The Campaign of Königgrätz

APPENDIX I.

THE PRUSSIAN ADVANCE FROM KÖNIGGRÄTZ TO THE DANUBE

The day after the battle of Königgrätz was occupied by the Prussians in resting their fatigued troops, and in separating the mingled corps and detachments of the different armies. Late in the afternoon the first movements in advance began.

The fortresses of Josephstadt and Königgrätz were still in the hands of the Austrians. They were well garrisoned, and could only be taken by siege. Both were summoned to surrender, and both refused. These fortresses were of the greatest importance, as they commanded the line of railway on which the Prussians depended for supplies, and controlled the passage of the Elbe in the vicinity of the battle field. Strong detachments were, therefore, left to mask the fortresses, and on the 5th of July the Prussian armies marched to Pardubitz and Przelautsch, at which points they crossed the Elbe. A division of Landwehr was sent to Prague, which city surrendered, without resistance, on the 8th of July. The Prussians were thus able to open communications with the rear by rail, via Pardubitz, Prague, Turnau and Reichenberg, in spite of the fortresses of Theresienstadt, Königgrätz and Josephstadt.

After the battle of Königgrätz all touch with the Austrians had been lost, and for three days the Prussians were completely in the dark as to the direction taken by the retreating army. On July 6th it was learned that Von Benedek, with the greater portion of his army, had retreated upon Olmütz.

After the battle two lines of retreat were open to Von Benedek. It was desirable to retreat upon Vienna, for the double purpose of protecting the city, and effecting a junction with the victorious troops, withdrawn from Italy for the defense of the capital.24 But Vienna was 135 miles distant; the army had been heavily defeated; and there was danger that a retreat of such a distance would degenerate into a demoralized rout. Olmütz was only half as far away; its fortress would afford the necessary protection for reorganizing and resting the army; and its position on the flank of the Prussians would be a serious menace to their communications, in case of their advance on Vienna. Von Benedek, therefore, retreated upon Olmütz, sending the Xth Corps by rail to Vienna, and the greater part of his cavalry by ordinary roads to the same point.

The situation was now favorable to Von Moltke. He had the advantage of interior lines, and he did not hesitate to make use of them. Yet the problem was by no means devoid of difficulties. The Austrian army at Olmütz was still formidable in numbers; the extent of its demoralization was not known; the Austrian troops had a high reputation for efficiency, and for a capacity to present an undaunted front after a defeat; and it was thought possible that Von Benedek might assume the offensive. To leave such a formidable army unopposed on his flank was not to be thought of; yet it was desirable to reach Vienna before the arrival at that city of the troops recalled from Italy, or, at any rate, before a considerable army could be concentrated for the defense of the capital. A division of the Prussian forces was, therefore, necessary. The Army of the Elbe and the First Army were directed upon Vienna: the former to move via Iglau and Znaym; the latter, via Brünn. The Crown Prince was directed upon Olmütz to watch Von Benedek. There were three courses open to the Austrian commander: 1. To attack the flank of the First Army, between Olmütz and Vienna; 2. To withdraw rapidly to the capital; 3. To attack the Crown Prince. In the first case, the First Army would be supported by the Army of the Elbe, and the combined forces would be able to take care of themselves. In the second case, the Crown Prince was to attack the retiring army and harass its march. In the third case, the Crown Prince, who, though inferior in numbers, was superior in morale, might be more than a match for the Austrians. In case of defeat, however, he was to retreat into Silesia, where he would have the support of the Prussian fortresses; while Von Moltke, freed from Von Benedek, could seize the Austrian capital and command peace.

On July 7th the cavalry of the Second Army recovered touch with the Austrians, and there was some skirmishing with their rear guards.

On July 8th the Austrian government made overtures for an armistice of not less than eight weeks, nor more than three months; as a condition to which the fortresses of Königgrätz and Josephstadt were to be surrendered. The proposition was rejected by the Prussians, who continued to advance.

