Dio's Rome, Volume 3

The following is contained in the Forty-ninth of Dio's Rome.

How Caesar conquered Sextus and overthrew Lepidus (chapters 1-18).

How Ventidius conquered and slew Pacorus and expelled the Parthians, driving them across the Euphrates (chapters 19-21).

How Antony was defeated by the Parthians (chapters 22-33).

How Caesar subjugated the Pannonians (chapters 34-38).

How Antony by guile captured Artavasdes, the king of Armenia (chapters 39-41).

How the Portico of Paulus was consecrated (chapter 42).

How Mauritania Caesariensis became Roman property (chapters 43, 44).

Duration of time four years, in which there were the following magistrates here enumerated.

L. Gellius L. F. Poplicola, M. Cocceius Nerva. (B.C. 36 = a. u. 718.)

L. Cornificius L. F., Sextusi Pompeius Sexti F. (B.C. 35 = a. u. 719.)

M. Antonius M. F. (II), L. Scribonius L. F. Libo. (B.C. 34 = a. u. 720.)

Caesar (II), L. Volcacius L. F. Tullus. (B.C. 33 = a. u. 721.)

(BOOK 49, BOISSEVAIN.)

[B.C. 36 (a. u. 718)]

[-1-] This happened in the winter when Lucius Gellius and Cocceius Nerva became consuls. Caesar, when his fleet had been made ready and spring set in, started from Baise and coasted along Italy, having great hopes of encompassing Sicily on all sides. For he was sailing thither with many ships and those of Antony were already in the strait. Also Lepidus, though reluctantly, had promised to assist him. His greatest ground of confidence lay in the height of the vessels and the thickness of the timbers. They had been built unusually stout and unusually high so as to carry the largest number of marines possible; indeed, they were surmounted by towers, in order that the conflict might be waged from a higher point, as if from a wall: they were further intended to resist the rammings of antagonists and to bend aside their beaks by making the collision more violent. With such calculations Caesar was hastening to Sicily. As he was passing the promontory of Palinurus, so-called, a great storm fell upon him. This destroyed many ships, and Menas coming upon the rest in confusion burned a number and towed away the rest. And had he not again changed sides on the promise of immunity and through some other hopes, besides betraying the whole fleet that he commanded by receiving some triremes that simulated desertion, Caesar's voyage to Sicily on this occasion also would have proved fruitless. Menas's action was due to the fact that he was not allowed by Sextus to fight against Lepidus and was under suspicion in nearly every way. Caesar was then extremely glad to receive him, but trusted him no longer. He first repaired the damaged ships, freed the slaves that served on the triremes, and assigned the spare seamen, (many of whom when their vessels were destroyed in the wreck had dived and escaped by swimming) to Antony's fleet, which was short of men. Then he came to Lipara, and leaving there Agrippa and the ships, returned to the mainland with the intention of transporting the infantry across into Sicily, when an opportunity should arise.

