The Analogy of Religion to the Constitution and Course of Nature

5.) Were we even sure that death would suspend our intellectual powers, it would not furnish even the lowest probability that it would destroy them.

Objec. From the analogy of plants.

Ans. This furnishes poets with apt illustrations of our frailty, but affords no proper analogy. Plants are destitute of perception and action, and this is the very matter in question.

REMARKS

1. It has been shown, that confining ourselves to what we know, we see no probability of ever ceasing to be: – it cannot be concluded from the reason of the thing: – nor from the analogy of nature.

2. We are therefore to go upon the belief of a future existence.

3. Our going into new scenes and conditions, is just as natural as our coming into the world.

4. Our condition may naturally be a social one.

5. The advantages of it may naturally be bestowed, according to some fixed law, in proportion to one’s degrees in virtue.

1.) Perhaps not so much as now by society; but by God’s more immediate action.

2.) Yet this will be no less natural, i. e. stated, fixed, or settled.

3.) Our notions of what is natural, are enlarged by greater knowledge of God and his works.

4.) There may be some beings in the world, to whom the whole of Christianity is as natural as the visible course of nature seems to us.

6. These probabilities of a future life, though they do not satisfy curiosity, answer all the purposes of religion, as well as demonstration.

1.) Even a demonstration of a future state, would not demonstrate religion, but would be reconcilable with atheism.

2.) But as religion implies a future state, any presumption against such a state, would be a presumption against religion.

3.) The foregoing observations remove all presumptions of that sort, and prove to a great probability, a fundamental doctrine of religion.

CHAPTER IITHE GOVERNMENT OF GOD BY REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS

The question of a future life is rendered momentous by our capacity for happiness and misery.

Especially if that happiness or misery depends on our present conduct.

We should feel the deepest solicitude on this subject.

And that if there were no proof of a future life and interest, other than the probabilities just discussed.

I. In the present world our pleasures and pains are, to a great extent, in our own power

1. We see them to be consequences of our actions.

2. And we can foresee these consequences.

3. Our desires are not gratified, without the right kind of exertion.

4. By prudence we may enjoy life; rashness, or even neglect may make us miserable.

5. Why this is so is another matter.

1.) It may be impossible to be otherwise.

2.) Or it may be best on the whole.

3.) Or God’s plan may be to make only the good happy.

4.) Or the whole plan may be incomprehensible to us.

Objec. It may be said “this is only the course of nature.”

Ans. It is granted: but

1. The course of nature is but the will of God. We admit that God is the natural governor of the world: and must not turn round and deny it because his government is uniform.

2. Our natural foresight of the consequences of actions, is his appointment.

3. The consequences themselves, are his appointment.

4. Our ability to foresee these consequences, is God’s instruction how we are to act.

Objec. By this reasoning we are instructed to gratify our appetites, and such gratification is our reward for so doing.

Ans. Certainly not. Foreseen pleasures and pains are proper motives to action in general; but we may, in particular cases, damage ourselves by indulgence. Our eyes are made to see with, but not to look at every thing: – for instance the sun.

It follows, from what has been said, that

II. We are, now, actually under God’s government, in the strictest sense

1. Admitting that there is a God, it is not so much a matter of speculation, as of experience, that he governs us.

2. The annexing of pleasures and pains to certain actions, and giving notice them, is the very essence of government.

3. Whether by direct acts upon us, or by contriving a general plan, does not affect the argument.

1.) If magistrates could make laws which should execute themselves, their government would be far more perfect than it is.

2.) God’s making fire burn us, is as much an instance of government, as if he directly inflicted the burn, whenever we touched fire.

4. Hence the analogy of nature shows nothing to render incredible the Bible doctrine of God’s rewarding or punishing according to our actions.

Additional remarks on Punishment

As men object chiefly to future punishment, it is proper to show further that the course of administration, as to present punishment, is analogous to what religion teaches as to the future.

Indeed they add credibility to it.

And ought to raise the most serious apprehension.

I. Circumstances to be observed touching present punishments

1. They often follow acts which produce present pleasure or advantage.

2. The sufferings often far exceed the pleasure or advantage.

3. They often follow remotely.

4. After long delay they often come suddenly.

5. As those remote effects are not certainly foreseen, they may not be thought of at the time; or if so, there is a hope of escaping.

6. There are opportunities of advantage, which if neglected do not recur.

7. Though, in some cases, men who have sinned up to a certain point, may retrieve their affairs, yet in many cases, reformation is of no avail.

