The Squeeze: Oil, Money and Greed in the 21st Century
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Primed by his experiences with Brent Spar and Nigeria, Watts put together a list of tasks under the heading ‘Reputation Management’. For Watts, Brent Spar had been ‘a life-changing experience … We had done a technically excellent job but we had all missed the big trick. A time bomb was ticking – we missed it and we all thought we were doing our best … We never dreamt we would get that much attention.’ But if Brent Spar was Watt’s ‘big wake-up call’, he found that Nigeria ‘keeps us awake all the time’. By April 1996 he had compiled a list of initiatives, including ‘Ethics, Human Rights, Political Involvement, and the key items for the review of the Business Principles’. The ‘stewardship over Shell’s reputation’ was Watts’s priority.
Greenpeace’s campaign against the oil companies had focused on Shell’s exploration in the West Shetland islands. Ignoring the environmental lobby, Herkströter realised, was pointless. The initiative, he noted, had been seized by BP’s John Browne. Spotting the tide of opinion, Browne had, amid fanfare, delivered a speech at Stanford University urging the world to ‘begin to take precautionary action now’ to protect the environment. Shell’s directors agreed to embrace the same ideology. The corporation crafted public statements promoting its intention to be more open, to acknowledge human rights and to protect the environment by including renewable energy projects in its core business plan. In the future, said Herkströter, Shell would engage with Greenpeace to discuss the reduction of greenhouse gases in coal gasification and biofuels. Satisfied that he had fulfilled the public relations requirements, Herkströter approved the purchase of one fifth of Canada’s Athabasca tar sands for C$27 million, a relative pittance. The total estimated reserves were 1,701 billion barrels of oil. Shell anticipated extracting 179 billion barrels. Exploitation of the tar sands was uneconomic while oil was at $15 a barrel, but would be profitable once the price hit $40, although the process offended Shell’s newfound commitment to protect the environment. The tar’s extraction would require the felling of 54,000 square miles of forest, an area the size of New York state, and as a consequence wildlife would be killed and water polluted. Huge amounts of power would be required to create the steam or hot water needed to separate the bitumen from the clay, and more power and chemicals were required to separate the light petroleum from the bitumen. The whole process created three times more carbon than conventional oil operations. In The Hague, the purchase was mentioned as manifesting Shell’s ability to play both sides of the argument.
At the end of 1997, Herkströter retired. Mark Moody-Stuart, his successor, was dissatisfied with his inheritance. Appointed as ‘Mr Continuity’, Moody-Stuart, a Cambridge geologist and a Quaker who loved sailing, regarded his predecessor’s changes as timely but ineffectual. Few of the reforms had materialised. ‘Shell needs drastic remedial measures,’ he said, while fearing that the majority of Dutch directors would resist even the appointment of senior directors from outside the corporation. Shell had already missed out on two important investments. Approached by the governments of Angola and Azerbaijan to develop their oil, the company had refused requests for preliminary cash bonuses, and the opportunities were seized by BP and Exxon. Under Herkströter, Moody-Stuart lamented, Shell had even ignored the middle way. Adrift and unacclimatised to the new world, Shell had allowed its long-nurtured relationships with the governments of Oman, Nigeria and Brunei to deteriorate, and earnings were falling. In 1998 the company’s profits were $5.146 billion, compared to $8.031 billion in 1997. ‘There will be a coming crisis if we don’t change,’ warned Moody-Stuart. ‘Change is a pearl beyond price.’ The obstacles were Shell’s fragmented culture, divided management and entrenched country barons who had successfully frustrated Herkströter’s reforms. To many British employees, the Dutch engineers’ arrogance was stultifying. Convinced of their superiority, they regarded their rivals at Exxon, Chevron and especially BP with measured contempt. Yet some refused appointments in unpleasant oilfields, preferring to remain in the comfort of European and American offices, focused on investment and process rather than practical work on the ground. Convinced of the righteousness of science and engineering, the LNG department had seriously advocated building a terminal near the Bay Bridge in San Francisco.
‘I’m clearing out the cupboard,’ Moody-Stuart announced, planning instant surgery. Offices around the world were closed and country chairmen demoted, 4,000 staff were dismissed, 40 per cent of the chemicals plants sold, $4.5 billion of bad investments written off, capital spending cut by one third and, most dramatically, American Shell lost its independence. Appallingly managed and beyond financial control, US Shell represented 22 per cent of the company’s assets, yet contributed only 2.6 per cent of its earnings. Walter van de Vijver, a 42-year-old engineer, was dispatched to integrate the American company with its European owner. The cost of Moody-Stuart’s surgery was huge. Shell’s net income fell by 95 per cent, from $7.7 billion in 1997 to $350 million in 1998. There was little optimism that things would improve. The oil price in 1998, Moody-Stuart believed, was ‘likely to stay at $10’, and the likelihood of it going above $15 was ‘low’. At those prices, Shell’s profits, like BP’s and Exxon’s, were certain to fall further.