Von Benedek was relieved from the chief command of the Austrian army, being superseded by Archduke Albrecht, who had won the victory of Custozza over the Italians. Von Benedek retained command, however, until the arrival of his army on the Danube. The Austrians were now straining every nerve to assemble an army at Vienna. Leaving only one corps and one division in Italy, the Archduke’s army had been recalled from Venetia, and was proceeding, by rail and by forced marches, to the Danube.

On the 11th of July Von Benedek’s army was ordered to Vienna. This army, after a continuous retreat of eight days duration, had just completed its concentration at Olmütz; but the movement to Vienna was begun without delay, the IIId Corps being sent on the day the order was received. The withdrawal of the army from Olmütz to Vienna was not an easy operation. The railway was, as yet, beyond the reach of the Prussians; but the aid that it could lend was not great. It was estimated that the withdrawal of the entire army by the single line of railway would require a full month. Part of the troops were, accordingly, hurried on by rail, and the bulk of the army was ordered to march by the valley of the March to Pressburg. This was the most direct route, and the one which offered the best roads for marching, though by taking this line the Austrian army would expose a flank to the attack of the Prussians. Above all things, celerity was necessary, in order that the march might be completed without fatal interruption. Von Benedek’s army marched in three echelons. The first, composed of the IId and IVth Corps, with the greater part of the Saxon cavalry, started on the 14th of July. The second, consisting of the VIIIth and Ist Corps, left the next day; and the third, made up of the VIth Corps and the Saxons, followed on the 16th.

The Austrian cavalry presented a bold front to the Prussian armies moving on Vienna, and a sharp action was fought at Tischnowitz, on the 11th of July, between the cavalry of Frederick Charles’ advanced-guard and a division of Austrian lancers, resulting in the defeat of the latter. On the 12th Frederick Charles took possession of Brünn without resistance. The next day, after some skirmishing with the Austrian cavalry, the Army of the Elbe occupied Znaym.

After a rest of two days, the Army of the Elbe and the First Army continued their march towards the Danube; the former being directed towards Krems, the latter moving via Nikolsburg.

The Austrian troops from Italy began to arrive at Vienna on the 14th of July. In the meantime, the Crown Prince, hearing of Von Benedek’s withdrawal from Olmütz, directed his march on Prerau, and, on the 14th, reached Prosnitz, about twelve miles south of Olmütz. The first Austrian echelon, marching by the right bank of the March, just escaped serious collision with the Crown Prince, the cavalry of the Second Army skirmishing with the Saxon cavalry, and becoming engaged with a battalion of infantry on the flank of the Austrian IId Corps.

On the following day Von Bonin, with the Ist Corps and Von Hartmann’s cavalry division, attacked the second echelon of Von Benedek’s army, and defeated it in the actions of Tobitschau and Rokienitz. As a result of these actions, the right bank of the March was no longer available for the Austrian retreat. Von Benedek had, however, succeeded in slipping away from the Crown Prince, though at the expense of losing his best and most direct road to Vienna.

Learning that large bodies of Austrians had been seen moving south from Olmütz for some days, Von Moltke saw at once that it would be impossible to bar Von Benedek’s path with the Second Army, and immediately ordered the First Army to Lundenburg. The railway and telegraph at Göding were cut by a detachment of Prussian cavalry, on the 15th, and Frederick Charles occupied Lundenburg the next day.

This was a severe blow to Von Benedek, for he thus lost his railway communication with Vienna, his march by the valley of the March was headed by the Prussians, and he was compelled to make a detour by crossing the Carpathian mountains and following the valley of the Waag. To compensate, as far as possible, for the loss of the shorter road, Von Benedek hastened his troops by forced marches. Von Moltke did not deem it prudent to send the Second Army after Von Benedek into the valley of the Waag, as communication between the Crown Prince and Frederick Charles would thus be lost, and it was now desirable to concentrate rather than separate. It was accordingly determined to push forward with all available troops to the Danube. The Crown Prince had already seen the impossibility of thwarting Von Benedek’s retreat, and, as early as the 15th, had left the Ist Corps to mask Olmütz, had directed the Vth Corps and a cavalry division to follow on the flank of Von Benedek, and had pushed forward with the rest of his army upon Brünn, where he arrived on the 17th. On the same day the Army of the Elbe and the First Army were in the neighborhood of Nikolsburg.

