The Campaign of Königgrätz

THE INVASION OF SAXONY, AND ITS RESULTS

In the meantime the main armies had not been idle. The invasion of Saxony was begun on the 16th of June by the Army of the Elbe and the First Army. On the night of the 15th of June the Saxon army began its retreat to Bohemia, detachments of pioneers tearing up the railroad track between Rieza and Dresden, and between the latter city and Bautzen. The work of destruction, except the burning of the bridge at Rieza, was hurriedly and imperfectly done, and did not appreciably delay the Prussian advance. The Army of the Elbe advanced from Torgau, via Wurzen, Dahlen and Strehla; a division to each road, and a detachment from the right division moving via Ostrau and Dobeln to cover the right flank. The First Army advanced from the neighborhood of Görlitz, through Löbau and Bautzen, a strong detachment being sent out on the Zittau road, beyond Ostritz, to observe the passes of Reichenberg and Gabel, for the army was making a flank march, and the Austrians might attack through these passes. A cavalry detachment was pushed out through Bischofswerda to feel the left of the Army of the Elbe.

On the 18th of June the Army of the Elbe occupied Dresden, and pushed its outposts beyond the city as far as Lockwitz and Pillnitz. On the following day the junction of the two armies was perfected. The 1st Reserve Division was sent from Berlin to reinforce Herwarth Von Bittenfeld, and the combined forces of the Army of the Elbe and the First Army were placed under the command of Prince Frederick Charles. To guard against a possible invasion of Saxony by the Bavarians, measures were at once taken to fortify Dresden, which was occupied by the 2nd Reserve Division from Berlin; Leipsic and Chemnitz were occupied by Landwehr; and the Leipsic-Plauen railway beyond Werdau was destroyed.

On the 17th of June the Emperor of Austria issued a manifesto, in which he formally announced to his subjects the state of war existing between Austria and Prussia. Italy declared war against Austria three days later.

We can now see the immense results following from the thorough military preparation of Prussia. Launching, as it were, a thunderbolt of military force upon her enemies at the first moment of war, less than two weeks sufficed for the complete conquest of Hanover, Hesse-Cassel and Saxony. Indeed, four days had sufficed for the seizure of the last two. The King of Hanover had been dethroned; the Elector of Hesse-Cassel was a prisoner, and the King of Saxony was a fugitive with his army in Bohemia. The military results were even greater than the political consequences. The severed portions of the Prussian kingdom were united. The Hanoverian army had been eliminated from the military problem, and there was no longer any menace to Prussia from the rear. Von Falckenstein was now free to turn his undivided attention to the Bavarians and the Federal Corps, and the occupation of Saxony prevented all possibility of a junction of the Bavarian and Saxon armies. But the strategical advantages gained in regard to operations in Bohemia were the grandest result of the occupation of Saxony.

We have seen that on the 14th of June the Army of the Elbe was around Torgau, the First Army near Görlitz; and the Second Army in the vicinity of Neisse; being thus separated from each other by from 100 to 125 miles. The Second Army covered Breslau, the Army of the Elbe covered Berlin, and the First Army was in a position to support either of the others. Geographical circumstances thus compelled the separation of the Prussian armies, and only two of them were available for the invasion of Bohemia. The occupation of Saxony changed matters for the better. The distance between the Army of the Elbe and the First Army was reduced to the extent of actual junction, and these combined armies were only about 120 miles from Landshut, where the right of the Second Army now rested, and with which there was communication by means of the hill road of Schreiberschau. The entire force was now available for the invasion of Bohemia; the northern passes of the Bohemian frontier were secured; and if compelled to act upon the defensive, Frederick Charles could find in the mountains of Southern Saxony many advantageous positions for defensive battle.

The Prussian plan of operations required an advance of Frederick Charles’ armies from Saxony into Bohemia, and an invasion of that province by the Second Army, advancing from Silesia; both armies to unite at Gitschin, or in its vicinity. It is clear that in thus advancing from divergent bases, the Prussians gave to their adversary the advantage of operating by interior lines; generally a serious military error, as the general operating by interior lines, holding one of the opponent’s armies by a containing force, and falling with superior numbers upon the other, may defeat both in succession. Von Moltke’s plan was, however, sound and proper, for the following reasons:

1. The geographical configuration of the Prussian frontier compelled the separation of the Prussian armies, in order that Lusatia and Silesia might both be protected from Austrian invasion; and the only possible concentration that would not yield to the enemy the advantage of the initiative, and permit him to invade Prussia, was a concentration to the front, in the hostile territory.