Moody-Stuart’s parallel agenda was to reform Shell’s ‘Business Principles’. A team had been working since September 1997 to develop a five-year strategy to resolve dilemmas involving human rights, global climate change and environmental problems. A larger question was whether any of these activities made sense in a ‘world of $10 oil’. Moody-Stuart was emphatic that his strategy was to generate profits ‘while contributing to the well-being of the planet and its people’. By then Watts had completed his study to alter Shell’s reputation. To boost employees’ self-esteem and to celebrate the ‘transformation process’, Moody-Stuart agreed that Watts, the new head of exploration and production, should stage a stunt. At a conference of 600 Shell executives in Maastricht in June 1998, Watts was propelled onto the stage in a spaceship, dressed in a spacesuit. ‘I have seen the future and it was great,’ he yelled to his audience, all of whom were wearing yellow T-shirts emblazoned with the slogan ‘15 per cent growth’. The onlookers were, remarked one eyewitness, ‘gobsmacked’ by Watts’s attempt to remake his ‘dour, pedantic image’. Everyone understood his agenda, however: Shell’s reserves were falling, and targets needed to be stretched. Managers were formally urged to ‘improve our effectiveness’. The message was ‘improve the score card’. At the end of his presentation, Watts urged his flock to sing Beethoven’s ‘Ode to Joy’: ‘Somewhat over the top,’ Moody-Stuart admitted. ‘We all do foolish things occasionally.’ Galvanising morale had been important. The oil majors were facing a torrid time. Those that failed, Moody-Stuart knew, would be buried alive. Executives from four American oil companies – Mobil, Amoco, Arco and Texaco – had approached Shell seeking mergers or to be bought. Shell’s split structure made that impossible. The company, Moody-Stuart knew, needed a counterplot to resist the unexpected challenge posed by BP.
FIVE The Star
John Browne understood oil better than most. Shell’s Mark Moody-Stuart, Chevron’s David O’Reilly and Exxon’s Lee Raymond could not match Browne’s intellect and bravado, but none had as much to prove. Employed by BP since leaving Cambridge University, the son of a BP executive who had met his Romanian mother, a survivor of Auschwitz, in post-war Germany, Browne understood that trouble and taboos had been inherent within BP since its creation. During his youth he had lived with his parents in Iran and had witnessed the company’s arrogance and subsequent humiliation. The industry’s rollercoastering battles ever since encouraged his taste for audacious gambles to rebuild a conglomerate lacking geographical logic and natural roots.
BP was founded on disobedience and survived by maverick deeds. The original sinner was William Knox D’Arcy, a wealthy Australian who arrived in Persia in 1901 on a hunch that oil could be discovered there. D’Arcy negotiated a 60-year concession over 480,000 square miles of desert. For seven years his team drilled unsuccessfully across an area twice the size of Texas, until in 1908 he was ordered by Burmah Oil, a Scottish investor, to stop. Having started yet another test bore D’Arcy’s team ignored the message and, detecting a strong smell of gas, struck oil. There was no natural reason why that fortuitous discovery should have evolved into the formation of a famous company. Culturally, the directors of the new Anglo-Persian Oil Company based in Glasgow were embarrassingly ignorant about their faraway asset. In contrast to the American oil companies which had spawned an integrated market built on discoveries in Texas and across the prairies, Anglo-Persian, which became BP, was a colonial concession sponsored by the British government. Managed by retired military officers recruited particularly from the Indian army, its staff clung to their suzerainty. Amateurs in marketing and untrained to supervise refineries and chemical industries, they aspired to be gentlemen, and were generally indifferent to indigenous politicians, especially Arabs and Iranians, whom they regarded as inferior. Unlike Shell’s country chairmen, soaked in local cultures and enjoying rapport with host governments, BP’s managers carelessly alienated their hosts, offhandedly oblivious of Iraq’s and Iran’s vast oil wealth.
