A Voyage Round the World

JOHN MASEFIELD.

January 30, 1911.

AUTHOR'S INTRODUCTION

Notwithstanding the great improvement of navigation within the last two centuries, a voyage round the world is still considered as an enterprize of so very singular a nature, that the public have never failed to be extremely inquisitive about the various accidents and turns of fortune with which this uncommon attempt is generally attended. And though the amusement expected in these narrations is doubtless one great source of that curiosity with the bulk of readers, yet the more intelligent part of mankind have always agreed that from accounts of this nature, if faithfully executed, the more important purposes of navigation, commerce, and national interest may be greatly promoted: for every authentic description of foreign coasts and countries will contribute to one or more of these great ends, in proportion to the wealth, wants, or commodities of those countries, and our ignorance of those coasts; and therefore a voyage round the world promises a species of information of all others the most desirable and interesting, since great part of it is performed in seas with which we are as yet but very imperfectly acquainted, and in the neighbourhood of a country renowned for the abundance of its wealth, though it is at the same time stigmatised for its poverty in the necessaries and conveniences of a civilized life.

These considerations have occasioned the compiling the ensuing work; which, in gratifying the inquisitive disposition of mankind, and contributing to the safety and success of future navigators, and to the extension of our commerce and power, may doubtless vie with any narration of this kind hitherto made public: since as to the first of these heads it may well be supposed that the general curiosity hath been strongly excited by the circumstances of this undertaking already known to the world; for whether we consider the force of the squadron sent on this service, or the diversified distresses that each single ship was separately involved in, or the uncommon instances of varying fortune which attended the whole enterprize, each of these articles, I conceive, must, from its rude, well-known outlines, appear worthy of a compleater and more finished delineation.

Besides these descriptions and directions relating thereto, there is inserted in the ensuing work an ample account of a particular navigation of which hitherto little more than the name has been known, except to those immediately employed in it: I mean the track described by the Manila ship, in her passage to Acapulco, through the northern part of the Pacific Ocean. This material article is collected from the draughts and journals met with on board the Manila galeon, founded on the experience of more than a hundred and fifty years' practice, and corroborated in its principal circumstances by the concurrent evidence of all the Spanish prisoners taken in that vessel. And as many of their journals, which I have examined, appear to have been not ill kept, I presume the particulars of their route may be very safely relied on by future navigators. The advantages which may be drawn from an exact knowledge of this navigation, and the beneficial projects that may be formed thereon, both in war and peace, are by no means proper to be discussed in this place, but they will easily offer themselves to the skillful in maritime affairs. However, as the Manila ships are the only ones which have ever traversed this vast ocean, except a French straggler or two which have been afterwards seized on the coast of Mexico, and as, during near two ages in which this trade has been carried on, the Spaniards have, with the greatest care, secreted all accounts of their voyages from the rest of the world, these reasons alone would authorize the insertion of those papers, and would recommend them to the inquisitive as a very great improvement in geography, and worthy of attention from the singularity of many circumstances therein recited.

Thus much it has been thought necessary to premise with regard to the ensuing work, which it is hoped the reader will, on perusal, find much ampler and more important than this slight sketch can well explain. But as there are hereafter occasionally interspersed some accounts of Spanish transactions, and many observations relating to the disposition of the American Spaniards, and to the condition of the countries bordering on the South Seas, and as herein I may appear to differ greatly from the opinions generally established, I think it behoves me particularly to recite the authorities I have been guided by in these matters, that I may not be censured as having given way either to a thoughtless credulity on one hand, or, what would be a much more criminal imputation, to a willful and deliberate misrepresentation on the other.

