The Life of General Garibaldi

CHAPTER III

Como is a city beautifully situated on the northern end of Lake Como; but on the low land near the margin, and overlooked by the mountains, which rise beyond and around.

The enthusiasm which prevailed on Garibaldi's arrival was extreme; and the alarm bells were rung in all the communes of the Varesotto, Tramezzo, Como and Lecco districts. The volunteers were pouring in from every village and hamlet. In this manner the insurrection gained ground in Upper Lombardy. At the first appearance of the braves, all the civil authorities of Como and Lecco recognized the government of King Victor Emanuel, which in those towns was represented by Count Visconti Venosta, a young nobleman from Valtellina of great determination. His spirited proclamations roused the enthusiasm of country folks and citizens, who hastened to the scene of action with an ardor never witnessed in 1848. Money, so much wanted, poured into Garibaldi's military treasury, together with gold necklaces and other valuable trinkets from fair Lombard ladies. The sum thus collected in two days reached 2,000,000 francs.

Garibaldi had been instructed to move in the direction of Varese by slow marches, keeping himself in constant communication with Cialdini's division, which did not follow. By the necessity of strategetical combinations, Gen. Cialdini was obliged to march to and fro from Vercelli and Stroppiana, guarding the right bank of the Upper Sesia, as far as Gattinara. The necessary result of this constant marching and countermarching was that of retarding the projects of Garibaldi. He moved slowly for two days, but he could not stand it any longer; and hastening from Romagnana to the headquarters of the king, he begged him to observe that he did not and could not understand the scientific principles of a regular war, and that he wished to be left to his daring inspiration.

Victor Emanuel saw directly that it was of no use to keep such a bird in the cage of strategic rules, and, letting him loose, said: "Go where you like, do what you like. I have only one regret – that of not being able to follow you."

While occupying the place, amidst the enthusiasm of the inhabitants, he learned that General Urban was approaching with forty thousand Austrians. He immediately retired from the city, leaving two hundred men, with orders to hold the place, with the aid of the inhabitants, to the last extremity. The enemy came on, attacked, and were bravely resisted, but succeeded in taking the town. Supposing that Garibaldi had retreated into Switzerland, without any intention of returning, they appeared to entertain no apprehensions of danger from that quarter. It then became highly important that he should be apprised of the condition of things. Every effort was made to procure a messenger, and high rewards were offered; but the hazards were so great that no one could be found willing to run the desperate risk of his life, or rather to go to certain death, as the Austrians were believed to hold and watch every avenue to the country.

Garibaldi, who was waiting in the mountains for an opportunity to make a sudden descent upon the enemy, but cut off from communication, and in ignorance of their situation, was surprised in his wild retreat by the arrival of a lady, who had come from Como alone, on horseback, by pursuing by-paths, and with great skill and boldness, finding her way between and around the various points which were guarded by the enemy. Although only twenty-four years of age, brought up in refined society, and of aristocratic family – a daughter of Count Raimondi – this fair and youthful stranger appeared before Garibaldi like a vision, and, with an air corresponding with the spirit which had inspired her through her wild and perilous expedition, presented to him the dispatches with which she had been intrusted, at her earnest petition, in Como. Garibaldi learned from them the position of the enemy, and the readiness of the people to receive him again. Without a moment's delay, he set out on his return, and by a forced march, conducted with the greatest skill, suddenly returned to the Lake of Como, with his resolute band.

Como was occupied after a hard fight of two hours at San Fermo and Camerlata. This last-mentioned position is to be considered as the key of the picturesque barrier of Como, for its elevated ground enables a small body of men to oppose a long resistance even to an army of 15,000 strong. The positions were carried at the point of the bayonet, for the Cacciatori delle Alpi could not fire their muskets, so much inferior in range to those of the enemy. It was a hard and bloody fight, which may, without exaggeration, be compared to the struggles of old, when Roman and Carthaginian legions met together.

The news of the organizing of a corps by the celebrated Garibaldi, had induced the Austrians to make their last demand upon Piedmont, which was a very extraordinary one, and indicated the interesting truth that they duly appreciated Garibaldi. It was, that, unless his band was immediately dispersed, they would march forward in three days. This demand was not complied with, but the King of Sardinia prepared to receive the threatened invaders. With excellent judgment, however, he did not attempt to occupy the line of the Mincio; he chose a stronger one within his own territory, and occupied that extending from Alessandria to the Apennines, toward Genoa, leaving the road to Turin open to the enemy. The Austrians moved; but, as soon as they had crossed the Ticino, the engineer who had charge of the canals which irrigate the extensive valley, was ordered to open them and make an inundation. The Austrians soon discovered that the water was rising, and the general sent word to the engineer in terms like these:

"Your brother is a prisoner in my hands; if you do not immediately stop the inundation, I will cut off his head."