[-2-] On learning this Sextus himself lay quietly at anchor off Messana, watching for his attempt to cross, and ordered Demochares to anchor opposite Agrippa at Mylae. This pair spent most of the time in testing each other's strength according as each one would temporarily give way a little; yet they did not dare to risk an engagement with their entire armaments. They were not acquainted with each other's forces and on both sides they figured everything about their opponents as being greater and more terrible than the reality. Finally Agrippa comprehended that it was not advantageous for him to delay,—for the adherents of Sextus, occupying a friendly position, had no need to hurry,—and taking the best of his ships set out for Mylae to spy out the numbers of the enemy. As he could not see them all and no one of them manifested any inclination to come out into the open sea, he despised them, and on his return made preparations to sail against Mylae on the following day with all his ships. Demochares came to much, the same conclusion. He had the idea that the ships which had approached him were the only ones, and seeing that they sailed very slowly by reason of their size he sent for Sextus by night and made preparations to assail Lipara itself. When day broke, they were sailing against each other, expecting to meet inferior numbers. [-3-] As they came near together and each contrary to his expectations saw that his opponents were many more than he had thought, they were at first both alike thrown into confusion, and some even backed water. Then, fearing flight more than battle, because in the latter they hoped to prevail, but in the former they expected to be utterly destroyed, they moved toward each other and joined in conflict on the sea. The one side surpassed in the number of its ships, the other in the experience of its sailors: to the first the height of the vessels, the thickness of the catheads and the towers were a help, but charges straight ahead furthered the progress of the second, and the strength of Caesar's marines was matched by the daring of their antagonists; for the majority of them, being deserters from Italy, were quite desperate. As a result, possessing the mutual advantages and deficiencies which I have mentioned, they had equal power contributed by their evenly balanced equipment, and so their contest was close for a very long period. The followers of Sextus alarmed their opponents by the way they dashed up the waves: and they knocked holes in some ships by assailing them with a rush and bursting open the parts outside the oars, but as they were struck from the towers in the combat and brought alongside by grappling irons, they suffered no less harm than they inflicted. The Caesarians, also, when they came into close conflict and had crossed over to the hostile ships, proved superior; but as the enemy leaped out into the sea whenever the boats sank, and by their swimming well and being lightly equipped succeeded easily in climbing upon others, the attackers were at a corresponding disadvantage. Meantime the rapidity with which the ships of the one party could sail proved an offset to the solidity of those on the other side, and the heaviness of the latter counterbalanced the agility of the former. [-4-] Late in the day, near nightfall, Caesar's party finally conquered, but instituted no pursuit: the reason as it appears to me and may be conjectured from probability was that they could not overtake the fleeing ships and were afraid of running aground in the shallows, with which they were unacquainted, near the coast. Some say that Agrippa because he was battling for Caesar and not for himself thought it sufficient merely to rout his adversaries. For he had been in the habit of saying to his most intimate associates that the majority of those holding sovereign power wish no one to display more ability than themselves; and that they attended personally to nearly all such matters as afford them a conquest without effort, but assign the less favorable and more complicated business to others. And if they ever are forced to entrust some choice enterprise to their assistants, they are irritated and displeased at the latter's renown. They do not pray that these subordinates may be defeated and fare badly, yet they do not choose to have them win a complete success and secure glory from it. His advice therefore was that the man who intended to survive must relieve his masters of the annoyance incident to such undertakings and still reserve for them the successful completion of the work. As for me, I know that the above is regularly true and that Agrippa paid attention to it, but I am not setting down that on that particular occasion this was the cause of his failure to pursue. For he was not able, no matter how much he might have desired it, to follow up the foe.

[-5-] While the naval battle was in progress, Caesar, as soon as he perceived that Sextus was gone from Messana and that the strait was destitute of guards, did not let slip this opportunity of the war but immediately embarked on Antony's vessels and crossed to Tauromenium. Yet this seizure of the opportunity was not accompanied by good fortune. No one prevented him from sailing or disembarking, and he constructed his camp, as he had done everything else, at leisure. When, however, the naval battle had ended, Sextus got back to Messana with speed, and learning of Caesar's presence he quickly filled the ships with fresh warriors and assailed him with the vessels and also with his heavy-armed men on land. Caesar did not come out to fight the latter, but sailed out against Sextus through contempt of the few opposing ships and because they had been previously defeated: then it was that he lost the majority of his fleet and barely avoided destruction himself. He could not even escape to his own men that were in Sicily but was glad to reach the mainland in safety. He was himself then in security, but was mightily disturbed at seeing his army cut off on the island. His confidence was not restored until a fish of its own accord jumped out of the sea and fell at his feet. By this incident his spirits were invigorated and he believed the soothsayers who had told him that he should make Sicily his slave.

