A Christian Directory, Part 2: Christian Economics

CHAPTER I.

DIRECTIONS ABOUT MARRIAGE; FOR CHOICE AND CONTRACT

As the persons of christians in their privatest capacities are holy, as being dedicated and separated unto God, so also must their families be: HOLINESS TO THE LORD must be as it were written on their doors, and on their relations, their possessions, and affairs. To which it is requisite, 1. That there be a holy constitution of their families. 2. And a holy government of them, and discharge of the several duties of the members of the family. To the right constituting of a family, belongeth, (1.) The right contracting of marriage, and, (2.) The right choice and contract betwixt masters and their servants. For the first,

Direct. I. Take heed that neither lust nor rashness do thrust you into a married condition, before you see such reasons to invite you to it, as may assure you of the call and approbation of God. For, 1. It is God that you must serve in your married state, and therefore it is meet that you take his counsel before you rush upon it; for he knoweth best himself what belongeth to his service. 2. And it is God that you must still depend upon, for the blessing and comforts of your relation: and therefore there is very great reason that you take his advice and consent, as the chief things requisite to the match: if the consent of parents be necessary, much more is the consent of God.

Quest. But how shall a man know whether God call him to marriage, or consent unto it? Hath he not here left all men to their liberties, as in a thing indifferent?

Answ. God hath not made any universal law commanding or forbidding marriage; but in this regard hath left it indifferent to mankind: yet not allowing all to marry (for undoubtedly to some it is unlawful). But he hath by other general laws or rules directed men to know, in what cases it is lawful, and in what cases it is a sin. As every man is bound to choose that condition in which he may serve God with the best advantages, and which tendeth most to his spiritual welfare, and increase in holiness. Now there is nothing in marriage itself which maketh it commonly inconsistent with these benefits, and the fulfilling of these laws: and therefore it is said, that "he that marrieth doth well,"1 that is, he doth that which of itself is not unlawful, and which to some is the most eligible state of life. But there is something in a single life which maketh it, especially to preachers and persecuted christians, to be more usually the most advantageous state of life, to these ends of christianity; and therefore it is said, that "he that marrieth not, doth better." And yet to individual persons, it is hard to imagine how it can choose but be either a duty or a sin; at least except in some unusual cases. For it is a thing of so great moment as to the ordering of our hearts and lives, that it is hard to imagine that it should ever be indifferent as a means to our main end, but must either be a very great help or hinderance. But yet if there be any persons whose case may be so equally poised with accidents on both sides, that to the most judicious man it is not discernible, whether a single or married state of life is like to conduce more to their personal holiness or public usefulness, or the good of others, to such persons marriage in the individual circumstantiated act is a thing indifferent.

By these conditions following you may know, what persons have a call from God to marry, and who have not his call or approbation. 1. If there be the peremptory will or command of parents to children that are under their power and government, and no greater matter on the contrary to hinder it, the command of parents signifieth the command of God: but if parents do but persuade and not command, though their desires must not be causelessly refused, yet a smaller impediment may preponderate than in case of a peremptory command. 2. They are called to marry who have not the gift of continence, and cannot by the use of lawful means attain it, and have no impediment which maketh it unlawful to them to marry. "But if they cannot contain, let them marry; for it is better to marry than to burn," 1 Cor. vii. 9. But here the divers degrees of the urgent and the hindering causes must be compared, and the weightiest must prevail. For some that have very strong lusts may yet have stronger impediments: and though they cannot keep that chastity in their thoughts as they desire, yet in such a case they must abstain. And there is no man but may keep his body in chastity if he will do his part: yea, and thoughts themselves, may be commonly, and for the most part, kept pure, and wanton imaginations quickly checked, if men be godly, and will do what they can. But on the other side, there are some that have a more tameable measure of concupiscence, and yet have no considerable hinderance, whose duty it may be to marry, as the most certain and successful means against that small degree, as long as there is nothing to forbid it. 3. Another cause that warranteth marriage is, when upon a wise casting up of all accounts, it is apparently most probable that in a married state, one may be most serviceable to God and the public good: that there will be in it greater helps and fewer hinderances to the great ends of our lives; the glorifying of God, and the saving of ourselves and others. And whereas it must be expected that every condition should be more helpful to us in one respect, and hinder us more in another respect; and that in one we have most helps for a contemplative life, and in another we are better furnished for an active, serviceable life, the great skill therefore in the discerning of our duties, lieth in the prudent pondering and comparing of the commodities and discommodities, without the seduction of fantasy, lust, or passion, and in a true discerning which side it is that hath the greatest weight.2

