Private Journal of Henry Francis Brooke

July 22nd.– Heard from the Government of India that Abdul Rahman is to be proclaimed Amir of Kabul forthwith by Sir D. Stewart. I cannot think this a wise step, but the desire to get out of the war at any cost is, I think, blinding the Government to the many weak points in the arrangement.

July 23rd.– Visited the city in order that I might give General Primrose my views of an idea of his to occupy a certain portion of it without troops should we be attacked here. The arrangement does not seem to me to be either necessary or desirable, as I would prefer keeping all our small force, except the garrison of the Fort and the City walls, in the open, striking at the enemy whenever opportunity offered. I have explained this, and I hope it will, if necessity arise, be carried out. When riding to the Fort this morning I was stopped by a native who informed me he had something very important to tell me, which was, that this being the Mahomedan |Rumours of a rising.| Sunday (Friday) a rising was to take place to-day. The old gentleman, who belonged to the Moghul or Persian tribe, who hate the Afghans, was in an awful fright, and I think he allowed his fears to magnify matters much. However, I am keeping my eyes open, have taken all precautions, and am ready, but fear the Afghans won't come to the point.

July 24th.– The guard on the Shikarpore Gate of the City was fired on by some armed men during the night, the fire being returned by the guard. In reporting the matter to General Primrose, I strongly urged that the walls and buildings outside the City gates, which afforded cover to villains of sorts to approach and fire at our guards, should be demolished. This, however, would have involved much distress and annoyance to the Afghans, and he did not care to push the matter strongly (after events, however, proved that the suggestion was a proper one). We received news that 150 of our cavalry, under General Nuttall, had completely routed 600 of Ayoob Khan's Cavalry.

July 25th.– 3 companies of the 28th N.I. arrived from Chaman, a most welcome addition, small as it is, to our painfully weak force.

July 26th.– The guard on the Herat Gate was fired on during the early morning. I again urged the necessity for demolishing all cover near the gates, but the measure was deemed too strong. I am determined, if possible, to catch the scoundrels who go about, and hold parties of Cavalry and Infantry in readiness all night to go without delay to any place where firing of this desultory nature is heard. This is harassing to the troops, but cannot be helped. 2 more companies of the 28th N.I. arrived.

July 27th.– I got information that some of the enemy were concealed in the hills above old Kandahar, so, obtaining permission from General Primrose to make a raid on them, I despatched parties of the 7th Fusiliers and 4th N.I. to see if the report was correct, and if so to attack and defeat them. I rode out myself in the afternoon to see how the search through the very difficult ground was being carried on, and quite approved the arrangements made by Major Marshall who was in command. No one, however, was found, though there were evident signs that several places had been recently inhabited, and very hurriedly evacuated.

