The Criminal Prosecution and Capital Punishment of Animals

Mancini, Lombroso, Garofalo, Albrecht, Benedikt, Büchner, Moleschott, Despine, Fouillée, Letourneau, Maudsley, Bruce Thompson, Nicholson, Minzloff, Notovich and other European criminal lawyers, physiologists and anthropologists have devoted themselves with peculiar zeal and rare acuteness to the study and solution of obscure and perplexing problems of psycho-pathological jurisprudence, and have drawn nice and often overnice distinctions in determining degrees of personal responsibility. Judicial procedure no longer stops with testimony establishing the bald facts in the case, but admits also the evidence of the expert alienist in order to ascertain to what extent the will of the accused was free or functionally normal in its operation. Here it is not a question of raving madness or of drivelling idiocy, perceptible to the coarsest understanding and the crassest ignorance; but the slightest morbid disturbance, impairing the full and healthy exercise of the mental faculties, must be examined and estimated. If “privation of mind” and “irresistible force,” says Zupetta, are exculpatory, then “partial vitiation of mind” and “semi-irresistible force” are entitled to the same or at least to proportional consideration. There are states of being which are mutually contradictory and exclusive and cannot co-exist, such as life and death. A partial state of life or death is impossible; such expressions as half-alive and half-dead are hyperbolical figures of speech used for purely rhetorical purposes; taken literally, they are simply absurd. It is not so, however, with states of mind. The intellect, whose soundness is the first condition of accountability, may be perfectly clear, manifesting itself in all its fulness and power, or it may be partially obscured. So, too, the will, whose self-determination is the second condition of accountability, may assert itself with complete freedom and untrammelled force, or it may act under stress and with imperfect volition. Moral coercion, whether arising from external influences, abnormities of the physical organism or defects of the mental constitution, is not less real because it is not easy to detect and may not be wholly irresistible. For this reason, it involves no contradiction in terms and is not absurd to call an action half-conscious, half-voluntary, or half-constrained. “Partial vitiation of mind” is a state distinctly recognized in psychiatrical science. In like manner, there is no essential incongruity in affirming that an impulse may be the result of a “semi-irresistible force.” But these mental conditions and forces do not manifest themselves with equal obviousness and intensity in all cases; sometimes they are scarcely appreciable; again they verge upon “absolute privation of mind” and “wholly irresistible force;” and it is the duty of the judge to adjust the penalty to the gradations of guilt as determined by the greater or less freedom of the agent.

The same process of reasoning would lead to the admission of quasi-vitiations of mind and quasi-irresistible forces as grounds of exculpation. Thus one might go on analyzing and refining away human responsibility, and reducing all crime to resultants of mental derangement, until every malefactor would come to be looked upon, not as a culprit to be delivered over to the sharp stroke of the headsman or the safe custody of the jailer, but as an unfortunate victim of morbid states and uncontrollable impulses, to be consigned to the sympathetic care of the psychiater.

Italian anthropologists and jurisprudents have been foremost and gone farthest, both theoretically and practically, in this reaction from mediæval conceptions of crime and its proper punishment. This violent recoil from extreme cruelty to excessive commiseration is due, in a great measure, to the Italian temperament, to a peculiar gentleness and impressionableness of character, which, combined with an instinctive aversion to whatever shocks the senses and mars the pleasure of the moment, are apt to degenerate into shallow sentimentality and sickly sensibility, thereby enfeebling and perverting the moral sense and distorting all ideas of right and justice. To minds thus constituted the cool and deliberate condemnation of a human being to the gallows is an atrocity, in comparison with which a fatal stab in the heat of passion or under strong provocation seems a light and venial transgression. This maudlin sympathy with the guilty living man, who is in danger of suffering for his crime, to the entire forgetfulness of the innocent dead man, the victim of his anger or cupidity, pervades all classes of society, and has stimulated the ingenuity of lawyers and legislators to discover mitigating moments and extenuating circumstances and other means of loosening and enlarging the intricate meshes of the penal code so as to permit the culprit to escape. To this end they eagerly seized upon the doctrine of evolution and endeavoured to seek the origin of crime in hereditary propensities, atavistic recurrences, physical degeneracies and other organic fatalities, for which no one can be held personally responsible, and constructed upon the basis of the most recent scientific researches a penological system giving free scope and full gratification to this pitying and palliating disposition.