Here it must be carefully observed, 1. That the two first reasons for marriage, (concupiscence and the will of parents,) or any such like, have their strength but in subordination to the third (the final cause, or interest of God and our salvation). And that this last reason (from the end) is of itself sufficient without any of the other, but none of the other are sufficient without this. If it be clear that in a married state you have better advantages for the service of God, and doing good to others, and saving your own souls, than you can have in a single state of life, then it is undoubtedly your duty to marry; for our obligation to seek our ultimate end is the most constant, indispensable obligation. Though parents command it not, though you have no corporal necessity, yet it is a duty if it certainly make most for your ultimate end. 2. But yet observe also, that no pretence of your ultimate end itself will warrant you to marry, when any other accident hath first made it a thing unlawful, while that accident continueth. For we must not do evil that good may come by it. Our salvation is not furthered by sin; and though we saw a probability that we might do more good to others, if we did but commit such a sin to accomplish it, yet it is not to be done. For our lives and mercies being all in the hand of God, and the successes and acceptance of all our endeavours depending wholly upon him, it can never be a rational way to attain them, by wilful offending him by our sin! It is a likely means to public good for able and good men to be magistrates and ministers; and yet he that would lie, or be perjured, or commit any known sin that he may be a magistrate, or that he may preach the gospel, might better expect a curse on himself and his endeavours, than God's acceptance, or his blessing and success; so he that would sin to change his state for the better, would find that he changed it for the worse: or if it do good to others, he may expect no good but ruin to himself, if repentance prevent it not. 3. Observe also, that if the question be only which state of life it is (married or single) which best conduceth to this ultimate end, then any one of the subordinate reasons will prove that we have a call, if there be not greater reasons on the contrary side. As in case you have no corporal necessity, the will of parents alone may oblige you, if there be no greater thing against it: or if parents oblige you not, yet corporal necessity alone may do it: or if neither of these invite you, yet a clear probability of the attaining of such an estate or opportunity, as may make you more fit to relieve many others, or be serviceable to the church, or the blessing of children who may be devoted to God, may warrant your marriage, if no greater reasons lie against it; for when the scales are equal, any one of these may turn them.

By this also you may perceive who they be that have no call to marry, and to whom it is a sin. As, 1. No man hath a call to marry, who laying all the commodities and discommodities together, may clearly discern that a married state is like to be a greater hinderance of his salvation, or to his serving or honouring God in the world, and so to disadvantage him as to his ultimate end.

Quest. But what if parents do command it? or will set against me if I disobey?

Answ. Parents have no authority to command you any thing against God or your salvation, or your ultimate end. Therefore here you owe them no formal obedience: but yet the will of parents, with all the consequents, must be put into the scales with all other considerations, and if they make the discommodities of a single life to become the greater, as to your end, then they may bring you under a duty or obligation to marry; not necessitate præcepti, as obedience to their command; but necessitate medii, as a means to your ultimate end, and in obedience to that general command of God, which requireth you to "seek first" your ultimate end, even "the kingdom of God, and his righteousness," Matt. vi. 33.

Quest. But what if I have a corporal necessity, and yet I can foresee that marriage will greatly disadvantage me as to the service of God and my salvation?