[-6-] Caesar in haste sent for Agrippa to render aid to them, and meantime they were being besieged. When, provisions began to fail them and no rescuing force appeared, Cornificius their leader became afraid that if he stayed where he was he should in the course of time be compelled by hunger to yield to the besieging party; and he reflected that while he delayed there in that way none of the enemy would come into conflict with him, because he was stronger in point of heavy-armed infantry, but if he should go forward in any direction one of two things would happen,—either they would be attacked by the enemy and come off victorious, or, if their adversaries were unwilling to do this, they would retire to a place of safety, get a supply of provisions, and obtain some help from Caesar or from Agrippa. Therefore he burned all the vessels which had survived from the sea-fight and had been cast up against the ramparts, and started out himself as if to proceed to Mylae. Both cavalry and light-armed troops attacked him from a distance (not daring to come to close quarters) and proved frightfully troublesome to him. For the enemy came close, whenever there was good opportunity, and again turned back with rapidity. But his men, being heavy-armed, could not pursue them in any way owing to the weight of their armor, and were endeavoring to protect the unarmed, who had been saved from the fleet. As a result they were continually suffering disastrously and could do no damage in return; for, in case they made a rush upon any group, they would put the foe to flight, but not being able to pursue farther they found themselves in a worse plight on their return, since by their sortie they had been isolated. They endured the greatest hardship throughout their entire journey, but chiefly in crossing the rivers. Then their adversaries hemmed them in as they were going along rapidly, in disorder, a few at a time, as usual on such occasions, and struck them in favorable spots that they saw exposed. They were shot at, moreover, whenever they encountered places that were muddy or where the current was strong, and when they happened to be stuck for a moment or were carried down stream. [-7-] This the enemy did for three whole days and on the last demoralized them completely, especially since Sextus with his heavy-armed contingent had been added to their attacking force. Consequently the Caesarians no longer mourned such as were perishing but counted them fortunate to escape from further torment, and in their hopelessness wished that they, too, were among those already dead, wounded were far more in number than those died, and being struck from a distance with stones and javelins and receiving no blow from near at hand their wounds were in many places, and not as a rule favorably located. These men were themselves in great distress and they caused the survivors far more trouble than did the enemy. For if they were carried they usually brought about the death of the men supporting them, and if they were left behind, they threw the whole army into dejection by their laments. The detachment would have perished utterly, had not the foe, though reluctantly, taken their hands off them. Agrippa, after winning the naval battle, had sailed back to Lipara, but when he learned that Sextus had fled to Messana and Demochares had gone off in some other direction, he crossed over to Sicily, occupied Mylae and Tyndaris, and sent food and soldiers to the other party. Sextus, thinking that Agrippa himself would come likewise, became frightened and beat a hasty retreat before his approach, even abandoning some baggage and supplies in his fortifications. The followers of Cornificius obtained from these ample support and made their way in safety to Agrippa. Caesar received them back with praises and gifts, although he had treated them after the victory of Agrippa in a very supercilious manner, thinking the latter had finished the war. Cornificius, indeed, prided himself so much upon his preservation of the soldiers, that in Rome, whenever he went out of his house to dine, he always returned home on the back of an elephant.

[-8-] Caesar after this entered Sicily and Sextus encamped opposite him in the vicinity of Artemisium. They did not have any great battle at once, but indulged in a few slight cavalry skirmishes. While they were stationed there in hostile array Sextus received as an accession Tisienus Gallus, and Caesar Lepidus with his forces. Lepidus had encountered the storm which I mentioned, and also Demochares, and he had lost a number of ships: he did not come to Caesar immediately, but on account of his reverse or to the end that his colleague should face difficulties by himself or in the wish to draw Sextus away from him he had made an assault on Lilybaeum. Gallus was sent thither by Sextus and contended against him. From there both the contestants, as they accomplished nothing, went to Artemisium. Gallus proved a source of strength to Sextus, but Lepidus quarreled with Caesar; he claimed the privilege of managing everything on equal terms with Caesar as his fellow-commander, whereas he was employed by him entirely in the capacity of lieutenant: therefore he inclined to favor Sextus and secretly held communication with him. Caesar suspected this, but dared not give expression to his doubts and alienate him openly, nor could he safely conceal his thoughts: he felt it would look suspicious if he should not consult him at all and that it would be dangerous to reveal all his plans. Hence he determined to dispose of the uncertainty as quickly as possible, before there was any rebellion, though for most reasons there was no need of particular haste. He had as much food and as much money as Sextus, and therefore hoped to overthrow him without effort before a great while. Still, when he had once reached this decision, he himself led out his land force and marshaled it in front of the camp, while simultaneously Agrippa sailed close in and lay at anchor. Sextus, whose forces were far inferior to theirs, would not oppose them on either element. This lasted for several days. Finally, Pompey became afraid that he might be despised for his behavior and be deserted by his allies, hence he gave orders for the ships to weigh anchor; in these he reposed his chief trust.

