security, while some may see the positive side of their contribution to the development of the country. But those governments which have more balanced strategies are the ones that are benefitting the most from the collaboration with diasporas and retain their connection for extended periods of time⁵¹.

As mentioned before, debates about theories of migration and development have been shifting from optimism in the 1950s and 1960s to pessimism in the 1970s-1980s and again optimism in the 1990s-2000s became dominant, these shifts also changed the social and development theories⁵². From an optimistic and developmentalism point of view, poor countries can be modernized and achieve as much economic growth as western countries have already achieved through capital transfer and industrialization.

One of the factors that can impact the growth of both home and host countries is migrants and diasporas because they are known as agents of development. They invest, they bring innovations, and optimists think that capital from labor scarce to capital scarce migrant-sending countries helps the home countries. Moreover, they believe that diasporas can exert an influence on democracy and education and can change traditional idealism. For example, De Haas in 2010 explains that remittances, knowledge, skill, and experience that diasporas transfer can help developing countries to achieve economic growth. Therefore, it is necessary for governments to encourage emigration to promote development. However, neo-Marxist pessimism is afraid of countries’ dependency. They believe that in the process of migration north wins and the south loses because migrants escape the misery. And they also argue that human capital loss is because of migration, which leads to nonproductive and remittance-dependent countries. Moreover, they believe that the remittances sent by the diasporas are hardly invested in production companies and are mostly spent in consumption or invested in houses and lands, which weakens the domestic economy and increases dependency. Besides, from a pessimistic point of view, diasporas can negatively impact the socio-cultural integrity of migrant-sending countries⁵³.

To understand how diasporas can impact development it is necessary to understand the term “development” which has different meanings in different scientific areas. In general, the positive change toward a specific goal is called development⁵⁴. Historically, there have always been debates about the differences between development and economic growth, because they tended to be perceived as being the same in the meaning. But now, in addition to economic indicators, social indicators are also discussed in order to consider development⁵⁵; therefore, the overall quality of life is something that these days is considered as development, such as better education, access to health services, social services, gender equality, human rights, etc.⁵⁶.

Diaspora and migration development have emerged at the transnational level because of the connections between the migrants and the homelands. There are many definitions given to understand transnationalism, but the one that is mostly used is the one given by Mazzucato in 2008; his definition of transnationalism is:

Transnationalism

“The processes by which immigrants forge and sustain
multi-stranded social relations that link together their societies
of origin and settlement”.

On the other hand, many researchers define transnationalism as a concept that is based on occupations that need long-lasting connection across the national borders and the flow of non-material things such as ideas, knowledge, etc. Therefore, transnationalism is usually perceived as the linkage between people living in different countries⁵⁷. Technical possibilities have made it easier for migrants and families to live transnationally and keep their transnational identities; nowadays they can easily use the banking system, telephones, internet, etc. Although many believe that migrants will lose contact with home countries by integrating into host countries (that explains some of the pessimism concerns) now it is clear that migrants still maintain their ties with their home countries, which enables them to have an active role in the growth of their home countries through telecommunication and regular visits⁵⁸.

But why Diasporas are defined as transnational communities? Because they are acting as a bridge between the receiving and sending countries. And when explaining diaspora as transitional communities, the world community represents the shared origin by the members of the communities and is not limited to the country, it can also present a region in a country or even an ethnic group. The contribution of diaspora to the development of their home countries depends on many different actors with different goals and capacities, and the impacts they can have to increase the quality of life and promote human welfare. For example, the process of donation takes place in different ways such as private organizations, governmental organizations, professional associations, and NGOs, etc.

Table 1–3. Diasporas’ donation means

Donor Aggregation

Individual donor

Multiple donors

Donation size

Small

Some remittances, individual donations

Hometown associations,
online platforms, small foundations

Large

Direct donations from magnates, celebrities, sports stars, large foundations established by such
individuals

Professional association, family foundations, venture philanthropy funds

Source: Retrieved from Newland et al. 2010, p. 10⁵⁹

Table 1–3 divides donations based on size and aggregation. Individual groups of donors consist of those people who have sufficient resources to donate personally. Middle-income individuals, celebrities, sports stars, entrepreneurs, and so on are placed in this group and the amount of their donation ranges from small to large. The small donation size of individual donors are remittances and personal donations that they send back home. Individual donors have different objectives. Some may send money in order to help relieve a natural disaster while others may send money due to family issues. Moreover, many of the donations towards a project usually happen through intermediaries whose job is to facilitate the donation process. These foundations and associations support the socio-economic life of people and are engaged in the reconstruction and development of many projects in their country. Their collaboration includes consultation, health support, advocacy work, rights of vulnerable groups, education, and infrastructure. These intermediaries are as following:

– Professional associations are non-profit organizations whose goal is to encourage networking for the members. They have legal, medical, and IT professionals who provide programs of contribution through knowledge and skills, and at the macro-level, they can lobby⁶⁰.

