British Diplomacy and the Concept of the Eastern Pact (1933-1935)

ibidem Press, Stuttgart

Contents

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER 1 From Fear to Partial Acceptance. British Approach to Collective Security (1919–1933)

CHAPTER 2 Turning Point in the Moscow–Berlin Relations in the Assessment of British Diplomacy (January 1933–January 1934)

2.1. Foreign Office and the Increasing Soviet-German Conflict in 1933

2.2. In the Face of the Soviet Diplomatic Game Concerning the Baltic States at the Turn of 1933/1934

2.3. Moscow’s Declarations on Collective Security Policy (December 1933–January 1934)

CHAPTER 3 London’s Reactions to the Emergence of the Concept of the “Eastern Locarno” (March–July 1934)

3.1. The International Context of the Franco-Soviet Initiative in the Assessment of the Foreign Office

3.2 British Opinions on the Reports of the Soviet Plans to Join the League of Nations

3.3. The Foreign Office Reaction to the French Declaration of Extending the Locarno System in East Central Europe (May–June 1934)

3.4. Analysis of the French Project of 27 June 1934

CHAPTER 4 British Diplomatic Efforts for the Accession of the Soviet Union to the Collective Security System (July-September 1934)

4.1. Louis Barthou’s Visit in London (9–10 July 1934)

4.2. The Activity of the Foreign Office for the Conclusion of the Eastern Pact

4.3. Slowdown in the Activities of the British Diplomacy

4.4. In View of the Rejection of the Concept of the Eastern Pact of Mutual Assistance by the Third Reich and Poland

4.5. Great Britain and the Accession of the USSR to the League of Nations

CHAPTER 5 Impasse in Negotiations on the Eastern Pact after the Death of Louis Barthou (October 1934–February 1935)

5.1. International and Internal Conditions of the British Government’s Foreign Policy at the Turn of 1934 and 1935

5.2. Foreign Office and the Paris–Moscow–Berlin Triangle (October–December 1934)

5.3. Assessment of the Political Activity of the USSR at the Turn of 1934/1935

5.4. Foreign Office and the Diplomatic Activity of Pierre Laval in the European Arena (December 1934–January 1935)

5.5. The London Visit of Pierre-Étienne Flandin and Pierre Laval (1-3 February 1935)

CHAPTER 6 Negotiations on the Concept of the Eastern Pact of Non-Aggression and Consultation (February–April 1935)

6.1. Formulating a New Concept of the Eastern Pact

6.2. Hopes Associated with the Visit of British Ministers in Berlin

6.3. Anthony Eden’s Talks in Moscow

6.4. Sounding of the New Concept of the Eastern Pact in Warsaw and Prague

6.5. Eastern Pact at the Conference in Stresa (11-14 April 1935)

CHAPTER 7 Epilogue of British Efforts for the Conclusion of the Eastern Pact (April–November 1935)

7.1. Foreign Office and the Franco-Soviet Pact of Mutual Assistance of 2 May 1935

7.2. Final Efforts for the Eastern Pact of Non-Aggression and Consultation

7.3. London’s Resignation from Promoting the Concept of the Eastern Pact

CONCLUSION

BIBLIOGRAPHY

ANNEX

A1. DICTIONARY OF PERSONS APPEARING IN THE BOOK

A2. STRUCTURE OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE IN 1933–1935

A3. ABBREVIATIONS

Copyright

To Professor Andrzej M. Brzeziński

British policy towards Germany after Adolf Hitler came to power on 30 January 1933 has been a subject of numerous studies that yielded hundreds of publications. The so-called Appeasement, as London’s policy in 1933–1939 came to be known, was harshly condemned as soon as the war ended, although the criticism abated with time. As more new source materials came to light, one-sided assessment was no longer possible, especially since it often resulted from entanglement in contemporary political struggles. Some dubbed London’s actions a policy of “realism,” which paved the way for affirmation of Appeasement. Such views often involved the assertion that by the 1930s Britain had no longer been a world superpower, which in part relieved politicians who shaped the decisions of His Majesty’s government in international relations of responsibility. With time, 1938–1939 came to be treated separately as characteristic of the policy of Appeasement, while previous actions the United Kingdom on the European arena were described as “deterrence diplomacy,” emphasising the desire to deter potential aggressors primarily through renewed armament. For obvious reasons, the greatest interest in the issue of British policy towards continental Europe in the years immediately preceding World War Two has always been the domain of historians representing the English-speaking world.1