[-9-] When the signal was raised and the trumpet gave the first call, all the boats joined battle near the land and the infantry force of both alike was marshaled at the very edge of the breakers, so that the spectacle was a most notable one. The whole sea in that vicinity was full of ships,—they were so many that they formed a long line,—and the land just back of it was occupied by the armed men, while that further removed, but adjoining, was taken up by the rest of the throng that followed each side. Wherefore, though the struggle seemed to be between the fighters on the ships alone, in reality the others too participated. For those on the ships contended more valiantly in order to exhibit their prowess to those beholding them, and the latter, in spite of being considerably separated from them, nevertheless in watching the men in action were themselves in a way concerned in the conflict. The battle was for a long time an even one, the fighting being precisely similar to that in previous encounters, and the men on shore followed it with minds equally intent. They were very hopeful of having the whole war settled by this engagement: yet they felt encouraged even should that not prove the case, the one party expecting that if they should conquer then no further labor of importance would be theirs, and that if they should prevail on this occasion they would incur no further danger of defeat. Accordingly, in order that they might keep their eyes fixed upon the action and not incommode those taking part in it they were silent or employed but little shouting. Their cries were directed to the combatants or were addressed by way of invocation to the gods; such as got the upper hand received praise and such as gave way abuse, and besides uttering many exhortations to their warriors they shouted not a little against each other, wishing their own men to hear more easily what was said, and their opponents to catch familiar words less frequently.

[-10-] While the two sides were equally matched, these were the conditions among both parties alike and they even tried to show by gestures of the whole body that they could see and understand. When, however, the adherents of Sextus were routed, then in unison and with one impulse the one side raised the paean and the others a wail of lamentation. The soldiers as if they too had shared defeat at once retired to Messana. Caesar took up such of the vanquished as were cast on shore and went into the sea itself to set on fire all the vessels that ran aground in shoal water; thus there was no safety for such as continued to sail, for they would be disabled by Agrippa, nor for such as tried to land anywhere, for they were destroyed by Caesar, except for a few that made good their escape to Messana. In this hard position Demochares on the point of being taken slew himself and Apollophanes who had his ship unscathed and might have fled went over to Caesar. The same was done by others,—by Gallus and all the cavalry that followed him and subsequently by some of the infantry. [-11-] This most of all caused Sextus to despair of the situation, and he resolved to flee. He took his daughter and certain other persons, his money and the rest of his chief valuables, put them by night aboard of such ships as sailed best out of the number that had been preserved, and departed. No one pursued him, for his sailing had been secret and Caesar was temporarily in the midst of great disturbance.

