The Life of Jefferson Davis

55

It is only fair to state that General Johnston proposed operations, similar in their main features to those of Lee, though it does not therefore follow that they would have been equally successful. Johnston’s ability as a strategist can not be questioned, and to those who closely and intelligently studied his campaigns, there can be little doubt as to his aggressive qualities, though in this respect, results were not in his favor.

56

Mr. Davis was every day upon the battle-field, and from this circumstance the impression prevailed in Richmond that he was directing the army in person. A common report, which I have never seen contradicted, was that the President narrowly escaped death during the progress of the battles. As related to the writer, the circumstance was as follows: The President, in company with General Magruder and other officers, was at a farm-house, upon which one of the Federal batteries was preparing to open. General Lee, apprised of the President’s whereabouts, sent a courier to warn him of his danger, and he and his companions escaped without injury, just as the Federal battery opened fire.

57

A serious disadvantage suffered by General Lee was the capture of his plan of battle by General McClellan. Completely informed as to his adversary’s movements, and with ninety thousand men against thirty-three thousand, the wonder is, that McClellan did not overwhelm the Confederate army. The means by which the enemy obtained this important paper was a subject of much gossip in the Confederacy.

58

A sufficient proof of the injury done the South by the pretended neutrality of England was the confession of the British Foreign Secretary. Said he: “The impartial observance of neutral obligation by Her Majesty’s Government has thus been exceedingly advantageous to the cause of the more powerful of the two contending parties.”

59

General Lee stated the proportion of the Federal strength to his own as ten to three. Mr. Swinton states Hooker’s force at one hundred and twenty thousand infantry, twelve thousand cavalry, and four hundred guns. Lee’s effective force was considerably less than fifty thousand.

The absence of Longstreet was severely felt by General Lee in his operations against Hooker. The presence of a force was absolutely indispensable upon the south side of James River, in the early spring, to meet the formidable Federal force in the neighborhood of Suffolk. An impression, altogether erroneous, however, prevailed, that Longstreet’s detention from Lee was caused by President Davis. The President eventually ordered Longstreet to Lee, after his delay at Richmond.

60

“Of Stonewall Jackson, Mr. Davis spoke with the utmost tenderness, and some touch of reverential feeling, bearing witness to his earnest and pathetic piety, his singleness of aim, his immense energy as an executive officer, and the loyalty of his nature, making obedience the first of all duties… He had the faculty, or, rather, gift of exciting and holding the love and confidence of his men to an unbounded degree, even though the character of his campaigning imposed on them more hardships than on any other troops in the service. Good soldiers care not for their individual sacrifices, when adequate results can be shown, and these General Jackson never lacked… ‘For glory he lived long enough,’ continued Mr. Davis, with much emotion; ‘and if this result had to come, it was the Divine mercy that removed him. He fell like the eagle, his own feather on the shaft that was dripping with his life-blood. In his death, the Confederacy lost an eye and arm; our only consolation being that the final summons could have reached no soldier more prepared to accept it joyfully.’” —Craven’s Prison Life of Jefferson Davis, pp. 180, 181.

61

Chiefly conscripts.

62

It has been generally assumed that General Lee committed grave errors at Gettysburg. The following explanation by Lee shows the extreme caution with which such a judgment should be pronounced: “It had not been intended to fight a general battle at such distance from our base unless attacked by the enemy; but, finding ourselves unexpectedly confronted by the Federal army, it became a matter of difficulty to withdraw through the mountains with our large trains. At the same time, the country was unfavorable for collecting supplies, while in the presence of the enemy’s main body, as he was enabled to restrain our foraging parties by occupying the passes of the mountains with regular and local troops. A battle thus became, in a measure, unavoidable. Encouraged by the successful issue of the first day, and in view of the valuable results which would ensue from the defeat of the army of General Meade, it was thought advisable to renew the attack.”

Mr. Swinton, who derived his information from General Longstreet, makes a statement which throws much light upon the theory with which this campaign was undertaken: “Indeed, in entering upon the campaign, General Lee expressly promised his corps commanders that he would not assume a tactical offensive, but force his antagonist to attack him.” —Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac.

63

Major John Esten Cooke justly says: “Gettysburg was the Waterloo – Cemetery Hill the Mount St. Jean of the war… Not without good reason is the anniversary of this great battle celebrated at the North with addresses and rejoicings – with crowds, and brass bands, and congratulations. The American Waterloo is worth making that noise over; and the monument proposed there is a natural conception.”

64

General Johnston, whether willingly or unwillingly, it is not necessary for us to inquire, was the favorite of the anti-administration faction. His name and opinions were, upon all occasions, quoted to aid in the disparagement of the administration. This faction was as blind in its zealotry in favor of Johnston, as in its prejudice against Davis. The motive of this zealous championship of Johnston was, however, to offset the well-known confidence of General Lee in the President.

