History, Culture and Traditions of the Kazakh People

As historian N. Masanov notes, it was impossible to unite all the zhuzes in the Steppe into a single state, as the Kazakh nomadic society was too dispersed, with a population density of no more than 1—2 people per square kilometer. There were neither cities nor permanent centers of executive power. The nomadic way of life implied a minimal level of political centralization, with centrifugal tendencies predominating (Masanov, 2006).

An important achievement of Khan Tauke was the compilation of the code of laws «Zhety Zhargy» (The Seven Charters or Tauke Khan’s Code), which defined the key principles of law and order in Kazakh society, based on the ancient customs of the nomads (Nomads are nomadic tribes, nomadic peoples). The approximate period of its creation dates back to the 1670s.

By the 1670s, the Kazakhs had lost a significant portion of their nomadic territories in the Semirechye region and the northeastern part of the country, largely as a result of the expansion of Dzungar feudal lords into the Kazakh steppes. This incited unrest and sparked conflicts among the Kazakhs themselves over pasturelands. These developments necessitated the implementation of essential regulatory measures aimed at stabilizing the social order, as well as the mobilization of all available forces to ensure a unified defense against a formidable external enemy – the Dzungars (Dzungars (Oirats) are Western Mongolian tribes (Torgouts, Khoshouts, Derbets and Dzungars). The neighboring Turks called them Kalmyks. In the first half of the 17th century, these tribes formed a strong union – the Dzungar (Oirat) state. The Oirats, as part of the Mongolian super-ethnos, had the same traditions of nomadic statehood that Genghis Khan laid down for all Mongols), – against whom war had become inevitable (Klyashtorny, S.G. & Sultanov, T.I., 1992). One of these measures was the Code of Khan Tauke.

According to Kazakh legends, to compile it, Khan Tauke convened a council of three biys, which included Tole-biy from the Senior Zhuz, Kazybek-biy from the Middle Zhuz, and Aiteke-biy from the Junior Zhuz (Outstanding biys-judges Tolebiy, Kazybek-biy and Aitekebiy. They are depicted in close-up, with a proud posture, sitting in an oriental manner on a small elevation. One of them put his hand to his heart, another holds a half-bent right hand, open in front of himself, the third holds scrolls of letters. This monument symbolizes reason, wisdom, and also respect for the origins of Kazakh justice and its outstanding bearers). About these three outstanding steppe men, the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, academician N.A. Nazarbayev, said: «Much can be said about the glorious lives of these three great biys, about their deeds in the name of honor, dignity, and utmost devotion to the cause of the people, about their natural leadership talent, oratorical gift, and impeccable justice» (Zimanov, 2003).

Khan Tauke, after discussing the frequent conflicts among the Kazakhs with the three biys, drafted and enacted certain legal provisions. The Tauke Code stipulated responsibilities for crimes against persons, property offenses, and violations in the realm of family and marital relations, including ten types of punishments. It also mandated that every autumn, Kazakh elders gather for a one-month council to deliberate on public and state affairs. To govern the zhuzs, Khan Tauke persuaded the biys to select special leaders.

The internecine wars that began during the old age of Tauke were exploited by the neighbors of the Kazakhs. This further exacerbated the foreign policy situation of the KazakhKhanate: from the west, raids were carried out by the Volga Kalmyks and Yaik Cossacks, from the north – by the Siberian Cossacks, across the Yaik – by the Bashkirs, from the south – by the Bukharans and Khivans, but the main danger came from the east, from the Dzungar Khanate.

In the history of the Kazakhs, almost the entire 17th century and the first half of the 18th century were spent in the struggle against the Oirat. The Dzungar War was a pivotal event for the Kazakhs and a period of greatest national consolidation. Under the growing external threat, Khan Tauke showed interest in establishing more trusting economic and political relations with the Russian state. Thus, during his reign, Kazakh ambassadors were sent to the city of Tobolsk to establish trade relations with Russian merchants.

The complexity of the foreign policy situation of the Kazakh tribes and the real threat from neighboring opponents prompted Khans Kaip (the khan elected after the death of Tauke) and the Khan of the Junior Zhuz Abulkhair (1680—1748) in 1717 to appeal to Peter I with a request for acceptance of Russian subjects. However, this appeal yielded no results. According to one historical interpretation, Peter I, preoccupied with the war against Sweden and aware of internal unrest among the Kazakh clans, chose not to involve himself in the politics of the Kazakh Khanate (Brockhaus, 1895).

