Historical Introductions to the Symbolical Books of the Evangelical Lutheran Church

153. Luther's Doctrine Endorsed

To adhere faithfully to Luther's doctrine of conversion and salvation by grace alone was also the determination of the loyal Lutherans in their opposition to the Synergists. Planck correctly remarks that the doctrine which Flacius and the Anti-Synergists defended was the very doctrine which "Luther advocated in his conflict with Erasmus." (Prot. Lehrbegriff 4, 667.) This was substantially conceded even by the opponents. When, for example, at the colloquy in Worms, 1557, the Romanists demanded that Flacius's doctrine of free will be condemned by the Lutherans, Melanchthon declared that herein one ought not to submit to the Papists, who slyly, under the name of Illyricus [Flacius], demanded the condemnation of Luther, whose opinion in the doctrine of free will he [Melanchthon] was neither able nor willing to condemn. (Gieseler 3, 2, 232.) In their Confession, published in March, 1569, the theologians of Ducal Saxony (Wigand, Coelestin, Irenaeus, Kirchner, etc.) declared: "We also add that we embrace the doctrine and opinion of Dr. Luther, the Elias of these latter days of the world, as it is most luminously and skilfully set forth in the book De Servo Arbitrio, against Erasmus, in the Commentary on Genesis, and in other books; and we hold that this teaching of Luther agrees with the eternal Word of God." (Schluesselburg, Catalogus 5, 133.)

Luther's sola-gratia-doctrine was embodied also in the Formula of Concord, and this with a special endorsement of his book De Servo Arbitrio. For here we read: "Even so Dr. Luther wrote of this matter [the doctrine that our free will has no power whatever to qualify itself for righteousness, etc.] also in his book De Servo Arbitrio; i.e., Of the Captive Will of Man, in opposition to Erasmus, and elucidated and supported this position well and thoroughly [egregie et solide]; and afterward he repeated and explained it in his glorious exposition of the book of Genesis, especially of chapter 26. There likewise his meaning and understanding of some other peculiar disputations introduced incidentally by Erasmus, as of absolute necessity, etc., have been secured by him in the best and most careful way against all misunderstanding and perversion; to which we also hereby appeal and refer others." (897, 44; 981, 28.) In the passage of his Commentary on Genesis referred to by the Formula, Luther does not, as has been claimed, retract or modify his former statements concerning the inability of the human will and the monergism of grace, but emphasizes that, in reading De Servo Arbitrio, one must heed and not overlook his frequent admonitions to concern oneself with God as He has revealed Himself in the Gospel, and not speculate concerning God in His transcendence, absoluteness, and majesty, as the One in whom we live and move and have our being, and without whom nothing can either exist or occur, and whose wonderful ways are past finding out. (CONC. TRIGL., 898.) And the fact that the Lutheran theologians, living at the time and immediately after the framing of the Formula of Concord, objected neither to the book De Servo Arbitrio itself nor to its public endorsement by the Formula of Concord, is an additional proof of the fact that they were in complete agreement with Luther's teaching of conversion and salvation by grace alone. (Frank 1, 120.)

This sola-gratia-doctrine, the vital truth of Christianity, rediscovered and proclaimed once more by Luther, was, as stated, the target at which Erasmus directed his shafts. In his Diatribe he defined the power of free will to be the faculty of applying oneself to grace (facultas applicandi se ad gratiam), and declared that those are the best theologians who, while ascribing as much as possible to the grace of God, do not eliminate this human factor. He wrote: Free will is "the ability of the human will according to which man is able either to turn himself to what leads to eternal salvation or to turn away from it." (St.L. 18, 1612.) Again: "Those, therefore, who are farthest apart from the views of Pelagius ascribe to grace the most, but to free will almost nothing; yet they do not abolish it entirely. They say that man cannot will anything good without special grace, cannot begin anything good, cannot continue in it, cannot complete anything without the chief thing, the constant help of divine grace. This opinion seems to be pretty probable because it leaves to man a striving and an effort, and yet does not admit that he is to ascribe even the least to his own powers." (1619.) One must avoid extremes, and seek the middle of the road, said Erasmus. Pelagius had fallen into Scylla, and Luther into Charybdis. "I am pleased with the opinion of those who ascribe to free will something, but to grace by far the most." (1666.) Essentially, this was the error held, nursed, and defended also by the Synergists, though frequently in more guarded and ambiguous phrases. But their theory of conversion also involved, as Schaff and Schmauk put it, "the idea of a partnership between God and man, and a corresponding division of work and merit." (Conf. Principle, 600.)

