The Analogy of Religion to the Constitution and Course of Nature
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36
[“S. What shall we say, then, of the shoemaker? That he cuts with his instrument only, or with his hands also? A. With his hands also. S. Does he use his eyes also, in making shoes? A. Yes. S. But are we agreed that he who uses, and what he uses, are different? A. Yes. S. The shoemaker, then, and harper, are different from the hands and eyes they use? A. It appears so. S. Does a man then use his whole body? A. Certainly. S. But he who uses, and that which he uses are different. A. Yes. S. A man then is something different from his own body.” Plat. Alcibi. Prim. p. 129, D. Stallb. Ed.“It may easily be perceived that the mind both sees and hears, and not those parts which are, so to speak, windows of the mind.” “Neither are we bodies; nor do I, while speaking this to thee, speak to thy body.” “Whatever is done by thy mind, is done by thee.” Cicero, Tusc. Disput. I. 20, 46 and 22, 52.“The mind of each man is the man; not that figure which may be pointed out with the finger.” Cic., de Rep. b. 6, s. 24.]
37
[Butler’s argument, if advanced for proof would prove too much, not only as to brutes but as to man; for it would prove pre-existence. And this is really the tenet, (i. e. transmigration,) of those who arrive at the doctrine of immortality only by philosophy. Philosophy cannot establish the doctrine of a future state, nor can it afford any presumptions against either a future or a pre-existent state.Nothing is gained by insisting that reason teaches the true doctrine of the soul; any more than there would be by insisting that by it we learned the doctrine of a trinity, or atonement. Philosophy does teach that He who can create, under infinite diversity of forms, can sustain existence, in any mode he pleases.The reader who chooses to look further into the discussion as to the immortality of brutes, will find it spread out in Polignac’s Anti-Lucretius, and still more in Bayle’s Dictionary, under the articles Pereira, and Rorarius. The topic is also discussed in Des Cartes on the Passions: Baxter on The Nature of the Soul: Hume’s Essays, Essay 9: Search’s Light of Nature: Cheyne’s Philosophical Principles: Wagstaff on the Immortality of Brutes: Edwards’ Critical and Philosophical Exercitations: Watt’s Essays, Essay 9: Colliber’s Enquiry: Locke on the Understanding, b. 2, ch. ix.: Ditton on the Resurrection: Willis De Anima Brutæ.]
38
[It is as absurd to suppose that a brain thinks, as that an eye sees, or a finger feels. The eye no more sees, than the telescope or spectacles. If the nerve be paralyzed, there is no vision, though the eye be perfect. A few words spoken or read, may at once deprive of sight, or knock a person down.The mind sometimes survives the body. Swift, utterly helpless from palsy, retained his faculties. In some, the body survives the mind. Morgagni, Haller, Bonnet, and others, have proved that there is no part of the brain, not even the pineal gland, which has not been found destroyed by disease, where there had been no hallucination of mind, nor any suspicion of such disease, during life.]
39
Pp. 84, 85.
40
[We are told by sceptics that “mind is the result of a curious and complicated organization.” A mere jumble of words! But were the mind material, there is no evidence that death would destroy it: for we do not see that death has any power over matter. The body remains the very same as it does in a swoon, till chemical changes begin.]
41
There are three distinct questions, relating to a future life, here considered: Whether death be the destruction of living agents; if not, Whether it be the destruction of their present powers of reflection, as it certainly is the destruction of their present powers of sensation; and if not, Whether it be the suspension, or discontinuance of the exercise of these present reflecting powers. Now, if there be no reason to believe the last, there will be, if that were possible, less for the next, and less still for the first.