Meanwhile, during that difficult period, Russia’s intervention in the affairs of the Kazakh khanates was considered objectively inevitable. Wild nomadic tribes near the border periodically raided the weak neighboring settlements of Russia. Moreover, Peter the Great himself paid attention to the Kazakh state, as trade caravans passed through it, and the Russian emperor saw Kazakhstan as a gateway to Asian countries: «If that (the Kazakh, author’s note) horde does not wish to become subject to us, then I will try, despite the great expenses, to spend at least up to a million, but only in order to ensure that they are obligated to be under the protection of the Russian Empire with just one document… for that Kyrghyz-Kaisak horde… is indeed the key and gate to all Asian countries and lands; and for that reason, this horde needs to be under Russian protection, so that through them we can have communication in all countries and adopt measures beneficial to the Russian side (Bekmakhanov, 1957)».

At the beginning of the 18th century, Dzungar aggression intensified, and the struggle against them grew fiercer as the Oirats targeted the most sacred region for the Kazakhs – the Syr Darya region. This area contained the winter pastures of the three zhuzs and served as the spiritual and political capital of the Kazakhs – Turkestan (Domnin, 2011). In the period 1723 1727there were the most devastating invasions, imprinted in the people’s memory of the Kazakhs as Aktaban shubyryndy – “Years of Great Calamity”, when the capital cities of Turkestan, Tashkentand Sairam were captured by the Dzungars. The ruined groups of Kazakhs of the Senior Zhuz and a small part of the Middle Zhuz migrated to the region of Khujandand Samarkand. Kazakhs of the Junior Zhuz fled to Khiva and Bukhara. Some Kazakh clans migrated to the desert regions of Kyzylkumand Karakum. During the Years of Great Calamity, the Kazakhs lost the rich pastures of Semirechye, traditional migration routes were disrupted, trade and artisanal centers declined, and livestock numbers sharply decreased. This tragedy was reflected in the song” Elim – ai” (“My People”), which expresses the profound sorrow of the Kazakh nation. The weakening of the Kazakhs was exploited by other neighbors – the Volga Kalmyks, Cis-Ural Cossacks, Bashkirs, the Beks of Kokand, and, the Khans of Bukhara and Khiva – further worsening the situation.

One of the reasons that prompted the western Mongolian feudal lords to territorial conquests was the manifestation of a pasture crisis. The lack of land in the Oirat uluses was associated with population growth and a constant increase in livestock numbers. The Dzungars had an increasing need for light industrial goods, metallurgical products, and weapons, and they sought possible access to trade routes and markets (Umetbaev, 2008).

And as early as 1730, the Khan of the Junior Zhuz, Abulkhair, sent a petition to Empress Anna Ioannovna in St. Petersburg requesting acceptance of Russian citizenship. In response, the Russian government promptly dispatched its officials.

Some sources indicate that the Kazakh population received the news of the arrival of Russian officials with surprise, especially regarding their demand for an oath of allegiance to the Russian Tsar. This fact caused unrest among the Kazakhs (Brockhaus, 1895). Nevertheless, on October 10, 1731, Khan Abulkhair, along with several sultans and a small group of prominent biys and batyrs, took the oath of allegiance to the Russian Empire. This event took place in the interfluve of the Irgiz and Tobol rivers, in the Maytube tract. Abulkhair was the first to swear the oath, followed by his associates. As a token of loyalty to the Tsar’s throne, Abulkhair pledged to send hostages from among his sons to Russia. Together with Abulkhair, Khan Semeke (Sameke, Shemyak) of the Middle Zhuz and the northern clans of the Middle Zhuz also accepted Russian citizenship.

It should be noted that, in the context of that time, allegiance in Central Asia and the Caucasus was often viewed as a tactical measure. The oath of loyalty could be used to forge a military alliance (in this case, against the Dzungars) or to strengthen the internal position of a ruler who recognized the supreme authority of a powerful emperor (Golunov, 2005). The final incorporation of the main part of Kazakhstan – particularly the Middle and Senior Zhuzes – into Russia occurred later, in the first half of the 19th century.

Initially, after accepting the allegiance, Russia did not exert serious influence on the internal affairs of the Kazakh Khanate. Abulkhair, swearing loyalty to Russia, promised to guard the Russian borders and not to disturb the border Russian population, to pay yasak (Yasak (Mongolian zasag «power»; Tatar yasak – tax in kind, Bashkir yaһаҡ «tax, tax») – in Russia from the 15th to the beginning of the 20th centuries, a tax in kind from the peoples of Siberia and the North, mainly in furs) in the form of animal skins, to protect merchant caravans during their journey through the steppe, and, if necessary, to send his troops for their safety (Brockhaus, 1895).

