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The intense anxiety at Brigade and Divisional Headquarters can best be imagined. For the first two hours of the battle little news could be gained from Battalion Headquarters as to the progress of the fight. The whole battlefield was enveloped in smoke, and interest was chiefly centred on the fine stand which was being made by the Queen’s Westminsters at Towy Post, where a power buzzer was installed, and messages were received from the signallers even after the capture of the post. At one time, while the 4th Londons were still holding the front-line system, the enemy was attacking Bailleul East Post, held by the London Scottish, and had captured two machine guns with crews just in front of the post. A well-timed counter-attack from this gallant regiment drove the enemy back and released the guns and crews.
As the smoke cleared from the field, the Divisional Artillery took every advantage of their well-situated observation posts. But, though the struggle was going on before them, observers found that both sides were frequently so mixed up that they could give no help. Small bodies of our infantry could be seen clearly, fighting with Germans on all sides of them.
On the right the situation of the 4th Division was very obscure. The division was reported to have lost touch with its own brigades, while the lateral line between the 169th and 12th Brigades was also cut.
With the withdrawal of the 56th Division to the Bailleul-Willerval line the situation cleared. They were then in touch with the 4th Division, and the artillery was able to put down a protective barrage in front of this line. The 3rd Canadian Division gave valuable assistance with nine 18-pounders.
8. The First Battle of Arras 1918.
“From this time till about 3 p.m.” (writes Brig.-Gen. Elkington), “many excellent targets in the open were engaged by both field and heavy artillery with great effect. Unfortunately, owing to the limited number of guns available, and that many had to be used for the immediate protection of our infantry, only a few could be used for the excellent targets in the open. At about 3.30 p.m. the enemy made a heavy attack against the Bailleul line, particularly on Bailleul East Post; this was completely shattered by a concentrated barrage and by rifle and machine-gun fire. With the exception of hostile bombing attacks up the communication trenches leading to the Bailleul line, the enemy made no further serious effort to attack. All battery positions were heavily shelled throughout the day by all calibres of ordnance, the shelling being more of the nature of area shoots than definite counter-battery work. As a result, from dawn on the 28th to dawn on the 29th twelve 18-pounders were destroyed or put out of action by enemy shell-fire. In addition two 18-pounders in position as an enfilade section near Arleux, facing south-east, had to be destroyed and abandoned when our line was withdrawn to the Bailleul line. This section engaged many targets with observation from the vicinity of the guns, and was fought until our infantry withdrew through it. The detachments then retired after damaging the guns, burning the dug-outs, and removing dial sights and breach blocks. All the six 6-inch mortars in the front line were lost to the enemy, and no news was available as to the fate of the officers and detachments of the two that were manned (they were afterwards found to have been made prisoners).... During the night of the 28th/29th, with the exception of two batteries, all the Divisional Artillery was withdrawn to positions at an average of about 3,600 yards to our new front, this move being carried out by single batteries in turns.... The ammunition expended from the early morning of the 28th to the early morning of the 29th by the 56th Divisional Artillery alone was: 23,000 rounds of 18-pounder and 8,000 rounds of 4·5 howitzer.... As a result of an urgent request to the Corps on the afternoon of the 28th for new guns to replace the damaged ones, six new ones were sent up—these turned out to be 15-pounders, for which we had no ammunition.... The Germans in their official communiqué reported that the 56th Division had been annihilated!”
The German attack was definitely crushed in the morning, but during the afternoon a number of half-hearted and tentative attacks were made. The situation, however, became more quiet about 6 p.m., and the 169th Brigade was relieved by the 167th, with the 5th Canadian Mounted Rifles in support at Point du Jour.
During the night the engineers were employed in blocking and filling-in the communication trenches in front of the new line, and patrolling was actively carried out. The Kensingtons penetrated into Arleux Loop South, Kent Road, and the junction of Tommy and Baron, which seems to show that the enemy were dazed.
