The February 2015 Assassination of Boris Nemtsov and the Flawed Trial of his Alleged Killers
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ibidem Press, Stuttgart
Table of Contents
Preface
Chapter One A Self-Blinded Murder Investigation
Missing Surveillance Tapes Discussed at the Trial of Nemtsov’s Accused Killers
Other Withheld Materials
A Brief Window
The Nemtsov Family Attorneys on the Missing Tapes
A New “Zapruder Film”
Protecting “State Secrets”
The “Kulagin Dashcam Tape”: Video Evidence Spurned by the Authorities
Journalist David Satter Discusses the “Kulagin Tape”
A Videotape from 3 Veernaya Street in Moscow
A November 2017 Update from Igor Murzin
Conclusion
Chapter Two A Seemingly Endless Flawed Trial
What is Media-zona?
Interviews of Three Jurors
A Transparent Hint from Putin as the Trial was Winding Down
The Role of Torture in Obtaining Confessions from the Accused
The Defense Cites the Alleged Torture of the Accused
The European Court for Human Rights Identifies Torture in the Case of One of the Accused
Economist Andrei Illarionov Emphasizes the Use of Torture
The Persecution of Defense Attorney Zaurbek Sadakhanov
Conclusion
Chapter Three The Version of the Prosecution
A Report by Kommersant One Week after the Murder
“Patriots of Russia and Her Enemies”
The Significance of this Leaked Version
A Prestigious State Award
The Version Favored by Putin—A “Ukrainian Trace”
Tatyana Stanovaya on the “Ukrainian Trace”
Spreading Putin’s Preferred Version of the Crime
Postscript: Two Assassination Attempts in 2017
Putin Tribune Sergei Markov Discusses the “Ukrainian Trace”
A Ukrainian Pistol
A Second Novaya gazeta Report on the Assassination
Preparing the Murder
The Carrying Out of the Murder
The Arrest and Afterwards
After the Murder
Concerning the Motives for the Murder
The Significance of this Second Novaya gazeta Report
The Early Course of the Investigation
Duritskaya’s 28 February 2015 Account
Fact-checking Duritskaya’s Testimony
Taking Stock Forty Days after the Murder
The Chekist Version Forty Days On
The Crime Is Declared to Have Been Solved
Eyewitnesses, Gone Missing for Months, Suddenly Appear
The Court Testimony of Evgenii Molodykh
Molodykh and the Facts of the Case
The Prosecution’s Final Argument
Muddying the Waters
The Jury Finds the Accused Guilty--the Judge Then Passes Sentence
Conclusion
Postscript: One year after the Verdict, the Investigations Committee and FSB Reopen the Case
Chapter Four The Version of the Nemtsov Family Attorneys
Commentary
A Second Major Prokhorov Interview
Commentary
Prokhorov Debunks the “Ukrainian Trace” in the Murder
The Position of Attorney Olga Mikhailova
Identifying Chechen MVD and FSB Personnel among the Alleged Hitmen
Prokhorov’s February 2017 Interview with TheIns.ru
Questioning other Witnesses
Petitions submitted by Olga Mikhailova
Commentary
The Nemtsov Family Attorneys Attempt to Intercede for the Accused
Witnesses called by the Family Attorneys
Gennadii Gudkov’s Testimony
The Testimony of Ryklin, Yashin and Gudkov
Summary of Findings
Prokhorov’s Summation
Assessing the Final Arguments of the Nemtsov Family Attorneys
An Interview with Vadim Prokhorov Five-and-a-Half Months after the Trial
Assessing Prokhorov’s December 2017 Conclusions
Chapter Five The Versions of Vladimir Milov and Andrei Illarionov
Part One: The Findings of Economist Vladimir Milov
Milov’s Blog of 2 March 2015
Subsequent Milov Commentary
Milov on the Murder Investigation as of the Summer of 2016
Conclusion
Part Two: The Findings of Economist Andrei Illarionov
Positing a Second Shooter
Illarionov’s March 2 Interview with GordonUA.com
Two Years On--Countering Ilya Yashin’s Alleged “False Testimony”
Illarionov’s View of the Crime as of April 2017
Conclusion
Chapter Six The Versions of Leonid Martinyuk and Andrei Piontkovskii
Part One: The Conclusions of Filmmaker Leonid Martinyuk
Identifying the Mastermind behind the Murder
Part Two: The Findings of Mathematician Andrei Piontkovskii
Why the FSB Attack on the “Kadyrov Project”?