Lepidus had attacked Messana and on being admitted to the town set fire to some of it and pillaged other portions. When Caesar on ascertaining this came up quickly and withstood him, he was alarmed and slipped out of the city, but encamped on a strong hill and made complaints about his treatment; he detailed all the slights he had received and demanded all that had been conceded to him according to their first compact and further laid claim to Sicily, on the ground that he had helped subdue it. He sent some men to Caesar with these charges and challenged him to submit to arbitration: his forces consisted of troops which he had brought in from Libya and all of those who had been left behind in Messana; for he had been the first to enter it and had suggested to them some hopes of a change in the government. [-12-] Caesar made no answer to it, thinking that he had justice all on his side and in his weapons, since he was stronger than his rival. He immediately set out, however, against him with some few followers, expecting to alarm him by his suddenness,—Lepidus not being of an energetic nature,—and to win over his soldiers. On account of the fewness of the men accompanying him they thought when he entered the camp that he was on a peaceful errand. But as his words were not at all to their liking, they became irritated and attacked him, even killing some of the men: he himself quickly received aid and was saved. After this he came against them once more with his entire army, shut them within their ramparts, and besieged them. This made them afraid of capture, and without creating any general revolt, through dread of Lepidus, they individually, a few at a time or one by one, deserted him and transferred their allegiance. In this way he too was compelled on his own initiative to array himself in mourning garments and become a suppliant of Caesar. As a result Lepidus was shorn of all authority and could not even live in Italy without a guard. Of those who had been enlisted in the cause of Sextus, members of the senatorial or equestrian classes were punished, save a few, while in the case of the rank and file all free citizens were incorporated in the legions of Caesar, and those that had been slaves were given back to their masters for vengeance: in case no master could be found for any one of them, he was impaled. Of the cities some voluntarily opened their gates to the victor and received pardon, and others resisted him and were disciplined.

[-13-] While Caesar was thus occupied his soldiers revolted. Being so many they drew encouragement from their very numbers and when they stopped to think of their dangers and the hopes that rested on them they became insatiable in the matter of rewards, and gathering in groups they demanded whatever each one longed for. When their talk had no effect,—for Caesar since no enemy longer confronted him made light of them,—they became clamorous. Setting before him all the hardships they had endured and bringing to his notice any promise he had ever made them they uttered many threats besides, and thought to render him willy-nilly their slave. As they gained nothing this way, they demanded with much heat and deafening shouts to be relieved at least from further service, saying they were worn out. This was not because they really wished to be free from it, for most of them were in their prime, but because they had an inkling of the coming conflict between Caesar and Antony and for that reason set a high value upon themselves. And what they could not obtain by requests they expected they could secure by threatening to abandon him. Not even this, however, served their purpose. Caesar would not yield to them, even if he knew for an absolute certainty that the war was going to occur and clearly understood their wishes. He did not think it proper for a commander to do anything against his will under compulsion from the soldiers, because they would be sure, if he did, to want to get the advantage of him again in some other matter. [-14-] So he pretended that their request was a fair one and their desire only human and dismissed first those that had accompanied him in the campaign against Antony at Mutina, and next, since the rest were troublesome, all of them who had been ten years in the service. And in order to restrain the remainder he gave further notice that he would no longer employ any one of them, no matter how much such a person might wish it. On hearing this they uttered not another word, but began to exhibit great devotion toward him because he announced that he would give to the men that had been released,—not to all, save to the first of them, but to the worthiest,—everything that he had promised, and would assign them land. They were also influenced by the fact that he gave to all of them five hundred denarii and to those who had been victors in the sea-fight a crown of olive besides. After this he inspired them all personally with great hopes and the centurions with the idea that he would appoint them to the senatorial bodies in their native lands. Upon his lieutenants he bestowed various gifts and upon Agrippa a golden crown adorned with beaks of ships,—a decoration given to nobody before or since. And it was later ratified by a decree that as often as any persons celebrated a triumph, wearing49 the laurel crown, Agrippa should always wear this trophy of the naval encounter. In this way Caesar calmed the soldiers temporarily. The money he gave them at once and the land not much later. And since what was still held by the government at the time did not suffice, he bought more in addition, especially considerable from the Campanians dwelling in Capua, since their city needed a number of settlers. To them he also gave in return the so-called Julian supply of water, one of their chief sources of pride at all times, and the Gnosian territory,50 from which they still gather harvests.