On the 29th, except for some demonstrations at the bombing blocks, the enemy made no move. There were many reports that he was massing for further attacks, but it became evident that he was relieving his storming troops. As night fell, the first platoons of the 4th Canadian Division started to relieve, and during the night the 167th Brigade moved back to Villers au Bois, the 168th to Mont St. Eloi, and the 169th to Ecoivres.
On the 30th General Dudgeon visited the First Army Headquarters, where he was congratulated by His Majesty the King.
There is little doubt that the enemy hoped to achieve great results by this new stroke, and that its failure was a serious set-back. Five divisions attacked the 4th and 56th Divisions north of the Scarpe and, according to captured documents, when the line Vimy-Bailleul-St. Laurent-Blangy had been won, three special divisions were to attack and capture the Vimy Ridge on the following day. South of the Scarpe eleven divisions were launched, with the object of capturing Arras and carrying the attack as far south as Bucquoy. The German official list (published 1919) gives eleven divisions attacking north and south of the Scarpe, one division at Neuville Vitasse, and one at Moyenneville—thirteen in all. It makes no mention of an attack south of Moyenneville. But the eleven which attacked on the Scarpe were beaten by the four British divisions which held that line—the 4th and 56th on the north, and the 3rd and 15th on the south.
From this date onward the great German offensive began to decline, and ended in the Somme area with a final effort to separate the French and British Armies on the 4th and 5th April, by an attack on the north and south of the Somme. “It was an established fact,” says Ludendorff, “that the enemy’s resistance was beyond our strength.” Strategically the Germans had not won what the events of the 23rd, 24th, and 25th March had led them to hope for—the failure to take Amiens was a great disappointment.
The total casualties of the division were 55 officers and 1,433 other ranks—not excessive, considering the weight of the attack and the immortal triumph gained by the 56th Division. The importance of this battle is so great that we give the comments of the two brigadiers.
Brig.-Gen. Coke says that during the six weeks his brigade had been in the line, the Cheshire Regt. had worked splendidly, and had put up double apron belts of wire where they would be most effective—the Naval-Marine line was protected by five belts of wire—and this stood the bombardment well enough to be a serious obstacle. When the smoke, which had enveloped the field at the commencement of the battle, had cleared, excellent observation was obtainable, and the divisional observers and artillery observers did splendid work. The enemy batteries, which came into action in the open during the afternoon, were brought up under cover of smoke, and started to fire point-blank at the Bailleul line, but the Divisional Artillery silenced them in a few minutes. There was no shortage of ammunition or bombs. The system of keeping a plentiful supply in deep dug-outs proved sound.
“All concerned are convinced that the enemy losses were extremely heavy in front of this brigade. The fullest use was made of Lewis guns and rifles, and every attempt of the enemy to advance on the Bailleul line over the open was checked by these means. The fire-bays constructed along Towy Alley proved specially valuable, and very considerable losses were inflicted on the enemy from them during our withdrawal to the Bailleul line.
Many officers testify to the gallant way in which the Machine Gun Battalion served its guns to the last and to the good results of the machine-gun fire.
Our artillery inflicted the maximum amount of damage possible. The number of guns available for the brigade section was quite inadequate to cover effectively such a wide front. But the infantry testify to the heavy losses inflicted on the enemy owing to the quick way in which the group and battery commanders engaged each good target as soon as it was observed.
Gallant work was done by the 169th Light Trench Mortar Battery during the day. Three of the teams disappeared with the garrisons in the left sector. During the withdrawal, mortars were placed to cover Pelican and Bailleul Posts.”
It was widely noticed by the men of this brigade that the enemy approached in a slow, dazed manner. The brigadier thinks that this may have been due to the great weight carried by the German infantry, who seem, amongst other things, to have carried a week’s rations. The enemy advanced in three or four lines and almost shoulder to shoulder.