2. The entire army “could not have advanced in effective order by one set of mountain roads, but would have extended in columns so lengthened that it would have been impossible to form to a front commensurate with its numbers.”

3. The re-entering base of the Prussians would enable each of their armies to cover its communications with its base, while one of these armies would surely menace the communications of the Austrians, if Von Benedek should advance against either.

4. The certainty that the Prussian armies could act with celerity, and the probability that the Austrian army was not yet fully prepared for prompt offensive maneuvers, justified the hope that the concentration might be effected at a point some distance in front of the enemy’s line. The distance from Görlitz and Neisse to Gitschin was less than the distance from Olmütz, Brünn and Bömisch Trübau to the same point, and there was an excellent prospect of being able to concentrate before Von Benedek could get his army well in hand to strike the Prussian armies separately.

5. By keeping up telegraphic communication between the two separated armies, their co-operation and simultaneous action could be assured.

6. If the Prussians could reach the Iser and the Elbe without serious check, the contracted theatre of operations would render Von Benedek’s interior position one of danger, rather than one of advantage. Von Moltke himself, in commenting upon his strategical combination, says: “If it is advantageous for a general to place his army on an interior line of operation, it is necessary, in order that he may profit by it, to have sufficient space to enable him to move against one of his adversaries at a distance of several days’ march, and to have time enough then to return against the other. If this space is very contracted, he will run the risk of having both adversaries on his hands at once. When an army, on the field of battle, is attacked in front and on the flank, it avails nothing that it is on an interior line of operations. That which was a strategical advantage becomes a tactical disadvantage. If the Prussians were allowed to advance to the Iser and to the Elbe, if the several defiles which it was necessary to pass fell into their power, it is evident that it would be extremely perilous to advance between their two armies. In attacking one, the risk would be incurred of being attacked in rear by the other.” The combination, on the field of battle, of the two armies operating from divergent bases, would admit of just such a front and flank attack as would convert Von Benedek’s strategical advantage into a serious tactical disadvantage. It would be a repetition of Waterloo.

7. A failure to unite before encountering the main force of the enemy, though unfortunate, would not necessarily have been disastrous. According to Jomini, the advantages of an interior position diminish as the armies operating increase in size; for the following reasons:

(a). “Considering the difficulty of finding ground and time necessary to bring a very large force into action on the day of the battle, an army of 130,000 or 140,000 men may easily resist a much larger force.

(b). “If driven from the field, there will be at least 100,000 men to protect and insure an orderly retreat and effect a junction with one of the other armies.

(c). “The central army … requires such a quantity of provisions, munitions, horses and materiel of every kind, that it will possess less mobility and facility in shifting its efforts from one part of the zone to another; to say nothing of the impossibility of obtaining provisions from a region too restricted to support such numbers.

(d). “The bodies of observation detached from the central mass to hold in check two armies of 135,000 men each must be very strong (from 80,000 to 90,000 each); and, being of such magnitude, if they are drawn into a serious engagement, they will probably suffer reverses, the effect of which might outweigh the advantages gained by the principal army.”

Finally, the increased defensive power given to infantry by the introduction of breech-loading rifles might be counted upon to increase greatly the probability of either of the Prussian armies being able to fight successfully a purely defensive battle against the entire army of Von Benedek, armed, as it was, with muzzle-loaders.

In view of these reasons, Von Moltke’s strategy was not only justifiable, but perfect. The Prussian objective was the Austrian army, wherever it might be.

Before the commencement of hostilities Von Benedek had, as we have seen, announced his intention of invading Prussia. Two routes offered themselves to his choice: one by way of Görlitz and Bautzen to Berlin; the other by way of the valley of the Oder into Silesia. The latter route was obstructed by the fortresses of Glatz, Neisse and Kosel; the former would have led to the unobstructed occupation of Saxony, and would have enabled the Bavarian army to concentrate, via the passes of the Saale and Wittenberg, with the Austrians and Saxons. But, at a time when minutes were worth millions, Von Benedek was slow; and the preparation and energy of the Prussians enabled them to take the initiative and throw the Austrians upon the defensive in Bohemia. Von Benedek then decided to concentrate his army in the vicinity of Josephstadt and Königinhof; to hold the strong defiles of the Iser or the Elbe with comparatively weak detachments, and throw his main army upon the Crown Prince or Frederick Charles, as circumstances might decide.