On the 19th the heads of the Prussian armies were within less than two days’ march of the Austrian capital, but part of the Prussian forces were as far back as Brünn. Von Moltke did not know, to a certainty, how much of Von Benedek’s army had been brought back from Olmütz before the obstruction of the railway. A large part of it might already be in his front; he knew that large bodies of troops had come in from Italy; the fortifications of Florisdorf were extensive; and it seemed possible that the Austrians might, by a last great effort, have assembled an army large enough to enable them to push forward from Florisdorf, to deliver battle on the Marchfeld for the defense of their capital. With the double object of preparing to attack and being in readiness to receive an attack, Von Moltke ordered the Army of the Elbe to Wolkersdorf, the First Army to Wagram, and the Second Army in reserve at Schönkirchen. The Prussian army was thus concentrated behind the Russbach, in position to meet an attack of 150,000 Austrians from Florisdorf; to reconnoiter and attack the Florisdorf entrenchments; or to leave a corps of observation in front of them and push to the left and seize Pressburg. The Second Army, with the exception of the Vth Corps, was to be in position to support the other two by the 21st. The Vth Corps was to be hurried up as rapidly as possible, in order that the entire army might be concentrated for a decisive battle.

The only troops of Von Benedek’s army which had reached Vienna by the 20th were the Xth and IIId Corps, part of the Saxons, and four cavalry divisions, numbering altogether from 55,000 to 60,000 men. The reinforcements from Italy which had arrived at the capital numbered about 50,000 men.

Although the occupation of Pressburg was absolutely necessary to secure the prompt junction of the divided Austrian armies, that important point was held by only a single brigade. As soon as the Austrian IId Corps had reached Tyrnau, its leading brigade was pushed forward rapidly, in country carts, to reinforce the brigade at Pressburg, and the rest of the corps hastened towards the same place by forced marches. If Pressburg fell into the hands of the Prussians, the force still with Von Benedek, constituting the bulk of his army, would not be able to reach Vienna, and form a junction with the Archduke Albrecht, except by making a long detour via Komorn, and would probably be delayed so long as to be helpless to prevent the capture of the capital.

On the 21st of July the Army of the Elbe and the First Army were in position behind the Russbach, and the Second Army was drawing near, its two advanced corps being not more than one day’s march distant. The situation of the Austrians was critical. Their IId Corps had not yet reached Pressburg, and that all-important point was still held by only two brigades. The Ist, VIth and VIIIth Corps, and a division of Saxons, had gotten no farther than Neustadtl and Trentschin, nearly sixty miles from Pressburg. On the same day Von Fransecky, with the Prussian IVth Corps and a cavalry division, crossed the March, in the vicinity of Marchegg, advancing upon Pressburg. Everything portended to the Austrians the loss of that valuable strategic point, and the consequent cutting off of Von Benedek from Vienna. The Prussian army, numbering, at least, 184,000 men, was concentrated and opposed to an army of not more than 110,000 men, at most, at Vienna. The capture of the capital seemed certain; and Von Moltke, with his forces augmented to 200,000 men, by the reinforcements that were pushing on to join him, could then turn upon Von Benedek, and give a coup de grace to the last remnant of Austria’s military power.

At this junction, however, diplomacy stepped in, and, through the mediation of France, a five days’ armistice, as a preliminary to peace, was agreed upon; the armistice to go into effect at noon on the 22d of July.

VALLEY of the MAINE.