However, these attempts to revamp the Semi-Pelagian teaching resulted in a controversy which more and longer than any other endangered and disquieted the Lutheran Church, before as well as after the adoption of the Formula of Concord. Whether the unregenerate man, when the Word of God is preached, and the grace of God is offered him, is able to prepare himself for grace, accept it, and assent thereto, was, according to the Formula of Concord, "the question upon which, for quite a number of years now, there has been a controversy among some theologians in the churches of the Augsburg Confession." (881, 2.) And of all the controversies after Luther's death the synergistic controversy was most momentous and consequential. For the doctrine of grace with which it dealt is the vital breath of every Christian. Without it neither faith nor the Christian religion can live and remain. "If we believe," says Luther in De Servo Arbitrio, "that Christ has redeemed men by His blood, then we must confess that the entire man was lost; otherwise we make Christ superfluous or the Redeemer of but the meanest part of us, which is blasphemous and sacrilegious." Reading the book of Erasmus, in which he bent every effort toward exploding the doctrine of grace, Luther felt the hand of his opponent clutching his throat. In the closing paragraph of De Servo Arbitrio Luther wrote: "I highly laud and extol you for this thing also, that of all others you alone have gone to the heart of the subject… You alone have discerned the core of the matter and have aimed at the throat, for which I thank you heartily. —Unus tu et solus cardinem rerum vidisti, et ipsum iugulum petisti, pro quo ex animo tibi gratias ago, in hac enim causa libentius versor, quantum favet tempus et otium." (E. v. a. 7, 367. 137; St. L. 18, 1967; Pieper, Dogm. 2, 543.) And so the Synergists, who renewed the doctrine of Erasmus, also flew at the throat of Christianity. Genuine Lutheranism would have been strangled if synergism had emerged victorious from this great controversy of grace versus free will.

154. The Father of Synergism

During the first period of his activity in Wittenberg, Melanchthon was in perfect agreement with Luther also on the question of man's inability in spiritual matters and the sole activity, or monergism, of grace in the work of his salvation. As late as 1530 he incorporated these views in the Augsburg Confession, as appears, in particular, from Articles II, V, XVIII, and XIX. His later doctrine concerning the three concurring causes of conversion (the Holy Spirit, the Word, and the consenting will of man), as well as his theory explaining synergistically, from an alleged dissimilar action in man, the difference why some are saved while others are lost, is not so much as hinted at in the Confession. But even at this early date (1530) or soon after, Melanchthon also does not seem any longer to have agreed whole-heartedly with Luther in the doctrine of grace and free will. And in the course of time his theology drifted farther and farther from its original monergistic moorings. Nor was Luther wholly unaware of the secret trend of his colleague and friend toward – Erasmus. In 1536, when the deviations of Melanchthon and Cruciger, dealt with in our previous chapter, were brought to his notice, Luther exclaimed: "Haec est ipsissima theologia Erasmi. This is the identical theology of Erasmus, nor can there be anything more opposed to our doctrine." (Kolde, Analecta, 266.)