Brig.-Gen. Loch sent in a frank and interesting paper, in which he points out:
“(a) The uselessness of locking up large garrisons in the front-line posts which are clearly known to the enemy and are within effective trench-mortar range. Front-line posts should be held lightly, and be used as observation posts and to keep the enemy patrols from approaching our main line of defence. They should be carefully concealed, need have no regular communication trenches, and should be frequently changed. The garrisons should be small and frequently relieved. If rushed and captured from time to time, little harm is done, provided the garrison have no identification marks. Deep dug-outs in such posts are a positive danger and should not be allowed; shelters against the weather are ample. If heavily attacked, the rôle of such posts should be to put up the S.O.S. and withdraw. The sole exception to this rôle is in the case of posts whose whereabouts can be properly hidden from the enemy. Such posts can be strongly garrisoned and may have machine guns, as they will have to break up and delay an attack. The losses in the forward posts are sufficient commentary on the unsoundness of the (present) system.
(b) The value of changing the actual position of the garrison in any post–vide Wood Post.
(c) The grave danger of altering carefully thought-out dispositions at the eleventh hour. On the evening of the 27th inst. my dispositions, which had been most minutely worked out to meet the situation of an attack on my right flank at the junction with the left of the 169th Brigade, about Viscount Street, and covering Bradford and Mill Posts, had to be changed as the result of orders, and consequently this portion of the line (always weak) was rendered hopelessly incapable of withstanding a strong attack. It is recognised that larger questions were involved, and no doubt decided the redistribution, which was not complete before the attack developed.
(d) The uselessness of Stokes mortars in the actual front line. Such weapons can only open on their S.O.S. lines, and are very vulnerable from attacks on the flanks. The four forward guns only fired about 50 rounds before being surrounded. Had they been behind the main defensive line covering the communication trenches, and themselves covered by the infantry, they would have been far more valuable, and would not possibly have been overrun.
(e) The value of trench blocks was fully found out. Such blocks should be prepared ready against penetration laterally, so as to localise it.
(h) Previous rehearsals and thorough knowledge of overland routes are essential. To the fact that these points had received proper attention is attributable the successful delaying action of this brigade.
(i) Defensive flanks prepared as such are invaluable.
(j) Infantry and machine guns must establish closer liaison.... It should be recognised once and for all that all machine guns in a brigade sector must come under the senior machine-gun officer in that sector.... Nothing herein said, however, should be permitted to detract from the principle that the battalion commander can and should issue orders to the guns covering him if he considers the situation demands it....
(k) Main forward communication trenches should never be traced to lead into strong points.... Such communication trenches are mere covering approaches to these strong points and afford easy access to the enemy. Our main battle zone should not be covered by a single trench, e.g. the Red Line (Bailleul), but should consist of at least three trenches with strong points so constructed as not to be apparent and obvious. As with garrisons of forward posts, so with garrisons of battle trenches, they should be constantly moved so as to avoid giving away the position actually held.”
A captured German officer of the 152nd I.R., 41st Division, gave as the main causes of the failure of the attack (a) the intensity of the machine-gun barrage, which caused heavy casualties. His regiment lost 12 officers and the 16th I.R. lost 24 officers; (b) watches did not appear to have been correctly synchronised. We have mentioned the service rendered by the Machine Gun Battalion, but, unfortunately, there is no record of Lieut.-Col. E. C. S. Jervis’ dispositions. This gallant and able officer says that the “tender spots” in his defence were the low ridges running due east and west through Bradford Post, and from Mill Post, south of Belvoir Alley, and then west. The former could not be covered by machine-gun fire, the latter was. And we know that the enemy, having exterminated the garrison, were mown down, in and round Gavrelle, from the indirect fire of fourteen machine-guns.
Apart from the heavy artillery fire, which, in itself, caused heavy casualties, Colonel Jervis points out an interesting feature in this battle: the complete mastery of the air which the enemy had throughout the day, resulting in machine-guns being spotted and engaged by low-flying aeroplanes, which also directed the fire of specially detailed heavy artillery. Needless to say, machine-guns are very vulnerable to this form of attack; and we must also point out, having mentioned the capture of guns, that when once the enemy has penetrated the trench system machine-gunners have great difficulty in dealing with bombing attacks from the flanks. The Machine Gun Battalion, however, had a great opportunity in this battle, and took full advantage of it.