First alarming account of disaster

July 28th.– I was woke at 1·30 a.m. by Colonel La Touche, of the Cavalry, who came to report to me that a small portion (a native officer and 30 men) of one of the Cavalry regiments with General Burrows' Force had just reached camp, having, they said, rode 60 miles without drawing rein to bring the information of the total annihilation, by Ayoob Khan's army, of the force under General Burrows. They declared that a great battle had been fought the previous day about noon; that after holding out for 5 hours under a terrible fire, that the whole force had been broken up and taken to flight, and been cut to pieces in detail. Both Generals, Burrows and Nuttall, were said to be dead, that no one, but these men themselves, was saved. The story was a terrible one, and enough to shock the stoutest heart and nerves. I could not, and would not, believe it in its entirety, and told Colonel La Touche that I felt sure things were not as black as they were painted, though I feared they were bad enough. The first thing, however, was to take the news to General Primrose, so, pulling on a few clothes, I ran over to his house with Colonel La Touche and told him the bad news, at the same time recommending caution in accepting, without some reserve, the story of the native officer and men of the Sind Horse. A disaster had, without doubt, occurred, and the only question was whether or not a remnant had escaped, and if so of what strength. A hurried consultation was held, and it was unanimously agreed that, with the certainty of the whole country rising like one man against us, it would be worse than madness for our small force to attempt to hold the altogether indefensible military position which the parsimony and want of military forethought on the part of Sir Donald Stewart had bequeathed to us. As I have often remarked hitherto on the hopeless position, from a military point of view, of the Kandahar Cantonments, it is useless repeating all the objections to them again. Suffice it to say, that they have no independant water supply; that they are commanded on one side by two low hills, and that they are straggling, and entirely without military defences of any kind, and that no amount of labor or money could have made them tenable in |City to be occupied versus cantonments.| the few days at our disposal. Our only alternative was to accept another utterly false military position, and to occupy the whole City of Kandahar, it being impossible to place our force, small as it was, in the Citadel, nor (could we have done so) to have held the Citadel against an enemy in possession of the City. It is hardly necessary to point out the dangers in, and objections to, the occupation of the City, as they are self-evident, the first and chief one being the vastness of its size in comparison with the force at our disposal. The City, of which I give a rough plan on one of the foregoing pages, is a sort of irregular parallelogram, one side (N.) being 1,200 yards long; the W. 1,900 yards long, the S. 1,300 yards long, and the E. 2,000 yards long, a total length of wall of something under 4 miles, to protect which, and an additional half mile of wall in the Citadel, we should have, unless some portion of General Burrows' force returned, not quite 1,500 men. When I mention that to defend lines of this length, according to military rules, a force of 18,000 men is considered the correct thing – the almost hopelessness of the position may be imagined. Behind and within these walls lay a city with a population of 30,000, of whom 14,000 were men, out of whom it was no exaggeration to feel that half at least must of necessity be our deadly enemies, and that consequently, in addition to offering resistance to hordes without, we had to guard against treachery from within. The position, for these two reasons alone, was utterly wrong, but it was the sole possible alternative, and had to be accepted, and its difficulties and dangers dealt with as might be possible. The question of water was the urgent one, but as we knew the City had a sufficient supply for its inhabitants, of which we purposed to turn out at least one half, we trusted we should get enough for ourselves. The walls vary in height from 18 feet in the lowest place to 25 feet in the highest, and are about 20 feet thick at the base, and 12 to 14 feet broad at the parapet. There are 6 Gates – four principal ones – from which the various faces take their names, and 2 minor ones. The northern gate is called the Eedgah; the southern the Shikarpore, being the gate from which the main road to India leads; the western gate is the Kabul gate, and near it a smaller one known as the Bar Dourani; the eastern gate is the Herat gate, and close to it another called the Topkhana or Artillery gate. Along the walls, at intervals of 100 yards, are high turrets, which give the only flanking defence, very poor in quality and degree. This point hurriedly, but definitely and decidedly, settled, we had no time for conversation or consideration, as immediate action was necessary, the carrying out of which General Primrose placed unreservedly in my hands. The first thing to be done was to have the sick and ammunition conveyed to a place of safety in the Citadel, and as it was clear we could not use our heavy battery (viz., 4 40-pounders and 2 six-inch mortars), drawn by bullocks in the field, I sent it also without delay into the Citadel, and issued orders to all commanding officers to move all public and private property belonging to their regiments to the Citadel also. |Further details of General Burrows' defeat.| About 4 a.m. one or two native stragglers from General Burrows' Force came in and gave a less terrible account of the destruction which had befallen it than the Sind Horse had done, and at ¼ to 5 a.m. Veterinary-Surgeon Oliver, of the Horse Artillery, arrived and was brought to me. He was greatly exhausted, but I learned from him that there was a very considerable proportion of the force saved, and that the main body was covering the retreat, and was probably then about 10 miles off, Generals Burrows and Nuttall being with them. I sent Mr. Oliver on to General Primrose, who had ridden down to the Citadel to start work there, to tell his story, and convey a message from me that I requested permission to take a small force and move out in the direction of Kokeran to cover General Burrows' retirement. Feeling sure the proposal would be approved, I ordered

to be held in readiness to march at once. About ¾ of an hour later General Primrose arrived from the Citadel and authorized my starting at once, urging on me, however, to use great caution, and avoid, as far as possible, any considerable loss of life. Being anxious to be off at once, I had no time to give any attention to getting my own property into the Citadel, but had to leave the matter to my native servant, telling him to do the best he could, and to take the most useful things into safety first, and I may here say that he must have worked admirably, as, when I got to the Fort at 7 o'clock in the evening, I found he had brought off in safety every single thing I possessed. At ½ past 5 o'clock (¾ of an hour after I first heard that any remnants of Burrows' force was saved, and trying to return) I paraded my little force, which was, I was horrified to find, much smaller than I had intended, as the full number of men were not at the moment available. Time was precious to our poor comrades wearily fighting their way back to Camp, so I decided not to wait till I could get my numbers, and started with only