– Hometown associations are among the most popular ones. They provide forums for diasporas to gather in a state, town, etc. to share their experiences and operate on common interest issues. These associations collect donations for infrastructures, renovation, building schools, health centers, churches, and public places. Many of these organizations provide scholarships for youth to continue their education⁶¹.

– Online platforms: They help donors to donate online. They can also assist donors with other forms of donation such as lending money as micro interest-free loans or making the arrangement for them to directly donate to a specific project (Newland et al. 2010).

– Faith-Based institutions: They have a religious identity and enjoy the privilege to work in closed governments. They are non-political institutions and have well-established networks by governmental approval (Newland et al. 2010).

In 2012, Brinkerhoff categorized Diasporas’ contributions into two groups, namely remittances and human capital which can be extended to skill transfer, political influence, investment, etc.⁶²

Table 1–4. Diasporas’ contributions

Remittances

Human Capital

Positive views

Micro-level

Remittances made by diasporas are important contributions to the well-being of their families and community members in their countries of origin⁶³.

Brain gain

When the diasporas return on a permanent basis or even temporarily to their communities of origin, they bring back knowledge, skills, and experience that they have acquired abroad. These skills and experiences can be used to cover knowledge and skill gaps in their countries of origin⁶⁴.

Macro level

Remittances are more stable and reliable sources of external finance. They have been proved to be less fluctuating and less cyclical than other capital flows such as foreign direct investment and development aid⁶⁵.

Knowledge

Investment

The inflow of capital can potentially enable diasporas and their families to invest in agriculture and other private enterprises⁶⁶. World Bank has found strong indications of increased direct investment and portfolio investment in the presence of diaspora networks.

Skills

Spillover effect

Significant impact on nonimmigrant households as well as remittance-receiving communities. It can provide employment and income for non-migrant households. It also increases wages in sending countries⁶⁷.

Ideas and innovation

Negative views

Inflation⁶⁸
(Newland 2013)

Brain drains

Inequality
(Newland 2013)

Reduces the stock of educated
workers

Dependency (Newland 2013)

Low productivity

Not an investment but an
insurance for the future
(Newland 2013)

Deprives the private sector

Possibility of Dutch disease
(Newland 2013)

Decreases the quality of services

Source: Provided by the authors

As we explained, migration has positive and negative effects on the economic growth and development of countries. Different push and pull factors exert great influence on the migration process; higher wages, better working incentives, and environments as pull factors can decrease the emigration pace, while push factors such as lower wages, unattractive environment can play an important role in increasing emigration from a particular country.

Although the role of contemporary labor and trade diasporas in generating flows of capital in the form of remittances back to the homelands is crucial, the effects of migration on economic growth and development are not fully discovered yet. Many researchers such as De Haas, (2012) have shown the positive effects of migration and remittances on economic growth and development, and how they can influence human capital development. For example, migration remittances, in contrast to foreign direct investment (FDI), are believed to be a non-profit money transfer and in research done by Chami, Fullenkamp, Jahjah (2005) it is shown to have a negative relationship with GDP growth⁶⁹. They believe that remittances may not be a direct source for economic development but an external source for development and that they work as an instrument to reduce the poverty and inequality. In a research study done by Ngoma and Ismail (2013), the negative impact of remittances on the economic growth of Sub-Saharan African countries was discovered⁷⁰. It has been found that among 89 developing countries, a 1% increase in the inflow of remittances to the home country will increase by 2% years of schooling both at secondary and tertiary levels⁷¹. Furthermore, it has been proposed that migration and economic development and economic growth are also dependent on many other political, geographical, and similar factors, for example, migration among the countries in the same region is believed to have a more positive influence on the development of the countries.