On the 22d Von Fransecky struck the two Austrian brigades at Blumenau, just in front of Pressburg. While everything was going in favor of the Prussians, and they seemed to be not only on the point of defeating the Austrians, but of capturing their entire force, the hour of noon arrived; the armistice went into effect, the action was, with difficulty, broken off, and, after the sudden termination of the battle, both armies bivouacked on the field.

The preliminary terms of peace were signed at Nikolsburg on the 26th of July, and definitely ratified at Prague on the 30th of August. The orders for the withdrawal of the Prussian armies were issued on the 25th of August, and the Austrian territory was entirely evacuated by them by the 20th of September.

By the terms of the treaty of peace, Venetia was ceded to Italy; the old Germanic confederation was dissolved; Schleswig-Holstein became the property of Prussia; Austria consented to the formation of a North German Confederation, and a union of the South German States, from both of which confederations she was to be excluded; and the defeated power agreed to pay 40,000,000 Prussian thalers to the victor. From this sum, however, 15,000,000 thalers were deducted as the price of the Austrian claims to Schleswig-Holstein, and 5,000,000 thalers for the free maintenance of the Prussian army in the Austrian provinces from the preliminary truce to the final establishment of peace. Peace with the German allies of Austria was made at about the same time. As a result of the war, Prussia annexed the territories of Hanover, Hesse-Cassel, Nassau and the free city of Frankfort. The population of the victorious kingdom was increased by 4,285,700 people; and its area, by nearly 25,000 square miles of land.

APPENDIX II.

THE CAMPAIGN IN WESTERN GERMANY

The surrender of the Hanoverian army at Langensalza, on June 29, 1866, left Von Falckenstein free to operate against the armies of the South German States. His army, now designated “The Army of the Maine,” numbered 45,000 men and 97 guns.

Opposed to him were the Bavarian Corps, numbering 40,000 men and 136 guns, and the VIIIth Federal Corps, numbering 46,000 men and 134 guns. The former, under the command of Prince Charles of Bavaria, had concentrated at Schweinfurt; the latter, under the command of Prince Alexander of Hesse, at Frankfort.

Having been informed that the Hanoverians were marching on Fulda, Prince Charles began a forward movement, to effect a junction with them at that point; but receiving later news to the effect that the occupation of Hesse-Cassel had caused the Hanoverians to turn off towards Mühlhausen, and that Prussian forces were concentrating at Eisenach, he decided to direct his march more to the right, so as to be able to operate either by way of Fulda or the Thuringian Forest [Thüringer Wald], as circumstances might decide. The march of the Bavarians was begun on June 22d; but much was wanting to complete their organization and equipment, and their progress was so slow that on the 26th their most advanced division had only reached Neustadt, on the Saale, scarcely twenty miles from Schweinfurt.

A prompt union of the separated forces of the allies was of the utmost importance. Yet the most precious time was aimlessly wasted, and it was not until June 26th that any definite steps were taken towards effecting a junction of the Bavarians and the VIIIth Corps. On that day Prince Charles and Prince Alexander held a conference, at which it was decided to move forward and effect the junction of the two corps at Hersfeld, about twenty-one miles north of Fulda. They overlooked the important fact that they were twice as far away from the designated point as the Prussians were.

Nothing but the most energetic action on the part of the allies could overcome the disadvantages of their strategical situation. Yet Prince Charles, learning that negotiations were being conducted between the Hanoverians and the Prussians, delayed his march, evidently losing confidence in the sincerity of his allies, and fearing that a surrender of the Hanoverians might leave him to contend alone with Von Falckenstein. For three days the Bavarians remained inactive; then, hearing of the battle of Langensalza, Prince Charles advanced towards Gotha. On June 30th the Bavarians had advanced to Meiningen, Schleusingen and Hildburghausen, where they received news of the surrender of the Hanoverian army. The VIIIth Corps, in the meantime, had continued its march towards Hersfeld.