65

The President ordered a Court of Inquiry for investigation of the facts of the campaign in Mississippi. General Pemberton requested that the most searching inquiry should be made, and that the court be allowed to invite all attainable testimony against him.

66

It is noteworthy that when trial vindicated the confidence of Mr. Davis in an officer, of whose capacity the critics were doubtful (as was the case in numberless instances), they made no acknowledgment of error. For example, the President was accused of the most unworthy nepotism in his appointment of General “Dick” Taylor, who was a brother of Mr. Davis’ first wife. Yet that appointment was insisted upon by Stonewall Jackson, in whose army Taylor commanded a brigade. The President made Taylor a Brigadier, because he thought him competent; and afterward a Major-General, because Jackson knew him to be worthy of it. Did Taylor’s subsequent career vindicate the President or the critics?

The case of the brave and efficient Early was another instance in which Mr. Davis was at variance with the newspaper and congressional censors, and in which, as usual, the President was sustained by Lee. It is needless to multiply examples.

67

One of the worst of these proceedings of the enemy, was the execution of Captains Corbin and McGraw. On hearing of their fate, the Confederate Government inquired of the Federal authorities the reason of their actions. The response was, that they were executed as spies. The record of their trial was then demanded. In answer to this request, the Federal Government furnished a copy of the charges and specifications against them, and of the sentence of the court which condemned them, but none of the evidence.

From the papers thus furnished, it appears that it was not true that they had been accused or tried as spies – that the sole charge against these unfortunate gentlemen was, that they had recruited soldiers for the Confederacy in Kentucky, a State embraced in our political system and represented regularly in the Confederate Congress by Senators and Representatives. Nor was the evidence of this charge supplied. Not a scintilla of proof appeared that these men were spies. The sole pretext for their execution was the technical one that these officers were recruiting in one of the States claimed by the enemy, as one of the United States, a principle which applies equally to Virginia or South Carolina, and which would, if carried out, sentence to the gallows every officer and private we had in our service.

68

General D. H. Hill has given a most manly exhibition of feeling toward Mr. Davis, in an article published, some months since, in his magazine. We quote from General Hill, who alludes, at length, to the alleged rancor of Mr. Davis toward his opponents. General Hill prefaces his remarks with the declaration, that he “has never been among the personal friends of Mr. Davis;” that he was “at no time an admirer of his executive abilities;” and further declares himself to have been the recipient of an “unexplained, and perhaps unexplainable wrong,” at the hands of Mr. Davis. Says this gallant soldier:

“It was said of Mr. Davis that he could see no good in his enemies and no evil in his friends. I know of one instance, at least, of incorrectness of the former statement. I was present when a discussion took place in regard to the suppression of a newspaper because of the disloyal character of its articles, which were producing desertion in the army, and disaffection among the people at home. The editor had been converted to Unionism by the battle of Gettysburg and fall of Vicksburg, and, like all newborn proselytes, was fiery in his zeal. A cabinet officer present said: ‘This man is not more disloyal than – ’ (naming a well-known editor, whose assaults upon Mr. Davis at this time were very virulent.) ‘I don’t see how one paper can be suppressed without suppressing the other.’ To this a gentleman replied: ‘You are unjust. Mr. – , though an enemy of the President, yet shows by his abuse of the Yankees that he has no love for them. The other editor betrays hatred of the President and of his own people.’ Mr. Davis immediately assented to this, saying: ‘You have exactly described the difference between the two men.’… But it is not true that he could see no good in his enemies, and that he pursued them with rancorous hate. I do not doubt that in the comparison with his supposed friends, they were in his estimation both intellectually weak and morally perverse. But, apart from this, he could be just and appreciative of their merits. I saw him several times during the session of a Confederate Congress in which he had been harshly assailed. Once he alluded incidentally to his troubles, but without the least resentment in language or manner. I think that there was no instance of the suppression of a newspaper, though several editors were notoriously disloyal to the Confederate cause, and still more of them intensely hostile to the Confederate President. Like Washington, Mr. Davis held ‘error to be the portion of humanity, and to censure it, whether committed by this or that public character, to be the prerogative of a freeman.’”

69

At the beginning of the war, the South had only fifty millions of coin, and had a paper circulation of about the same amount.