Brig.-Gen. Elkington expresses the opinion that this was the best action fought by the 56th Division. We do not go quite so far as this. It was more satisfactory to the troops, no doubt, but there is a great difference between defence and attack. A successful defence is more cheering to the infantry and artillery, inasmuch as they can more easily estimate the damage they do to the enemy; but it would not be fair to say that this was better than the hard fighting at Gommecourt and south of Arras in April 1917, or indeed on the Somme in 1916 and Ypres in 1917. The fact remains, however, that the 56th Division had, by its stout defence, twice saved the situation, which had been imperilled by enemy successes elsewhere.
CHAPTER VIII
THE ADVANCE TO VICTORY
BATTLE OF ALBERT 1918—BATTLE OF THE SCARPE 1918It must not be thought that this first great German effort ended like Act I at a theatre, with a curtain dropping for fifteen minutes while the actors rested and changed their clothes, and the spectators found solace in nicotine or alcohol.
Troops in line, though they were not being attacked, probably worked harder than ever before and the nervous tension was as great as ever. All were conscious that the Germans might erupt again, and, as is usual in such times of stress, the weak-hearted were always ready to endow the enemy with miraculous powers of assembling, of covering himself with a cloak of invisibility. The rush had been stopped, but only by the sacrifice of a very considerable area of ground, and at the expense of many reserves; but a mass of enemy divisions was still concentrated on the Somme.
It was certain that the enemy would attack again, and it seemed probable that it would be about the centre of the British line, where his preparations were already complete. Indeed, the situation was more serious than it had ever been.
The British Army had used up all its reserves in the fighting on the Somme, and in addition ten divisions had been withdrawn from the north and replaced with worn-out divisions, reinforced from England. The reasons for draining the north are given by Sir Douglas Haig as being that he could, under urgent necessity, give ground there to a limited extent, but a break-through in the centre, about Vimy, “would mean the realisation of the enemy’s plans, which had been foiled by our defence of Arras on the 28th March, namely, the capture of Amiens and the separation of the bulk of the British Armies from the French and from those British forces acting under the direction of the latter.” Therefore, in view of the preparations which had been made on that sector by the enemy, British forces could not be reduced.
Certain preparations for an attack north of the La Bassée Canal had been observed prior to the 21st March, and there were indications that the enemy was completing these early in April; but the extent and force of the possible attack could not be gauged.
On the 7th April a heavy and prolonged bombardment with gas shell was opened by the Germans from Lens to Armentières. And at 4 o’clock in the morning of the 9th the bombardment was reopened with the greatest intensity. At 7 o’clock, again helped by a thick fog, the enemy attacked the left brigade of the Portuguese 2nd Division and broke into their trenches; a few minutes later the attack spread to the north and south. The attack included the left of the First Army and the right of the Second Army.
This great thrust in the direction of Hazebrouck was brought to a standstill between Merville and the Forêt de Nieppe, but the enemy penetrated beyond Bailleul, and in the north took Kemmel Hill and forced a retirement from the Passchendaele Ridge.
This brings the general situation up to the end of April. But we must note that on the 14th Marshal Foch became the Allied Generalissimo.
The next German move was on the 27th May, north-west of Rheims, on the Aisne front. The 19th, 21st, 25th, and 50th British Divisions, which had taken part in both the Somme and the Lys Valley fighting, had been sent down to a quiet part of the French front; they were joined by the 8th Division, which had been in some of the hardest fighting on the Somme. These divisions constituted the IX Corps and were included in the Sixth French Army. The German attack fell on the IX Corps and the French Corps on their left, which was holding the Chemin des Dames; they were forced from their positions, and by the 30th May the enemy had reached the Marne. The attacks continued until the 6th June, when they culminated in two attempts on the Montagne de Bligny, but here they were held.