I knew there could be no organized resistance, and that if I was cautious I could come to no harm, but, all the same, I am free to confess that I could not avoid feeling anxious about my guns, as the loss of 2 more would have been simply ruin to us. I must here describe the route I had to follow, as its peculiarities added much to the difficulties and dangers of the enterprise. Immediately after leaving the Barracks the road passes for about ½ a mile through walled gardens, each garden forming a little fortification of itself, and giving cover for any number of armed men. These passed through, the Village of Abasabad is reached through the main street of which the road goes. This street is so narrow that in places it was a close shave to get the R.A. carriages through, and it twists and winds about most unpleasantly. Beyond the village is another quarter of a mile of walled gardens, and then an open plain is come to with, however, commanding hills all along the road to the right (about 300 yards off), and on the left a string of strongly placed villages about the same distance from the road. It is evident, therefore, that every inch of road offered extraordinary facilities for the enemy to resist our |Terrible accounts of the retreat.| advance. As we left the camp we began to meet the first of the long string of fugitives, who continued afterwards to pass us till we reached Kokeran, a more terrible sight I never witnessed; all appearance of organization or discipline gone; each man, whether European or native, was fighting, as it were, for his own life, careful of nothing but getting into safety. All were wearied and harrassed, and many unable hardly to move one foot before the other, as indeed was not wonderful, considering that since 4 p.m. the previous day they had been marching, with a cruel enemy on all sides of them, shooting and stabbing every man who, too wearied to drag on, sat down for a moment's rest. To add to the horrors of the march they had, in the whole distance of over 50 miles, found water only twice, and what this means no one who has not lived and worked in this climate can tell. From all I can hear there were some marvellous instances of self-denial in this matter: men giving up their last drop of water, which was more than their lives to them, to men more feeble than themselves, and, apparently, none equalled or exceeded in this respect Captain Slade, of the Horse Artillery, as noble a soldier as ever lived. Officers and men have since told me of his heroic efforts to save his guns, to give assistance and to sacrifice his life, or deny himself to save or help anyone; all also join in saying General Burrows' conduct was splendid, and that he had fairly won the Victoria Cross 3 or 4 times. Once when all hope seemed lost, for dismounted men he got off his horse, put two wounded officers on it, and led it himself for 3 miles, with a howling crowd of savages following him, anxious for his life. I had never seen the retreat of a panic-stricken military force before, and I trust I never may do so again, as it is too horrible for description, and this retreat excelled in terror any that I have ever read of. As each inch of the road (till my little force was seen) had to be fought for against a set of blood-thirsty savages, rather than fall into whose hands alive, it is said several men shot themselves, knowing the horrible fate that would otherwise be in store for them. Then the want of water was a fearful aggravation of the sufferings of the wretched men, and the length of the march, 50 miles, made the hope of escape seem impossible. I must now go back to my own enterprise, which, I rejoice to think, was successful, and resulted in the saving of many valuable lives. I had hardly got my little force in column of route outside the Barrack gates, when the enemy commenced |Relieving force meet with oppositions.| a desultory and harmless fire on us from behind the walls of the neighbouring gardens. I at once sent forward some skirmishers to the front, and a cavalry picquet to the extreme right and left, and was glad to see the spirit with which all advanced, which at once told on the rabble opposed to us, who gave up their positions and ran for their lives, several being killed as they ran. In this way, pressing on steadily, I cleared the gardens and the Village of Abasadad, and was able to bring my guns and remainder of my column through that extremely awkward position. On the other side of the village the skirmishers had advanced, driving the enemy before them, till the more open ground was reached. Here I formed up my column once more, preparatory to pushing on for Kokeran. On the range of high hills which ran along the left of the road, at about 300 yards off, were small bodies of the enemy, as also in the strongly placed villages on my left. Before advancing I had to send out small parties on either flank to dislodge these people, which they did with the greatest ease. My way was again clear, and I advanced without opposition for about a mile, when, on a low hill, about 2,000 yards to my right-front, I saw a considerable force posted, which was being