That Melanchthon's theology was verging toward Erasmus appears from his letter of June 22, 1537, to Veit Dietrich, in which he said that he desired a more thorough exposition also of the doctrines of predestination and of the consent of the will. (C. R. 3, 383.) Before this, in his Commentary on Romans of 1532, he had written that there is some cause of election also in man; viz., in as far as he does not repudiate the grace offered – "tamen eatenus aliquam causam in accipiente esse quatenus promissionem oblatam non repudiat." (Seeberg 4, 442.) In an addition to his Loci of 1533 he also spoke of a cause of justification and election residing in man. (C. R. 21, 332.) In the revised editions of 1535 and 1543 he plainly began to prepare the way for his later bold and unmistakable deviations. For even though unable to point out a clean-cut and unequivocal synergistic statement, one cannot read these editions without scenting a Semi-Pelagian and Erasmian atmosphere. What Melanchthon began to teach was the doctrine that man, when approached by the Word of God, is able to assume either an attitude of pro or con, i. e., for or against the grace of God. The same applies to the Variata of 1540 in which the frequent "adiuvari" there employed, though not incorrect as such, was not without a synergistic flavor.

Tschackert remarks of the Loci of 1535: "Melanchthon wants to make man responsible for his state of grace. Nor does the human will in consequence of original sin lose the ability to decide itself when incited; the will produces nothing new by its own power, but assumes an attitude toward what approaches it. When man hears the Word of God, and the Holy Spirit produces spiritual affections in his heart, the will can either assent or turn against it. In this way Melanchthon arrives at the formula, ever after stereotype with him, that there are three concurring causes in the process of conversion: 'the Word of God, the Holy Spirit, and the human will, which, indeed, is not idle, but strives against its infirmity.'" (520.)

However, during the life of Luther, Melanchthon made no further measurable progress towards synergism. Perhaps the unpleasant experiences following upon his innovations in the doctrine of good works acted as a check also on the public development of his synergistic tendencies. During Luther's life Melanchthon, as he himself admitted to Carlowitz (106), dissimulated, keeping his deviating views to himself and his intimate friends. After Luther's death, however, he came out unmistakably and publicly, also in favor of synergism, endorsing even the Erasmian definition of free will as "the power in man to apply himself to grace." He plainly taught that, when drawn by the Holy Spirit, the will is able to decide pro or con, to obey or to resist. Especially in his lectures, Melanchthon – not indeed directly, but mentioning the name of Flacius – continually lashed such phrases of Luther as "purely passive," "block," "resistance," – a fact to which Schluesselburg, who had studied in Wittenberg, refers in support of his assertion that Melanchthon had departed from Luther's teaching on free will. (Catalogus 5, 32.) While Melanchthon formerly (in his Loci of 1543) had spoken of three causes of a good action (bonae actionis) he now publicly advocated the doctrine of three concurring causes of conversion. Now he boldly maintained that, since the grace of God is universal, one must assume, and also teach, that there are different actions in different men, which accounts for the fact that some are converted and saved while others are lost. According to the later Melanchthon, therefore, man's eternal salvation evidently does not depend on the gracious operations of God's Holy Spirit and Word alone, but also on his own correct conduct toward grace. In his heart, especially when approaching the mercy-seat in prayer, Melanchthon, no doubt, forgot and disavowed his own teaching, and believed and practised Luther's sola-gratia-doctrine. But it cannot be denied that, in his endeavors to harmonize universal grace with the fact that not all, but some only, are saved, Melanchthon repudiated the monergism of Luther, espoused and defended the powers of free will in spiritual matters, and thought, argued, spoke, and wrote in terms of synergism. Indeed, Melanchthon must be regarded as the father of both synergism and the rationalistic methods employed in its defense, and as the true father also of the modern rationalistico-synergistic theology represented by such distinguished men as Von Hofmann, Thomasius, Kahnis, Luthardt, etc. (Pieper 2, 582; Frank 1, 231.)