Anyhow, discussions about remittances are the most controversial part of the diasporas’ contribution; therefore, this topic should be independently developed and discussed. Today, governments from developing and developed countries are interested in collaboration with their diasporas and the impact of remittances. Through regulatory issues in sending and receiving countries, they try to attract investments and remittances from their diasporas, and they are keen to use the human capital out of the borders of the home country. Thus, governments are establishing agencies and departments in order to deal with their diasporas; a few examples of these agencies are established in countries such as Armenia, Georgia, and a few African countries⁷². There are also cases where the financial facilities are established in order to make the transfers cheaper, easier, and faster; however, migrants’ intention to invest and send remittances to their home countries is mostly for personal interests, and in many scenarios, their needs and wishes in the home country are not satisfied, so in order to be able to encourage development, there must be a balance between diasporas’ needs, wishes, and capabilities and the capability of the home country to meet those needs. But unfortunately, in some countries, the ability of governments to influence diasporas is more than diasporas’ ability to impact development⁷³ and diasporas’ activities due to the many reasons are restricted, and their attempts are condemned. Therefore, in order to have an impact on development and economic growth, remittance finally should be invested or saved that Carling, in his research, comes up with the following graph that shows the role of remittances on development:

Figure 1–1. Role of remittances in development

Source: CARLING, J. (2004c)⁷⁴

Moreover, in different research studies, it is discussed that remittances are invested or saved for future consumption, which means even the consumption of these savings will have a manifold effect on economic development⁷⁵. When migrants succeed to save some money, they become interested in sending their money to their home countries either in form of remittances or investing their money in their home countries rather than the host country. Hence, the main influences migrants can have on their home country are economic, industrial, and scientific, the money that they send to home countries is usually spent on construction and opening of new business, and/or they pay for the education of children at schools or universities. In addition to the microeconomic effects, remittances and diasporas have a great impact on macroeconomic and balance of payments of certain countries, thus, some countries such as the Philippines promote their labor migration, because of the role of the remittances from migrants is crucial for their national economy⁷⁶. This is highly related to the connection of diaspora with their home countries and how they wish to assist their country of origin by remittances or investment. In addition, they influence the social behavior of the people in the home country and change their behavioral characteristics by what they have learned from the host countries, and in some cases, they become involved in the political activities of their country. But the issue of remittances still poses critical questions: how remittances can promote development and sustainability? How are they going to help poor people to be integrated into the country’s economy? What are the policies and rules to enhance the chance of development by using remittances?

1.3. Demographic indicators of Iran

Today the role of demography in the development of countries is evident. Socio-economic and political factors are dependent on demography and resources are connected to the population. Demography studies the human population. It studies the size, composition, and distribution of population and investigates mortality, fertility, and migration among others. Population growth or decline, structure, process, distribution, composition (in terms of age, sex, race, marital status, etc.), and other characteristics of the population are the subjects of demography studies⁷⁷. Demography explains how mortality, fertility, and migration can influence the population. It divides population changes into two parts: moving into the population (birth) and moving out of a population (death and migration). Therefore, a basic demographic equation is created based on these factors⁷⁸:

Pt+1 = Pt + Bt to t+1 – Dt to t + 1 + It to t+1 – Et to t+1

Pt+1: population at time t+1
Pt: population at time t
B t to t+1: births between times t and t+1
Dt to t+1: deaths between times t and t+1
It to t+1: immigrants (or in-migrants) to the population between times t and t+1
Et to t+1: emigrants (or out-migrants) from the population between times t and t+1

This formula explains that: When Bt to t+1 > Dt to t+1 the country has a natural increase in population and when Bt to t+1 < Dt to t+1 the country experiences natural decrease.

Moreover, net international migration (Immigration minus emigration) and net internal migration (In-migration minus out-migration) are calculated based on It to t+1 — Et to t+1. According to this equation when:

It to t+1 < Et to t+1 the sending country is experiencing negative net internal or international migration. When It to t+1 > Et to t+1 the receiving countries are experiencing positive net international or internal migration.

Many theories have been presented to understand demography, but the most widely used theory of demography is demographic transition theory. This theory is the best explanation for population growth and was developed by Warren S. Thompson (1929) and Frank W. Note stein (1945) and extended by Kingsley Davis (1963). This theory says that because of societal modernization, four stages of mortality and fertility change created⁷⁹:

1. Birth rate and death rate are both high. Therefore, there is a small population change.

2. Because of modernization and industrialization, the mortality rate falls and a lower death rate and higher birth rate causes population growth.