8. Inconsiderateness is often as disastrous as wilful wrong-doing.

9. As some punishments by civil government, are capital, so are some natural punishments.

1.) Seem intended to remove the offender out of the way.

2.) Or as an example to others.

II. These things are not accidental, but proceed from fixed laws

1. They are matters of daily experience.

2. Proceed from the general laws, by which the world is governed.

III. They so closely resemble what religion teaches, as to future punishment, that both might be expressed in the same words

e. g. Proverbs, ch. i.

The analogy sufficiently answers all objections against the Scripture doctrine of future punishment, such as

1.) That our frailty or temptations annihilate the guilt of vice.

2.) Or the objection from necessity.

3.) Or that the Almighty cannot be contradicted.

4.) Or that he cannot be offended.

REMARKS

1. Such reflections are terrific, but ought to be stated and considered.

2. Disregard of a hereafter cannot be justified by any thing short of a demonstration of atheism. Even skeptical doctrines afford no justification.

3. There is no pretence of reason for presuming that the licentious will not find it better for them that they had never been born.

CHAPTER IIIMORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD

As the structure of the world shows intelligence, so the mode of distributing pleasure and pain, shows government. That is, God’s natural government, such as a king exercises over his subjects.

But this does not, at first sight, determine what is the moral character of such government.

I. What is a moral or righteous government?

1. Not mere rewarding and punishing.

2. But doing this according to character.

3. The perfection of moral government is doing this exactly.

Objec. God is simply and absolutely benevolent.

Ans. Benevolence, infinite in degree, would dispose him to produce the greatest possible happiness, regardless of behaviour. This would rob God of other attributes; and should not be asserted unless it can be proved. And whether it can be proved is not the point now in hand.

The question is not whether there may not be, in the universe, beings to whom he manifests absolute benevolence, which might not be incompatible with justice; but whether he treats us so.

4. It must be owned to be vastly difficult, in such a disordered world, to estimate with exactness the overplus of happiness on the side of virtue: and there may be exceptions to the rule. But it is far from being doubtful that on the whole, virtue is happier than vice, in this world.

II. The beginnings of a righteous administration, are seen in nature

1. It has been proved (ch. ii.) that God governs: and it is reasonable to suppose that he would govern righteously.

1.) Any other rule of government would be harder to account for.

2.) The Bible doctrine that hereafter the good shall be happy, and the wicked miserable, is no more than an expectation that a method of government, now begun, shall be carried on.

2. The opposite consequences of prudence and rashness, show a right constitution of nature; and our ability to foresee and control these consequences, shows that we are under moral law.

3. God has so constructed society that vice, to a great degree, is actually punished by it.

1.) Without this, society could not exist.

2.) This is God’s government, through society; and is as natural, as society.

3.) Since the course of things is God’s appointment, men are unavoidably accountable for their behaviour.

Objec. Society often punishes good actions, and rewards wickedness.

Ans. 1. This is not necessary, and consequently not natural.

2. Good actions are never punished by society as good, but because considered bad.

4. By the course of nature, virtue is rewarded, and vice punished, as such, which proves a moral government; as will be seen if we rightly distinguish between actions and their qualities.

1.) An action may produce present gratification though it be wrong: in which case the gratification is in the act, not the morality of it: in other cases the enjoyment consists wholly in the quality of virtuousness.

2.) Vice is naturally attended with uneasiness, apprehension, vexation, remorse, &c.

– This is a very different feeling from that produced by mere misfortune.

– Men comfort themselves under misfortune, that it was not their own fault.

3.) Honest and good men are befriended as such.

4.) Injuries are resented as implying fault; and good offices are regarded with gratitude on account of the intention, even when they fail to benefit us.

– This is seen in family government, where children are punished for falsehood, fretfulness, &c., though no one is hurt.

– And also in civil government, where the absence or presence of ill intention goes far in determining the penalty of wrong-doing.

5.) The whole course of the world, in all ages and relations, turns much upon approbation and disapprobation.

6.) The very fact of our having a moral nature, is a proof of our being under God’s moral government.

– We are placed in a condition which unavoidably operates on our moral nature.

– Hence it arises that reward to virtue and reprobation of vice, as such, is a rule, never inverted. If it be thought that there are instances to the contrary, (which is not so,) they are evidently monstrous.

– The degree in which virtue and vice receive proper returns, is not the question now, but only the thing itself, in some degree.

7.) It is admitted that virtue sometimes suffers, and vice prospers; but this is disorder, and not the order of nature.