42
This, according to Strabo, was the opinion of the Brachmans, νομίζειν μὲν γὰρ δὴ τὸν μὲν ἐνθάδε βίον, ὡς ἂν ἀκμὴν κυομένων εἶναι· τὸν δὲ θάνατον, γένεσιν εἰς τὸν ὄντως βίον, καὶ τὸν εὐδαίμονα τοῖς φιλοσοφήσασι· Lib. xv. p. 1039, Ed. Amst. 1707. [“For they think that the present life is like that of those who are just ready to be born; and that death is a birth into the real life, and a happy one to those who have practised philosophy.”] To which opinion perhaps Antoninus may allude in these words, ὡς νῦν περιμένεις, πότε ἔμβρυον ἐκ τῆς γαστρὸς τῆς γυναικός σου ἐξέλθῃ, οὕτως ἐκδέχεσθαι, τὴν ὥραν ὲν ᾗ τὸ ψυχάριόν σου τοῦ ἐλύτρου τούτου ἐκπεσεῖται. Lib. ix. c. 3. [As this last passage may, by some, be thought indelicate, it is left untranslated.]
43
[The increase of a force in any direction, cannot of itself change that direction. An arrow shot from a bow, towards an object, does not aim at some other object, by being shot with more force.]
44
[Our nature will always be ours, or we should cease to be ourselves, and become something else. And this nature is social. Every one feels, at least sometimes, that he is not complete in himself for the production of happiness; and so looks round for that which may fit his wants, and supply what he cannot produce from within. Hence amusements, of a thousand kinds, are resorted to, and still more, society. Society is a want of the mind; as food is of the body. Society, such as perfectly suits our real nature, and calls out, in a right manner, its every attribute, would secure our perfect happiness. But Such society must include God.]
45
See Part II. chap. ii. and Part II. chap. iv.
46
[Objections and difficulties belong to all subjects, in some of their bearings. Ingenious and uncandid men may start others, which care and candor may remove. It is therefore no proof of weakness in a doctrine, that it is attacked with objections, both real and merely plausible. Error has been spread by two opposite means: – a dogmatic insisting on doubtful points, and an unteachable cavilling at certain truth.]
47
Part I. chap. vii.
48
[Our relation to God is “even necessary,” because we are his creatures: so that the relation must endure so long as we endure. But our relations to other creatures are contingent, and may be changed or abrogated.]
49
Pp. 93, 94.
50
[“The terms nature, and power of nature, and course of nature, are but empty words, and merely mean that a thing occurs usually or frequently. The raising of a human body out of the earth we call a miracle, the generation of one in the ordinary way we call natural, for no other reason than because one is usual the other unusual. Did men usually rise out of the earth like corn we should call that natural.” Dr. Clarke, Controv. with Leibnitz.]
51
[That man consists of parts, is evident; and the use of each part, and of the whole man, is open to investigation. In examining any part we learn what it is, and what it is to do: e. g. the eye, the hand, the heart. So of mental faculties; memory is to preserve ideas, shame to deter us from things shameful, compassion to induce us to relieve distress. In observing our whole make, we may see an ultimate design, – viz.: not particular animal gratifications, but intellectual and moral improvement, and happiness by that means. If this be our end, it is our duty. To disregard it, must bring punishment; for shame, anguish, remorse, are by the laws of mind, the sequences of sin.See Law’s Notes on King’s Origin of Evil.]
52
[It is almost amazing that philosophy, because it discovers the laws of matter, should be placed in antagonism with the Bible which reveals a superintending Providence. The Bible itself teaches this very result of philosophy, – viz.: that the world is governed by general laws. See Prov. viii. 29: Job. xxxviii. 12, 24, 31, 33: Ps. cxix. 90, 91: Jer. xxxi. 35, and xxxiii. 25.]
53
See Part II. chap. vi.
54
Part II. chap. vi.