3. Fertility decreases and lower birth and death rates cause the population to decrease.

4. Mortality and fertility decline, any increase and decrease are due to fertility.

The second demographic transition introduced by Dirk van de Kaa (1987) and Ron Lesthaeghe (2009, 2010) explained that fertility declines are due to demographic behaviors such as high divorce rate, same-sex marriages, first marriage age increase, and voluntary childlessness. Furthermore, David Coleman (2006) expanded the demographic transition theory: he explains that today many countries, in order to maintain their population, rely on immigration, which can change the structure of population, culture, social experiences, and identity. Therefore, we can say that demographic transition is a set of transitions:

Figure 1–2. Demographic transition model

Source: Retrieved from Poston DL, Bouvier LF. 2017

The most important factors in the structure of demography are age and sex. They are characteristics of demography and they are tied with mortality, fertility, and migration. Fertility changes by age and sex. In the actual production of children (fertility) the ratio of males is higher than females. The normal sex ratio at birth (SRB) confirms that there are 105 boys per 100 girls. In addition, the ability to produce children (fecundity) for females is between ages of around 15–49 years and for men between ages of around 15–79 years old. Moreover, the mortality rate varies by age and sex. Females, in general, have a lower death rate than males at every age of life. Migration is also related to age and sex; men are more interested in long-distance migration while women prefer short-distance migration, but with the increase in gender equity, men and women tend to be similar in migration. In global demographic patterns, there is a North-South division in this concept; the south has higher birth rates, higher death rates, and younger populations than the north, which shows that these differences within the south will drive the future. So now we can understand why demography is important. Because it helps us to understand:

1. The future by past patterns,

2. How population changes influence society and technology

3. How societies adjust themselves to demographic changes⁸⁰.

Demographic indicators

In 2020, the Statistical Center of Iran announced the population of Iran to be 83,277,433 million, 51% of the population are men and 49% women. Before the 1979 Islamic revolution, the government’s main policy was to keep the quality of life high; thus, it was not promoting population growth, but after the revolution, the population started to grow at a faster pace. Moreover, in 2014 the supreme leader of Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, announced the new policies and incentives to increase the population to 150 million⁸¹ and he insisted that country’s infrastructures allow to have 150 million people. He, then in 2018, repeated his words⁸². General population policies which are considered as a turning point in the Iranian demographic history and population policies announced by Ayatollah Ali Khamenei includes the following 14 various policy goals⁸³: Achieving fertility rate to more than the replacement level, Facilitating, and promoting family formation and increasing children, Allocating appropriate facilities for mothers especially during pregnancy and breastfeeding, Strengthening the foundation and stability of the family, Promoting and institutionalizing the Islamic-Iranian lifestyle, Promoting life expectancy (providing family health and nutrition), Creating a culture for respecting and honoring the elderly., Empowering the population at working age, Spatial and geographical redistribution of the population, Maintaining and attracting population in villages and border areas and low density, Managing internal and external migration, Encouraging Iranians abroad to attend and invest, Strengthening the components of national identity and Continuous monitoring of population policies.

Illustration 1.1 shows the change in population for the last six decades. It shows that currently, Iran’s population is almost five times more than 1957.

Graph 1–1. Iran’s population change, 1957–2020

Source: Statistical Center of Iran available at: https://www.amar.org.ir/

In 2011–2016, the population growth rate was around 1.24%. in 2020, the population growth rate is expected to be around 0.7%⁸⁴. Today Iran’s share of the population in the world (7553.502 million) is 1.1%, and among emerging markets and developing economies (6481.049 million) it has 1.2% of the population share, its population is also equal to 7.7% of advanced economies’ population⁸⁵. Most of Iran’s population is in urban areas and the urbanization rate in the country has increased from 31.4% in 1957 to 75% in 2019⁸⁶. The population of Iran in 2016 based on citizenship is shown in Table 1.5. In this table, the number of Afghan immigrants living in Iran is 1.5 million which is equal to a 1.9% share of Iran’s population. Citizens from Iraq, Pakistan, and Turkey are the countries that have the next most shares in the population respectively. Citizens from other countries are depicted in a separate column and those citizens for whom there was no information available are assigned in the N/A column. Moreover, based on UNHCR, in 2021, approximately 2,25 million undocumented afghans, 586 thousand Afghan passport holders (including Afghans on student visas and others whose family visas have been extended), and 800 thousand refugees (of which 780,000 are Afghans and 20,000 are Iraqis) are living in Iran⁸⁷.

Table 1–5. Population of Iran based on gender and citizenship, 2016

Population based on citizenship in 2016

Iran

Afghanistan

Iraq

Pakistan

Turkey

Others

N/A

Total

Men

39556422

845267

19725

8327

429

12161

56111

40498442

Women

38610400

738712

14807

5993

284

8683

48949

39427828

Total

78166822

1583979

34532

14320

713

20844

105060

79926270

Source: Statistical Center of Iran available at:
https://www.amar.org.ir/

Graph 1.2 shows that around 25% of the population is under 15 years old. Almost 20% of the population (17.5 million) are between 15–29 years old. Approximately 48% of the population is between 30–64 years old and almost 10% of the men and women population is within the age range of 35–39 years old. Around 6.5% of the population are more than 65 years old and the population of people over the age of 60 is around 8,8 million which constitutes 10.5% of the whole population and has a 3.6% growth rate every year.