increased every moment by contingents from the villages in the rear of the hill, from which we could see people hurrying in great numbers. Seeing a good position about 1,000 yards ahead, I pushed on to it rapidly, and getting my guns into action, threw forward the Cavalry to threaten the left flank, while the Infantry moved slowly to the front. A couple of shells planted, with charming precision, by my friend Captain Law had a most happy effect, and, as we could see, shook the confidence of the enemy, good as their position was. They did not, however, seem disposed to take the hint, and kept up a constant, but, owing to the distance, harmless fire on us as we advanced. Presently, however, on a repetition of the dose equally well administered, assisted by a few volleys from our rifles, they broke, the greater part rushing to the rear, but some, as I had hoped, trying to cross the road and gain the shelter of the hills on the left. This was the moment for the Cavalry, who charged with excellent effect, doing good execution at the same time. I gave the fugitives to the rear a couple of shells at 2,000 yards where, thinking themselves safe, they had halted to breathe. Serious as the work on hand was, we could not help a hearty laugh at the consternation caused by the unexpected visitors. The mass of people broke away in all directions, leaving, as we could see afterwards as we advanced, a good percentage on the ground. I dare say there are some critics who will think that this position ought to have been carried at the point of the bayonet, in order that a severe lesson might have been inflicted, and under other circumstances I might have thought so myself, but, placed as we were when the loss of every man was serious, I had determined to utilize to the utmost the long range of our weapons, and to do all the fighting I could at long bowls, and by sticking steadily to this, I succeeded in carrying out my object which entailed a march of 14 miles, every inch of which had to be contested or defended, with the loss only of 1 man killed and two or three slightly wounded. I quite acknowledge there are objections to the arrangement, but I feel sure it was the right one for the occasion. After this no regular opposition was offered till I reached Kokeran, which is a large village with a fortified enclosure in its midst, which was full of the enemy, who had been ill treating the stragglers of General Burrows' force all morning. Knowing the ground well, I at once selected my position, and was quickly placed to command the whole of the country round. I was |Kokeran – General Burrows' force sighted.| just going to give the order for the guns to come into action, when, to my delight, at about a mile off, at the spot where I knew was the ford of the Argandab, where the road from Girishk crossed the river, I saw a mass of men which I at once recognized as what remained of General Burrows' Force. I decided, therefore, before hammering Kokeran to communicate with them, and sent some Cavalry to make a circuit to the right and join General Burrows, informing him that I was clearing his way, and that he might, I felt sure, advance in 20 minutes, by which time I would have his way open. The Cavalry had hardly started before I recognized that the enemy, seeing that the position I had taken up had rendered Kokeran untenable, had suddenly evacuated that place, and taken up an extremely strong position on my right flank, from which, without delay, they opened a heavy fire on us. A few shells and a rapid demonstration, for it never reached a hand-to-hand fight, soon, however, did their business, and, to my great satisfaction, I found myself able to ask General Burrows to come on along a perfectly safe road. It was a sad cavalcade, many wounded, all well nigh tired to death. The gun carriages, alas, reduced by 2, which had been lost, covered with sick, wounded, dead and dying, while the wretched horses, dying themselves of thirst and fatigue, were hardly able to drag them along. Many poor fellows, wounded almost to death, trying with a terrible anxiety to cling to the back of a horse or a camel, knowing too well the fate that would await them if they failed to keep their seats. To these latter my appearance was a double blessing, as I had brought with me 25 litters (palanquins), into which the worst cases were placed, and they were able to finish their journey in comparative comfort. One poor fellow (Major Iredell) had a compound fracture of the ankle, and his foot was merely hanging on by the skin, and yet he had ridden for 18 hours, and was wonderfully well, and is, I hope, now in a fair way to recovery. Almost last of all, followed only by a Cavalry escort, came poor Burrows himself, who, poor fellow, completely broke down when he saw me, and could not say a word. I made him get off his horse and take a little whiskey and water I had with me, and a bit of biscuit, and soon he was more composed and better. He, like them all, was relieved beyond measure to see me, and my diminutive following, as they knew their troubles were at an end. I agreed that they should all, to the last straggler, pass me, and that when they were half a mile ahead I should follow slowly, and bring up the rear of all, covering them from all annoyance. Soon (all too soon, for they were but a very little company) they had filed passed, and I then recalled my Cavalry, which had been watching the ford of the Argandab a mile to |Small cavalry charge – one man killed.