The engineer, with the greatest resolution, pressed the work with redoubled vigor that night; and by employing two hundred more men, completed it before morning. The Austrians, finding that they were likely to be caught in a kind of trap, with the inundation rising on their right, and the Piedmontese army on their left, soon retreated, and recrossed the Ticino.

This action was important, not only on account of its resulting in the first victory against the Austrians, but also because of the excellence of the Piedmontese troops, which had been denied, and was certainly seriously doubted by Louis Napoleon, who had given to Victor Emnanuel four battalions of French Zouaves for his body-guard. These were the only French troops in that battle; and they so much admired the conduct of the King of Sardinia, that they elected him "Corporal" on the field. This is esteemed the highest military honor which can be in any way acquired; and it is one which Louis Napoleon himself has never yet received, even from his own troops.

The battle of Montebello was the first ever decided by a railroad. When the action commenced, there was only a single regiment to resist the Austrians. This was a French regiment, which was so soon, so rapidly, and so greatly reinforced by other French troops, transported on the railroad, that the day was soon decided in their favor. The importance and effect of this manner of conveying the troops was acknowledged by the Austrians, in their official report of the battle.

This was fought about twenty miles beyond the last engagement, that of Montebello; and the chief honor of the day belongs to the French. That battle was the first in which rifled cannon and electrical telegraphs were ever brought into use; and both were proved successful in the highest degree. Louis Napoleon was the inventor of the former; and their efficiency was strongly doubted and even denied by many scientific and practical men; but it was established beyond future question by the experiment of that day. The French had also a corps of electricians among them, with apparatus prepared for the establishment and change of lines of telegraphic wires wherever troops were stationed; and these proved of eminent service in conveying orders and information between the positions.

The banks of the Mincio are, as it were, formed for military scenes. From the source of the river, down almost as far as Pozzolo, the river winds through a succession of hills, rushing close to their base on one side, and leaving fine open meadows on the other. At some points the hills approach on both sides, and form a kind of gorge or neutral ground, where the river is kept within proper bounds, and not allowed to encroach on either side. Perhaps the most picturesque spot on the whole river is here, between Borghetto and Vallegio. Two large semi-circles of hills are opposed to each other, the direction of them being the bend of the river on this spot; they intersect each other about their centre, and a little below this point are the two villages of Borghetto and Vallegio. The latter is behind the hills on the left bank; only two mills, a church, and a little mediæval tower, erected on one of the lower spurs, stand close to the water's edge. Borghetto has, likewise, only a few detached houses on the banks of the river, the rest of the village being built on the hill which skirts the right bank. On the highest point of the Vallegio side rises a most picturesque group of towers of pure Italian castellated architecture, slender and high like campaniles, with a gallery on their summit, built on a succession of small arches springing out of the body of the building. From these towers, an old wall runs down to the banks of the river, where two other lower, but more massive, towers stand, with the ruins of a bridge over the river between them. From the second of these towers, the wall runs up to the hill where Borghetto stands, and ends there in another square tower. This castle, as well as the surrounding domain, belongs to the Visconti family, and the fortifications were evidently intended to close the passage of the river, which they may have done at one time; now they form only a picturesque feature in the scenery. The road from Volta to this place descends along the hillside in a gentle slope, and, after traversing the river, winds up in a similar but much steeper rise, so that you can keep in view the whole passage through the valley. On the right bank of the river extends a fine meadow, through which the road leads. It was now the camping-ground of the Cavalry of the Guard, and was, during the passage, a chaos of troops, horses, carts, and mules, which were huddled together there, waiting for a passage across one of the four bridges which span the narrow but rapid little stream. It was like the emigration of one of those nomadic tribes of which history tells us. It seemed for a moment as if it were impossible to disentangle that mass, and yet it kept moving, and passed over the river without accident or delay. As all the bridges which had been broken down on the river behind had been repaired, the pontoon train of the whole army became available for the Mincio passage, and there must have been, at the very least, from 12 to 15 bridges on this short line.

The Austrian army, after occupying the right bank of the Mincio, had retired across the stream, in order to lead the French and Sardinians to believe that they were retreating. When the latter had extended their lines, the Austrians suddenly returned and reoccupied their old formidable positions on the heights of Solferino, San Cassiano, and Cavriana, and onward to Volta, all crowned with cannon. Their lines extended five leagues. This movement was made in the night of June 23d, and at three o'clock in the morning they were discovered, in large bodies, marching across the plain to attack the allies.