In return, Khan Abulkhair asked for the establishment of eternal khanly dignity for his lineage, to be passed down through inheritance, and for the construction of a fortress to protect his borders. These conditions were met by Russia: a fortress was built at the mouth of the River Or to protect against the Dzungars (the modern city of Orsk in the Orenburg region, founded in 1735). For the next century, khans were elected only from Abulkhair’s lineage in the Junior Zhuz, even in cases where it contradicted the will of the steppe people. This circumstance was one of the reasons explaining the impossibility for Russia, despite all efforts, to subjugate the Steppe, which the Russian government nominally controlled for over a hundred years, as if acknowledging that the power of the khan was based not on its decision but on the right of primogeniture. The khans, lacking strong influence over their population, became more dependent on various clans.

Some sources assert that Abulkhair repeatedly took an oath of loyalty to Russia, which was linked to his violations of certain obligations to the tsarist administration. For instance, it was Abulkhair who, in December 1737, became the chief organizer of an invasion by more than 20,000 Kazakh troops into the then defenseless Kalmyk pastures, subjecting them to brutal plunder and destruction. More than two thousand people were captured as prisoners. At that time, as is known, the Russo-Turkish war was underway, and the Kalmyk army was on a campaign against the Turkish allies, the Kuban Cossacks, with whom the Kazakhs maintained secret ties. Essentially, Abulkhair was striking a blow to Russia’s back. Such events raised doubts among Russian officials about Abulkhair’s loyalty to his oath.

Despite his contradictory and ambiguous actions, as historian I. Yerofeeva notes, Khan Abulkhair possessed a unique intellectual gift, strong will, and grand strategic vision. Considering the significant achievements, he attained in both domestic and foreign policy, Abulkhair undoubtedly ranks among the most outstanding Kazakh rulers (Moiseev, 2000).

Abulkhair emerges as the main figure in the struggle against the Dzungars during the war of 1723—1730. He was the architect of Kazakhstan’s multivector foreign policy, which he pursued in the 1740s toward both Russia and the Dzungars. Facing resistance to his policy from the Orenburg governor I.I. Neplyuev, Abulkhair began sending embassies to various countries to seek citizenship. It is known, for example, that alongside Russian citizenship, he intended to accept Turkish citizenship as well, and to strengthen political ties by marrying his daughter to the Dzungar Khan, thereby establishing a political alliance (Domnin, 2011).

Khan Abulkhair was killed in 1748 as a result of a conspiracy organized by the Kazakh nobility led by Sultan Barak. Following Abulkhair’s death, the Russian government decided to appoint his son Nuraly as the Khan of the Junior Zhuz, which contradicted the established laws of the Steppe. The election of the new Khan violated the centuries-old Chingisids tradition and involved only a limited number of participants. According to Kazakh customs, the khan’s dignity was supposed to pass to one of the deceased’s brothers rather than to his sons. By a decree of Empress Elizabeth in 1749, Nuraly was confirmed as Khan and later swore allegiance to her. Thus, Nuraly became the first Kazakh Khan to effectively receive power from the Russian government. Strong opposition to his authority existed even within the Junior Zhuz, where Batyr Sultan, who possessed no less authority and influence than Abulkhair, claimed the khanate.

According to historian A. Ryazanov, Nuraly Khan had many enemies within the Horde and was unable to pursue an independent policy like his ancestors. He constantly feared losing his power and therefore sought support from the Russian government. The Tsarist administration supported Nuraly but demanded certain courses of action that often did not align with the interests of the nomads. By yielding to the government and implementing Russian policies, Khan Nuraly became essentially an official dependent on the treasury. The Khan developed a sense of irresponsibility typical of the Tsarist voivodes and began to abuse his authority. The scholar adds: «He was selfish and unjust; he oppressed and plundered the Kyrgyz clans hostile to his power and thus aroused hatred within the Horde. Living away from the Horde near the Russian borders, Nuraly lost all influence over the internal affairs of the Horde by the end of his long life» (Taimasov, 2009).

The incorporation of the Senior and Middle Zhuzes into Russia extended over many years. However, the integration of Kazakhstan into the Russian Empire was primarily achieved through diplomatic means, although military methods were also employed (Syzdykova, 2012).