But, although the Italians have been pioneers in this movement, it has not been confined to them; it extends to all civilized nations, and expresses a general tendency of the age. Even the Germans, those leaders in theory and laggards in practice, whose studies and speculations have illustrated all forms and phases of judicial procedure, but who adhere so conservatively to ancient methods and resist so stubbornly the tides of reform in their own courts have yielded on this point. They no longer regard insanity and idiocy as the only grounds of exemption from punishment, but include in the same category “all morbid disturbances of mental activity,” and “all states of mind in which the free determination of the will is not indeed wholly destroyed, but only partially impaired.” In order to realize the radical changes that have taken place in this direction within a relatively recent period, it will suffice merely to compare the present criminal code of the German Empire with the Austrian code of 1803, the Bavarian code of 1813, and the Prussian code of 1851. It must be remembered, too, that these changes have been effected under the drift of public opinion in spite of the political preponderance of Prussia and her strong bureaucratic influence, which has always been exerted in favour of severe penalties, and shown slight consideration for individual frailties and criminal idiosyncrasies in inflicting punishment. As the stronghold of a stolid and supercilious squirearchy (Junkerthum) in Germany, Prussia has stubbornly resisted to the last every reformatory movement in civil and social, and especially in criminal legislation.

A recent decision of the supreme court of the German Empire (pronounced in the summer of 1894) seems to put a check upon this tendency by rejecting the plea of “moral insanity” in the extenuation of crime. As a matter of fact, however, the question whether such a state of mind as “moral insanity” exists or can exist has not yet been settled; and so long as psychiaters do not agree as to the actuality or possibility of this anomalous mental condition, courts of justice may very properly refuse to take it into consideration or to allow it to exert the slightest influence upon their judgment in the infliction of judicial punishment. Moral insanity, as usually defined, involves a disturbance of the moral perceptions and a derangement of the emotional nature, without impairing the distinctively intellectual faculties. The supposed victim of this hypothetical form of madness is capable of thinking logically and often shows remarkable astuteness in forming his plans and executing his criminal purposes, but seems utterly destitute of the moral sense and of all the finer feelings of humanity, performing the most atrocious deeds without hesitation and remembering them without the slightest compunction. In moral stolidity and the lack of susceptibility he is on a level with the lowest savage. German psychiaters, on the whole, are inclined to regard such persons, not as morally insane, but as morally degenerate and depraved; and German jurists and judges are not disposed to admit such vitiation of character as an extenuating circumstance, especially at a time when criminals of this class are on the increase and are banded together to overthrow civilized society and to introduce an era of anarchy and barbarism. The decision of the German judicatory is therefore not reactionary, but merely precautionary, and simply indicates a wise determination to keep the administration of criminal law unencumbered by theories, which science has not yet fully established and which at present can only serve to paralyze the arm of retributive justice.