Subsequent Commentary
Bulldogs Fighting under a Rug
Information Uncovered by Journalist David Satter
Conclusion
Chapter Seven The Version of an Outlier
Novaya gazeta Assails Murzin
Murzin Encounters Kuznetsov
Dmitrii Muratov of Novaya gazeta excoriates Murzin
Attorney Vadim Prokhorov Dismisses Murzin’s findings
Murzin Rebuts Prokhorov
Piontkovskii and Martinyuk on Murzin’s Writings
Comments by Leonid Martinyuk
The Nemtsov Assassination: a “Sacral Sacrifice”
Mining the “Materials of the Case”
David Satter in late October 2017 Discusses Murzin’s Evidence
Murzin on Material from “Potok”
Murzin’s April 2017 Comments on an Alleged “Ukrainian Trace” in the Murder
Conclusion
Chapter Eight The Version of the Defense
Treatment of Defense Attorney Khadisov
Belittling Defense Attorney Byurchieva
The Treatment of Defense Attorney Tsakaev
A Gambit by the Defense--Shift the Blame for the Murder onto the Deceased Shavanov
The “Toptuny”
Chain of Custody of the Shell Casings
Questions concerning the Purchase of a ZAZ Shans Getaway Vehicle
Duritskaya’s Testimony
Bridge Video
The Key Kulagin Dashcam Video
The Questioning of Zaur Dadaev in Court
Beslan Shavanov’s Arrival in Moscow
Dadaev’s Activities on the Day of the Murder
The Judge Excludes Surveillance Videos from the House Camera at Veernaya 3
Mark Kaverzin Makes the Defense’s Case for Dadaev
Defense Attorney Tsakaev Speaks
Final Plea to the Jury
Final Pleas of the Gubashev Brothers
Dadaev’s Final Plea
Media-zona Sums up the Defense’s Case at the Conclusion of the Trial
A Crushing Verdict for the Defense
Chapter Nine The Author’s Version
SPPS Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society
Copyright
The assassination of Boris Nemtsov, one of the two most important leaders of the Russian opposition, on a Moscow bridge at the very foot of the Kremlin, on 27 February 2015, on the eve of a mass protest march that he had co-organized, has been aptly termed the Russian crime of the relatively young twenty-first century. Due to the closed nature of Russian society and its tight control by an authoritarian regime, the truth concerning who committed this monstrous crime, and how it has been covered up, remains largely unknown. As I attempted to do in my previous book, The Moscow Bombings of 1999, I have sought to shed light on murky deeds carried out in darkness.1
I have been aided in this task by the pioneering work of a number of leading Russian analysts, who have relentlessly attempted to discover how, and by whom, the murder was carried out, and why. These analysts have uniformly had distinguished careers: Andrei Illarionov served as Putin’s chief economic advisor for five years; Vladimir Milov was Russian deputy minister for energy; Andrei Piontkovskii was a well-known Russian mathematician and Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences; Leonid Martinyuk was an accomplished documentary filmmaker; and David Satter has for many years been a top contributor to the Wall Street Journal and other publications covering the USSR and post-communist Russia. All of them were personally acquainted with the victim. Finally, Petersburg attorney Igor Murzin, a specialist on CCTV and other visual and road monitoring systems relating to auto accidents occurring on roads and bridges, has provided key information concerning how the murder took place.
In addition, I have devoted one chapter each to the views of the prosecution, the defense, and the Nemtsov family attorneys, as they were presented over a nine-month period during the trial of Nemtsov’s accused killers.