Little changed before the nationalisation of BP’s oilfields in Iraq in 1951. Sir Eric Drake, the corporation’s conceited chairman, assumed that the confiscation would be compensated by increasing oil prices and the discovery of new reserves in Libya, Nigeria and Abu Dhabi, or by expanding into petrochemicals and shipping. Over the next 20 years, BP balanced the escalating demands of the Shah of Iran, the bellicosity of OPEC and Arab nationalism, especially in Libya, by finding new oil in Alaska in 1968 and the North Sea in 1970. The problem was the directors’ lack of commitment to exploration. The discovery of a new field, noted the exploration department in 1971, evoked the reaction, ‘What on earth are we going to do with all this oil?’ Terry Adams, BP’s director in Abu Dhabi, was expected to embody that casual attitude. To finance a pipeline in Alaska, Adams was ordered in early 1973 to sell half of BP’s share in Abu Dhabi’s offshore interests to a Japanese company for $736 million. ‘This is top secret, none of the locals need to know,’ BP’s manager Roger Bexon told him, referring to Sheikh Zaid, the leader of the state. In his anger after the sale was announced, Sheikh Zaid nationalised half of the Anglo-Japanese investment. The Japanese never believed that BP was unaware of the impending confiscation, and the Abu Dhabians griped about BP’s lack of respect. Insouciantly, the British pleaded ignorance, underestimating the profoundly negative consequence of their arrogance.
Arab irritation compounded BP’s problems in the region after the 1973 war. In succession, the company’s oilfields in Kuwait and Libya were nationalised. Overnight, BP’s plight was dire; the company had become entirely dependent on the discovery of oil in Alaska and imminent production in the North Sea, and it had fallen in rank from membership of the Big Three to seventh among the Seven Sisters. Morale was flagging, and there were even fears that BP faced extinction. Unlike the precise management processes at Chevron, Mobil and Exxon, which ran in harmony regardless of the identity of the individual chief executive, BP’s direction depended upon the chairman’s vision. ‘There are no sacred cows,’ declared Peter Walters, appointed chairman in 1981, who advocated retrenchment. BP’s focus was to be entirely oil. Following Exxon and Shell, Walters slowly reversed the diversification into non-oil businesses and ordered a $6 billion sale of all the nutrition manufacturers and mineral interests. He seemed unable to do much more to salvage the company from the morass. Impaired by the British government’s nonchalance, BP was crippled by debts, aggravated by the government’s order to repurchase about 10 per cent of the company’s shares from the Kuwaiti government which had been bought during a disastrous flotation. In an industry dominated by Exxon and Shell, BP had hit the buffers, destabilised by debt. Walters never recovered his self-confidence.
Two BP directors in America regarded Walters’s cuts and style as merely scratching the surface rather than offering a revolution. In 1983, Bob Horton, a brash 46-year-old fellow of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and his 35-year-old deputy John Browne had arrived at BP’s American headquarters in Cleveland, Ohio, to supervise BP’s 54 per cent investment in Sohio, the successor to the Standard Oil Company of Ohio, the original John D. Rockefeller corporation. The purchase had given BP an entrée into Alaska, but London had failed to prevent the American directors buying a copper-mining company, wasting $6 billion of Alaskan profits. ‘Sohio’s completely out of control,’ exclaimed Horton. ‘They’re losing $1 billion a year.’ Originally acquired in 1970, Sohio was Horton’s platform to prove his credentials as Walters’s successor. As head of BP chemicals in 1980, he had closed 20 plants and fired two thirds of the workforce. The cure at Sohio in May 1987 was to buy total ownership for $7.9 billion (£2.5 billion) and dismiss swathes of staff. Sohio, Horton and Browne proudly announced, would earn profits of $560 million within two years. Renamed BP America, it represented 53 per cent of BP’s total assets. From Ohio, the warts of BP’s culture in London were glaring. Deprived of courage, hope and energy, BP could only be resuscitated if the employees’ historical aversion to risk was replaced by American entrepreneurship. Their successful remedy in Cleveland, Horton and Browne decided, should be applied to the whole company after they returned to London in 1989.