8.) It follows, that we have in the government of the world, a declaration from God, for virtue and against vice. So far as a man is true to virtue, is he on the side of the divine administration. Such a man must have a sense of security, and a hope of something better.

5. This hope is confirmed by observing that virtue has necessary tendencies beyond their present effects.

1.) These are very obvious with regard to individuals.

2.) Are as real, though not so patent, in regard to society.

– The power of a society under the direction of virtue, tends to prevail over power not so directed, just as power under direction of reason, tends to prevail over brute force.

– As this may not be conceded, we will notice how the case stands, as to reason:

· Length of time, and proper opportunity, are necessary for reason to triumph over brutes.

· Rational beings, disunited, envious, unjust, and treacherous, may be overcome by brutes, uniting themselves by instinct: but this would be an inverted order of things.

– A like tendency has virtue to produce superiority.

· By making the good of society, the object of every member of it.

· By making every one industrious in his own sphere.

· By uniting all in one bond of veracity and justice.

3.) If the part of God’s government which we see, and the part we do not see, make up one scheme, then we see a tendency in virtue to superiority.

4.) But to produce that superiority there must be

– A force proportioned to the obstacles.

– Sufficient lapse of time.

– A fair field of trial; such as extent of time, adequate occasions, and opportunities for the virtuous to unite.

5.) These things are denied to virtue in this life, so that its tendencies, though real, are hindered.

6.) But it may have all requisite advantages hereafter.

– Eternity will be lasting enough.

– Good men will unite; as they cannot do now, scattered over the earth, and ignorant of one another.

– Other orders of virtuous beings will join; for the very nature of virtue is a bond of union.

7.) The tendency of such an order of things, so far as seen by vicious beings in any part of the universe, would be to the amendment of all who were capable of it, and their recovery to virtue.

8.) All this goes to show that the hinderances to virtue are contingent, and that its beneficial tendencies are God’s declarations in its favor.

9.) If the preceding considerations are thought to be too speculative, we may easily come to the same result by reflecting on the supremacy which any earthly nation would attain, by entire virtue for many ages.

REMARKS

Consider now the general system of religion. The government of the world is one; it is moral; virtue shall in the end prevail over wickedness; and to see the importance and fitness of such an arrangement we have only to consider what would be the state of things, if vice had these advantages, or virtue the contrary.

Objec. Why may not things be now going on in other worlds, and continue always to go on in this world, in the same mixed and disordered state as at present?

Ans. We are not proving that God’s moral government is perfect, or the truth of religion, but only seeing what there is in the course of nature, to confirm it, supposing it to be known. Were there nothing to judge by, but the present distribution of pleasure and pain, we should have no ground to conclude that hereafter we should be rewarded or punished exactly according to our deserts. But even then there would be no indication that vice is better than virtue. Still the preceding observations confirm the doctrine of future retribution; for,

1.) They show that the Author of nature is not indifferent to virtue and vice.

2.) That future distributive justice would differ not in kind, but in degree only, from God’s present government. It would be the effect, towards which we see the tendency.

3.) That higher rewards and punishments may be hereafter.

4.) That we should expect it to be so; because the tendencies of vice and virtue are immutable, while the hinderances are only artificial.

SUMMARY

[This enumerates the steps of the argument, in the foregoing chapter, in as condensed a form as possible.]

CHAPTER IVOF A STATE OF PROBATION

The doctrine of probation comprehends several particulars. But the most common notion is that our future interests are depending; and depending on ourselves. And that we have opportunities for both good and bad conduct, and temptations to each.

This is not exactly the same as our being under moral government; for it implies allurement to evil, and difficulties in being good.

Hence needs to be considered by itself.

Doctrine. The natural government of God, in this world, puts us on trial as to the things of this world; and so implies, what religion teaches, that his moral government puts us on trial as to a future world.

I. So far as we are tempted to do what will damage our future temporal interests, so far we are under probation as to those interests

1. The annexing of pleasures and pains to actions, as good or bad, and enabling us to foresee their effect, implies that our interests, in part at least, depend on ourselves.

2. We often blame ourselves and others for evils, as resulting from misconduct.

3. It is very certain that we often miss possible good, and incur evils, not for want of knowing better, but through our fault.

4. Every one speaks of the hazards of young persons, from other causes than ignorance.

II. These natural or temporal trials are analogous to our moral and religious trial

1. In both cases, what constitutes the trial, is either in our circumstances or in our nature.

1.) Some would do right but for violent or extraordinary temptations.

2.) Others will seek evil, and go out of their way after wicked indulgence, when there are no external temptations.