55
The general consideration of a future state of punishment, most evidently belongs to the subject of natural religion. But if any of these reflections should be thought to relate more peculiarly to this doctrine, as taught in Scripture, the reader is desired to observe, that Gentile writers, both moralists and poets, speak of the future punishment of the wicked, both as to the duration and degree of it, in a like manner of expression and of description, as the Scripture does. So that all which can positively be asserted to be matter of mere revelation, with regard to this doctrine, seems to be, that the great distinction between the righteous and the wicked, shall be made at the end of this world; that each shall then receive according to his deserts. Reason did, as it well might, conclude that it should, finally and upon the whole, be well with the righteous, and ill with the wicked: but it could not be determined upon any principles of reason, whether human creatures might not have been appointed to pass through other states of life and being, before that distributive justice should finally and effectually take place. Revelation teaches us, that the next state of things after the present is appointed for the execution of this justice; that it shall be no longer delayed; but the mystery of God, the great mystery of his suffering vice and confusion to prevail, shall then be finished; and he will take to him his great power and will reign, by rendering to every one according to his works.
56
[Our language furnishes no finer specimens of the argument analogical. Butler here seizes the very points, which are most plausible and most insisted on, as showing the harshness and unreasonableness of Christianity; and overthrows them at a stroke by simply directing attention to the same things, in the universally observed course of nature.]
57
Chap. i.
58
See chaps. iv. and vi.
59
[This chapter, more than any other, carries the force of positive argument. If in this world, we have proofs that God is a moral governor, then in order to evince that we shall be under moral government hereafter, we have only to supply an intermediate consideration, – viz.: that God, as such, must be unchangeable. The argument, as just remarked, assumes a substantive form, because admitted facts, as to this world, exhibiting the very principles on which God’s government goes at present, compel us not only to suppose that the principles of God will remain, but to believe so.]
60
Chap. ii.
61
The objections against religion, from the evidence of it not being universal, nor so strong as might possibly have been, may be urged against natural religion, as well as against revealed. And therefore the consideration of them belongs to the first part of this treatise, as well as the second. But as these objections are chiefly urged against revealed religion, I choose to consider them in the second part. And the answer to them there, ch. vi., as urged against Christianity, being almost equally applicable to them as urged against the religion of nature; to avoid repetition, the reader is referred to that chapter.
62
Dissertation II.
63
Chap. vi.
64
See Lord Shaftesbury’s Inquiry concerning Virtue, Part II.
65
[At the foundation of moral improvement, lies the conviction that what is right, is our happiness, no less than our duty. This again is based upon a conviction that God governs justly; and has all power over us for good or evil. As creation is full of the evidences of design, so is Providence. And as the human mind shows, in its structure, the most exquisite marks of design, so the government of mind shows a final object for all our faculties. Among the attributes of mind we observe, conspicuous, a disposition to seek ends, lay plans, and sacrifice present indulgence to future and greater good: and a facility in learning how to subordinate one thing to another, so as to secure success in our plans. This, with conscience to approve or disapprove our modes, constitutes an evident adaptedness to a moral government on the part of God; and would be worse than superfluous, if there be no such government. Every rule of action, deduced by reason from the light of nature, may fairly be regarded as God’s law; and the inconveniences resulting from wrong actions, are God’s retributions. These retributions, felt or observed, are divine teachings, saying, emphatically, if you act thus you shall receive thus. We do actually so judge, in relation to physics. Every rule of motion, distance, gravitation, heat, electricity, &c. &c., is received as God’s law; and we would deem it insane to act in opposition.]
66
[Consult Capp on the Gov. of God: Twisse Vindiciæ Prov. Dei: Wittichii Excre. Theol.: Dwight’s Theol.: Martinius de Gubernatione Mundi: Liefchild on Providence: Morton on do.: Sherlock on do.: Rutherford on do.: and the Sermons of Thos. Leland, Porteus, Topping, Hunt, Davies, Horseley, South, Wisheart, Seed, Collings, and Doddridge.]
67
Chap. ii.
68
[In the structure of man, physical and mental, we find no contrivances for disease or pain, so that in general those who conform to the laws of their being, enjoy happiness; and suffering is chiefly the result of our own conduct. But, as without revelation we could only learn the evil of vice, by its effects, and would often learn it too late to retrieve our affairs, or our souls’ peace, God has in mercy given forth his teachings, by which, beforehand, we may know the effects of actions.]