The march of Prince Charles towards Gotha had been utterly fruitless. He had not only failed to assist the Hanoverians, but time had been lost, and the direction of his march had carried him away from, instead of towards, the VIIIth Corps. The latter corps was now at Friedburg, more than 80 miles from Meiningen, and the problem of effecting a junction now presented many difficulties. The union of the two corps could have been easily and safely effected by falling back to the line of the Maine; and this should have been done, though it was feared that a retreat, at the beginning of the campaign, and before the enemy had been seen, might have an injurious effect on the morale of the troops. To effect a junction without falling back would necessitate a flank march of more than 80 miles, over difficult mountain roads, in the immediate front of the enemy. Such a hazardous movement should not have been undertaken except as a last resort.

Nevertheless, Prince Charles decided to form line at Meiningen, facing Eisenach, hoping to join the VIIIth Corps via Hilders-Fulda and Geisa-Hünfeld, and requesting Prince Alexander to draw towards him with all available forces, partly via Hanau-Fulda-Hünfeld, and partly by rail from Frankfort to Gemünden, and thence via Hammelburg to Kissingen. The commander of the VIIIth Corps consented to move on Fulda, but did not see fit to send a force via Kissingen to the neighborhood of Schweinfurt, evidently for the military reason that he did not wish to divide his force while executing a dangerous movement, and for the political reason that the movement urged by Prince Charles, while it would cover Bavaria, would expose the territories of the contingents which composed the VIIIth Corps. Prince Charles showed a disposition to ignore the interests of his allies; Prince Alexander exhibited decided insubordination; both commanders displayed a lack of military ability; and the want of hearty coöperation between the two generals already portended disaster to the allied cause.

On July 1st the Bavarians concentrated at Meiningen, and began their march to Fulda. Prince Alexander, marching east, occupied Lauterbach and Alsfeld on July 3d. His force had been diminished by detachments left on the Lahn, both to cover Frankfort from a possible attack from the direction of Cassel, and to protect the flank and rear of the army marching towards Fulda.

On July 3d a Bavarian advanced-guard found Dermbach in possession of the Prussians, and was driven back with some loss. On the other hand, a Prussian detachment was driven out of Wiesenthal. Von Falckenstein had advanced from Eisenach on July 1st, and he was now in the immediate front of the Bavarians; Von Beyer’s division in and around Geisa; Von Goeben’s division at Dermbach, and Von Manteuffel’s division following in reserve.

On July 4th one of Von Goeben’s brigades struck a Bavarian division at Zella [about 3 miles south of Dermbach], and an indecisive action followed. With his other brigade, Von Goeben attacked another Bavarian division at Wiesenthal. Encountering considerable resistance, and having no immediate supports at hand, Von Goeben gave orders for the withdrawal of his troops, after an action of some hours’ duration. At the same time the Bavarians retreated, and the field was abandoned by both armies.

During this time the other Prussian divisions continued their march on Fulda, Von Beyer reaching Hünfeld, near which place his advanced-guard had a remarkable combat with the Bavarian reserve cavalry, which had been sent from Schweinfurt towards Vacha, to open communications with the VIIIth Corps. The Bavarian advanced-guard consisted of two regiments of cuirassiers and a detachment of horse artillery. On meeting the Prussians the Bavarians opened on them with grape. The artillery with Von Beyer’s advanced-guard quickly came into action, and opened fire with astonishing results; for the first shot from the Prussian guns sent the Bavarians back in a wild panic, the confusion being rapidly conveyed from the advanced-guard to the main body, until the entire force (consisting of three brigades) broke into a headlong stampede. Several regiments retreated as far as Brückenau and Hammelburg, and many troopers did not draw rein until they arrived at the Maine, many miles from the scene of action. Several days elapsed before the cavalry could be rallied at Brückenau. In this case the Bavarians could neither plead surprise nor heavy loss. They saw their enemy in time to open fire on him first; and their total loss was only 28 men. Only a few shots, from two guns, were fired by the Prussians before the Bavarian cavalry had scampered beyond reach of harm.