Answ. 1. You must understand that no corporal necessity is absolute: for there is no man so lustful but may possibly bridle his lust by other lawful means; by diet, labour, sober company, diverting business, solitude, watching the thoughts and senses, or at least by the physician's help; so that the necessity is but secundum quid, or an urgency rather than a simple necessity. And then, 2. This measure of necessity must be itself laid in the balance with the other accidents; and if this necessity will turn the scales by making a single life more disadvantageous to your ultimate end, your lust being a greater impediment to you than all the inconveniencies of marriage will be, then the case is resolved, "it is better to marry than to burn." But if the hinderances in a married state are like to be greater, than the hinderances of your concupiscence, then you must set yourself to the curbing and curing of that concupiscence; and in the use of God's means expect his blessing.

2. Children are not, ordinarily, called of God to marry, when their parents do absolutely and peremptorily forbid it. For though parents' commands cannot make it a duty, when we are sure it would hinder the interest of God our ultimate end; yet parents' prohibitions may make it a sin, when there is a clear probability that it would most conduce to our ultimate end, were it not prohibited. Because, (1.) Affirmatives bind not semper et ad semper, as negatives or prohibitions do. (2.) Because the sin of disobedience to parents will cross the tendency of it unto good, and do more against our ultimate end, than all the advantages of marriage can do for it. A duty is then to us no duty, when it cannot be performed without a chosen, wilful sin. In many cases we are bound to forbear what a governor forbiddeth, when we are not bound to do the contrary if he command it. It is easier to make a duty to be no duty, than to make a sin to be no sin. One bad ingredient may turn a duty into a sin, when one good ingredient will not turn a sin into a duty, or into no sin.

Quest. But may not a governor's prohibition be overweighed by some great degrees of incommodity? It is better to marry than to burn. 1. What if parents forbid children to marry absolutely until death, and so deprive them of the lawful remedy against lust? 2. And if they do not so, yet if they forbid it them when it is to them most seasonable and necessary, it seemeth little better. 3. Or if they forbid them to marry where their affections are so engaged, as that they cannot be taken off without their mutual ruin? May not children marry in such cases of necessity as these, without and against the will of their parents?

Answ. I cannot deny but some cases may be imagined or fall out, in which it is lawful to do what a governor forbiddeth, and to marry against the will of parents: for they have their power to edification, and not unto destruction. As if a son be qualified with eminent gifts for the work of the ministry, in a time and place that needeth much help; if a malignant parent, in hatred of that sacred office, should never so peremptorily forbid him, yet may the son devote himself to the blessed work of saving souls: even as a son may not forbear to relieve the poor (with that which is his own) though his parents should forbid him; nor forbear to put himself into a capacity to relieve them for the future; nor forbear his own necessary food and raiment though he be forbidden: as Daniel would not forbear praying openly in his house, when he was forbidden by the king and law. When any inseparable accident doth make a thing, of itself indifferent, become a duty, a governor's prohibition will not discharge us from that duty, unless the accident be smaller than the accident of the ruler's prohibition, and then it may be overweighed by it; but to determine what accidents are greater or less is a difficult task.

And as to the particular questions, to the first I answer, If parents forbid their children to marry while they live, it is convenient and safe to obey them until death, if no greater obligation to the contrary forbid it: but it is necessary to obey them during the time that the children live under the government of their parents, as in their houses, in their younger years (except in some few extraordinary cases). But when parents are dead, (though they leave commands in their wills,) or when age or former marriage hath removed children from under their government, a smaller matter will serve to justify their disobedience here, than when the children in minority are less fit to govern themselves. For though we owe parents a limited obedience still, yet at full age the child is more at his own disposal than he was before. Nature hath given us a hint of her intention in the instinct of brutes, who are all taught to protect, and lead, and provide for their young ones, while the young are insufficient for themselves; but when they are grown to self-sufficiency, they drive them away or neglect them. If a wise son that hath a wife and many children, and great affairs to manage in the world, should he bound to as absolute obedience to his aged parents, as he was in his childhood, it would ruin their affairs, and parents' government would pull down that in their old age, which they built up in their middle age.