Von Benedek’s concentration began on the 18th of June; and on the 25th his army stood as follows:

The Ist Corps, with one brigade of the IIIrd Corps and a cavalry division, on the left bank of the Iser, from Turnau, through Müchengrätz to Jung Buntzlau, where the retreating Saxons formed on the left.

The Xth Corps, with one cavalry division, at Jaromir.

The IVth Corps at Opocno.

The VIth Corps at Solnitz.

The IIIrd Corps on the left of the VIth, at Tynist.

The VIIIth Corps at Wamberg.

The IId Corps at Geyersberg.

Four cavalry divisions were at Gabel, Leitomischel, Abtsdorf and Policzka, respectively.

The force on the Iser, under Count Clam-Gallas, was thus opposed to the entire army of Frederick Charles; while Von Benedek confronted the Crown Prince with six corps. The Austrian line extended beyond Gitschin, the point at which the Prussian armies were to concentrate.

THE INVASION OF BOHEMIA

It was now certain that Bohemia was to be the theater of war. This province of the Austrian Empire may be described as a huge basin, whose rim is composed of mountains. It is separated from Silesia by the Riesengebirge (Giant Mountains), from Saxony by the Erzgebirge (Iron Mountains), from Moravia by the Moravian Hills, and from Bavaria by the Fichtelgebirge and the Böhmerwald; the Moravian Hills and the Böhmerwald separating it from the valley of the Danube. This great basin is drained by the Elbe river, which, rising in the Riesengebirge, makes a huge loop, flowing first south, then west, and finally north, and receives the waters of the Iser, Adler, Moldau and Eger rivers before it issues forth from the Bohemian frontier into Saxony. This theater is well suited to defensive operations, as the mountain frontiers are penetrated by few passes, and the forests and rivers constitute additional obstacles. On the Silesian frontier the only issues by which an invader can enter Bohemia are the passes of Trautenau, Eypel, Kosteletz, Nachod and Neustadt. These passes could all be easily defended, while on the Saxon frontier the passes of Reichenberg, Gabel and Königstein-Tetschen could be used by retarding forces, which could afterwards find a strong defensive line on the Iser.

No. 2.

1st. ARMY ON 22ND., 23RD. & 24TH. JUNE.

Two railway lines lay in the theater of war, and were of great importance to the contending armies. One line ran from Vienna, via Kosel, Breslau and Görlitz, to Dresden. The other connected the Austrian capital with Prague, via Olmütz (or Brünn) and Bömisch Trübau. The two lines were joined by a railway from Dresden to Prague, and by one which, running from Löbau to Turnau, branched from the latter point to Prague and Pardubitz. These railways connected with others leading to all the important cities of Prussia. The two Prussian armies could cover their railway communications while advancing; but the Prague-Olmütz line, which was of vital importance to the Austrian army, ran parallel to, and dangerously near, the Silesian frontier, and was not covered by the Austrian front during the operations in Bohemia.

The Prussian advance began on the 20th of June. The Army of the Elbe marched from the vicinity of Dresden, via Stolpen, Neustadt, Schluckenau and Rumburg, to Gabel. As the greater part of this march had to be made by one road, it required six days, though the distance was only 65 miles. The First Army had concentrated at Zittau, Herrnhut, Hirschfelde, Seidenberg and Marklissa. From these points it began its march on the 22d of June, each division marching by a separate road; and on the 25th it was closely concentrated around Reichenberg. The entire Prussian front was now reduced to about 100 miles, and Herwarth Von Bittenfeld was only twelve miles from Frederick Charles.

It would have been dangerous in the extreme for the Crown Prince to begin his march while Von Benedek held six corps in hand to hurl upon him. The passage of the Second Army through the defiles depended on surprise; and in the face of a superior and concentrated army, it would have been a desperate undertaking. It was necessary, therefore, to distract the plans of the enemy by false maneuvers, and to wait for Frederick Charles to menace the Austrian left, on the Iser, before beginning the forward movement with the Second Army. With these objects in view, the VIth Corps was ordered to push forward towards Olmütz, and Frederick Charles received the following instructions from Von Moltke: “Since the difficult task of debouching from the mountains falls upon the Second, weaker, Army, so, as soon as the junction with Herwarth’s corps is effected, the First Army must, by its rapid advance, shorten the crisis.” The VIth Corps moved from Neisse into the Austrian dominions as far as Freiwaldau, where its advanced-guard had a successful skirmish with a party of Austrian cavalry. This corps was supposed by the Austrians to be the advanced-guard of the Crown Prince’s army marching upon Olmütz; and the demonstration had the effect of holding a large force of Austrians between Hohenmauth and Bömisch Trübau, where it could not be used to oppose the real advance of the Second Army.