A note on the correct translation of one key Russian word that crops up often in this manuscript. The word zakazchik means literally “the person who ordered up [zakazal] the murder.” There appears to be no precise English equivalent for this term. The word “mastermind” is often chosen by translators, but this term can be misleading. The words sponsor, initiator, or contractor would seem to be more accurate. In the Nemtsov killing, one can quite easily posit a sponsor, plus one or several sub-sponsors, as well as those individuals who organized the crime further down the chain of command.
This study does not offer a detailed biographical sketch of the late Russian politician, who died at age fifty-five. A useful source for Nemtsov’s biography is a documentary film, Nemtsov, made by Russian political activist Vladimir Kara-Murza.2 This film does not cover the assassination itself. A film which does is Leonid Martinyuk’s documentary “That doesn’t mean you have to kill him,” made in cooperation with Andrei Piontkovskii.3 The title of the film refers to words spoken by Vladimir Putin following Nemtsov’s killing. The documentary’s premiere occurred in October of 2016 and thus it was unable to include key information that came to light subsequently (e.g., the making public of the materials of the criminal case by lawyer Igor Murzin, and the extensive comments on them made by journalist David Satter).
I also want to acknowledge here the generous assistance I have received from Martin Dewhirst of the University of Glasgow, who read through all the chapters in this book and made numerous useful suggestions on how to improve the text.
Concerning Nemtsov, I will repeat what has been said about him by his numerous friends and admirers, both in Russia and the West. He was a highly intelligent, extraordinarily energetic, unfailingly courageous politician, who was self-evidently prepared to die for his democratic convictions. Like numerous admirable high-level Western politicians, both contemporary and past, Nemtsov was far from perfect, with his womanizing being his most salient flaw (one reported unblinkingly in Kara-Murza’s film). In the context of Putin’s repressive regime, Nemtsov’s womanizing represented a dangerous weakness that could be, and indeed was, cynically probed and exploited by the Russian special services. None of this, however, should detract from Nemtsov’s unique political achievements, or from his deserved status as a luminous martyr, worthy of the name of St. Boris the Russian martyr, whose icon was found by investigators on his body as it lay on the bridge.
On 27 February 2018, on the third anniversary of the assassination, a stretch of the Northwest Washington road outside the Russian Embassy was officially unveiled by U.S. lawmakers and D.C. Council members as “Boris Nemtsov Plaza.” “The street sign directly outside the Russian Embassy,” Senator Marco Rubio, Republican of Florida, declared on this occasion, “will serve as an enduring reminder to Vladimir Putin and those who support him that they can’t use murder and intimidation to silence the voices of freedom.” Those gathered in the square, Senator Christopher Coons, Democrat of Delaware, noted, “know that someday, someday Russia will be free again. This embassy will [then] be honored again by the name Boris Nemtsov.”4 Honored abroad, Nemtsov will eventually, and perhaps sooner than one might think, find acceptance and deep respect in his long-suffering homeland.
1 See: John B. Dunlop, The Moscow Bombings of September 1999: Examinations of Russian Terrorist Attacks at the Onset of Vladimir Putin’s Rule (Stuttgart: ibidem Verlag, second expanded edition, 2014.) For a map showing the site of Nemtsov’s murder, see: “Mapping Boris Nemtsov’s assassination,” Brown Political Review, 16 March 2015 https://www.brownpoliticalreview.org/ 2015/03/mapping-boris-nemtsovs-assassination/
2 This film is accessible on You Tube: https://www.youtube.com/watch ?v=v2E3ybT9KTA
3 For the English version of Martinyuk’s film, see: https://en.nemtsov-most.org/2016/10/20/premier-of-the-film-that-doesnt-mean-you-have-to-ki ll-him-film/
4 See: “Street signs outside Russian embassy in Washington now honor slain dissident,” washingtonpost.com, 27 February 2018.
Chapter One
A Self-Blinded Murder Investigation
“You will agree that, at such an ultra-important site [as the Kremlin], there cannot be cameras that do not work. There must be cameras of the Federal Protection Service [FSO] there, as well as of the special services [FSB]. We are not being permitted to see the faces of the true criminals….”