British diplomacy is the main focus of this volume. The Foreign Office encountered a number of obstacles in its activities and had to reckon with the opinion of other factors. First of all, in the British structure of power, the government’s policy was the responsibility of the prime minister. He was the one who decided what extent of freedom the secretary for foreign affairs had. During the terms of James Ramsay MacDonald (24 August 1931–7 June 1935) and Stanley Baldwin (7 June 1935–27 May 1937) as prime ministers, chiefs of British diplomacy had a relatively large range of autonomy in shaping London’s involvement in the international arena. Both prime ministers of the so-called National Government deliberately left the decision in that area to Sir John Simon, and after the reconstruction of the cabinet, to Sir Samuel Hoare. However, the situation was also influenced by objective conditions. In the case of the former, his age and health played no small role, while in the case of the latter it was a well-known fact that he did not like to be involved in external affairs. Occasions when the cabinet made decisions regarding foreign policy as a whole body were few and far between. The situation began to change with the progression of the Italian-Abyssinian conflict in 1935. Other ministers whose powers extended beyond the British Isles, namely the heads of the Dominion Office, the Colonial Office, the India Office, the Board of Trade, or ministries responsible for the defence of Great Britain: the War Office, the Admiralty and the Air Ministry had relatively little to say regarding the foreign policy of London. A special role in the government was reserved for chancellor of exchequer, who was said to be the most important minister. In the period in question, Neville Chamberlain held that office. He was a man of strong character, who tried to influence the foreign policy of the United Kingdom. To achieve that, he used his competence in the field of budgeting, which meant that he could orchestrate the transfer of funds for purposes he recognised as priority. In Chamberlain’s case, his ambitions extended further, however. He was particularly active in issues concerning the Far East, where he tried to promote his concepts of an agreement with Japan. In 1933–1935, another important figure was the relatively young conservative politician, Anthony Eden, dreaming of being appointed as foreign secretary (he eventually achieved his goal in December 1935). According to Sir Robert Vansittart, he never lost any opportunity to promote himself. In December 1933, he was appointed Lord Privy Seal in MacDonald’s government, which placed him in charge of contacts with the League of Nations. From June 1935, Eden held the post of minister for the League of Nations, created especially for him. Though he was critical of the heads of diplomacy of his country, there were no conflicts in the foreign policy of London of that era that would get outside the circle of the political elite.2

In the 1930s, various types of inter-ministerial committees began to play an increasingly important role in shaping the strategy of British foreign policy. These bodies were entrusted with analysing various issues of national and imperial security because the large government grew relatively inert, if not downright immobile. They reported to the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID), which then commented on them, developed them and formulated conclusions for the Cabinet. Among them, the most important in 1933–1935 was the Defence Requirements Sub-Committee (DRC), headed by the Secretary of the Government and the CID, Sir Maurice Hankey. The DRC was established with the task of estimating the armament needs of the United Kingdom, when it became obvious that the British government would need to move away from the “Ten Years Rule”, which will be discussed in the first chapter. In that case, the Foreign Office had an impact on recommendations adopted by its representative, Sir Robert Vansittart.3

The Foreign Office was therefore largely independent in carrying out the foreign policy of the country, including the concept of the Eastern Pact. This did not mean, however, that British diplomacy did not face any problems at the time. One of them was the question of the personality of the ministry’s heads: its political superior, Sir John Simon and the highest ranking civil servant, Sir Robert Vansittart.4 The former, a renowned lawyer, earned the moniker of “expert in alternatives,” meaning that he excelled in accurate analyses and balanced judgments on any issue, often discovering deeply hidden aspects. However, he was also plagued by indecisiveness, which provoked dissatisfaction among numerous British experts in international relations. Simon himself, who was offered the post of head of the Foreign Office solely on political grounds (it was a prestigious position for a leader of a rather small faction of liberals, which made it possible for the government to use the title of “National”), was on many occasions called a “great mistake” by British politicians, journalists and diplomats. Prime minister MacDonald himself often considered changing his foreign minister. The only thing that prevented him from doing so was the fear that after the departure of liberals the cabinet would lose its “national” character.

Sir Robert Vansittart, however, was a man of great temperament, linguistic abilities (he was fluent in French, German, Turkish, Spanish and Arabic) and considerable experience in diplomacy. He enjoyed the confidence of prime minister James R. MacDonald and lord president of the council, Stanley Baldwin, serving as their private secretary during the early stages of his career. These were the two most important people in the British cabinet, and on 7 June 1935 they swapped positions. Vansittart had a very clearly defined vision for further action, based on the experiences of diplomats from the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, with whom he had the opportunity to work closely together. The guiding principle of the permanent under-secretary of state was to ensure the balance of power in the regions of interest for London from the point of view of the global interests of the Empire, and to support diplomatic efforts with economic and military powers. This was meant to serve as a tool to enforce Britain’s own purposes on vulnerable countries or deter potential aggressors. Unfortunately, personalities of the two most important figures in the FO proved to be incompatible and conflict and distrust grew between them. After Simon took a position in the Home Office and Sir Samuel Hoare was put in charge of foreign affairs, the situation in the Foreign Office calmed down considerably.

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