On the 24th, the emperor, who had arrived just before, ordered the Sardinian army (which formed the left wing) to occupy Pozzolengo, and the French to occupy Solferino and Cavriana. The king also sent a detachment toward Peschiera. The Austrians resisted them powerfully. At ten o'clock the battle became general, and was continued during a severe storm. After twelve hours fighting, the Austrians brought up their reserve of 80,000 men, and the allies theirs of 50,000. After three more hours of severe fighting, the heights were taken by the allies, and the Austrians retreated.

In 1796, Solferino was the point most strenuously contested and won by Augereau. On this occasion that position was taken three times by the French, and the last time at the point of the bayonet. The Emperor of Austria commanded in person, and greatly animated his troops, who fought well. After they had been driven from Solferino, they made a powerful concentrated attack on the right wing of the allies, but were repulsed by a dash of cavalry.

Although the allies were victorious, they were unable to pursue the enemy, who retreated in good order.

The official journal at Vienna, of June 26, published the following official dispatch from the seat of war:

"On the 23d inst., the imperial royal army crossed at four places to the right bank of the Mincio. The right wing of the army occupied Pozzolengo, Solferino, and Cavriana. The left wing marched on the 24th inst. to Guidizzolo and Castel-Goffredo, and repulsed the advancing enemy on all sides. As the Imperial Royal army continued its advance toward the Chiese, the enemy – who had also assumed the offensive with his whole force – pushed forward such large bodies of troops, that there was a general engagement between the two armies at ten o'clock, or thereabouts, in the morning of the 24th instant.

"The right wing, which was formed by the second army, under the general of cavalry, Count Schlick, maintained possession of the place which it had originally occupied in the first line of battle until 2 o'clock in the afternoon, and the first army (the left wing), under the general of artillery, Count Wimpffen, continually gained ground in the direction of the Chiese. Toward 3 o'clock the enemy made a vehement attack on Solferino, and after several hours' hard fighting, obtained possession of the place, which had been heroically defended by the fifth corps d'armée. An attack was then made on Cavriana, which place was courageously defended until the evening by the first and seventh corps d'armée, but was eventually left in the hands of the enemy.

"While the struggle for Solferino and Cavriana was going on, the eighth corps d'armée, which was on the outer flank of the right wing, advanced and repulsed the Sardinian troops opposed to it: but this advantage did not enable the Imperial Royal army to recover the positions that had been lost in the centre. The third and ninth corps, which were supported by the eleventh corps, were engaged on the left wing, and the reserve cavalry attached to this wing made several brilliant attacks. Unusually heavy losses, and the fact that the left wing of the first army was unable to make progress on the right flank of the enemy, who directed his main force in the centre against Volta, led to the retreat of the Imperial Royal army. It began late in the evening, during a violent storm. Yesterday evening Pozzolengo, Monzambano, Volta and Goito, were still occupied by our troops."

CHAPTER IV

The Austrian army, with its imposing numbers, high military reputation, and menacing attitude a few weeks before, when threatening and afterward invading Piedmont, from the line of the Mincio, had now become vastly weakened, reduced, and disheartened by the successive conflicts and defeats which have been briefly described. The causes of its misfortunes have been accounted for, by an eye-witness, in remarks which we abridge as follows:

"The Austrian military system has been changed completely within the last six or seven years; yet the change in part explains the shortcomings of the past few weeks. The Austrian army, up to this date, has been an army of very young soldiers, not long under training. According to the regulations, a fixed number of corps has to be maintained throughout the Austrian empire. At a fixed period of every year the youth of that empire are drafted into the army, and distributed among the corps. The arrival of these new drafts liberates an equal number of men who have already served. The latter, after one, or two, or three years' service, at the option of the colonels of regiments, retire to their homes on a furlough of indefinite duration, and are only called out again in the event of a war. The Austrian army at Montebello, Palestro, Magenta, and Cavriana was thus composed of young soldiers. It would have been wiser, doubtless, had the Austrians thought of this matter in time. They were aware that Louis Napoleon would move, if he moved at all, with the flower of his army. They knew that he had paid high premiums to induce old soldiers to remain in the ranks after the expiration of their usual time, and that the picked men of the French army, tried under the fierce sun of Africa, and in the hard campaign of the Crimea, would be opposed to them, and be assisted besides by an artillery of a novel and most effective kind. They did not take sufficient heed of these important facts, any more than they considered that generals who, ten years ago, fought with ability and success in the campaigns of Italy might possibly have lost some of their original vigor. The result has been such as to open their eyes to the necessity of supplying defects. The question, as far as the present war is concerned, is this: Which is best, to risk all the tried men first, and trust to recruits after, or employ first the young soldiers, and bring up reserves after? As far as the present campaign is concerned, the results favor the first of these alternatives.

