The Lyon in Mourning, Vol. 1

Copy of a Letter which served to cover the above to Lady Terperse from Mr. Patrick Gordon, Presbyterian preacher at Rhynie

26 Jan. 1747

[fol. 427.] Madam, – The inclosed came to me two or three days ago, and I intended to have delivered it to you with my own hand. But as I cannot travel so far for some days by reason of necessary business in my parish, I thought proper, rather than delay it any longer, to transmit it in this manner. My correspondent is a gentlewoman that lives in the neighbourhood of Carlisle, who saw Terperse every day for some time before his death, and says he died as became a truly penitent Christian, to the conviction of all the clergy and others that conversed with him. She writes me that one Wright, by orders from Mr. Farquharson, provided a coffin for his body; that she gave such grave-cloaths as are usual, put them on, and saw him buried in St. Culbert's Churchyard. So that you and all your relations are very much obliged to this gentlewoman. She [fol. 428.] desires me further to acquaint you that he never received any letter from you nor any remittance; and the letter I wrote, giving him an account of you and your children did not reach Carlisle till after his death; that she has his stock-buckle, buttons, and a book he left to his son, Charles, which she is ready to send to Edinburgh to any person you shall name there, which you may do by me when you please, for I intend to write her soon. Terperse mentions some note or account in his letter; but it did not come to my hand, nor does my correspondent write anything about it. I am, Madam, your most humble servant,

Rhynic, January 26th, 1747.

Copy of a Letter, said to be written by Lord George Murray or one of his friends, 1746. 192

[fol. 429.] In answer to what you write about the Highland army having not behaved with their usual bravery, or that some of their principal officers had not done their duty, which might be the occasion of their late misfortune, I must inform you by all I can learn, the men showed the utmost eagerness to come to action, nor did I hear of any one officer but behaved well, so far as the situation and circumstances would allow. The truth seems to be that they were overpowered by a superiour force, and their field of battle was ill-chosen, which gave the Duke of Cumberland great advantages, especially in his canon and horse. Another misfortune they lay under was a total want of provisions, so that they were reduced to the hard necessity either of fighting an army a third stronger, or to starve or disperse. As to what happened the day of the battle and the preceding day, I shall let you know [fol. 430.] what I could learn.

15 April.

On the fifteenth, all those of the Highland army as were assembled were drawn up in line of battle upon a moor south from Culloden, facing eastwards. This was done early in the morning, as it was known that the Duke of Cumberland was come to Nairn the night before; but as he did not move before mid-day, it was judged he would not march that day, it being his birthday; and as his troops had made no halt from the time he left Aberdeen, it was reasonable to think he would give them a day's rest. It was then proposed to make a night attack upon the Duke of Cumberland's army in their camp, which, if it could be done before one or two o'clock in the morning, might (though a desperate attempt) have had a chance of succeeding. Several of the officers listened to this, as they knew the Duke of Cumberland was much superiour to the Highland army. The objection to it was that a great many of the army had not as yet joined, particularly Keppoch, the Master of Lovat, Cluny, Glengyle, the Mackenzies, and [fol. 431.] many of the recruits of Glengary and other regiments, which were all expected in two or three days, and some of them sooner; that if they should fail in the attempt and be repulsed, it would not be easy rallying the Highlanders in the dark; that if the Duke of Cumberland was alarm'd by any of his patrollers, he might have time to put his army in order in the camp (I suppose no spy should give timely notice), and place his canon charged with cartouch shot as he had a mind, and his horse might be all in readiness so as to pursue, if the Highlanders had been beat off; and lastly, the difficulty of making their retreat with perhaps a good many wounded men, whom the Highlanders will never leave, be it possible to bring them off. It is to be remarked that there was no intelligence of the enemy's camp. Add to this, how fatiguing it would be to march backwards and forwards twenty miles, and probably be obliged to fight next day; nor could they make their retreat safe and not be attacked before they joined the rest of the army.