The Crown Prince’s army was to move as follows:

The Ist Corps3 via Liebau and Trautenau, to Arnau;

The Guards, via Neurode, Braunau, Eypel, to Königinhof;

The Vth Corps, via Glatz, Reinerz, Nachod, to Gradlitz;

The cavalry, from Waldenburg, via Trautenau, to Königinhof.

No. 1.

PROPOSED ADVANCE OF 2ND. ARMY FROM 25TH. TO 28TH. JUNE.

No. 3.

POSITION OF BOTH ARMIES ON THE EVENING OF THE 25TH. JUNE.

The VIth Corps, having made the diversion to Freiwaldau, was withdrawn to Glatz and Patschkau, from which points it was to follow the Vth. A corps of observation, consisting of two regiments of infantry, one of cavalry, and a light battery, was detached at Ratibor to make demonstrations against Austrian Silesia. In case this detachment should encounter a large force of the enemy, it was to fall back upon the fortress of Kosel. During the campaign an unimportant war of detachments was carried on in this region, generally to the advantage of the Prussians.

JUNE 26TH

On the 26th of June the Army of the Elbe marched upon Niemes and Oschitz. The advanced-guard encountered an Austrian outpost near Hühnerwasser, and drove it back after a sharp skirmish. The main body of the Army of the Elbe bivouacked at Hühnerwasser, with outposts towards Weisswasser, Münchengrätz and Gablonz. In the evening there was another brisk outpost fight in the direction of Münchengrätz, in which the Austrians were again worsted.

In the First Army the advance on this day was begun by General Von Horn, whose division had held the outposts the night before. At Liebenau Von Horn struck the Austrians, whose force consisted of a small body of infantry, four regiments of cavalry and two batteries of horse artillery. Driven out of the village, and from the field where they next made a stand, the Austrians retreated across the Iser, via Turnau, to Podol. The First Army now occupied a position extending through Reichenberg, Gablonz, Liebenau and Turnau; Von Horn’s division extending down the Iser from Turnau, with outposts near Podol. Free communication—in fact a junction—was now established with the Army of the Elbe, one division of which occupied Bömisch Aicha.

An attempt made by a company of Prussian riflemen to seize the bridges at Podol, about dusk in the evening, brought on a sharp fight. The forces on each side were reinforced until parts of two Prussian and two Austrian brigades were engaged. A stubborn infantry battle was carried on by moonlight until 1 o’clock in the morning, when the Austrians retreated towards Münchengrätz. By this victory the Prussians secured the passage of the Iser at Podol; the shortest line to Gitschin was opened to them; the communications of Count Clam-Gallas with the main army were threatened; and a plan which he had formed to riposte upon the Prussians at Turnau was thwarted.

We will now turn to the Second Army. On this day the Ist Corps concentrated at Liebau and Schomberg, ready to cross the frontier. The Vth Corps was at Reinerz, about twenty miles from the Ist. The Guard Corps, which had just crossed the frontier, in front of Neurode, midway between the two corps, was in a position to support either. The VIth Corps was at Landeck and Glatz, part of its cavalry being sent forward to cover the left of the Vth Corps and maintain communication between the two. After passing the mountains, the entire army, pivoted on Nachod and Skalitz, was to wheel to the left, seize the Josephstadt-Turnau railway, and form a junction along that line with the armies of Frederick Charles. On the evening of the 26th, the advanced-guard of the Vth Corps occupied Nachod. The distance between the Crown Prince and Frederick Charles had now been reduced to about fifty miles, while the distance between the extreme corps of the Austrian army was about the same. Von Benedek’s strategical advantages were already beginning to disappear. The Prussian demonstrations towards Olmütz had caused the Austrian IId Corps to be retained dangerously far to the right; Count Clam-Gallas was struggling against superior numbers on the Iser, and Von Benedek had only four corps with which he could immediately oppose the four corps of the Crown Prince.

No. 4.

POSITION OF BOTH ARMIES ON THE EVENING OF THE 26TH. JUNE.

The Austrian commander ordered the following movements for the next day: