Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania to the Inhabitants of the British Colonies
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It is pretty well known on this continent, that Ireland has, with a regular consistence of injustice, been cruelly treated by ministers in the article of pensions; but there are some alarming circumstances relating to that subject, which I wish to have better known among us. 41 The revenue of the crown there, arises principally from the excise granted "for pay of the army, and defraying other public charges in defence and preservation of the kingdom" – from the tonnage and additional poundage granted "for protecting the trade of the kingdom at sea, and augmenting the public revenue" from the hearth-money granted, as a "public revenue for public charges and expences." There are some other branches of the revenue, concerning which there is not any express appropriation of them for public service, but which were plainly so intended.
Of these branches of the revenue, the crown is only a trustee for the public. They are unalienable; they are inapplicable to any other purposes, but those for which they were established; and therefore are not legally chargeable with pensions.
There is another kind of revenue, which is a private revenue. This is not limited to any public uses; but the crown has the same property in it, that any person has in his estate. This does not amount at the most to fifteen thousand pounds a year, probably not to seven; and it is the only revenue that can legally be charged with pensions. If ministers were accustomed to regard the rights or happiness of the people, the pensions in Ireland would not exceed the sum just mentioned: but long since have they exceeded that limit, and in December, 1765, a motion was made in the House of Commons in that kingdom, to address his Majesty, on the great increase of pensions on the Irish establishment, amounting to the sum of £.158,685 in the last two years.
Attempts have been made to gloss over these gross incroachments, by this specious argument, – "That expending a competent part of the public revenue in pensions, from a principle of charity or generosity, adds to the dignity of the crown, and is, therefore, useful to the public." To give this argument any weight, it must appear that the pensions proceed from "charity or generosity" only – And that it "adds to the dignity of the crown" to act directly contrary to law.
From this conduct towards Ireland, in open violation of law, we may easily foresee what we may expect, when a minister will have the whole revenue of America, in his own hands, to be disposed of at his own pleasure. For all the monies raised by the late act are to be "applied, by virtue of warrants under the sign manual, countersigned by the high treasurer, or any three of the commissioners of the treasury." The "residue" indeed, is to be paid "into the receipt of the exchequer, and to be disposed of by parliament." So that a minister will have nothing to do but to take care that there shall be no "residue," and he is superior to all controul.
Besides the burden of pensions in Ireland, which have enormously encreased within these few years, almost all the offices, in that poor kingdom, have, since the commencement of the present century, and now are bestowed upon strangers. For though the merit of those born there justly raises them to places of high trust, when they go abroad, as all Europe can witness, yet he is an uncommonly lucky Irishman, who can get a good post in his native country.
When I consider the42manner in which that island has been uniformly depressed for so many years past, with this pernicious particularity of their parliament continuing43 as long as the crown pleases, I am astonished to observe such a love of liberty still animating that loyal and generous nation; and nothing can raise higher my idea of the integrity and public spirit of the people44 who have preserved the sacred fire of freedom from being extinguished though the altar, on which it burned, has been thrown down.
In the same manner shall we unquestionably be treated, as soon as the late taxes, laid upon us, shall make posts in the "government," and the "administration of justice," here, worth the attention of persons of influence in Great Britain. We know enough already to satisfy us of this truth. But this will not be the worst part of our case.
The principals in all great offices will reside in England, make some paltry allowance to deputies for doing the business here. Let any man consider what an exhausting drain this must be upon us, when ministers are possessed of the power of affixing what salaries they please to posts, and he must be convinced how destructive the late act must be. The injured kingdom, lately mentioned, can tell us the mischiefs of absentees; and we may perceive already the same disposition taking place with us. The government of New York has been exercised by a deputy. That of Virginia is now held so; and we know of a number of secretaryships, collectorships, and other offices held in the same manner.
True it is, that if the people of Great-Britain were not too much blinded by the passions, that have been artfully excited in their breasts, against their dutiful children, the colonists, these considerations would be nearly as alarming to them as to us. The influence of the crown was thought, by wise men many years ago, too great, by reason of the multitude of pensions and places bestowed by it; these have vastly increased since45 and perhaps it would be no difficult matter to prove that the people have decreased.
Surely, therefore, those who wish the welfare of their country, ought seriously to reflect what may be the consequence of such a new creation of offices, in the disposal of the crown. The army, the administration of justice, and the civil government here, with such salaries as the crown shall please to annex, will extend ministerial influence, as much beyond its former bounds, as the late war did the British dominions.
But whatever the people of Great-Britain may think on this occasion, I hope the people of these colonies will unanimously join in this sentiment, that the late act of parliament is injurious to their liberty; and that this sentiment will unite them in a firm opposition to it, in the same manner as the dread of the Stamp-act did.
Some persons may imagine the sums to be raised by it, are but small, and therefore may be inclined to acquiesce under it. A conduct more dangerous to freedom, as before has been observed, can never be adopted. Nothing is wanted at home but a precedent, the force of which shall be established, by the tacit submission of the colonies. With what zeal was the statute erecting the post-office, and another relating to the recovery of debts in America, urged and tortured, as precedents in the support of the Stamp-act, though wholly inapplicable. If the parliament succeeds in this attempt, other statutes will impose other duties. Instead of taxing ourselves as we have been accustomed to do from the first settlement of these provinces; all our useful taxes will be converted into parliamentary taxes on our importations; and thus the parliament will levy upon us such sums of money as they chuse to take, without any other limitation than their pleasure.
We know how much labour and care have been bestowed by these colonies, in laying taxes in such a manner, that they should be most easy to the people, by being laid on the proper articles; most equal, by being proportioned to every man's circumstances; and cheapest by the method directed for collecting them.
But parliamentary taxes will be laid on us without any consideration, whether there is any eassier mode. The only point regarded will be, the certainty of levying the taxes, and not the convenience of the people, on whom they are to be levied, and therefore all statutes on this head will be such as will be most likely, according to the favourite phrase, "to execute themselves."
Taxes in every free state have been, and ought to be as exactly proportioned, as is possible, to the abilities of those who are to pay them. They cannot otherwise be just. Even a Hottentot could comprehend the unreasonableness, of making a poor man pay as much for defending the property of a rich man, as the rich man pays himself.
Let any person look into the late act of parliament, and he will immediately perceive, that the immense estates of Lord Fairfax, Lord Baltimore,46 and our proprietors, which are amongst "his Majesty's other dominions" to be "defended, protected and secured" by that act will not pay a single farthing of the duties thereby imposed, except Lord Fairfax wants some of his windows glazed. Lord Baltimore, and our proprietors are quite secure, as they live in England.
I mention these particular cases as striking instances, how far the late act is a deviation from that principle of justice, which has so constantly distinguished our own laws on this continent.
The third consideration with our continental assemblies in laying taxes has been the method of collecting them. This has been done by a few officers under the inspection of the respective assemblies, with moderate allowances. No more was raised from the subject, than was used for the intended purposes. But by the late act, a minister may appoint as many officers as he pleases for collecting the taxes; may assign them what salaries he thinks "adequate" and they are to be subject to no inspection but his own.
In short, if the late act of parliament takes effect, these colonies must dwindle down into "common corporations," as their enemies in the debates concerning the repeal of the Stamp-act, strenuously insisted they were: and it is not improbable, that some future historians will thus record our fall.
"The eighth year of this reign was distinguished by a very memorable event, the American colonies then submitting for the first time, to be taxed by the British parliament. An attempt of this kind had been made two years before, but was defeated by the vigorous exertions of the several provinces in defence of their liberties. Their behaviour on that occasion rendered their name very celebrated for a short time all over Europe; all states being extremely attentive to a dispute between Great-Britain and so considerable a part of her dominions. For as she was thought to be grown too powerful by the successful conclusion of the late war she had been engaged in, it was hoped by many, that as it had happened before to other kingdoms, civil discords would afford opportunities of revenging all the injuries supposed to be received from her. However the cause of dissention was removed by a repeal of the statute, that had given offense. This affair rendered the submissive conduct of the colonies so soon after, the more extraordinary; there being no difference between the modes of taxation which they opposed, and that to which they submitted, but this, that by the first, they were to be continually reminded that they were taxed, by certain marks stampt on every piece of paper or parchment, they used. The authors of that statute triumphed greatly on this conduct of the colonies, and insisted that if the people of Great-Britain, had persisted in enforcing it, the Americans would have been in a few months so fatigued with the efforts of patriotism, that they would quickly have yielded obedience.
"Certain it is, that though they had before their eyes so many illustrious examples in their mother country, of the constant success attending firmness and perseverance in opposition to dangerous encroachments on liberty, yet they quietly gave up a point of the last importance. From thence the decline of their freedom began, and its decay was extremely rapid; for as money was always raised upon them by the parliament, their assemblies grew immediately useless and in a short time contemptible; and in less than one hundred years, the people sunk down into that tameness and supineness of spirit by which they still continue to be distinguished."
Et majores vestros et posteros cogitate.
Remember your ancestors and your posterity.
A FARMER.LETTER XI
Beloved Countrymen,
I have several times, in the course of these letters, mentioned the late act of parliament, as being the foundation of future measures injurious to these colonies; and the belief of this truth I wish to prevail, because I think it necessary to our safety.
A perpetual jealousy respecting liberty, is absolutely requisite in all free states. The very texture of their constitution, in mixt governments, demands it. For the cautions with which power is distributed among the several orders, imply, that each has that share which is proper for the general welfare, and therefore, that any further imposition mull be pernicious.47Machiavel employs a whole chapter in his discourses, to prove that a state, to be long lived, must be frequently corrected, and reduced to its first principles. But of all states that have existed, there never was any, in which this jealousy could be more proper than in these colonies. For the government here is not only mixt, but dependant, which circumstance occasions a peculiarity in its form, of a very delicate nature.
Two reasons induce me to desire, that this spirit of apprehension may be always kept up among us, in its utmost vigilance. The first is this, that as the happiness of these provinces indubitably consists in their connection with Great-Britain, any separation between them is less likely to be occasioned by civil discords, if every disgusting measure is opposed singly, and while it is new: for in this manner of proceeding, every such measure is most likely to be rectified. On the other hand, oppressions and dissatisfactions being permitted to accumulate – if ever the governed throw off the load, they will do more. A people does not reform with moderation. The rights of the subject therefore cannot be too often considered, explained, or asserted: and whoever attempts to do this, shews himself, whatever may be the rash and peevish reflections of pretended wisdom, and pretended duty, a friend to those who injudiciously exercise their power, as well as to them, over whom it is so exercised.
Had all the points of prerogative claimed by Charles I. been separately contested and settled in preceding reigns, his fate would in all probability have been very different, and the people would have been content with that liberty which is compatible with regal authority. But48 he thought, it would be as dangerous for him to give up the powers which at any time had been by usurpation exercised by the crown, as those that were legally vested in it. This produced an equal excess on the part of the people. For when their passions were excited by multiplied grievances, they thought it would be as dangerous for them, to allow the powers that were legally vested in the crown, as those which at any time had been by usurpation exercised by it. Acts, that might by themselves have been upon many considerations excused or extenuated, derived a contagious malignancy and odium from other acts, with which they were connected. They were not regarded according to the simple force of each, but as parts of a system of oppression. Every one therefore, however small in itself, being alarming, as an additional evidence of tyrannical designs. It was in vain for prudent and moderate men to insist, that there was no necessity to abolish royalty. Nothing less than the utter destruction of monarchy, could satisfy those who had suffered, and thought they had reason to believe, they always should suffer under it.
The consequences of these mutual distrusts are well known: But there is no other people mentioned in history, that I recollect, who have been so constantly watchful of their liberty, and so successful in their struggles for it, as the English. This consideration leads me to the second reason, why I "desire that the spirit of apprehension may be always kept up among us in its utmost vigilance."
The first principles of government are to be looked for in human nature. Some of the best writers have asserted, and it seems with good reason, that "government is founded on49opinion."
Custom undoubtedly has a mighty force in producing opinion, and reigns in nothing more arbitrarily than in public affairs. It gradually reconciles us to objects even of dread and detestation; and I cannot but think these lines of Mr. Pope, as applicable to vice in politics, as to vice in ethics.
'Vice is a monster of so horrid mien,As to be hated, needs but to be seen;Yet seen too oft, familiar with her face,We first endure, then pity, then embrace.'When an act injurious to freedom has been once done, and the people bear it, the repetition of it is most likely to meet with submission. For as the mischief of the one was found to be tolerable, they will hope that of the second will prove so too; and they will not regard the infamy of the last, because they are stained with that of the first.
Indeed, nations in general, are not apt to think until they feel; and therefore nations in general have lost their liberty: For as violations of the rights of the governed, are commonly not only specious,50 but small at the beginning, they spread over the multitude in such a manner, as to touch individuals but slightly. Thus they are disregarded.51 The power or profit that arises from these violations, centering in few persons, is to them considerable. For this reason the governors having in view their particular purposes, successively preserve an uniformity of conduct for attaining them. They regularly increase and multiply the first injuries, till at length the inattentive people are compelled to perceive the heaviness of their burdens. – They begin to complain and enquire – but too late. – They find their oppressors so strengthened by success, and themselves so entangled in examples of express authority on the part of their rulers, and of tacit recognition on their own part, that they are quite confounded: For millions entertain no other idea of the legality of power, than that it is founded on the exercise of power. They voluntarily fatten their chains, by adopting a pusillanimous opinion, "that there will be too much danger in attempting a remedy," or another opinion no less fatal, "that the government has a right to treat them as it does." They then seek a wretched relief for their minds, by persuading themselves, that to yield their obedience is to discharge their duty. The deplorable poverty of spirit, that prostrates all the dignity bestowed by divine providence on our nature – of course succeeds.
From these reflections I conclude, that every free State should incessantly watch, and instantly take alarm on any condition being made to the power exercised over them, innumerable instances might be produced to shew, from what slight beginnings the most extensive consequences have flowed: but I shall select two only from the history of England.
Henry the seventh was the first monarch of that kingdom, who established a standing body of armed men. This was a band of 50 archers, called yeomen of the guard: And this institution, notwithstanding the smallness of the number, was, to prevent discontent,52"disguised under the pretence of majesty and grandeur." In 1684, the standing forces were so much augmented, that Rapin says – "The King, in order to make his people fully sensible of their new slavery, affected to muster his troops, which amounted to 4000 well armed and disciplined men." I think our army, at this time, consists of more than seventy regiments.
The method of taxing by excise was first introduced amidst the convulsions of civil wars. Extreme necessity was pretended, and its short continuance promised. After the restoration, an excise upon beer, ale and other liquors, was granted to the53 King, one half in fee, the other for life, as an equivalent for the court of wards. Upon James the second's accession, the parliament54 gave him the first excise, with an additional duty on wine, tobacco, and some other things. Since the revolution it has been extended to salt, candles, leather, hides, hops, soap, paper, paste-board, mill-boards, scaleboards, vellum, parchment, starch, silks, calicoes, linens, stuffs, printed, stained, &c. wire, wrought plate, coffee, tea, chocolate, &c.
Thus a standing army and excise have, from the first slender origins, tho' always hated, always feared, always opposed, at length swelled up to their vast present bulk.