On the other hand the Prince was vastly bent for the night-attack, [fol. 432.] and said he had men enow to beat the enemy, whom he believed utterly dispirited, and would never stand a bold and brisk attack. The Duke of Perth, Lord John Drummond, with others, seemed to wish it; and Lord George Murray, Lochgary, with many others, were induced to make a fair trial what could be done, though they were very sensible of the danger should it miscary. They observed with much concern the want of provisions. The men had only got that day a biscuit each, and some not even that.193 It was feared it would prove worse next day, except they could take provisions from the enemy; and they had reason to believe if the men were allowed to disperse to shift for some meat (which many of them would do if the army continued there all night), that it would be very difficult to assemble them in the event of a sudden alarm, which, considering the nearness of the enemy, might very reasonably be supposed; and as they must have layen that night in the muirs near Culloden, as they had done the night before, they knew many of them would disperse [fol. 433.] without liberty to several miles distance for provisions and quarters, and that it would be far in the day before they could be assembled again; and as Keppoch came up and joined the army that afternoon, they flattered themselves that the men they had might do if they could have made the attack by one or two in the morning, especially if they were undiscovered, as they had great hopes they might. For having examined the different roads, of which they had perfect intelligence from the MacIntoshes, who lived in those very parts, they found they could keep upon a muir the whole way so as to shun the houses, and be a considerable way from the highroad that leads from Inverness to Nairn. They also considered that in the event of making the attack, should they even be beat off without the desired success, they might before daybreak get back the length of Culcarick,194 which was very strong ground, and from thence by a hill they could retire the whole way on the south side of the water of Nairn, till they were joined by their friends whom [fol. 434.] they expected and by the stragglers. Nor did they believe the enemy would follow them (suppose the Highlanders were beat back) till it were good daylight, so as they could see about them and send out reconnoitering parties to prevent their falling into ambuscades and snares. And before all this could be done, the Highland army might have reached Culcarick,195 and the hilly ground on the south side of the water above-mentioned, where regular troops could not easily overtake them, and where their canon and horse (in which their greatest superiority consisted) would have been of little use. That they found the Prince was resolved to fight the enemy without waiting for the succours that were soon expected, and without retiring to any strong ground, or endeavouring to draw the Duke of Cumberland's army farther from the sea, from whence he got all his provisions, that was brought about in ships which sailed along it as his army marched near the shore.