Soon, in 1738, Khan Semeke died in the Middle Zhuz. According to steppe custom, the khan’s title was inherited by Kuchuk Khan’s son, Abulmambet Sultan, while the military leadership passed to the influential Sultan Abylai. Shortly thereafter, in 1740, Abulmambet Khan and Abylai arrived in Orenburg and concluded a treaty establishing the Russian Empire’s protectorate over the Middle Zhuz (Nurbaev, 2007b). The final voluntary accession of the Middle Zhuz’s population to Russia occurred only in the mid-19th century (Bekmakhanov, 1957).

After the death of Abulmambet (presumably in 1769 or 1771), Abylai was elected khan of the Middle Zhuz (Shalgimbekov, 2014). Under his rule were the vast majority of the Middle Zhuz tribes, except for the Kipchak clans and part of the Naiman, as well as most of the Senior Zhuz clans (Domnin, 2011). Abylai’s efforts to strengthen the southern borders of the country contributed to the consolidation of his authority in the Senior Zhuz.

Before the Qing Empire’s conquest of Dzungaria in 1758 (Umetbaev, 2008), Abylai maintained his independence by skillfully exploiting the conflict between the Oirats and China. After the conquest, he acknowledged the Chinese emperor as his sovereign. Upon the accession of Catherine II to the throne, Abylai swore allegiance to the Empress, while simultaneously remaining a subject of China. Following Abylai’s death (circa 1780—1781), a political crisis erupted in the territories of the Middle and Senior Zhuzes, leading to the disintegration of the Kazakh Khanate’s political system and the loss of its independence. Prior to its incorporation into Russia, the territory of the Senior Zhuz was divided into separate patrimonial clans headed by sultans – descendants of Khan Abylai. The existence of fragmented holdings and frequent internal conflicts within the Senior Zhuz resulted in the devastation of the Kazakh population.

The main regions of Semirechye and Southern Kazakhstan remained outside the influence of the Russian Empire until the second half of the 19th century. Consequently, by the early 19th century, a significant portion of the Senior Zhuz fell under the control of Kokand ruler Alim Khan. Due to its territorial and political fragmentation, the Senior Zhuz was powerless to organize resistance against the khans of Kokand and feudal China. Devastating wars and severe oppression by the Kokand beks – who compelled the Kazakhs to pay the zyaket (or the zakat – a tax levied on Muslims) – were among the principal reasons for the voluntary accession of the Senior Zhuz population to Russia. Thus, in 1818, the Senior Zhuz petitioned to be accepted as subjects of the Russian Empire. The imperial government considered the request of the Kazakh clans of the Senior Zhuz on January 18, 1819, and officially proclaimed the Kazakhs of this Zhuz as voluntary subjects of Russia. The first to accept Russian subjecthood were the Wusun, Zhalayir, and their branches, followed by the Abdan, Suvan, Shapyrashty, Ysty, Oshakty, Kangly, and other clans (Bekmakhanov, 1957).

At that time, for the countries of Central Asia, including Kazakhstan, the potential threat posed by China was incomparable to the threat from Dzungaria. The Manchu-Chinese forces, having crushed the Dzungar state, carried out a massive massacre, physically exterminating the majority of the Oirats. This event profoundly shocked the peoples of Central Asia, turning their eyes towards Russia as a natural ally. Moreover, the Russian Empire effectively demonstrated its power in the region when, under the threat of military intervention, it compelled Iran – which had seized parts of Central Asia in the first half of the 18th century – to abandon its plans to invade the Kazakh steppes. The threat of Kazakhstan and Central Asia being absorbed by China was very real and could only be countered by Russia’s strength. Based on the theory of the «lesser evil,» subjugation to the Russian Empire under those historical conditions was preferable, as Russia was, at that time, a more advanced power compared to China. Ultimately, in the 18th century, Kazakhstan’s incorporation into Russia was historically inevitable and was only a matter of time (Syzdykova, 2012).

In that historical era, the key events in the development of Kazakhstan were not limited solely to the issue of joining the Russian Empire. A tragic chapter in Kazakh history was marked by the bloody battle with the Volga Kalmyks in 1771, which brought great suffering to both peoples. The Volga Kalmyks were part of the Western Mongols – Oirats – who migrated to the banks of the Volga in the early 17th century. The increasing policies of Tsarism restricted the rights of the Kalmyk population. There was a pronounced shortage of pasture lands. Each year, the Kalmyks were required to send combat detachments to the Russian army, many of whom perished in Russia’s numerous wars. Additionally, part of the Kalmyk population was subjected to Christianization policies.