Mediæval penal justice sought to inflict the greatest possible amount of suffering on the offender and showed a diabolical fertility of invention in devising new methods of torture even for the pettiest trespasses. The monuments of this barbarity may now be seen in European museums in the form of racks, thumbkins, interlarded hares, Pomeranian bonnets, Spanish boots, scavenger’s daughters, iron virgins and similar engines of cruelty. Until quite recently an iron virgin, with its interior full of long and sharp spikes, was exhibited in a subterranean passage at Nuremberg, on the very spot where it is supposed to have once performed its horrible functions; and in Munich this inhuman instrument of punishment was in actual use as late as the beginning of the nineteenth century. The criminal code of Maria Theresa, published in 1769, contained forty-five large copperplate engravings, illustrating the various modes of torture prescribed in the text for the purpose of extorting confession and evidently designed to serve as object lessons for the instruction of the tormentor and the intimidation of the accused. That Prussia was the first country in Germany to abolish judicial torture was due, not to the progressive spirit of the nation or of its tribunals, but solely to the superior enlightenment and energy of Frederic the Great, who effected this reform arbitrarily and against the will of jurists and judges by cabinet-orders issued in 1740 and 1745. Crimes which women are under peculiar temptation to commit, were punished with extraordinary severity. Thus the infanticide was buried alive, a small tube communicating with the outer air being placed in her mouth in order to prolong her life and her agony. A case of this kind is recorded in the proceedings of the “Malefiz-Gericht” or criminal court of Ensisheim in Alsatia under the date of February 3, 1570. In 1401, an apprentice, who stole from his master five pfennigs (then as now the smallest coin of Germany and worth about the fifth of a cent), was condemned to have both his ears cut off. Incredible barbarities of this kind were practised by some of the best and noblest men of that age. Thus Cardinal Carlo Borromeo, who was pre-eminent among his contemporaries for the purity of his life and the benevolence of his character, did not hesitate to condemn Fra Tommaso di Mileto, a Franciscan monk, to be walled up alive, because he entertained heretical notions concerning the sinfulness of eating meat on Friday, and expressed doubts touching the worship of images, indulgences, the supreme and infallible authority of the pope, and the real presence in the eucharist. This cruel sentence, a striking illustration of the words of Lucretius,

“Tantum religio potuit suadere malorum,”

was pronounced December 16, 1564, as follows: “I condemn you to be walled up in a place enclosed by four walls, where, with anguish of heart and abundance of tears, you shall bewail your sins and grievous offences committed against the majesty of God, and the holy mother Church and the religion of St. Francis, the founder of your order.” A bishop, who should impose such a punishment now-a-days, would be very properly declared insane and divested of his office.

Much ridicule has been cast upon the so-called “Blue Laws” of Connecticut on account of the narrowness and pettiness of their prevailing spirit. From our present point of view they are absurd and in many respects atrocious, but compared with the penal codes of that time they mark a great advance in human legislation. They reduced the number of crimes, then punishable in England by death, from two hundred and twenty-three to fourteen. In the mother-country, as late as the seventeenth century, counterfeiters and issuers of false coin were condemned to be boiled to death in oil by slow degrees. The culprit was suspended over the cauldron and gradually let down into it, first boiling the feet, then the legs and so on, until all the flesh was separated from the bones and the body reduced to a skeleton. The Puritans of New England, relentless as they were in their dealings with sectaries, were never so ruthless as this; nor is it probable that they would have inflicted capital punishment upon their own “stubborn and rebellious sons,” or upon persons who “worship any other God but the Lord God,” had it not been for precedents recorded in laws enacted by a semi-civilized people thousands of years ago and supposed to have been dictated by divine wisdom. They failed to perceive the incongruity of attempting to rear a democratic commonwealth on theocratic foundations and made the fatal mistake of planning their structure after what they regarded as the perfect model of the Jewish Zion.

If we compare these barbarities with the law recently enacted by the legislature of the state of New York, whereby capital punishment is to be inflicted as quickly and painlessly as possible by means of electricity, we shall be able to appreciate the immense difference between the mediæval and the modern spirit in the conception and execution of penal justice.