The youth population (15–29 years old), which used to be around 21 million in 2012, has decreased to around 17.5 million today and continues to decrease at the rate of –3.24%. Forecasts of the statistical center of Iran show that in 2021 the number of old people (more than 60 years old) will surpass 10.5% of the population, in 2042 more than 19.4%, and in 2052 it will reach 26.1% of the population. In addition, based on the world bank in 1960 life expectancy in Iran was around 50 years old and it has increased to approximately 77 years old in 2019⁸⁸. Table 1.6 shows that the youths’ share in the population of Iran is 24%. This table reveals that until 1987 the population of Iran was relatively young. But from 1987 onwards the share of the youths in the population started to decrease. Wertheim test maintains that in developing or undeveloped countries the ratio of those who are under 15 years old to the total population is around 40% or more.

Graph 1–2. Iran’s age pyramid, 2020

Source: Statistical Center of Iran available at:
https://www.amar.org.ir/

Table 1–6. Iran’s youth ratio based on Wertheim test,
1957–2016

1957

1967

1977

1987

1997

2007

2016

Urban

40.25

44.1

40.98

42.83

37.55

23.7

23

Rural

43.06

47.3

47.68

48.57

42.58

28.1

26.9

Total

42.17

46.09

44.53

45.45

39.51

25.1

24

Source: Statistical Center of Iran available at:
https://www.amar.org.ir/

In table 1.7 you can see the sex ratio of Iran from 1957 to 2016. The sex ratio of Iran has not changed drastically, and it has been always between the rates of 103 to 107. In 2016 the sex ratio of Iran was 103 which is almost near the normal rate of 105. The sex ratio can be calculated based on the following formula: where M is a number of males and F is a number of females.

SR=(M/F) * 100

Table 1–7. Iran’s sex ratio based on urban and rural area, 1957–2016

1957

1967

1977

1987

1997

2007

2016

Urban

106

108

110

105

104

104

102

Rural

102

107

103

104

102

103

105

Total

104

107

106

105

103

104

103

Source: Statistical Center of Iran available at:
https://www.amar.org.ir/

Illustration 1.3 shows the number of births and deaths in Iran from 1998–2019. The number of deaths has decreased from 551,345 in 1998 to 395,392 in 2019. On the other hand, the number of births has increased from 1.18 million to 1.19 during the same period, but from 2015 there is a slight decrease in the number of births. In this year mothers’ age ranges of 25–29, 30–34, and 35–39 years old have accounted for the most births by 32%, 24%, and 23% respectively. In 2019, the Crude Birth Rate (per 1,000 people) in Iran is 18.42 and the Total Fertility Rate (births per woman) is 1.7⁸⁹.

Graph 1–3. Iran’s number of births and deaths, 1998–2019

Source: National organization for civil registration available at:
https://www.sabteahval.ir/en

Although the number of marriages has increased since 1990, it has drastically decreased since 2010. The number of marriages has fallen from 891,621 to almost 520,000 in 2019. Graph 1.4 confirms that not only has the number of marriages decreased but also the number of divorces has increased from 37,000 divorces in 1990 to 171,000 divorces in 2019. The ratio of marriage to divorce shows that for every divorce only 4 marriages are registered.

Graph 1–4. Iran’s number of marriages and divorces, 1990–2019

Source: National organization for civil registration available at:
https://www.sabteahval.ir/en

In addition to the explanations above, the average age of both men and women at the time of their first marriage has also increased. Based on National organization for civil registration since 1957 the average age of men at the first marriage has increased about 5 years and the women have experienced a 6-year increase. This increase is the same for both men and women across urban and rural areas.

Table 1–8. Average age of men and women at the first marriage,
1957–2019

1957

1967

1977

1987

1997

2007

2019

Total

Men

24.9

25

24.1

23.8

25.6

26.2

29.7

Women

19

18.4

19.7

19.9

22.4

23.3

24.8

Source: National organization for civil registration available at:
https://www.sabteahval.ir/en

Having an 87.6% of literacy rate, Iran is a literate country. This literacy rate only pertains to those who are 6 years old and more and it is calculated based on the following formula:

Literacy rate for 6 years old and more = people more than 6 years old and more who are literate /population of people more than 6 years old and more *100

Governments’ efforts regarding literacy rates have been effective during the last 60 years. The literacy rate for women in rural areas has significantly increased from 1.2% to 72% and all over the country, this rate has increased from 8% to 84.2% in 2017. In urban areas more than 90% of men and 88% of women are literate and in total 90% of people in urban areas are literate which has increased from 1957 by about 55%.