| my front. On their return over this mile the enemy, emboldened by our preparations for departure, suddenly rushed down in great numbers to cut them off, but Captain Anderson was equal to the occasion, and setting at nought the difference of numbers, charged them, and cut his way through, leaving, however, his very best soldier dead on the ground. Although I would have liked to have punished the enemy for this affair, prudence said no, and so I commenced my return for Kandahar, keeping half a mile in rear of General Burrows' column, and picking up many poor fellows (putting them on my guns), who, even in this short distance, had begun to fall out again. For the first three miles after leaving Kokeran, all was absolute quiet, the result of the lessons of the morning, and the wearied column from Girishk passed along in unaccustomed peace. At this time, however, I received information from the front, that the enemy had collected in great force on the hills around and in the Village of Abasabad, and that help to turn them out was wanted. I immediately hurried my guns and Cavalry to the front, and followed on with the Infantry, desiring Captain Law to pass General Burrows' force, and getting to his front open fire on the enemy. This he did in good style, and was making an advance to a second position, when I and the Infantry, who had also passed through General Burrows' Force, which were halted, came up. We completed the dispersion of the enemy with Artillery fire, and then throwing out skirmishers swept, for a second time that day, the gardens round Abasabad. This accomplished, and the road again clear for General Burrows' Force, I formed up on one flank and allowed them again to pass me, following them into the Cantonments, which I reached about ½ past one or two o'clock, very thankful indeed that I had gone out, and but little less delighted that I had managed to effect my object at such a very small loss. To ensure a safe conduct to any unfortunate straggler that might, by accident, have escaped notice, I sent a fresh company of the 7th Regiment to hold the entrance to the Village of Abasabad, and kept them there till all hopes of anyone coming in had gone, when I withdrew them. My column had constantly been on the move from half-past 5 a.m. till half-past one p.m., the most of the time under a burning sun, which made us all, even those who were riding, suffer from an intolerable thirst, and as there was no water between Kokeran and Kandahar, this was a great addition to our labors. On arrival in Cantonments General Burrows' |Property in cantonments taken into fort.| Force received orders to pass on to the Citadel, while I was desired to take in hands, without delay, measures for the evacuation of the Cantonments, and the safe conduct of all the troops there into the Citadel. The operation was most distasteful, but I had agreed to the necessity for it, and quite saw it was the only possible course. When I came to enquire into the position of affairs I was horrified to find that the 8 precious hours while I had been absent had been wasted in the most inexplicable way. Apparently little or nothing of the Government or private property in charge of regiments had been moved to the Fort, and all had yet to be done. It was then past 2 o'clock, and General Primrose telegraphed to me from the Citadel, to say he wished me to move in there as quickly as possible. (I ought to explain that the Citadel or Fort of Kandahar is about 1¼ miles from the Cantonments.) I at once set everyone to work, excusing no one and superintending all personally, to get as much property as possible into the Fort, sending there for all available carts, camels, ponies and mules, each of which, immediately it had got rid of its load, came back again, and so the afternoon passed away all too rapidly. At last all was safely sent in, except the baggage of the 66th, which was one of the regiments of General Burrows' Brigade, who, when going out to Girishk, had left some tons of things in a most careless and unpacked condition. I saw it would be hopeless had I had a day instead of an hour to get all in, but I put on big working parties, and worked away, putting off my departure from half hour to half hour, until it approached 6 o'clock, and I had been called on three or four times by General Primrose to move into the Citadel. I then saw it was useless to try and save more, and so I fixed ¼ past 6 o'clock as the hour for our departure, deciding that all not packed then must be abandoned. All this time I had been pressed all round by marauding bands of armed men, who were sweeping round, trying to kill and steal who and what they could. These necessitated strong picquets, and, from time to time, small expeditions, so my hands were full. At ¼ past 6 I paraded my force as follows: —