16 April.

For these reasons the gentlemen and most others, if not [fol. 435.] all, who were spoke to upon the subject, seemed to think the night attack might be attempted. But most of them thought they were in very bad circumstances at any rate, and no attempt could be more desperate than their present situation. Lord George Murray, about mid-day, desired Brigadier Stapleton and Colonel Ker to cross the Water of Nairn near where the army was drawn up (not far from the place where the battle was fought next day) to take a view of the hill ground on the south side of the water, which to him appeared to be steep and uneven, consequently much properer for Highlanders, for the ground they were drawn up upon was a large plain muir; and though in some places it was interspersed with bogues and deep ground, yet for the most part it was a fair field, and good for horse. After two or three hours, they returned and reported that the ground was rough and rugged, mossy and soft, so that no horse could be of use there; that the ascent from the water side was steep; and that there was about two or three places in about three or [fol. 436.] four miles where horse could cross, the banks being inaccessible. They could not tell what sort of ground was at a greater distance, but the country people informed them it was much like the other. Upon this information Lord George Murray proposed that the other side of the water should be the place for the army to be drawn up in line of battle next day; but this was not agreed to. It was said it was like shunning the enemy, being a mile further from the muir they were then upon and at a greater distance from Inverness, which it was resolved not to abandon, a great deal of baggage and ammunition being left there. This was before the resolution was taken of making the night attack. About seven at night an incident happened which had liked to have stopt their designed attempt, and upon it many were for giving it up as impracticable. The thing was this. Numbers of men went off to all sides, especially towards Inverness, and when the officers who were sent on horseback to bring them back came [fol. 437.] up with them, they could by no persuasion be induced to return again, giving for answer – they were starving; and said to the officers they might shoot them if they pleased, but they could not go back till they got meat. But the Prince continued keen for the attack, and positive to attempt it, and said there was not a moment to be lost; for as soon as the men should see the march begun, not one of them would flinch. It was near eight at night when they moved, which could not be sooner, otherwise they might have been perceived at a considerable distance, and the enemy have got account of their march. Lord George Murray was in the van. Lord John Drummond in the centre, and the Duke of Perth towards the rear, where also the Prince was, having Fitz-James's horse and others with him. Proper directions were given for small parties possessing all the roads, that intelligence might not be carried to the enemy. There were about two officers and thirty men of the MacIntoshes in the front as guides, and [fol. 438.] some of the same were in the centre and rear, and in other parts, for hindering any of the men from straggling. Before the van had gone a mile, which was as slow as could be to give time to the line to follow, there was express after express sent to stop them, for that the rear was far behind. Upon this the van marched still slower, but in a short time there came aide-de-camps and other officers to stop them, or at least make them go slower; and of these messages I am assured there came near an hundred before the front got near Culraick, which retarded them to such a degree that the night was far spent: for from the place the army began to march to Culraick was but six miles, and they had still four long miles to Nairn. It was now about one o'clock in the morning, when Lord John Drummond came up to the van and told there were several far behind; and, if they did not stop or go slower, he was afraid the rear would not get up. In a little [fol. 439.] time the Duke of Perth came also to the front, and assured that if there was not a halt the rear could not join. There was a stop accordingly. Lochiel had been mostly in the van all night, and his men were next the Athol men, who were in the front. These two bodies made about twelve hundred men. There were also several other officers that came up, there being a defile a little way behind occasioned by a wall of the wood of Culraick, which also retarded the march of those that were behind. The officers, talking of the different places of making the attack, said it was better to make the attempt with four thousand men before daybreak, as with double the number after it was light. Mr. O'Sullivan now having come up to the front, and it being now evident by the time the army had taken to march little more than six miles it would be impossible to make the other part of the road – which was about four miles – before it was clear day-light, besides the [fol. 440.] time that must be spent in making the disposition for the attack, as it could not be done by the army in the line by their long march. Mr. O'Sullivan said he had just then come from the Prince, who was very desirous the attack should be made; but as Lord George Murray had the van, and could judge the time, he left it to him whether to do it or not.

There were several volunteers present, who had walked all night in the front, such as Mr. Hepburn, Mr. Hunter, Mr. Anderson, and others; and as the Duke of Perth, Lord John Drummond, and other officers seemed to be much difficulted what to resolve upon, Lord George Murray desired the rest of the gentlemen to give their opinions, for they were all deeply concerned in the consequence. It was agreed upon all hands that it must be sun-rise before the army could reach Nairn and form, so as to make an attempt upon the enemy's camp; for one part was to have passed the water a mile above the town, to have fallen upon them towards the sea-side. The [fol. 441.] volunteers were all very keen to march. Some of them said that the red-coats would be all drunk, as they surely had solemnised the Duke of Cumberland's birth-day; and that, though it were day-light, they would be in such confusion they would not withstand the Highlanders.

This opinion shewed abundance of courage, for these gentlemen would have been in the first rank had there been any attack. But the officers were of different sentiments, as severals of them expressed.196 Lochiel and his brother said they had been as much for the night attack as anybody could be, and it was not their fault that it had not been done; but blamed those in the rear that had marched so slow, and retarded the rest of the army. Lord George Murray was of the same way of thinking, and said, if they could have made the attack, it was the best chance they had, especially if they could have surprized the enemy. But to attack a camp that was near double their number in day-light, when they would [fol. 442.] be prepared to receive them, would be perfect madness.