And to the second question I answer, that, 1. Children that pretend to unconquerable lust or love, must do all they can to subdue such inordinate affections, and bring their lusts to stoop to reason and their parents' wills. And if they do their best, there are either none, or not one of many hundreds, but may maintain their chastity together with their obedience. 2. And if any say, I have done my best, and yet am under a necessity of marriage; and am I not then bound to marry though my parents forbid me? I answer, it is not to be believed: either you have not done your best, or else you are not under a necessity. And your urgency being your own fault, (seeing you should subdue it,) God still obligeth you both to subdue your vice, and to obey your parents. 3. But if there should be any one that hath such an (incredible) necessity of marriage, he is to procure some others to solicit his parents for their consent, and if he cannot obtain it, some say, it is his duty to marry without it: I should rather say that it is minus malum, the lesser evil: and that having cast himself into some necessity of sinning, it is still his duty to avoid both, and to choose neither; but it is the smaller sin to choose to disobey his parents, rather than to live in the flames of lust and the filth of unchastity. And some divines say, that in such a case a son should appeal to the magistrate, as a superior authority above the father. But others think, 1. That this leaveth it as difficult to resolve what he shall do, if the magistrate also consent not: and, 2. That it doth but resolve one difficulty by a greater; it being very doubtful whether in domestic cases the authority of the parent or the magistrate be the greater.

3. The same answer serveth as to the third question, when parents forbid you to marry the persons that you are most fond of. For such fondness (whether you call it lust or love) as will not stoop to reason and your parents' wills, is inordinate and sinful. And therefore the thing that God bindeth you to, is by his appointed means to subdue it, and to obey: but if you cannot, the accidents and probable consequents must tell you which is the lesser evil.

Quest. But what if the child have promised marriage, and the parents be against it? Answ. If the child was under the parents' government, and short of years of discretion also, the promise is void for want of capacity. And if the child was at age, yet the promise was a sinful promise, as to the promising act, and also as to the thing promised during the parents' dissent. If the actus promittendi only had been sinful, (the promise making,) the promise might nevertheless oblige (unless it were null as well as sinful). But the materia promissa being sinful, (the matter promised,) to marry while parents do dissent, such a child is bound to forbear the fulfilling of that promise till the parents do consent or die. And yet he is bound from marrying any other, (unless he be disobliged by the person that he hath made the promise to,) because he knoweth not but his parents may consent hereafter; and whenever they consent or die, the promise then is obligatory, and must be performed.

The third chapter of Numbers enableth parents to disoblige a daughter that is in their house, from a vow made to God, so be it they disallow it at the first hearing. Hence there are two doubts arise: 1. Whether this power extend not to the disobliging of a promise or contract of matrimony. 2. Whether it extend not to a son as well as a daughter. And most expositors are for the affirmative of both cases. But I have showed you before that it is upon uncertain grounds: 1. It is uncertain whether God, who would thus give up his own right in case of vowing, will also give away the right of others, without their consent, in case of promises or contracts. And, 2. It is uncertain whether this be not an indulgence only of the weaker sex, seeing many words in the text seem plainly to intimate so much. And it is dangerous upon our own presumptions, to stretch God's laws to every thing we imagine there is the same reason for; seeing our imaginations may so easily be deceived; and God could have expressed such particulars if he would. And therefore (when there is not clear ground for our inferences in the text) it is but to say, Thus and thus should God have said, when we cannot say, Thus he hath said. We must not make laws under the pretence of expounding them: whatsoever God commandeth thee, take heed that thou do it: thou shalt add nothing thereto, nor take ought therefrom, Deut. xii. 32.