A point of practical importance, which the criminal anthropologist has to consider is the relation of moral to penal responsibility. If there is no freedom of the will and the commission of crime is the necessary result of physiological idiosyncrasies, hereditary predispositions, brachycephalous, dolichocephalous or microcephalous peculiarities, anomalies of cerebral convolution, or other anatomical asymmetries, over which the individual has no control and by which his destiny is determined, then he is certainly not morally responsible for his conduct. But is he on this account to be exempt from punishment? The vast majority of criminalists answer this question unhesitatingly in the negative, declaring that penal legislation is independent of metaphysical opinion, and that punishment is proper and imperative so far as it is essential to the protection and preservation of society. If the infliction of the penalties depriving a man of his freedom or his life is found to secure these ends, it is the duty of the tribunals established for the administration of justice to impose them without troubling themselves about the mental condition of the culprit or stopping to discuss problems which belong to the province of the psychiater. Legal tribunals are not offices in which candidates for the insane asylum are examined or certificates of admission to reformatories issued, but are organized as a terror to evil-doers in the general interests of society, and all their decisions should have this object in view. If a madman is not hanged for murder, it is solely because such a procedure would exert no deterring influence upon other madmen; society protects itself, in cases of this kind, by depriving the dangerous individual of his liberty and thus preventing him from doing harm; but it has no right to inflict upon him wanton and superfluous suffering. Even if it should be deemed desirable to kill him, the method of his removal should be such as to cause the least possible pain and publicity. Here, too, the welfare of society is the determinative factor.

This doctrine reduces confirmed criminals to the condition of ferocious beasts and venomous reptiles, and logically demands that they should be eliminated for precisely the same reason that noxious animals are exterminated, although neither the human nor the animal creatures are to blame for the perniciousness of their inborn proclivities and natural instincts. In the eyes of Courcelle-Seneuil a prison is a “kind of menagerie”; Naquet, the French chemist and senator, goes still farther, declaring that men are no more culpable for being criminal than vitriol is for being corrosive, and adding that it is our own fault if we put this stuff into our tea and are poisoned by it. The same writer maintains that “there is no more demerit in being perverse than in being cross-eyed or hump-backed.” In a recent lecture on criminal jurisprudence and biology Professor Benedikt cites the case of a Moravian robber and murderer, whose brain was found on dissection to resemble that of a beast of prey and who was therefore, in the opinion of the eminent Viennese authority, no more responsible for his bloody deeds than is a lion or a tiger for its ravages. The corollary to this anatomical demonstration is that one should treat such a man as a lion or a tiger and shoot him on the spot. Atavistic relapses, defective cerebral development and other abnormities undoubtedly occur in criminals, whose acts may be traced, in some degree, to these physical imperfections and therefore be pathologically stimulated and partially necessitated by them. On the other hand, there are thousands of persons with equally small and unsymmetrical craniums, who do not commit crime, but remain respectable, safe, and useful members of society.

Lombroso discovers in habitual malefactors a tendency to tattoo their bodies; but this kind of cuticular ornamentation indicates merely a low development of the æsthetic sense, a barbarous conception of the beautiful or what would be called bad taste, and has not the slightest genetic or symptomatic connection with crime and the proclivity to perpetrate it. As a means of embellishing the exterior man it may be rude and unrefined, but after all it is only skin-deep, and does not extend to the moral character. Honest people of the lower classes take pleasure in disfiguring themselves in this way, and soldiers and sailors, who are very far from furnishing the largest percentage of criminals, are especially addicted to it, simply because they find ample leisure in the barracks and the forecastle to undergo this slow and painful process of what they deem adornment. According to Lombroso criminals have as a rule thick heads of hair and thin beards; but as the majority of them are comparatively young, these phenomena are by no means remarkable. He has also found that the hair of such persons is usually black or dark chestnut; had his investigations been carried on in Norway and Sweden instead of in Italy, he would have certainly come to the conclusion that flaxen hair is an index of a criminal character.

It would be difficult to deny the existence of a constitutionally criminal class, a persistently perverse element, which is the born foe of all law and order, at war with every form of social and political organization and whose permanent attitude of mind is that of the Irishman, who, on landing in New York, inquired: “Have ye a government here?” and, on receiving an affirmative answer, replied, “Then I’m agin’ it.” Criminal anthropologists have been especially earnest in their endeavours to define this pernicious type and to determine the physiological and physiognomical features, which characterize and constitute it. This line of research is unquestionably in the right direction, but as a reaction against barren scholastic speculations and brutal penal codes has been carried to excess by enthusiastic specialists and led to broad generalizations and hasty deductions from insufficient data. Taine’s definition of man as “an animal of a higher species, that produces poems and systems of philosophy, as silkworms spin cocoons and bees secrete honeycomb,” applies with equal force to the vicious side of human nature. Criminal propensities, as well as creative powers, are the resultants of race, temperament, climate, food, organism, environment and other pre-natal and post-natal influences and agencies, to which the individual did not voluntarily subject himself and from which he cannot escape. The acts, therefore, which he performs, whether good or evil, are as independent of his will as the colour of his hair or the shape of his nose; for while they are apparently volitional impulses, the will itself, from which they seem to proceed, is determined by forces as fixed and free from his control as are those which render him blue-eyed or snub-nosed.