These facts are sufficient to support what I have said. 'Tis true that all the mischiefs apprehended by our ancestors from a standing army and excise, have not yet happened: but it does not follow from thence, that they will not happen. The inside of a house may catch fire, and the most valuable apartments be ruined, before the flames burst out. The question in these cases is not, what evil has actually attended particular measures – but what evil, in the nature of things, is likely to attend them. Certain circumstances may for some time delay effects, that were reasonably expected, and that must ensue. There was a long period, after the Romans had prorogued the command to55Q. Publilius Philo, before that example destroyed their liberty. All our kings, from the revolution to the present reign have been foreigners. Their ministers generally continued but a short time in authority;56 and they themselves were mild and virtuous princes.
A bold, ambitious Prince, possessed of great abilities, firmly fixed in the throne by descent, served by ministers like himself, and rendered either venerable or terrible by the glory of his successes, may execute what his predecessors did not dare to attempt. Henry IV. tottered in his seat during his whole reign. Henry V. drew the strength of the kingdom into France, to carry on his wars there, and left the Commons at home, protesting, "that the people were not bound to serve out of the realm."
It is true, that a strong spirit of liberty subsists at present in Great-Britain, but what reliance is to be placed in the temper of a people, when the prince is possessed of an unconstitutional power, our own history can sufficiently inform us. When Charles II. had strengthened himself by the return of the garrison of Tangier, "England (says Rapin) saw on a sudden an amazing revolution; saw herself stripped of all her rights and privileges, excepting such as the King should vouchsafe to grant her; and what is more astonishing, the English themselves delivered up these very rights and privileges to Charles II. which they had so passionately, and, if I may say it, furiously defended against the designs of Charles I." This happened only thirty-six years after this last prince had been beheaded.
Some persons are of opinion, that liberty is not violated, but by such open acts of force; but they seem to be greatly mistaken. I could mention a period within these forty years, when almost as great a change of disposition was produced by the secret measures of a long administration, as by Charles's violence. Liberty, perhaps is never exposed to so much danger, as when the people believe there is the least; for it may be subverted, and yet they not think so.
Public-disgusting acts are seldom practised by the ambitious, at the beginning of their designs. Such conduct silences and discourages the weak, and the wicked, who would otherways have been their advocates or accomplices. It is of great consequence, to allow those, who, upon any account, are inclined to favour them, something specious to say in their defence. The power may be fully established, though it would not be safe for them to do whatever they please. For there are things, which, at some times, even slaves will not bear. Julius Cæsar and Oliver Cromwell did not dare to assume the title of King. The grand Seignior dares not lay a new tax. The King of France dares not be a protestant. Certain popular points may be left untouched, and yet freedom be extinguished. The commonality of Venice imagine themselves free, because they are permitted to do, what they ought not. But I quit a subject, that would lead me too far from my purpose.
By the late act of parliament, taxes are to be levied upon us, for "defraying the charge of the administration of justice, the support of civil government – and the expences of defending his Majesty's dominions in America."
If any man doubts what ought to be the conduct of these colonies on this occasion, I would ask them these questions.
Has not the parliament expressly avowed their intention of raising money from us for certain purposes? Is not this scheme popular in Great-Britain? Will the taxes, imposed by the late act, answer those purposes? If it will, must it not take an immense sum from us? If it will not, is it to be expected, that the parliament will not fully execute their intention, when it is pleasing at home, and not opposed here? Must not this be done by imposing new taxes? Will not every addition, thus made to our taxes, be an addition to the power of the British legislature, by increasing the number of officers employed in the collection? Will not every additional tax therefore render it more difficult to abrogate any of them? When a branch of revenue is once established, does it not appear to many people invidious and undutiful, to attempt to abolish it? If taxes, sufficient to accomplish the intention of the Parliament, are imposed by the Parliament, what taxes will remain to be imposed by our assemblies? If no material taxes remain to be imposed by them, what must become of them, and the people they represent? 57 "If any person considers, these things, and yet not thinks our liberties are in danger, I wonder at that person's security."