By this time Mr. John Hay came up and told the line was joined. He was told the resolution was taken to return. He began to argue upon the point, but nobody minded him. This was the gentleman the army blamed for the distress they were in for want of provisions, he having had the superintendency of all these things from the time of Mr. Murray's illness, who had always been extremely active in whatsoever regarded the providing for the army. It was about two o'clock in the morning (the halt being not above a quarter of an hour) when they went back in two columns, the rear facing about, and the van taking another way. At a little distance they had a view of the fires of the Duke of Cumberland's camp; and, as they did not shun passing near houses as they had done in advancing, they marched very quick. Day-light began to [fol. 443.] appear about an hour after. They got to Culloden pretty early, so that the men had three or four hours' rest. They killed what cattle or sheep they could find; but few of them had time to make anything ready before the alarm came of the enemy's being upon their march and approaching. The horse of the Prince's army had been all on such hard duty for several days and nights before that none of them were fit for patroling. At that time, Fitz-James's horse and several others had gone to Inverness to refresh, so at first it was not known whether it was an advanced party or the Duke of Cumberland's whole army. However, the Highlanders got ready as quick as possible, and marched through the parks of Culloden in battalions (just as they chanced to be lying) to the muir on the south side, facing eastwards, and about half a mile farther back than where they had been drawn up the night before. Lord George Murray proposed once more to pass the Water of Nairn, as being the strongest ground, and much the fitter [fol. 444.] for Highlanders. Cluny, who was expected every moment, was to come on that side; but it was not agreed upon for the same reason given the day before. Lord George, speaking to Mr. O'Sullivan, he told him that he was afraid the enemy would have great advantage in that plain muir, both in their horse and canon. But he, O'Sullivan, answered that he was sure horse could be of no use, because there were several bogues and morasses; but the event proved otherwise. Mr. O'Sullivan drew up the army in line of battle (he being both adjutant and quarter-master-general), and having shown every battalion their place, the right closed to some inclosures near the Water of Nairn, and the left towards the parks of Culloden. I cannot justly tell what order they were drawn up in. There had been some disputes a day or two before about their rank, but nobody that had any regard for the common cause would insist upon such things upon that occasion. Those who had [fol. 445.] gone off the night before and early that morning to Inverness and other parts had now joined, and the Master of Lovat was come up with a considerable recruit of his men. It was observed that upon the right there were park walls, under cover of which so many of the enemy could draw up and flank the Highlanders. Lord George Murray, who commanded that wing, was very desirous to have advanced and thrown them down; but as this would have broke the line, and the enemy forming their line of battle near that place, it was judged by those about him too dangerous to attempt.

Both armies being fully formed, the canonading began on both sides, after which there was some small alteration made in the disposition of the two armies by bringing troops from the second line to the first, as both the ends advanced to out-flank one another. The Highlanders were much galled by the enemy's canon and were turned so impatient that they [fol. 446.] were like to break their ranks. Upon which it was judged proper to attack, and orders were given accordingly. The right wing advanced first as the whole line did much at the same time. The left wing did not attack the enemy, at least did not go in sword in hand, imagining they would be flanked by a regiment of foot and some horse, which the enemy brought up at that time from their second line or corps de reserve. When the right wing were within pistol-shot of the enemy they received a most terrible fire not only in front but also in flank by reason of those that were posted near the stone walls, notwithstanding of which they went on sword in hand, after giving their fire close to the enemy, and were received by them with their spontoons and bayonets. The two regiments of foot that were upon the enemy's left would have been cut to pieces had they not been immediately supported by other two regiments from their second line. As it was, these two regiments [fol. 447.] (being Barrel's and that called Monroe's) had by their own confession above two hundred men killed and wounded. Two regiments of dragoons coming in upon the same side entirely broke that wing of the Highlanders, and though three battalions of the right of the second line were brought up and gave their fire very well, yet the ground and everything else was so favourable for the enemy that nothing could be done but a total route ensued.

I am positively informed that the Highland army did not consist of above seven thousand fighting men,197 and that the Duke of Cumberland's must have been ten or twelve thousand. In the one army there were not above an hundred and fifty horse, of which one half was of the regiment of Fitz-James. In the other army they had eleven or twelve hundred.