Mr. Anson, before he set sail upon this expedition, besides the printed journals to those parts, took care to furnish himself with the best manuscript accounts he could procure of all the Spanish settlements upon the coasts of Chili, Peru, and Mexico: these he carefully compared with the examinations of his prisoners, and the informations of several intelligent persons who fell into his hands in the South Seas. He had likewise the good fortune, in some of his captures, to possess himself of a great number of letters and papers of a public nature, many of them written by the Viceroy of Peru to the Viceroy of Santa Fee, to the Presidents of Panama and Chili, to Don Blass de Lezo, admiral of the galeons, and to divers other persons in considerable employments; and in these letters there was usually inserted a recital of those they were intended to answer; so that they contained no small part of the correspondence between those officers for some time previous to our arrival on that coast. We took, besides, many letters sent from persons entrusted by the Spanish Government to their friends and correspondents, which were frequently filled with narrations of public business, and sometimes contained undisguised animadversions on the views and conduct of their superiors. From these materials those accounts of the Spanish affairs are drawn which may at first sight appear the most exceptionable. In particular, the history of the various casualties which befel Pizarro's squadron is for the most part composed from intercepted letters. Though indeed the relation of the insurrection of Orellana and his followers is founded on rather a less disputable authority: for it was taken from the mouth of an English gentleman then on board Pizarro, who often conversed with Orellana; and it was upon inquiry confirmed in its principal circumstances by others who were in the ship at the same time: so that the fact, however extraordinary, is, I conceive, not to be contested.

And on this occasion I cannot but mention, that though I have endeavoured with my utmost care to adhere strictly to truth in every article of the ensuing narration, yet I am apprehensive that in so complicated a work some oversights must have been committed by the inattention to which at times all mankind are liable. However, I am as yet conscious of none but literal and insignificant mistakes; and if there are others more considerable which have escaped me, I flatter myself they are not of moment enough to affect any material transaction, and therefore I hope they may justly claim the reader's indulgence.

After this general account of the ensuing work, it might be expected, perhaps, that I should proceed to the work itself, but I cannot finish this Introduction without adding a few reflections on a matter very nearly connected with the present subject, and, as I conceive, neither destitute of utility nor unworthy the attention of the public; I mean the animating my countrymen, both in their public and private stations, to the encouragement and pursuit of all kinds of geographical and nautical observations, and of every species of mechanical and commercial information. It is by a settled attachment to these seemingly minute particulars that our ambitious neighbours have established some part of that power with which we are now struggling: and as we have the means in our hands of pursuing these subjects more effectually than they can, it would be a dishonour to us longer to neglect so easy and beneficial a practice. For, as we have a navy much more numerous than theirs, great part of which is always employed in very distant nations, either in the protection of our colonies and commerce, or in assisting our allies against the common enemy, this gives us frequent opportunities of furnishing ourselves with such kind of materials as are here recommended, and such as might turn greatly to our advantage either in war or peace. Since, not to mention what might be expected from the officers of the navy, if their application to these subjects was properly encouraged, it would create no new expence to the government to establish a particular regulation for this purpose, as all that would be requisite would be constantly to embark on board some of our men-of-war which are sent on these distant cruises a person who, with the character of an engineer and the skill and talents necessary to that profession, should be employed in drawing such coasts and planning such harbours as the ship should touch at, and in making such other observations of all kinds as might either prove of advantage to future navigators, or might any ways tend to promote the public service. Persons habituated to these operations (which could not fail at the same time of improving them in their proper business) would be extremely useful in many other lights besides those already mentioned, and might tend to secure our fleets from those disgraces with which their attempts against places on shore have been often attended; and in a nation like ours, where all sciences are more eagerly and universally pursued and better understood than in any other part of the world, proper subjects for these employments could not long be wanting if due encouragement were given to them. This method here recommended is known to have been frequently practised by the French, particularly in the instance of Mons. Frazier, an engineer, who has published a celebrated voyage to the South Seas; for this person, in the year 1711, was purposely sent by the French king into that country on board a merchantman, that he might examine and describe the coast, and take plans of all the fortified places, the better to enable the French to prosecute their illicit trade, or, on a rupture between them and the court of Spain, to form their enterprizes in those seas with more readiness and certainty. Should we pursue this method, we might hope that the emulation amongst those who are commissioned for these undertakings, and the experience which even in the most peaceable intervals they would hereby acquire, might at length procure us a proper number of able engineers, and might efface the national scandal which our deficiency in that species of men has sometimes exposed us to: and surely every step to encourage and improve them is of great moment to the publick, as no persons, when they are properly instructed, make better returns in war for the distinctions and emoluments bestowed on them in time of peace. Of which the advantages the French have reaped from their dexterity (too numerous and recent to be soon forgot) are an ample confirmation.