69
See Dissertation II.
70
[It was contended by Mandeville in his “Fable of the Bees,” that private vices, as luxury for instance, are often conducive to the well-being of society. This idea is fully refuted by Warburton, Divine Legation of Moses, b. 1: Berkeley, Minute Philosopher, Dial. 2: and by Brown, Characteristics, Ess. 2.]
71
[A strong illustration of this distinction is seen in the “delivering up” of our Savior to be crucified. As to the mere act of delivering up, we find it referred, 1. To God the Father, John iii. 16: Acts ii. 23: Rom. viii. 32. 2. To Christ himself, Eph. v. 2, and v. 25, &c. In this last passage it is literally delivered himself. 3. To the Jewish rulers, Luke xx. 20: Mark xii. 12. 4. To Pontius Pilate, Matt. xxvii. 26: Mark xv. 15: John xix. 6. 5. To Judas, Matt. xxvi. 15: Zec. xi. 12.As to the mere act, Judas and Pilate did just what God the Father, and our Lord Jesus did. But how infinitely unlike the qualities of the act!]
72
[“When one supposes he is about to die, there comes over him a fear and anxiety about things in regard to which he felt none before. For the stories which are told about Hades, that such, as have practised wrong, must there suffer punishment, although made light of for a while, these torment the soul lest they should be true. But he who is conscious of innocence, has a pleasant and good hope, which will support old age.” Plato, Respub. i. s. 5.]
73
See Dissertation II.
74
[Aside from revelation, our ideas of the divine attributes must be derived from a knowledge of our own. Among these is our moral sense, which constrains us to consider right and wrong as an immutable distinction, and moral worth as our highest excellence. Hence we ascribe perfect virtue to God. It does not follow from such reasoning, that we form a Deity after our own conceptions, for it is but the argument a fortiori, “He that formed the eye, shall he not see? He that teacheth man knowledge, shall he not know?” Ps. xciv. 9. We do not conceive of a Deity who sees just as we do; but that he sees, for he makes sight. So we infer that he has moral attributes, because we have them, from him.This point is not sufficiently pressed upon infidels. They readily acknowledge God’s physical attributes, because the argument is addressed to their understanding, but deny his moral ones, because their hearts are hardened through the deceitfulness of sin.]
75
[It is easy to see that the occasional disadvantages of virtue, are no less conducive to moral excellence, than its being generally advantageous. In view of its general advantages, we are virtuous with a proper and commanded view to our instinctive desire for happiness. In face of its disadvantages, we cultivate virtue for its own sake.]
76
[The common remark, “virtue brings its own reward,” is true only with qualifications. The apostles, as to this life, were the most miserable of men: (1 Cor. xv. 9.) Virtue does not always bring earthly rewards. The grand support of the good is drawn from considerations of that future state which the infidel denies. Observe, 1. We cannot suppose that God would so construct man, as that his principal comfort and reward for virtue, is a delusion. 2. Very good persons are often beset with painful doubts and fears, as to their future safety. Would God allow such doubts, if the expectation of future happiness were the only reward of virtue? 3. This reward, at best, is private; but for the encouragement of virtue, it must have obvious triumphs.On the other hand, bad men grow callous to the rebukes of conscience, so that great sinners suffer less from remorse than small ones, and what is worse, owe their tranquillity to their guilt. Again, he who kills a good man, wholly deprives him of his only reward, if this life alone gives it. And the villain who kills himself, escapes his only punishment.Virtuous persons, in the strong language of Robert Hall, would be “the only persons who are wholly disappointed of their object; the only persons who (by a fatal and irreparable mistake), expecting an imaginary happiness in an imaginary world, lose their only opportunity of enjoying those present pleasures, of which others avail themselves; dooming themselves to grasp at shadows, while they neglect the substance, and harassed with a perpetual struggle against their natural propensities and passions, and all in vain!”