Like most oil men, Horton and Browne believed in 1989 that ‘demand had peaked’, and oil would remain cheap because high prices stunted demand. Exxon, Mobil, Chevron and other more powerful competitors argued that prices were unpredictable, and survival depended upon cutting costs. Horton encouraged Walters to follow the herd. ‘BP cannot survive with this culture,’ he told Walters after listing eleven layers of management. ‘It’s sclerotic. Get rid of the brigadier belt. Too many have a vested interest to sabotage change.’ Starting from scratch, said Horton, BP needed to be repositioned and to duplicate Shell’s ‘wonderful worldwide brand’. Browne, as the new chief executive of exploration, echoed that criticism. In June 1989 he commissioned a presentation for investors in London and at the Rockefeller Center in New York. ‘This is dreadful,’ he said after previewing the slides. ‘We’re declining.’ BP’s access to 70 billion barrels of reserves had dropped to four billion, and were not being replaced. Production was falling from 1.5 million barrels a day to below one million. While its rival Shell had successfully retained profitable oil and gas fields in Nigeria, Oman, Malaysia, Brunei and Holland, BP would go out of business unless it found new, big prospects. Tom Hamilton, the American chief for international exploration, was told by Browne to present a scenario for a new strategy. ‘I’m going away with my family on holiday,’ explained Hamilton. ‘Take the company plane and come back early,’ ordered Browne. ‘I’ll need 90 days to do it,’ replied Hamilton. ‘You’ve got three days to calculate the best odds to discover more oil,’ replied Browne. In September 1989, Browne commissioned new exploration operations in Yemen, Ethiopia, Vietnam, Angola, Gabon, Congo, South Korea and the Gulf of Mexico.
Few doubted the need for brutal surgery. Peter Walters’s retirement in early 1990 provided the opportunity for change. Persuaded by Bob Horton’s presentation about his achievements and by his argument in favour of a cultural revolution, the board unanimously picked ‘Horton the Hatchet’ as BP’s new chairman and chief executive. ‘Project 1990,’ said Horton, ‘is my personal crusade to revolutionise the company.’ Twelve thousand employees would be dismissed and $7 billion of assets sold. Horton espoused drama as a resolution to the crisis.
Eighty-two committees at BP’s London headquarters in Finsbury Square were axed, leaving just four. The eleven layers of management were also reduced to four. To inspire enthusiasm and to reincarnate BP’s 120,000 staff as open-minded and freethinking, Horton participated in ‘cultural change workshops’ with 40 senior staff to discuss the ‘new vision and values’. His propagandists praised ‘the terrific buzz which motivated us to get the change moving’, but others carped that the balance between pain and progress was wrong. Horton had chosen Jack Welch’s operation at General Electric as his model for a centralised, focused corporation. In the oil business, no one could ignore Lawrence Rawl, the chairman of Exxon. Although Exxon was, in Horton’s opinion, ‘wildly overmanned and too engineer- and lawyer-led’, Rawl consistently produced successful results. Horton’s public predictions, accompanying jerky attempts to build solid corporate foundations, compared poorly with Rawl’s rare but pertinent statements about Exxon’s unflustered deliberations. As oil prices gyrated in late 1990 from $40 down to $31, Rawl cautioned that uncertainty made investment decisions difficult: ‘This is a long-term business. We cannot turn the money off and on every time someone clears his throat in the Middle East or elsewhere as the price goes up and down.’
The ‘cough’ was Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. America’s oil industry was still struggling. Oil production had fallen every year since 1986 by between 2.5 and 6.5 per cent. Banks remained reluctant to lend because of the continuing uncertainties. The oil business, it was said, was as safe as rolling dice in Las Vegas. Even Exxon lacked sufficient money and personnel to instantly boost production. The US government offered no leadership to fashion a new energy policy. In 1988 America had believed that George Bush Snr was the oil industry’s dream candidate, although as Ronald Reagan’s vice president he had offered it no help, and he had in fact campaigned for the presidency as an environmentalist. During his single term, Bush would dilute an Energy Bill giving the industry minor tax relief, would not limit imports, and would cancel the sale of eight offshore leases. Texans, surrounded by abandoned derricks, were angry that the president sent the army to Kuwait out of fear of losing 1.5 million barrels of oil a day, but that no one appeared to care about Texas’s similar losses since 1986. Their anger spread to contempt for east coast liberals and Californian environmentalists who nevertheless still harboured a sense of entitlement that energy should be abundant and cheap. Hoping for a cautious recovery from that economic devastation, Horton concluded that ‘the fundamental realities point to higher oil prices’. BP, he decided, needed to change fast.