Table 1–9. Literacy rate for urban and rural areas based on gender,
1957–2017

1957

1967

1977

1987

1997

2007

2017

Men

Rural

10.9

25.4

43.6

59.9

76.5

81.1

83.92

Women

1.2

4.3

17.3

36

62.1

68.9

72.85

Total

6.1

15.1

30.5

48

69.3

75.1

78.52

Men

Urban

45.9

61.5

74.4

80.4

89.6

92.9

93.5

Women

22.4

38.3

55.6

65.4

81.7

85.6

88

Total

34.6

50.4

65.5

73.1

85.7

88.9

90.8

Men

Country

22.4

40.1

58.9

71

84.7

88.7

91

Women

8

17.9

35.5

52.1

74.2

80.3

84.2

Total

15.1

29.4

47.5

61.8

79.5

84.6

87.6

Source: Statistical Center of Iran available at:
https://www.amar.org.ir/

In September 2019, the ministry of education announced that around 14.5 million students are studying in more than 107,000 schools⁹⁰. Out of this population, more than 8 million are studying in primary schools, around 3.3 million are studying in junior high school, which is three years of studying, and around 2.5 of them are studying in senior high school. In addition, based on the statistical center of Iran in 2019, more than 13,000 students were studying in Iranian schools overseas.

Table 1–10. Number of students in Iran for academic year 2019

Education level

Number in 2019 (people)

Iranian students in Iranian schools in foreign countries

Total

14,468,744

13,242

Primary School

(6 years of studying)

8,174,875

7,756

Junior High School

(7th, 8th, and 9th year of studying

3,351,817

3,115

Senior High School

(10th, 11th, and 12th year of studying

2,492.388

2,371

Source: Statistical Center of Iran available at:
https://www.amar.org.ir/

In Iran, there are more than 2,500 universities out of which 141 are tuition-free. More than 3.5 million students are studying in these universities at different education levels: more than 1.9 million male and 1.6 million female students. Around 2 million of the students are studying at the bachelor level, around 900,000 are studying at master, Ph.D., or professional doctorate levels, medical or otherwise. An additional 650,000 students are studying at the college level which is a 2–3-year course of study leading to an associate degree. There are more women who are studying at the bachelor level than men, 1,057,281 and 1,019,080 respectively. The opposite is true for the master level with more than 350,000 men and 300,000 women studying at this level. Similarly, about 110,000 women and 120,000 men are studying at the Ph.D. and professional doctorate levels. The following table shows, the detailed number of students from 2007–2018 at different educational levels⁹¹.

Table 1–11. University students based on education level, 2007–2018

Year

Total

Ph.D. and professional doctorate

Master

Bachelor

(Kardani) Diploma (College)

2008–2007

3391852

70567

146605

2407798

766882

2009–2008

3308692

72301

179880

2305928

750583

2010–2009

3790878

84695

238603

2432730

1034850

2011–2010

4116593

92011

290679

2680817

1053086

2012–2011

4459287

100796

406168

2922935

1029388

2013–2012

4435880

120753

463613

2918024

933490

2014–2013

4804037

142174

615181

2966170

1080512

2015–2014

4802721

166225

720806

2819662

1096028

2016–2015

4348383

193206

774766

2558066

822345

2017–2016

4073827

224987

764370

2335844

748626

2018–2017

3616114

229025

656287

2076361

654441

Source: Statistics Center of Iran available at: https://www.amar.org.ir/

1.4. Economic indicators of Iran

In Graph 1.5, the IMF statistics of Iran’s real GDP growth shows that in 2020 during the coronavirus Covid-19 pandemic, Iran’s real GDP growth rate has increased to 1.5%, which is 4.8% more than the world real GDP growth rate (–3.3%), 3.7% more than emerging and developing countries’ real GDP growth rate (–2.2%), and 6.2% more than advanced economies’ growth rate (–4.7%). Based on World Bank in 2018, Iran’s GDP in the US dollar was 454 billion dollars.