And having mentioned engineers, or such as are skilled in drawing and the other usual practices of that profession, as the properest persons to be employed in these foreign enquiries, I cannot (as it offers itself so naturally to the subject in hand) but lament how very imperfect many of our accounts of distant countries are rendered by the relators being unskilled in drawing, and in the general principles of surveying, even where other abilities have not been wanting. Had more of our travellers been initiated in these acquirements, and had there been added thereto some little skill in the common astronomical observations (all which a person of ordinary talents might attain with a very moderate share of application), we should by this time have seen the geography of the globe much correcter than we now find it: the dangers of navigation would have been considerably lessened, and the manners, arts, and produce of foreign countries would have been better known to us than they are. Indeed, when I consider the strong incitements that all travellers have to pursue some part at least of these qualifications, especially drawing; when I consider how much it will facilitate their observations, assist and strengthen their memories, and of how tedious, and often unintelligible, a load of description it would rid them, I cannot but wonder that any person who intends to visit distant countries with a view of informing either himself or others, should be wanting in so necessary a piece of skill. And to enforce this argument still further, I must add that besides the uses of drawing, already mentioned, there is one which, tho' not so obvious, is yet perhaps of more consequence than all that has been hitherto urged; I mean the strength and distinguishing power it adds to some of our faculties. This appears from hence, that those who are used to draw objects observe them with more accuracy than others who are not habituated to that practice. For we may easily find by a little experience, that when we view any object, however simple, our attention or memory is scarcely at any time so strong as to enable us, when we have turned our eyes away from it, to recollect exactly every part it consisted of, and to recall all the circumstances of its appearance; since on examination it will be discovered that in some we were mistaken and others we had totally overlooked: but he that is accustomed to draw what he sees is at the same time accustomed to rectify this inattention; for by confronting his ideas copied on the paper with the object he intends to represent, he finds out what circumstances have deceived him in its appearance, and hence he at length acquires the habit of observing much more at one view, and retains what he sees with more correctness than he could ever have done without his practice and proficiency in drawing.

If what has been said merits the attention of travellers of all sorts, it is, I think, more particularly applicable to the gentlemen of the navy; since, without drawing and planning, neither charts nor views of land can be taken, and without these it is sufficiently evident that navigation is at a full stand. It is doubtless from a persuasion of the utility of these qualifications that his Majesty has established a drawing master at Portsmouth for the instruction of those who are presumed to be hereafter intrusted with the command of his royal navy: and tho' some have been so far misled as to suppose that the perfection of sea-officers consisted in a turn of mind and temper resembling the boisterous element they had to deal with, and have condemned all literature and science as effeminate and derogatory to that ferocity which, they would falsely persuade us, was the most unerring characteristic of courage: yet it is to be hoped that such absurdities as these have at no time been authorised by the public opinion, and that the belief of them daily diminishes. If those who adhere to these mischievous positions were capable of being influenced by reason or swayed by example, I should think it sufficient for their conviction to observe that the most valuable drawings made in the following voyage, though done with such a degree of skill that even professed artists could with difficulty imitate them, were taken by Mr. Piercy Brett, one of Mr. Anson's lieutenants, and since captain of the Lion man-of-war; who, in his memorable engagement with the Elizabeth (for the importance of the service, or the resolution with which it was conducted, inferior to none this age has seen), has given ample proof that a proficiency in the arts I have been here recommending is extremely consistent with the most exemplary bravery, and the most distinguished skill in every function belonging to the duty of a sea-officer. Indeed, when the many branches of science are attended to, of which even the common practice of navigation is composed, and the many improvements which men of skill have added to this practice within these few years, it would induce one to believe that the advantages of reflection and speculative knowledge were in no profession more eminent than in that of a sea-officer; for, not to mention some expertness in geography, geometry, and astronomy, which it would be dishonourable for him to be without (as his journal and his estimate of the daily position of the ship are founded on particular branches of these arts), it may be well supposed that the management and working of a ship, the discovery of her most eligible position in the water (usually stiled her trim), and the disposition of her sails in the most advantageous manner, are articles wherein the knowledge of mechanicks cannot but be greatly assistant. And perhaps the application of this kind of knowledge to naval subjects may produce as great improvements in sailing and working a ship as it has already done in many other matters conducive to the ease and convenience of human life. Since, when the fabric of a ship and the variety of her sails are considered, together with the artificial contrivances for adapting them to her different motions, as it cannot be doubted but these things have been brought about by more than ordinary sagacity and invention; so neither can it be doubted but that in some conjunctures a speculative and scientific turn of mind may find out the means of directing and disposing this complicated mechanism much more advantageously than can be done by mere habit, or by a servile copying of what others may perhaps have erroneously practised in similar emergencies. But it is time to finish this digression, and to leave the reader to the perusal of the ensuing work, which, with how little art soever it may be executed, will yet, from the importance of the subject and the utility and excellence of the materials, merit some share of the public attention.