Quest. If the question therefore be not of the sinfulness, but the nullity of such promises of children, because of the dissent of parents, for my part I am not able to prove any such nullity. It is said, that they are not sui juris, their own, and therefore their promises are null: but if they have attained to years and use of discretion, they are naturally so far sui juris as to be capable of disposing even of their souls, and therefore of their fidelity. They can oblige themselves to God or man; though they are not so far sui juris as to be ungoverned: for so, no child, no subject, no man is sui juris; seeing all are under the government of God. And yet if a man promise to do a thing sinful, it is not a nullity, but a sin; not no promise, but a sinful promise. A nullity is, when the actus promittendi is reputative nullus vel non actus. And when no promise is made, then none can be broken.

Quest. But if the question be only how far such promises must be kept, I answer by summing up what I have said: 1. If the child had not the use of reason, the want of natural capacity proveth the promise null: here ignorantis non est consensus. 2. If he was at age and use of reason, then, 1. If the promising act only was sinful, (as before I said of vows,) the promise must be both repented of and kept. It must be repented of because it was a sin; it must be kept because it was a real promise, and the matter lawful. 2. If the promising act was not only a sin but a nullity (by any other reason) then it is no obligation. 3. If not only the promising act be sin, but also the matter promised, (as is marrying without parents' consent,) then it must be repented of, and not performed till it become lawful; because an oath or promise cannot bind a man to violate the laws of God.

Quest. But what if the parties be actually married without the parents' consent? must they live together, or be separated? Answ. 1. If marriage be consummated per carnalem concubitum, by the carnal knowledge of each other, I see no reason to imagine that parents can dissolve it, or prohibit their cohabitation: for the marriage (for aught I ever saw) is not proved a nullity, but only a sin, and their concubitus is not fornication; and parents cannot forbid husband and wife to live together: and in marriage they do (really though sinfully) forsake father and mother and cleave to each other, and so are now from under their government (though not disobliged from all obedience). 2. But if marriage be only by verbal conjunction, divines are disagreed what is to be done. Some think that it is no perfect marriage ante concubitum, and also that their conjunction hath but the nature of a promise (to be faithful to each other as husband and wife): and therefore the matter promised is unlawful till parents consent, and so not to be done. But I rather think (as most do) that it hath all that is essential to marriage ante concubitum; and that this marriage is more than a promise of fidelity de futuro, even an actual delivery of themselves to one another de præsenti also; and that the thing promised in marriage is lawful. For though it be a sin to marry without parents' consent, yet when that is past, it is lawful for married persons to come together though parents consent not; and therefore that such marriage is valid, and to be continued, though it was sinfully made.

3. A third sort that are not called of God to marry, are they that have absolutely vowed not to marry. Such may not marry, unless Providence disoblige them, by making it become an indispensable duty. And I can remember but two ways by which this may be done. 1. In case there be any of so strong lust, as no other lawful means but marriage can suffice to maintain their chastity. To such marriage is as great a duty, as to eat or drink, or cover one's nakedness, or to hinder another from uncleanness, or lying, or stealing, or the like. And if you should make a vow that you will never eat or drink, or that you will go naked, or that you will never hinder any one from uncleanness, lying, or stealing, it is unlawful to fulfil this vow. But all the doubt is, whether there be any such persons that cannot overcome or restrain their lust by any other lawful means. I suppose it is possible there may be such; but I believe it is not one of a hundred. If they will but practise the directions before given, part i. chap. viii. part v. tit. 1 and 2, I suppose their lust may be restrained: and if that prevail not, the help of a physician may: and if that prevail not, some think the help of a surgeon may be lawful, to keep a vow, in case it be not an apparent hazard of life. For Christ seemeth to allow of it, in mentioning it without reproof, Matt. xix. 12, if that text be to be understood of castration: but most expositors think it is meant only of a confirmed resolution of chastity: and ordinarily other means may make this needless: and if it be either needless or perilous, it is unlawful without doubt.