Graph 1–5. Iran’s real GDP growth (annual percent change),
in comparison with advanced, emerging and developing economies
and the world, 1980–2020

Source: International Monetary Fund

However, in the last decades, Iran experienced negative real GDP growth rates in many years. In the 1980s, as a result of the Islamic revolution in 1979 and the eight-year of Iran-Iraq war (1980–1988) Iran experienced the lowest real GDP growth rate in the last four decades which was –18.8%. From 1988 onwards the country experienced a relatively positive growth rate until 2012 when, due to the intensified world sanctions, Iran’s growth rate fell to –7.4%. In 2013, under the presidency of Hassan Rouhani, the growth rate started to increase and in 2015, after the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) Nuclear Agreement between Iran and the P5+1 was signed, Iran experienced a positive real GDP growth rate, in 2016 real GDP growth rate was 13.4% which was the highest for the country in the last three decades. After Donald Trump was elected as the president of the USA in 2017 and decided to exit from the nuclear agreement, Iran’s economic growth fell to –6.8% in 2019.

Moreover, GDP per capita in Iran has been continuously increasing from 1980 to 1990 when it reached its apex in the last four decades equaling 10,797 U. S. Dollars. This rate was almost 8 times more than emerging and developing countries’ per capita, 2 times more than world per capita, and half of the advanced economies’ per capita. However, in 1992, it suddenly experienced a drastic fall to 884 $.

Graph 1–6. Iran’s GDP per capita, current prices (U.S. dollars per capita),
in comparison with advanced economies, emerging and developing economies and world, 1980–2020

Source: International monetary fund

As clearly seen in illustration 1.6, from 1992 to 2000, GDP per capita in Iran experienced a steady increase and reached 5,648 U.S. dollars in 2000. In 2020, Iran’s per capita was 7554$ which is more than emerging and developing countries per capita (5,166$), almost half of the world per capita (11,058$), and 16% of the advanced economies’ per capita (47,051$). In 2019, the Statistics Center of Iran announced a yearly inflation rate of 38.6%. Food, drinks, and tobacco experienced a 52.1% inflation rate while Non-food products and services experienced a 32.9% inflation rate.

Graph 1–7. Iran’s inflation rate, average consumer prices
(annual percent change), in comparison with advanced economies, emerging and developing economies and world, 1980–2020

Source: International monetary fund

Chart 1.7 clearly shows that during the last four decades, Iran experienced high inflation rates, but in the years 1985 (4.4%), 1990 (9%), 2016 (9.1%) and 2017 (9.6%) has experienced relatively a low inflation rate. In 1995, Iran’s inflation reached 49.3% which is the highest amount in forty years. According to the IMF inflation rate of Iran in 2020 was 36.5% as compared to the world’s inflation rate of 3.2%, emerging and developing countries’ 5.1%, and advanced economies’ 0.7%.

According to IMF, the unemployment rate of Iran in the last thirty years has always been more than 10% except for the year 1996 which was 9.1%, in 2001, this rate reached 16.6% which is the highest in the last three decades. IMF has announced a 10.8% unemployment rate for Iran in 2020⁹².

Graph 1–8. Iran’s unemployment rate (%), in comparison with advanced economies, 1990–2020

Source: International monetary fund

Employment in the major sectors of economic activity shows that the service sector with 50% has the highest share of employment, next is an industry with 32.9% and agriculture with 17.1%. Of those who are employed, 55.9% are working more than 44 hours per week.

2. FORMS, SCALE AND DIRECTION OF EMIGRATION FROM IRAN

In general, migration denotes leaving one’s country to live in another country. At times, this movement can also be internal, which is inside the boundaries of the country. Countries use different definitions for migration and the foreign-born children of the emigrants, as second or third-generation migrants, may not be considered as citizens. To understand migration, the first step is to start with the numbers and statistics; we should have a clear understanding of scales, flow, and patterns of migration, which helps us to better understand and plan different scenarios in the future. Migration patterns vary for different regions, and in some countries for example the Persian Gulf countries (Gulf Cooperation Council GCC, except Oman and Saudi Arabia) it has a huge impact on population changes⁹³.

Today, due to the political, social, economic, and technological changes, migration has become one of the main parts of the process of globalization. The more our world becomes globalized, the more our social, economic, and spiritual lives are influenced by the process. As stated before, in 2020, almost 272 million international migrants (3.5% of the world’s population equal to 1 in every 30 people in the world and showing a 0.7% increase as of 2000) exist in the world, 74% of whom are within the working-age of 20–64 years old; depicting an increase of 122 million from 2000⁹⁴. More than 82 million migrants are living in Europe, 84 million are residing in Asia and almost 59 million international migrants are living in North America. In 2019, High-income countries with 176 million international migrants have had more than 65% of the stock of migrants, while almost 82 million migrants were residing in middle-income countries, and another 13 million were living in low-income countries⁹⁵.