The hyperactive Horton lacked Rawl’s gravitas. He misunderstood Exxon’s foundations, created in around 1865, and built on vast untapped reserves of oil. Ever since John D. Rockefeller’s retirement in 1897, the corporation had been led by domineering personalities moulded by Exxon’s character and caution. Unlike that prototype, Horton was not fashioning himself as a conservative, sober, confident chieftain, but was duplicating the caricature of a brash American chief executive. After four years in Cleveland, he had forgotten that BP was a British Boys’ Club, uniting in a collegiate atmosphere people who had lived, worked and played together for 25 years. Running too fast, he was failing to implement his own plans. Instead of focusing on the cuts, he ordered BP to expand despite the continued recession. At a time when the price of oil was about $16 a barrel and slipping, he expected that it would rise to $21 or even $25. Convinced of his own genius, he welcomed personal publicity. Impulsive and careless with his language, he told the first journalist invited into his office: ‘I’m afraid because I am blessed by my good brain which is in advance of my colleagues’, I tend to get to the right answer rather quicker and more often than most people.’ (He would forever regret this remark: ‘It came out wrong, and I have had it hung round my neck ever since – never ever did I think I was a genius, far from it.’) The cover of Management Today featured Horton holding a hatchet, while Forbes magazine photographed him sitting on a throne. There was gossip within BP’s headquarters about Horton asking his secretary, ‘Should I go to a charm school?’ His insensitivity bewildered his colleagues. Newspapers began reporting Horton’s unpopularity, one asking: ‘When Robert Horton and his wife return from their holiday in Turkey, many BP staff will hope that their plane will crash.’ David Simon, a managing director, was told that Horton concealed such criticisms from his mother. ‘Good God,’ exclaimed Simon. ‘Horton has a mother!’ Another executive told Horton to his face, ‘Why don’t you bugger off to Chessington Zoo and watch the gorillas and monkeys?’ ‘Why?’ asked Horton. ‘Because you might learn a lot.’
Relations between Horton and his fellow directors were not improved after they arrived at Heathrow airport on 23 June 1992 to fly to Alaska for a board meeting. Horton was overheard having an unseemly argument with the BA employee at the check-in desk. The atmosphere at the board meeting was fractious. BP would record its first quarterly net loss of £650 million ($1.24 billion) after its income fell by 82 per cent, compared to a £415 million profit in 1991. The debt had increased to $16 billion and the share price had slid from 332 pence in June 1990 to 209 in June 1992. ‘We’re bleeding cash like crazy,’ said one director, querying why the proposed cuts had not materialised, especially at the refineries. ‘You can count on BP’s DNA to find an inspired route out of the trouble,’ countered a Horton sympathiser, only to be crushed by another director: ‘Exxon and Chevron don’t get into trouble.’ Oblivious to the storm, Horton insisted during the board meeting that BP should pay a normal dividend to please investors. ‘Could you wait outside?’ he was asked by the banker Lord Ashburton. Beyond his hearing, the reckoning was swift. ‘He’s spent too much time with ambassadors and playing politics in Washington,’ said one voice. ‘And he’s spent too little time on the details of the business,’ added another. ‘Bob is ambitious, abrasive and arrogant,’ concluded a third. ‘We need a change.’ The mood was summarised by Ashburton: ‘There’s been a build-up of small flakes which has become quite a lot of snow on the ground.’ Three weeks later the non-executive directors, including Ashburton and Peter Sutherland, met at Barings bank in the City on a Saturday morning to decide Horton’s fate.
The unsuspecting chief executive was summoned the following Wednesday. ‘Robert,’ said Ashburton, ‘the board has decided to ask for your resignation.’ ‘My God,’ exclaimed Horton, shocked that his fate was even being discussed. ‘I was brought down as laughable,’ he reflected. ‘I got a head of steam. My mistake was believing change could be done so fast. I should have shown more tenderness.’ The public announcement was stripped of any charitable sentiment. ‘Hatchet Horton’s’ decapitation matched the cultural change he had championed, except that his dismissal was interpreted by outsiders as the final collapse of a stodgy giant. BP, rival oil companies believed, would shortly be receiving the last rites.
Horton was replaced by David Simon, a trusted team player with expertise in refining and marketing. ‘This is about the style of running the company at the top,’ Simon said about his predecessor. ‘It’s not that I don’t have an ego. It’s just that it’s not terribly important to me.’ Simon, a cerebral linguist, acknowledged his limitations. ‘Look, chaps,’ he frequently smiled during meetings, ‘you know I’m not very bright, so could you explain this in simple language?’ Six weeks after Horton’s dismissal, BP halved its dividend. Horton’s intention to copy Exxon and centralise BP was reversed. Power was devolved to trusted subordinates who would be accountable to business units, an innovation introduced by McKinsey & Company, the management consultants. That suited John Browne, the head of exploration and production and the heir apparent. Although Browne’s admirers described an occasionally soft and lonely character, fond of ballet and opera and not inclined to socialise, he espoused confrontation to resolve problems. BP’s style, he believed, should not attempt to mimic Exxon’s. Hierarchies and conformity were to be destroyed, and to encourage initiative there would be informal lunches, no lofty titles, and meetings between forklift drivers and accountants. Outsiders were greeted by charm, but employees understood the ground rules of a self-styled alpha male: ‘One mistake and you’re out.’ His lesson from Sohio was the importance of consolidation and cuts.