When a misfortune happens people are apt to throw the blame upon persons or causes, which frequently are either [fol. 448.] the effect of malice or ignorance, without knowing the real springs and motives. Severals are of opinion that the night attack could have been made, but I am convinced of the contrary for the following reasons. The Highland army, when they halted near Culraick, were not above five thousand men. They had four miles to march, and part of them were obliged to have made a considerable circumference so that it would have been sun-rise before they could have made the attack. The ground about Nairn where the enemy lay encamped was a hard, dry soil, and plain muirs three miles round about except where the sea intervened; the nearest strong and uneven ground being the wood of Culraick. Let it be supposed the Highlanders had made an attack in the broad day-light upon an enemy double their number in their camp, who were well refreshed with a day and two nights' rest, with plenty of all kinds of provisions, with their canon pointed as they thought [fol. 449.] proper, their horse drawn up to their wish in a fine plain, what must the consequence have been? What would have been said of officers that led on men in such circumstances and such a situation? Would it not have been certain death and destruction of all those that made the attack? Would it not have been said and justly said, Why go you on in such a desperate attempt seeing it could not be done by surprize and undiscovered as projected? Why not try the chance of a fair battle by returning and being joined by the rest of the army as well as by those who had withdrawn the night before, and a great many others who were hourly expected; where also they might have canon and choice of the field of battle? By this means there was a fair chance, by others there was none.

As to the above-mentioned facts you may rely upon them. I saw the Duke of Perth, the Duke of Athol, Lord John Drummond, Lord George Murray, Lord Ogilvie, Colonel Stewart of Ardshiel, Colonel Roy Stewart, Lord Nairn, and several others, at Ruthven of Badenoch on the Friday two days [fol. 450.] after the battle, and they all agreed on the same things.

April.

One thing I must take notice of, that from the beginning of the whole affair there never had been the least dispute198 or misunderstanding among the officers. Some find fault that the night march was undertaken seeing there was not a certainty of marching to Nairn time enough to make the attack before day-light, as also that they had too few men.

In answer to this. It was not doubted when the march was begun but that there would be abundance of time. Their greatest precaution was not to be discovered. The Highlanders had often made very quick marches in the night-time. The French piquets I believe were in the rear and were not so clever in marching, and the muir they went through was more splashy than they expected, and they were obliged to make some turns to shun houses, and there were two or three dykes that took [fol. 451.] up a good deal of time to pass. The guides though they knew the ground very well, yet were not judges to tell what time it would take to march the ten miles, as they were called, though by reason of the indirect road, must be more. Notwithstanding of all this I am persuaded most of the army (had not the van been frequently stopt and retarded by repeated orders and messages) would have been at Nairn by two o'clock in the morning. As for the number of men, though not half that of the enemy, they might very probably have succeeded in the attempt had they made the attack undiscovered. Nothing is more uncertain than the events of war. Night attacks are most subject to disappointments. This march and counter-march, to be sure, was, as things turned out, a great disadvantage. It fatigued the men much, and a council of war might have been obtained in which doubtless a resolution would have been taken to chuse a more advantagious field of [fol. 452.] battle and perhaps postpon'd fighting for a day till the succours that were coming up with the utmost expedition should join. Councils of war were seldom held and were out of request199 from the time the army marched into England. I remember but of two that were held, the one at Brampton in regard of besieging Carlisle or going to attack General Wade. The other was at Carlisle, where it was resolved to march forwards. What happened at Derby was accidental by most of the officers being at the Prince's quarters, and taking into consideration their situation, they were all unanimous in advising the Prince to retreat. I think there was but one council of war called after they returned to Scotland, and that was near Crieff, the [fol. 453.] day after the retreat from Stirling, where there was some difference of opinion, but it was at last agreed to march for Inverness in two separate bodies, the one the Highland road, and the other by the coast, severals at first being for the army all going one road. The day of the battle of Falkirk the officers were called on the field where the army was drawn up betwixt Bannockburn and the Torwood, and all agreed immediately to march to the enemy; also the retreat from Stirling, it was advised by many of the principal officers, particularly the clans. They drew up the reasons and sign'd them at Falkirk three days before the retreat was made, the chief of which was that a vast number of men had gone off after the battle, and were not returned, and that the siege of Stirling Castle was not advancing; they did not think it advisable to fight in such circumstances.