77
[Because, so soon as any community, or collection of persons, conclude a man to be wholly vicious in his course, and without any restraint of conscience, he is at once shorn of his influence, and will soon be stripped of all power of mischief. On the other hand, we see the might of virtue unarmed with power, in Luther, in Roger Williams, in Wm. Penn, and innumerable other instances.]
78
Isa. lx. 21.
79
P. 109.
80
P. 110, &c.
81
P. 111, &c.
82
P. 118, &c.
83
See this proof drawn out briefly, ch. vi.
84
[This chapter is one of many attempts to account for the mixture of suffering and enjoyment in this world; and demands close examination both of its theory and its arguments. The student may consult, as he has opportunity, Musæi Disput.: Holtzsfusii Disp. de Lapsu Prim. Hominum: Selden de Laps. Angelorum: Stapferi Inst.: Witsii Econom. Fœd.: Bate’s Harmony of the Divine Attrib.: Calcott on the Fall: Shuckford on the Creation of Man: Manton’s Sermons: South’s do.: Toplady’s do.: Pearson on the Creed: Le Clerc’s Diss.: Henly’s Dissert.: Kennicott on the Tree of Life: and Fabricius de Primo Peccato Angelorum Lapsorum.]
85
[The evils of life, are not to be regarded as entering, necessarily, into God’s plan of probation; and they are not here so presented. The Scriptures show that all suffering is either punitive, or castigatory. Man at first was to be tried by temptations, not by sufferings.]
86
Chap. ii.
87
See Sermons preached at the Rolle, 1726, 2d ed. p. 205, &c. Pref. p. 25, &c. Serm. p. 21, &c.
88
[“If we persist in our objection, notwithstanding these analogies, then should we conclude, either that we are under the regimen of an unrighteous Deity, or that there is no Deity at all.” – Dr. Chalmers.]
89
[Shall we be of such? Shall we forget or disregard the great fact that when death has transferred us to other conditions, we, our proper selves, will remain? No longer, indeed, united with flesh and blood, surrounded with houses, lands, business, or enjoyments, such as the present, but still ourselves. Still with wants to be supplied, desires to be gratified, and capacities to be employed and developed!]
90
Part II. chap. v.
91
[This is one of those passages, remarked on in our introduction, as a statement not properly explained or guarded. We cannot suppose the author, to have overlooked the great fact of man’s fall and corruption. That the argument properly considered, stands good, is the verdict of such a man as Chalmers. After speaking of human helplessness in matters of religion, he says, “There is nothing in this [helplessness] to break the analogies on which to found the negative vindication that forms the great and undoubted achievement of this volume. The analogy lies here: – that if a man wills to obtain prosperity in this life, he may, if observant of the rules which experience and wisdom prescribe, in general, make it good. And if he wills to attain blessedness in the next life, he shall, if observant of what religion prescribes, most certainly make it good; in conformity with the declaration, ‘he that seeketh findeth.’”]
92
[It comes to this: – good things, in this life, are not forced upon us; for we may refuse them, or turn any of them into evils. Nor are they offered for our mere acceptance: but only as the results of self-control and pains-taking. So is it, as to heaven.]
93
[They are an answer, but a cavil remains, – viz.: “the difference between temporal and eternal things, is so vast that the cases are not analogous.” Fairly considered, the cases are analogous, differing only in degree, and not at all in principle. What would be wrong on a great scale, is wrong on a small one.Perhaps the analogy may be pressed further. As the happiness and life of some animals, may be sacrificed for the benefit of man, why may not the happiness and life of some men, be sacrificed for the good of innumerable beings of a higher order, who witness the affairs of this earth? It would but be securing “the greatest good of the greatest number.” No analogies could teach this, for analogies of course teach nothing. But if the Scriptures contained this doctrine, immensely more repugnant than that which our author is here defending, would analogy offer repellant presumptions?]
94
[That is, the son of Sirac, who says, “All things are double, one against another; and He hath made nothing imperfect: one thing established the good of another:” Ecclesiasticus xlii. 24.]