The main migration flows in the world are taken from the statistics of international datasets mainly UN DESA and OECD. The UN DESA data was last updated in 2015 when data were received from 45 countries. OECD data has been collected since 2000 and shows that the inflow of migration to OECD countries has grown from 3.8 million to 7 million during the 2000 to 2016 period, where Germany followed by USA and UK are the top recipients of international migrants. The top three countries of origin of migrants are India (17.5 million), Mexico (11.8 million), and China (10.7 million). On the other hand, the USA with 50.7 million immigrants is the top destination for international migrants and has stayed the main country of destination since 1970. Besides, the number of foreign births in this country has increased by four times since 1970 to 51 million in 2019, and Germany as the second host country has also experienced an increase in the number of international migrants from 8.9 million in 2000 to 13.1 million in 2019⁹⁶.

2.1. Migration patterns of Iran for the last 70 years

The subsequent pattern of emigration due to socio-economic and political reasons is divided into four phases: emigration from 1950 to1979, from 1979 to 1995, from 1995 to 2009⁹⁷, and from 2009 to the present including both forced and voluntary emigration from the country. Although many factors influencing the migration during each period overlap in all three phases, the significance of causes in every phase is different.

After the world war and in the early 50s, Iran’s economy was experiencing a huge change because of the revenues received from the oil export, which caused the society to move from traditionalism to modernization. During this period, the government needed highly educated workers; therefore, it provided financial support for many of the students to study abroad. In addition, many of the families who were now placed in the middle and upper middle class sent their children overseas for higher education in order to have socio-economic and political privileges upon their return. America, England, West Germany, France, Austria, and Italy were the main destination countries for Iranian students during this phase. However, In the early years of the Islamic revolution at the end of the 70s, many of these students’ families emigrated and joined their children. Furthermore, in the second phase of emigration due to the Islamic revolution in 1979 and the Iran-Iraq war (1980–1988) Iran’s economic, social and political structure underwent radical changes, many of students who emigrated in the first phase with the intention of returning to Iran, never returned and stayed in the western countries and constituted a huge pool of highly educated and highly skilled migrants in western countries who did not think that this would be a permanent settlement. In addition to those who never returned, many highly educated, and highly skilled Iranians emigrated, and the brain drain in the country gained momentum.

Emigration of highly skilled and educated people also continued in the third phase from 1995 to 2009. In this period, in addition to many individuals who had lower education levels, the number of refugees and asylum seekers also increased. The number of refugees and asylum seekers also drastically increased since the controversial Iranian presidential election in 2009 and the green movement followed by the protests in Iran. During this period Iran experienced a huge socio-economic crisis, therefore, many rich families invested their money abroad and bought assets mainly in neighboring countries such as Turkey, Emirate, etc., and they also sent their children overseas to escape the unfavorable socio-economic atmosphere in the country and problems such as military service, university entrance examination, etc. Moreover, in the last decade, Iran’s currency lost its power by almost 25 times, inflation rate and unemployment increased, and emigration of labor migrants to neighboring countries such as Iraq or Iraqi Kurdistan started to grow. In the table below, the four phases of emigration, the reasons for emigration, and those who emigrated in each phase are described in brief.

Table 2–1. Iran’s migration patterns for the last 70 years

Phases of Emigration

Reasons for emigration

Who emigrated?

First phase 1950–1979

— Slow economic recovery after the world war

— Restarting the oil production

— Students who received scholarships from the government.

— Students from middle and upper-middle-class families who were self-financed.

— Students’ families joined them at the end of this phase that coincided with the early days of the revolution.

— Ethnic and religious minorities.

— Government and military workers.

Second phase 1979–1995

— Islamic revolution in 1979

— Mohammadreza Shah Pahlavi was overthrown

— Socialists and liberals who left the country at first.

— Men who escaped military service during the Iran-Iraq war.

— Young women because of the gender restrictions such as wearing veil, education limits and etc.

— Many professionals, professors, academics, entrepreneurs.

— Ethnic and religious minorities.

— Government and military workers.

Third phase 1995–2009

— Economic crisis

— Human rights violations

— Lost opportunities

— Discriminations

— Highly skilled and educated people.

— Individuals with lower education.

— Refugees and asylum seekers.

Fourth phase 2009-to the present

— Controversial Iranian presidential election in 2009

— Green movement

— Socio-economic crisis

— Students (self-financed)

— Refugees and asylum seeker

— Socio-political activists

— Rich families

— Labor migration (beginning)

2.2. Scale and direction of emigration from Iran (1990–2019)

Emigration from Iran has always been a serious issue for Iranian governments, but the lack of proper and precise statistics and information has made it difficult for us to understand the exact number of Iranian immigrants in the world. Not only is this information