Artem Sarbashev, defense attorney for the accused Anzor Gubashev1
“The murder was committed at the walls of the Kremlin. This is the most protected site in Russia. There, twenty-four hours a day, high definition cameras operate, while personnel of the Federal Protection Service look out for, and watch, all suspicious people. In addition, officers of the special services [FSB] are constantly patrolling there, persons whom we cannot spot, since they move about in civilian clothing.”
Filmmaker Leonid Martynyuk2
“The key role in solving the murder of Boris Nemtsov could, and must, be played by the videotapes from the surveillance cameras on the Bolshoi Moskvoretskii Bridge, which are being scandalously concealed from the investigation, from the trial, and from society. All of these cameras…belong to the Federal Protection Service.”
Economist Andrei Illarionov3
One of the two chief leaders of the Russian political opposition (along with Aleksei Navalnyi) had been assassinated in the shadow of the Kremlin walls, but the killing itself was immediately de facto made the object of an information blackout. The Russian website Gazeta.ru was one of the first to look into this abnormal situation. On 2 March 2015, just three days after the murder, the site reported: “An incomprehensible situation was created with the surveillance cameras, of which there are more than a few in the area where the murder was committed. In the press service of the Department of Information Technologies, Gazeta.ru was informed that the Kremlin is considered a special site, and that the cameras on the territory adjacent to it have been positioned by the federal organs, and only they have access to their film.”4
This report suggested that there did exist surveillance footage of the murder at the time that it was committed, but that access to that footage was being denied. Other relevant video information was also said to be withheld: “The experts at the time pointed out that, theoretically, it would be possible to clarify the circumstances of the murder of the politician with the help of photographs taken from sputniks.” In a previous criminal case, Gazeta.ru noted, “A representative of the victims asked the court to request from the company ‘Sovzond’ and from the Institute of Geography of the Russian Academy of Sciences print-outs from the cameras of their satellites…. On the print-outs which were received, there were revealed the most minute details [concerning an auto accident--JBD].” Such satellite information was reportedly also being withheld from the Nemtsov murder investigation.
The Daily Telegraph observed, also on 2 March 2015: “Police investigating the murder of Boris Nemtsov have been unable to identify the killer because security cameras that could have recorded the attack had been turned off for maintenance, it has emerged. Cameras overlooking the murder scene on the Bolshoi Moskvoretskii Bridge could have provided crucial evidence including identifying the killer and the getaway vehicle, as well as further details of how the attack was planned. But Moscow’s Kommersant newspaper reported on Monday [2 March] that key cameras on the bridge…had been switched off for ‘repair work’ on the night of the killing.”5
Also on 2 March, a different explanation for the absence of videotapes was cited by the Federal Protection Service (the rough equivalent of the American Secret Service). A representative of the service, Sergei Devyatov, was quoted as having informed RIA Novosti: “The surveillance cameras are directed at the Kremlin and ensure a field of view of its internal territory. Moskvoretskii Bridge is not a zone of responsibility of the Federal Protection Service. There are no cameras of the FSO there,” he insisted.6
Devyatov then added, contradicting news reports that we have cited, that, when the murder took place, all of the FSO cameras were, in fact, working normally. Officials working for the City of Moscow, for their part, insisted: “All the cameras under the authority of [the city of] Moscow were working correctly. There was no work being conducted on them that night… ‘All of these materials are accessible by the investigative organs,’ they added.” This report suggested that critical video material existed but would be given only to the Russian investigative organs.
In its path-breaking March 2 report, which we have been discussing, Gazeta.ru emphasized that the FSO’s claims were flagrantly misleading. The website noted: “As far back as the decision of the Government of Moscow, No. 866-PP, of 29 September 2010, a list of streets was provided which are under the surveillance of the FSO. Among almost 300 sites in the capital is Point No. 154—the Bolshoi Moskvoretskii Bridge, on which Boris Nemtsov was shot.”
The upshot of these contradictory reports was that the assassination of Nemtsov had almost certainly been filmed by surveillance cameras situated on the Bolshoi Moskvoretskii Bridge and on the Kremlin walls, but this key video evidence was being intentionally withheld from the defense attorneys for the accused, from the Nemtsov family attorneys, and from the public.