"The advisers of his Imperial Majesty Francis Joseph, at last made up their minds that it was impossible, under present circumstances, to defend the line of the Mincio. Accordingly, the headquarters of the 2d Army, under Count Schlick, came into Verona from Villafranca; the headquarters of the 1st Army, under Wimpffen, being transferred to Mantua. Verona, Mantua, and the other strongholds of this great military quadrangle are very much stronger than they were ten years ago. There are great field works to be taken before any approach can be made to the main defences, and in the meanwhile Austria may have brought together again an army capable of risking another general action. The soldiers had one moment of enthusiasm; that was when the emperor led them in person on the 23d to the advanced position from which he intended to attack the enemy; but the events of the 24th seriously affected the morale of the army. Instead of attacking, as they were led to expect, they had to repel the assaults of the Allies, who knowing what was before them, had halted for a meal at two o'clock in the morning. The Austrians, whose baggage and cooking utensils accompany the columns even in the advance, bivouacked on the night of the 23d, and were attacked before they could get their breakfast. The baggage and cooking-carts were obliged to return to the rear out of the fire of the Allies, and the result was that the army of the Kaiser had to fight on empty stomachs. Hunger and hard knocks have a tendency to discourage even the bravest soldier. I was astonished to see men from the field of Solferino retiring unwounded, and lying down exhausted when out of the reach of the enemy's fire. I am told that many so exhausted laid themselves down only to die. The mystery is explained when one considers that these cases arose from want of ordinary sustenance.

"Lichtenstein's corps (the 2d) which should have taken part in the action of the day, was halted in consequence of the approach of some French cavalry in its vicinity, and Prince Lichtenstein, for reasons which he will doubtless have to explain, returned to Mantua. Again, General Zedwitz, commanding the cavalry brigade of the 1st Army, instead of advancing, as he should have done, fell back on Goito, thus depriving the emperor of six regiments of horse and a considerable amount of artillery. Thus, while on the part of the allies all the available guns that could be brought into action were used, on the side of the Austrians the artillery was weak and utterly unable to oppose an effectual fire to that of the enemy. It is true, on the other hand, that the French artillery did not commit the havoc which it might have done had its fire throughout the day been true to the mark, instead of being over it. Still, the effect of the inferiority under which the Austrians suffered in this respect, was disastrous, as it prevented them from repelling the advance of the infantry opposed to them. Among the wounded, to the number of 4,000 or 5,000 in Verona and the surrounding villages, it is remarkable how few suffered from wounds inflicted by artillery."

In contrast with the condition of the Austrian army, those of Piedmont and France were in most respects superior, and still more in the principles for which they fought. To mention again Napoleon's rifled cannon, in the words of a late writer:

"The superiority of the French artillery during the late Italian campaign was obvious to every one who made himself acquainted with the details of the great battles. At Solferino the heavy and very dangerous Austrian cavalry was thrown into disorder and rendered almost useless at distances to which their own batteries, more favorably placed, would not carry. The Austrians never yielded a foot on the hill of Solferino, till a battery of French rifled cannon was brought to bear upon them at a distance at which their own balls fell short. The Tower could not have otherwise been taken but with an infinitely greater slaughter than that which occurred. When Niel and McMahon had driven the Austrians back as far as the large open space known as the plain of Guidizzolo, there was a fair trial of artillery, which cost the Austrians dear; it was the last stand made by the immense left wing of the Austrian army, and one can well imagine how officers and men grew dispirited in face of artillery that silenced their own wherever it showed itself."

The following remarks on the plans and conduct of the war we abridge from the "London Times," of July 8th, 1860:

"As far as the Allies are concerned, their aim was driving the Austrians out of Italy. With this aim clearly and distinctly before them, the difficulties and chances could be more or less calculated in advance, and all that vagueness and uncertainty avoided which gives rise to those useless moves in two armies, neither of which knows what it is to do next.

"The Austrians were in this latter case when they began the war, nobody knew why, and while they were allowed to amuse themselves with their harmless offensive movements you saw all those insignificant skirmishes occur on the Sesia, which were put a speedy end to by the advance of the Allies. Since that time the war has been rolling along in great waves. The Allies went straight toward their aim, and the Austrians were so hard pressed, that they endeavored to oppose to a grand plan, executed with the most determined will, equally grand operations.