70

My limited space has prevented the extended account of the Confederate Commissary Department, which was originally designed. The history of its commissariat is an important chapter in the history of the Confederacy. President Davis was much abused for his retention of Colonel Northrop, who has been charged, both during and since the war, with incompetency, corruption, and every conceivable abuse of his office. The amount of truth, in the charge of corruption against Colonel Northrop, may be estimated, when we state a fact known almost universally in Richmond, that few persons suffered the privations of the war more severely than he. Hundreds of the most respectable gentlemen in the South willingly testify to the unimpeachable patriotism and purity of Colonel Northrop. Equally false was the statement that Mr. Davis gratified merely his personal partiality in appointing Commissary-General a man who had given no previous evidence of fitness. Colonel Northrop, when in the regular Federal army, had seen extensive service in that department, where he was detailed, after having been disabled. His services were amply testified to by his superiors, who regarded him as having peculiar qualifications for the duties of the commissariat. Of these facts Mr. Davis had personal knowledge, though, when he placed Colonel Northrop at the head of the Confederate commissariat, they had not met for more than twenty years.

Again, when commissioned by Mr. Davis, Colonel Northrop was the Commissary-General of South Carolina – a position to which he would hardly have been invited, without at least some conviction, by the authorities of that State, of his fitness. It is well known, too, that a committee of the Confederate Congress investigated the affairs of the Commissary Department, and made a report which amply and honorably vindicated Colonel Northrop. Indeed, a member of that committee, one of the ablest men in Virginia, and not friendly to Mr. Davis, declared it to be the best managed department of the Confederate Government.

Editors perpetually clamored against Colonel Northrop for issuing half rations to the army, who daily issued half sheets to their subscribers – refusing to understand that in each case the cause was the same, viz., an exhaustion of supply, resulting from the depletion of the resources of the country.

71

We present two resolutions of a series adopted by Federal prisoners of war:

“Resolved, That whilst allowing the Confederate authorities all due praise for the attention paid to our prisoners, numbers of our men are daily consigned to early graves in the prime of manhood, far from home and kindred, and this is not caused intentionally by the Confederate Government, but by the force of circumstances; the prisoner is obliged to go without shelter, and, in a great portion of cases, without medicine.

“Resolved, That whereas, in the fortune of war, it was our lot to become prisoners, we have suffered patiently, and are still willing to suffer, if by so doing we can benefit the country, but we would most respectfully beg to say that we are not willing to suffer to further the ends of any party or clique, to the detriment of our own honor, our families, and our country; and we would beg this affair be explained to us, that we may continue to hold the Government in the respect which is necessary to make a good citizen and a soldier.

These resolutions were adopted at a meeting of prisoners in Savannah, September 28, 1864, and sent to President Lincoln.

72

Upon the person of Dahlgren was found the address, from which extracts relative to the purpose of the expedition are given. The portions which we omit are mainly exhortations to the courage of the men in a desperate enterprise:

“Officers and men—

“You have been selected from brigades and regiments, as a picked command, to attempt a desperate undertaking – an undertaking, which, if successful, will write your names on the hearts of your countrymen in letters that can never be erased, and which will cause the prayers of your fellow-soldiers, now confined in loathsome prisons, to follow you wherever you may go.

“We hope to release the prisoners from Belle Island first, and, having seen them fairly started, we will cross the James River into Richmond, destroying the bridges after us, and exhorting the released prisoners to destroy and burn the hateful city; and do not allow the rebel leader, Davis, and his traitorous crew to escape,” etc. The conclusion of this remarkable order is, “Ask the blessing of the Almighty, and do not fear the enemy.”

We have not space for the indisputable testimony which has established the authenticity of the “Dahlgren Papers” – a subject upon which there is no longer room for doubt. The writer, at the time of this raid, had full descriptions of them from persons who saw the originals. They were found upon Dahlgren’s body by a school-boy thirteen years old, who could not write, and were immediately placed in the hands of his teacher. The soiled folds of the paper were plainly visible. The words referring to the murder of President Davis were a part of the regular text of the manuscript. Additional proof of the authenticity of the papers was furnished by the note-book, also found upon the person of Dahlgren, containing a rough draft of the address to the troops, and various memoranda. The address was written in pencil in the note-book, and differs very slightly from the copy, containing, however, the injunction that the Confederate authorities be “killed on the spot.” The statement of Mr. Halbach, who is still living, supported by the testimony of a number of persons, must be deemed conclusive of the genuineness of the documents published in the Richmond journals.

Hon. Stephen R. Mallory, late Confederate Secretary of the Navy, has recently made the following statement of Mr. Davis’ course concerning this matter:

“An expedition directed avowedly against the lives of the heads of the Government, and aiming at firing an entire city, was deemed so violative of the rules of war as to demand a retribution of death upon all concerned in it.

“The subject was one of universal discussion in Richmond; excitement increased with what it fed upon; Congress participated in it; and a pressure was brought to bear upon Mr. Davis to order the execution of some of the captured.