By this time the Allied reserves were being used wherever they were wanted. But it had been for the most part French reserves which had come to the aid of the British. At the beginning of July, however, Marshal Foch believed that the enemy was about to attack east and west of Rheims, and he moved the whole of his French troops (eight divisions) from Flanders, and in addition asked for four British divisions to relieve French troops on the Somme. A further four divisions were also sent down as a reserve behind the French front.
As the Marshal had foreseen, the enemy attacked on the 15th July, and, after making progress and crossing the Marne, was held by French, American, and Italian divisions.
On the 18th July the Marshal launched his great counter-offensive on the Château Thierry-Soissons front, and in this used the four British divisions he had held in reserve, and which constituted the XXII Corps. (The 56th Division entered this Corps later on.)
In view of the defeats inflicted up to the moment of the counter-offensive, it might well be supposed that the troops of the Entente were despondent. The Germans were surprised at M. Clemenceau stating that he would fight before Paris, that he would fight in Paris, and that he would fight behind Paris, and this same spirit certainly pervaded the 56th Division. With these great enemy successes throughout the months of March, April, May, and July in mind, the actions of the 56th Division during those months are perhaps the most significant and, in our opinion, the most gallant work they performed. There was no set battle. And a set battle is in some ways the easiest kind of attack for the infantry. The operations through those months were of a minor character, calling for a high level of courage and determination from small parties of men, parties so small that the success of the enterprise must depend on individual gallantry, as there was no mass to drag them along. At any time minor operations deserve more praise than is allotted to them, and at this time, in the face of a series of German victories, they are worthy of the highest admiration.
Divisional Headquarters were at a place called Acq, to the north-west of Arras, and the brigades in the neighbouring villages. Again the division was not to know a lengthy period of rest, for on the 8th April the 56th Division had relieved the 1st Canadian Division and Gen. Dudgeon took over command of the line. During the week of so-called rest, brigades were called upon to provide anything between 1,200 and 1,500 men each night for fatigues, digging further lines of defence. “Bow Bells” were active, and those who were not on fatigue joined in many a chorus with a flavour and memory of London Town.
The new front was south of the Scarpe and the Arras-Douai railway, ground over which the division had fought in the same month of the previous year. The high ground of Monchy and Orange Hill, on this side of the Scarpe, had been lost on the 28th, and the line now ran through Fampoux, on the north of the river, in front of Feuchy to Bois des Bœufs, to the east of Tilloy, and so to Neuville Vitasse. Bois des Bœufs was about the centre of the line held by the division, which was thus astride of the Arras-Cambrai road. The Corps was the XVII (Fergusson), and had been part of the Third Army, but on the 8th it was transferred to the First Army.
From the moment of taking over the line, patrols were pursuing an aggressive policy. Many small encounters took place in No Man’s Land, the 56th Division gradually gaining the ascendancy over the enemy.
On the 19th, at 4.30 a.m., the 168th Brigade carried out a most successful enterprise. The idea was to advance the outpost line on the Tilloy-Wancourt road, and was undertaken by the London Scottish on the right, with one company and a bombing section, and the 4th London Regt. on the left, with one platoon and two bombing sections. The enemy were taken completely by surprise. One warrant officer and three other ranks were captured, together with nine machine guns and a Grenatenwerfer. The enemy line was held throughout the day, but the hostile artillery fire became stronger, the position was not particularly good, and towards the evening orders were given to evacuate it. While this was being done at dusk, the Germans launched a counter-attack and a lively scuffle ensued. The enemy was first beaten off, and then the retirement was effected.
A curious incident occurred during this brush with the enemy. The Germans, as usual, sent up a multitude of lights, and a combination of these appear to have presented to the artillery observers a cluster of lights such as our S.O.S. rocket contained at that moment. The S.O.S. barrage was accordingly put down, much to the surprise of the London Scottish.
The prisoners were of the 65th Infantry Regt., 185th Division.
On the 23rd April the 56th Division took over from the 15th Division the sector north of the Arras-Cambrai road, and held the whole of the XVII Corps front.