BOOK I

CHAPTER I

OF THE EQUIPMENT OF THE SQUADRON: THE INCIDENTS RELATING THERETO, FROM ITS FIRST APPOINTMENT TO ITS SETTING SAIL FROM ST. HELENS

The squadron under the command of Mr. Anson (of which I here propose to recite the most material proceedings) having undergone many changes in its destination, its force, and its equipment, during the ten months between its original appointment and its final sailing from St. Helens; I conceive the history of these alterations is a detail necessary to be made public, both for the honour of those who first planned and promoted this enterprize, and for the justification of those who have been entrusted with its execution. Since it will from hence appear that the accidents the expedition was afterwards exposed to, and which prevented it from producing all the national advantages the strength of the squadron, and the expectation of the public, seemed to presage, were principally owing to a series of interruptions, which delayed the commander in the course of his preparations, and which it exceeded his utmost industry either to avoid or to get removed.

When, in the latter end of the summer of the year 1739, it was foreseen that a war with Spain was inevitable, it was the opinion of some considerable persons then trusted with the administration of affairs, that the most prudent step the nation could take, on the breaking out of the war, was attacking that crown in her distant settlements; for by this means (as at that time there was the greatest probability of success) it was supposed that we should cut off the principal resources of the enemy, and should reduce them to the necessity of sincerely desiring a peace, as they would hereby be deprived of the returns of that treasure by which alone they could be enabled to carry on a war.

In pursuance of these sentiments, several projects were examined, and several resolutions were taken by the council. And in all these deliberations it was from the first determined that George Anson, Esq., then captain of the Centurion, should be employed as commander-in-chief of an expedition of this kind: and he at that time being absent on a cruize, a vessel was dispatched to his station so early as the beginning of September to order him to return with his ship to Portsmouth. And soon after he came there, that is on the 10th of November following, he received a letter from Sir Charles Wager directing him to repair to London, and to attend the Board of Admiralty: where, when he arrived, he was informed by Sir Charles that two squadrons would be immediately fitted out for two secret expeditions, which, however, would have some connexion with each other; that he, Mr. Anson, was intended to command one of them, and Mr. Cornwall (who hath since lost his life gloriously in the defence of his country's honour) the other; that the squadron under Mr. Anson was to take on board three independent companies of a hundred men each, and Bland's regiment of foot; that Colonel Bland was likewise to embark with his regiment, and to command the land-forces; and that, as soon as this squadron could be fitted for the sea, they were to set sail, with express orders to touch at no place till they came to Java Head in the East Indies; that there they were only to stop to take in water, and thence to proceed directly to the city of Manila, situated on Luconia, one of the Philippine Islands; that the other squadron was to be of equal force with this commanded by Mr. Anson, and was intended to pass round Cape Horn, into the South Seas, to range along that coast; and after cruising upon the enemy in those parts, and attempting their settlements, this squadron in its return was to rendezvous at Manila, there to join the squadron under Mr. Anson, where they were to refresh their men, and refit their ships, and perhaps receive orders for other considerable enterprizes.