“He entertained no doubt that justice, humanity, and policy equally forbade this cruel measure, and refused to sanction it; and at the same time referred the subject to General Lee, then near Petersburg, for immediate attention. The General’s answer promptly came, asserting, without having been apprized of them, the views already presented by Mr. Davis; and the chief of which was, that the men, having surrendered with arms in their hands, and been accepted and treated as prisoners of war, could not, in retaliation for the unexecuted designs of their leader, be treated otherwise. This disposed of the case, and satisfied the people, who were ever ready to recognize the wisdom and policy of General Lee’s judgment.”

73

The “Fort Pillow massacre” was a fruitful theme for new chapters of “rebel barbarities.” Forrest was charged with indiscriminate slaughter of a captive garrison, when, in fact, he only continued to fight a garrison which had not surrendered. After the Confederates had forced their way into the fort, the flag was not taken down, nor did the garrison offer to surrender. The explanation obviously was that the enemy relied upon their gunboats in the river to destroy Forrest’s forces after they had entered the fort.

74

In the last two years of the war, there were few more promising officers than General Hoke. Mr. Davis thought very highly of his capacity, and, upon one occasion, alluded to him as “that gallant North Carolinian, who always did his duty, and did it thoroughly.”

75

At Hanover Junction, on the 23d of May, General Lee was joined by Breckinridge’s division, numbering less than three thousand muskets, and by Pickett’s division of perhaps three thousand five hundred muskets. General Lee was compelled, very shortly afterwards, to send Breckinridge’s division back to the Valley.

76

This estimate includes Grant’s losses in his assaults upon the fortifications of Petersburg, immediately after his passage of the James River. I have seen his total losses from the Rapidan, until the siege of Petersburg was regularly begun, estimated by Northern writers, at over ninety thousand.

77

President Davis regarded the security of Atlanta as an object of the utmost consequence, for which, if necessary, even great hazards must be run. His frequent declaration was that the Confederacy “had no vital points.” This theory was correct, as there was certainly no one point, the loss of which necessarily involved the loss of the cause. Yet it was obvious in the beginning that certain sections, either for strategic reasons, or as sources of supply, were of vast importance for the prosecution of the war to a speedy and successful conclusion. The value of Richmond and Virginia was obvious. Equally important was a secure foothold in the Mississippi Valley, and the possession of the great mountainous range from Chattanooga to Lynchburg, the “backbone region” of the South. Mr. Davis regarded each one of these three objects as justifying almost any hazard or sacrifice. Under no circumstances could he approve a military policy which contemplated the surrender of either of these objects, without a desperate struggle. He had wanted Vicksburg defended to the last extremity, and now desired equal tenacity as to Atlanta. This city was a great manufacturing centre; the centre of the system of railroads diverging in all directions through the Gulf States, and it was the last remaining outpost in the defense of the central section of the Confederacy.

78

Yet the argument that General Hood’s errors establish the wisdom of General Johnston’s policy, can hardly be deemed fair by an intelligent and impartial judgment. A more competent commander than Hood might have more ably executed an offensive campaign, even after the fall of Atlanta; or, again, other tactics than those of Johnston, from Dalton to Atlanta, might have had better results.

After Johnston’s removal, the President received numerous letters from prominent individuals in the Cotton States, heartily applauding that step. The condemnation of the President, for the removal of Johnston, came only after Hood’s disasters; and it must be remembered that Hood’s later operations were not in accordance with Mr. Davis’ views.

The writer remembers a pithy summary of the Georgia campaign, made by a Confederate officer, shortly before the end of the war. Said he: “While Johnston was in command there were no results at all; when Hood took command, results came very rapidly.”

79

It has been contended that the odds against the South in numbers and resources were compensated by the advantages of her defensive position, and by the strong incentives of a war for her homes and liberties. An ingenious argument in demonstration of the assumed defective administration of the Confederacy has been deduced from various historical examples of successful resistance against overwhelming odds. The most plausible citation has been the success of Frederick the Great, in his defense of Prussia against the coalition of Russia, Austria, and France. This illustration has no value, as it does not at all meet the case.

Waiving all consideration of the peculiar strategic difficulties of the South, Frederick first had the advantage of his English alliance. Frederick never fought odds greater than two to one, while the South fought three, four, sometimes five to one – but never equal numbers. Again, Prussia was inaccessible except by overland marches – not penetrated, like the South, in every direction by navigable rivers, and nearly surrounded by the sea. Frederick, too, was absolute in Prussia, and had the lives and property of all his subjects at his control. Mr. Davis, on the other hand, never could consolidate the resources of the South as he desired, being constantly hampered by demagogism in Congress, which could at all times be coerced by the press hostile to the administration, or influenced by the slightest display of popular displeasure. Pretending to place the whole means of the country at the disposal of the President, Congress yet invariably rendered its measures inoperative by emasculating clauses providing exemptions and immunities of every description. President Davis was too sincere a republican, and had too much regard for the restraints of the Constitution to violently usurp ungranted powers.