155. Unsound Statements of Melanchthon

Following are some of the ambiguous and false deliverances of Melanchthon: In the Loci of 1535 the so-called human cause of conversion which must be added to the Word and Spirit is described as endeavoring, striving, and wishing to obey and believe. We read: "We do not say this to ensnare the consciences, or to deter men from the endeavor to obey and believe, or from making an effort. On the contrary, since we are to begin with the Word, we certainly must not resist the Word of God, but strive to obey it… We see that these causes are united: the Word, the Holy Spirit, and the will, which is certainly not idle, but strives against its infirmity. In this manner ecclesiastical writers are accustomed to join these causes. Basil says: 'Only will, and God will precede,' God precedes, calls, moves, assists us, but let us beware lest we resist… Chrysostom says: He who draws, draws him who is willing." (C. R. 21, 376.)

In conversion and salvation God certainly must do and does His share, but man must beware lest he fail to do what is required of him. This is also the impression received from Melanchthon's statements in the third elaboration of his Loci, 1543. We read: "Here three causes of a good action concur (hic concurrunt tres causae bonae actionis): the Word of God, the Holy Spirit, and the human will assenting to and not resisting the Word of God (humana voluntas assentiens, nec repugnans Verbo Dei). For it could expel [the Spirit], as Saul expelled [Him] of his own free will. But when the mind hearing and sustaining itself does not resist, does not give way to diffidence, but, the Holy Spirit assisting, endeavors to assent, – in such a struggle the will is not inactive (in hoc certamine voluntas non est otiosa). The ancients have said that good works are done when grace precedes and the will follows. So also Basil says: 'Monon theleson, kai theos proapanta, Only will, and God anticipates. God precedes, calls, moves, assists us; but as for us, let us see to it that we do not resist. Deus antevertit nos, vocat, movet, adiuvat, SED NOS VIDERIMUS, ne repugnemus,' (21, 658.) And Phil. 1, 6: 'He which hath begun a good work in you will perform it until the day of Jesus Christ,' i. e., we are assisted by God (adiuvamur a Deo), but we must hear the Word of God and not resist the drawing God." (916.) "God draws our minds that they will, but we must assent, not resist. Deus trahit mentes, ut velint, sed assentiri nos, non repugnare oportet." (917.) Here we also meet the remark: "But the will, when assisted by the Holy Spirit, becomes more free. Fit autem voluntas adiuvata Spiritu Sancto magis libera." (663.) Frank comments pertinently that the magis presupposes a certain degree of liberty of the will before the assistance of the Holy Spirit. (1, 198.)

The boldest synergistic statements are found in the Loci of 1548. It was the year of the Leipzig Interim, in which the same error was embodied as follows: "The merciful God does not deal with man as with a block, but draws him in such a way that his will, too, cooperates." (C. R. 7, 51. 260.) As to the Loci of this year, Bindseil remarks in the Corpus Reformatorum: "This edition is famous on account of certain paragraphs inserted by the author in the article on Free Will. For these additions contain the Erasmian definition of free will (that it is the faculty of applying oneself to grace), on account of which Melanchthon was charged with synergism by the Flacians… For this reason the edition is called by J. T. Mayer 'the worst of all (omnium pessima).'" At the Weimar colloquy, 1560, even Strigel was not willing to identify himself openly with the Erasmian definition of free will (facultas applicandi se ad gratiam) as found in one of these sections. When Flacius quoted the passage, Strigel retorted excitedly: "I do not defend that definition which you have quoted from the recent edition [1548]. When did you hear it from me? When have I undertaken to defend it?" (Frank 1, 199. 135.) At the Herzberg colloquy Andreae remarked: "The Loci Communes of Melanchthon are useful. But whoever reads the locus de libero arbitrio must confess, even if he judges most mildly, that the statements are dubious and ambiguous. And what of the four paragraphs which were inserted after Luther's death? For here we read: 'There must of necessity be a cause of difference in us why a Saul is rejected, a David received.'" (Pieper 2, 587.)