In a 2 March 2015 blog, photographer Mitya Aleshkovskii offered further evidence that contradicted the claims of the FSO. Aleshkovskii wrote on Facebook: “Of course, the Federal Protection Service is lying when it states that not one video-camera filmed the moment of the murder, since they [supposedly] were all directed toward the Kremlin. I specially took this shot [photo provided on his Facebook page--JBD] on the bridge on the night of Nemtsov’s murder. I also asked other photographers to do the same thing. All four photos produced constitute one and the same shot, just taken from different distances. The camera on the Beklemishevskaya Tower [on the Kremlin wall] was aimed directly at the site of the murder. So the Federal Protection Service is lying here.”7
On 9 March 2015, the website RBK.ru reported the following concerning surveillance cameras.8 “According to the sources of RBK in the investigation brigade, there have been received high-quality [chetkie] tapes from the surveillance cameras located on the heights of the Bolshoi Moskvoretskii Bridge… The RBK correspondents counted 12 surveillance cameras aimed in different directions directly on the bridge (six on the right and six on the left side) and also four cameras in the garage of the FSO located directly under the bridge.”
Missing Surveillance Tapes Discussed at the Trial of Nemtsov’s Accused Killers
The question of the missing FSO and City of Moscow surveillance tapes was repeatedly, and, at times, angrily, referred to in the run-up to the trial of Nemtsov’s alleged killers, and, then, over the course of the nine-month long trial as well. At the third session of the trial, for example, which was held in early October of 2016, defense attorney Mark Zaverzin, who was representing the accused shooter, Zaur Dadaev, submitted a petition for footage from the GUP ‘Gormost’ [i.e., ‘city bridge’] television cameras. He then read a description of the cameras’ security system, in which eleven bridges are mentioned, including the Bolshoi Moskvoretskii Bridge, where the killing took place. Zaverzin pointed out that the official investigation had not sent a single inquiry [zapros] regarding these cameras to Gormost.” Zaverzin then requested that an inquiry be sent to “Gormost” concerning how their surveillance cameras worked, and how the information on them was preserved. “All of the defense attorneys for the accused supported him.”9
Clearly irritated by Zaverzin’s request, chief prosecutor Maria Semenenko then riposted: “The investigation has already done this, and, in volume twenty-one [of the case materials], there are tapes from surveillance cameras presented by the GUP Gormost.” Following Semenenko’s retort, presiding judge Yurii Zhitnikov expressed agreement with her statement and “declined the petition concerning the cameras from ‘Gormost’, inasmuch, as, in volume 21 [of the case materials], it is indicated that these tapes have already been requested, and that what was received does not present any interest for the investigation. ‘I have already examined these materials [the judge noted] and am, in principle, in agreement with the investigation.’” Both the prosecutor and the judge appear to have been acting deceitfully and in consort here.
Not giving up, defense attorney Kaverzin then “attempted to explain to the judge in what direction the cameras were pointed whose tapes had not been obtained by the investigation, and said that the ones that had been obtained were not from cameras pointed at the bridge…There are at least four cameras [Kaverzin emphasized] whose tapes do not exist, and they have not been examined.”
During the fourteenth session of the trial, held on 9 November 2016, Kaverzin requested further that “an answer from the GBU ‘Gormost’ be added [to the case], in which it is explained that precisely on the Bolshoi Moskvoretskii Bridge there are eight surveillance cameras. ‘We have studied the tapes from only two of them. Where are the other [six]? Why did the investigation not seize the tapes?’” he asked.10
During this same fourteenth court session, Kaverzin also pointed to another possible source of key information: “[Kaverzin] also spoke about the response from ‘Yandex’ [a well-known website, featuring panoramic street images--JBD] to the attorney’s inquiry touching upon panoramic images of the scene of the crime. At that company, they declined to make the requested materials available to the defense, saying that ‘only the competent organs’ could make such requests.” This stonewalling by Yandex mirrored that of the official criminal investigation, the prosecution, and the Moscow authorities.11