This scheme was doubtless extremely well projected, and could not but greatly advance the public service, and the reputation and fortune of those concerned in its execution; for had Mr. Anson proceeded for Manila at the time and in the manner proposed by Sir Charles Wager, he would, in all probability, have arrived there before they had received any advice of the war between us and Spain, and consequently before they had been in the least prepared for the reception of an enemy, or had any apprehensions of their danger. The city of Manila might be well supposed to have been at that time in the same defenceless condition with all the other Spanish settlements, just at the breaking out of the war; that is to say, their fortifications neglected, and in many places decayed; their cannon dismounted, or rendered useless by the mouldring of their carriages; their magazines, whether of military stores or provision, all empty; their garrisons unpaid, and consequently thin, ill affected, and dispirited; and the royal chests in Peru, whence alone all these disorders could receive their redress, drained to the very bottom; this, from the intercepted letters of their viceroys and governors, it is well known to have been the defenceless state of Panama, and the other Spanish places on the coast of the South Sea, for near a twelvemonth after our declaration of war. And it cannot be supposed that the city of Manila, removed still farther by almost half the circumference of the globe, should have experienced from the Spanish government a greater share of attention and concern for its security than Panama, and the other important ports in Peru and Chili, on which their possession of that immense empire depends. Indeed, it is well known that Manila was at that time incapable of making any considerable defence, and in all probability would have surrendered only on the appearance of our squadron before it. The consequence of this city, and the island it stands on, may be in some measure estimated, from the known healthiness of its air, the excellency of its port and bay, the number and wealth of its inhabitants, and the very extensive and beneficial commerce which it carries on to the principal ports in the East Indies, and China, and its exclusive trade to Acapulco, the returns for which, being made in silver, are, upon the lowest valuation, not less than three millions of dollars per annum.

On this scheme Sir Charles Wager was so intent that in a few days after this first conference, that is, on November 18, Mr. Anson received an order to take under his command the Argyle, Severn, Pearl, Wager, and Tryal sloop; and other orders were issued to him in the same month, and in the December following, relating to the victualling of this squadron. But Mr. Anson attending the Admiralty the beginning of January, he was informed by Sir Charles Wager that for reasons with which he, Sir Charles, was not acquainted, the expedition to Manila was laid aside. It may be conceived that Mr. Anson was extremely chagrined at the losing the command of so infallible, so honourable, and in every respect, so desirable an enterprize, especially too as he had already, at a very great expence, made the necessary provision for his own accommodation in this voyage, which he had reason to expect would prove a very long one. However, Sir Charles, to render his disappointment in some degree more tolerable, informed him that the expedition to the South Seas was still intended, and that he, Mr. Anson, and his squadron, as their first destination was now countermanded, should be employed in that service. And on the 10th of January he received his commission, appointing him commander-in-chief of the forementioned squadron, which (the Argyle being in the course of their preparation changed for the Gloucester) was the same he sailed with above eight months after from St. Helens. On this change of destination, the equipment of the squadron was still prosecuted with as much vigour as ever, and the victualling, and whatever depended on the commodore, was soon so far advanced that he conceived the ships might be capable of putting to sea the instant he should receive his final orders, of which he was in daily expectation. And at last, on the 28th of June 1740, the Duke of Newcastle, principal Secretary of State, delivered to him his Majesty's instructions, dated January 31, 1739, with an additional instruction from the Lords Justices, dated June 19, 1740. On the receipt of these, Mr. Anson immediately repaired to Spithead, with a resolution to sail with the first fair wind, flattering himself that all his difficulties were now at an end. For though he knew by the musters that his squadron wanted three hundred seamen of their complement (a deficiency which, with all its assiduity, he had not been able to get supplied), yet, as Sir Charles Wager informed him, that an order from the Board of Admiralty was dispatched to Sir John Norris to spare him the numbers which he wanted, he doubted not of its being complied with. But on his arrival at Portsmouth, he found himself greatly mistaken, and disappointed in this persuasion; for on his application, Sir John Norris told him he could spare him none, for he wanted men for his own fleet. This occasioned an inevitable and a very considerable delay; for it was the end of July before this deficiency was by any means supplied, and all that was then done was extremely short of his necessities and expectation. For Admiral Balchen, who succeeded to the command at Spithead, after Sir John Norris had sailed to the westward, instead of three hundred able sailors, which Mr. Anson wanted of his complement, ordered on board the squadron a hundred and seventy men only; of which thirty-two were from the hospital and sick quarter, thirty-seven from the Salisbury, with three officers of Colonel Lowther's regiment, and ninety-eight marines, and these were all that were ever granted to make up the forementioned deficiency.