The penological application of this philosophical principle has given rise to numerous theories concerning the nature and origin of crime. Lombroso and his disciples, as we have already intimated, attribute it to atavism or the survival in the individual of the animal instincts and low morals of the aboriginal barbarian. The criminal is simply a savage let loose in a civilized community and ignoring the ethical conceptions developed by ages of culture and performing actions that would have seemed perfectly proper and praiseworthy in the eyes of our pre-historic ancestors. The hero of the Palæolithic age is the brigand and cut-throat of to-day. The criminal type is nothing but a reversion to the primitive type of the race, and the representatives of this school of anthropologists have been untiring in their efforts to discover physical and moral characteristics common to both: long arms like chimpanzees, four circumvolutions of the frontal lobes of the brain like the large carnivora, small cranial capacity like the cave-men, canine teeth like anthropoid apes and a simian nose. This analogy extends to the eyes, the ears, the hair, and even to the internal organs, the liver, the heart and the stomach, and the diseases by which they are affected. It has also been observed that assassins are brachycephalous and thieves dolichocephalous. Marro maintains that in many cases metaphors express real facts and embody the common conclusions of mankind based upon centuries of observation: swindlers have a foxy look, long-fingered persons are naturally thievish, whereas a club-fisted fellow is pretty sure to have a pugnacious disposition, and to be a born rough. Nevertheless social surroundings, educational influences and other outward circumstances are important factors, not so much in changing the character as in giving it direction; the same cerebral constitution and consequent innate predisposition may make a man a hero or a bravo, a dashing soldier like Phil Sheridan, or a daring robber like Fra Diavolo, according to the place of his birth and the nature of his environment.

In common discourse we speak of atrabiliary, spleeny, choleric, or even stomachous persons, but such expressions are, in most cases, survivals of antiquated beliefs concerning the functions of certain physical organs. Hypochondria has no more originary connection with the cartilage of the breastbone than with the cartilage of the ear. In the literal sense of the terms a large-brained man is not necessarily of superior intellectual power any more than a large-hearted man is naturally generous or a large-handed man instinctively grasping. So, too, the theory that intelligence and morality are in direct proportion to the size and symmetry of the encephalon is not sustained by facts; at least the exceptions to the rule are so many and so remarkable as to render it extremely misleading and therefore of little practical value as a scientific principle. Gambetta’s brain, for example, weighed only 1294 grammes, being fifty-eight grammes less in weight than that of the average Parisian, and was so abnormally irregular in its configuration as to seem actually deformed. Any physiologist, says Dr. Manouvrier, who should come across such a skull in a museum, would unhesitatingly pronounce it to be that of a savage. The third frontal circumvolution of the left lobe of his brain had in the posterior part a supplementary fold said by some to be the organ of speech and by others to be the organ of theft; perhaps both combined in the ability of the orator to steal away men’s hearts, as Antony says of the seductive eloquence of Brutus. The distinguished physiologist Bichat was an ardent advocate of this doctrine of the causal connection between cranial capacity and symmetry and vigorous and well-balanced mental faculties, but after his death his own cranium was found to be conspicuously lacking in the very characteristics which he deemed so essential to man as a moral and intellectual being. The late German professor Bischoff based his argument against the higher education of woman on the fact that the average female brain weighs only 1272 grammes, and asserted that a person with such a light encephalon must be organically incompetent to master the various branches of study taught in our universities. A post-mortem examination proved his own brain to be considerably inferior in weight to that of the average woman.