3.) But even those who err through temptation, must have that within which makes them susceptible of temptation.

4.) So that we are in a like state of probation with respect to both present and future interests.

2. If we proceed to observe how mankind behave in both capacities, we see the same analogy.

1.) Some scarcely look beyond the present gratification.

2.) Some are driven by their passions against their better judgment and feeble resolutions.

3.) Some shamelessly go on in open vice.

4.) Some persist in wrong-doing, even under strong apprehensions of future misery.

3. The analogy is no less plain in regard to the influence of others upon us.

1.) Bad example.

2.) Wrong education.

3.) Corruptions of religion.

4.) General prevalence of mistakes as to true happiness.

4. In both cases negligence and folly bring difficulty as well as vice.

III. The disadvantages we labor under from our fallen and disordered state, are the same, in relation to both earthly and future interests

This disadvantage affords no ground of complaint; for,

1. We may manage to pass our days in comfort and peace.

2. And so may we obtain the security and comfort of religion.

3. We might as well complain that we are not a higher order of beings.

REMARKS

1. It is thus proved that the state of trial, which religion says we are in, is credible; for it exactly corresponds to what we see.

1.) If from birth till death we were in a constant security of enjoyment, without care or correctness, it would be a presumption against religion.

2.) It might, if we had no experience, be urged that an infinitely good Being would not expose us to the hazard of misery. This is indeed a difficulty, and must remain so; but still the course of nature is as it is.

3.) The miseries which we bring on ourselves are no more unavoidable than our deportment.

2. It has been proved that we are in danger of miscarrying as to our interests, both present and future.

3. The sum of the whole is, that as we do not have present enjoyments and honors forced upon us, in spite of misconduct, so this may be the case, as to that chief and final good which religion proposes.

CHAPTER VPROBATION INTENDED FOR MORAL DISCIPLINE AND IMPROVEMENT

Why we should be placed in the condition spoken of in the last chapter, is a question which cannot be answered. It may be that we could not understand, if told. And if we could, it might injure us to know, just now. It certainly is consistent with God’s righteous government.

Religion tells us that we are so placed in order to become qualified for a better state.

This, though a very partial answer to the inquiry why we are so placed, answers an infinitely more important question, – viz.: What is our business here?

I. We are placed in this state of trial, for our improvement in virtue, as the requisite qualification for future security and happiness

1. Every creature is designed for a particular way of life.

1.) Happiness depends on the congruity between a creature’s nature and its circumstances.

2.) Man’s character might be so changed as to make him incapable of happiness on earth.

3.) Or he might be placed, without changing his nature, in a world where he must be wretched, for want of the proper objects to answer to his desires.

4.) So that without determining what is the future condition of good men, we know there must be necessary qualifications to make us capable of enjoying it.

2. Human beings are so constituted as to become fit for new and different conditions.

1.) We not only acquire ideas, but store them up.

2.) We can become more expert in any kind of action.

3.) And can make settled alterations in our tempers.

4.) We can form habits– both bodily and mental.

As these operate in producing radical changes in human character, we will look for a moment at the process.

– Neither perceptions, nor knowledge, are habits; though necessary to forming them.

– There are habits of perception, however, and habits of action: the former are passive, the latter active.

– Habits of body are produced by external acts, and habits of mind by the exertion of principles; i. e. carrying them out.

– Resolutions to do well are acts, and may help towards forming good habits. But mere theorizing, and forming pictures in the mind, not only do not help, but may harden the mind to a contrary course.

– Passive impressions, by repetition grow weaker. Thus familiarity with danger lessens fear.

– Hence active habits may be formed and strengthened, by acting according to certain motives or excitements, which grow less sensibly felt and less and less felt, as the habit strengthens.

· Thus the sight of distress excites the passive emotion of pity, and the active principle of benevolence. But inquiring out cases of distress in order to relieve them, causes diminished sensitiveness at the sight of misery, and stronger benevolence and aptitude in relieving it.

· So admonition, experience, and example, if acted upon, produce good; if not, harden.

5.) The formation of a habit may be imperceptible and even inexplicable, but the thing itself is matter of certain experience.

6.) A habit once formed, the action becomes easy and often pleasurable: opposite inclinations grow weaker: difficulties less: and occasions more frequent.

7.) Thus, a new character, in several respects, is formed.

3. We should not have these capacities for improvement and for the reconstruction of character, if it were not necessary.

1.) They are necessary, even as to this life.

– We are not qualified, at first, for mature life: understanding and strength come gradually.