After the defeat of the Dzungarian state by China, the Volga Kalmyks attempted to return to their historical homeland. In January 1771, the Kalmyks, presumably numbering more than 100 thousand people, attempted to migrate to Chinese territory (Vishnyakova, n.d.). Those Kalmyks who were unable to move to the left bank due to thin ice following an early thaw remained on the right bank of the Volga. The route of the Kalmyk nomads passed through the territory of Kazakhstan. The actions of the Kalmyk settlers were not part of the plans of the tsarist regime, since they caused losses of subjects, and also served as an undesirable example for other peoples of the region. Therefore, the Russian authorities decided to return them. The Yaik and Orenburg Cossacks refused the Russian government’s offer to persecute the Kalmyks. Then the Orenburg governor decided to turn to the Kazakhs. Knowing about the traditional Kazakh-Kalmyk conflicts, Russian officials informed the Kazakhs about the approach of the Kalmyks (Mukataev, 2001). The Kazakhs were given the right to fight the Kalmyks on behalf of the Russian government, and they were also given the opportunity to keep all the spoils for themselves, provided that the Kalmyks returned to their former nomadic camps. The Kazakhs took advantage of the offer, hoping to retaliate against the Kalmyks for their raids during the Great Calamity, when the Kazakhs were forced to cede their lands under pressure from the Oirats. All three zhuzes took part in the battles with the Kalmyks.

Major battles between the Kazakhs and the Kalmyks took place on the banks of the Emba River and along the shores of Lake Balkhash. The Kalmyks made an attempt to halt on the banks of the Moiynty River, where they were surrounded by the Kazakh militia led by Abylai. The final blow to the Kalmyks was dealt by the Kyrgyz. This event in the history of the Kazakhs is known as «Shandy Zhorik’ («Dusty Campaign’). At that time, only a small part of the resettled Kalmyks made it to Dzhungaria, losing almost all their possessions. This war brought much hardship, grief, and suffering to both peoples.

In general, the history of Kazakh-Dzungar confrontation developed with varying success for both sides and was sometimes replaced by peaceful coexistence. Continuous wars between the Dzungar Khanate and the Qing Empire, dynastic disputes, frequent epidemics, and natural disasters within the Oirat uluses compelled Dzungar rulers to pause their military campaigns and conclude truces with the Kazakhs. Similar situations often arose within the Kazakh Khanate as well. In practice, this was manifested through exchanges of embassies, gifts, and services; the expansion of mutual barter trade; and support by leaders of both peoples in internal conflicts. Occasionally, the Dzungars provided political asylum to disgraced Kazakh khans and sultans. Relations and contacts between the two nations were sometimes marked by Kazakh-Dzungar intermarriages among young people and the practice of adoption, where heads of Oirat and Kazakh families would adopt young children of the opposite sex from each other (Masanov, N.E., Abylkhozhin, Zh. B. & Erofeeva, I.V., 2007).

When the Pugachev Rebellion began (1773—1775), many Kazakhs under Russian rule became actively involved in the uprising. After part of the Kazakh population of the Junior and Middle Zhuzes accepted Russian allegiance, tensions in the border regions adjacent to Russia significantly intensified. The root of the Kazakh-Russian conflicts was primarily related to land issues.

Firstly, the steppe dwellers lacked pastureland for grazing. After the Kazakhs accepted Russian allegiance, the Tsarist administration immediately imposed restrictions on their nomadic movement within their territories and near the border line.

Secondly, following the events of 1771, Kazakhs of the Junior Zhuz claimed the former Kalmyk pastures, but Russian authorities refused their resettlement on these lands.

Thirdly, the Kazakh population was unwilling to accept the construction of military fortifications on their lands, which also significantly disrupted traditional nomadic routes.

Fourthly, during 1752—1755, Russia captured the Novoishimsky territories, formerly inhabited by Kazakhs of the Middle Zhuz, where they used to roam.

As noted by specialists, the core of the emerging contradictions between the Kazakh and Russian sides lay in differing interpretations of allegiance. Through their oaths of loyalty, steppe rulers hoped to secure military support from Russia to maintain internal order and defend against external invasions, in exchange for ensuring the safety of trade caravans and Russian border settlements. In autocratic Russia, a strict hierarchy of power was maintained, where governance required the subordination of all lower levels. When these two principles came into conflict, popular uprising movements and liberation struggles ensued (Domnin, 2011).