- -
- 100%
- +
30 Vicky Kirby is correct, in my view, that “[t]he difficulty in Butler’s project is considerable, for she has to juggle a critique of construction while still defending its most basic tenets” (Vicky Kirby, Telling Flesh: The Substance of the Corporeal (New York: Routledge, 1997), 105). But Axel Honneth’s critique is not quite on the mark (Axel Honneth et al., Reification: A New Look at an Old Idea, The Berkeley Tanner lectures (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 69).
31 Arrhenius, Riktig, 20 [my translation].
32 Elizabeth Grosz, Space, Time, and Perversion: Essays on the Politics of Bodies (London: Routledge, 1995), 47-49. See also Kirby, Telling, 68, 171. The problem of biologism and feminism links back to the neurologist Jean-Martin Charcot, according to Kirby. Here biologism, the thought that the woman is her body, was strongly established and later developed by Charcot’s colleague, Sigmund Freud (Kirby, Telling, 59).
33 Susan Oyama, Evolution's Eye: A Systems View of the Biology-Culture Divide (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000), 82.
34 “Universal” here is well defined by the psychologist David Buss as “[f]eatures found across cultures, races, and populations are assumed to be more part of human nature than those features that are unique to certain subgroups or individuals” (David M. Buss, “Evolutionary Biology and Personality Psychology: Toward a Conception of Human Nature and Individual Differences,” American Psychologist 39, no. 10 (1984): 1135-1147, 1138). See also Richard Dawkins, River Out of Eden: A Darwinian View of Life (London: Phoenix, 1996), 45f.
35 See Sarah S. Richardson & Stevens Hallam (eds.), Postgenomics: Perspectives on Biology After the Genome (Durham: Duke University Press, 2015) and Haraway, Simians.
36 John Tooby & Leda Cosmides, “The Psychological Foundations of Culture,” in Jerome H. Barkow, Leda Cosmides, & John Tooby (eds.), The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation of Culture (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 23-26; Pinker, Blank, 30-104. Interestingly, see Christian Smith for a not dissimilar critique, but from the area of sociology itself (Smith, Person?, ch. 1). Yet Smith does not agree with theories such as Tooby and Cosmides’ that he calls “naturalistic positivist empiricism” (Smith, Person?, 4).
37 John Tooby & Leda Cosmides, “Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation of Culture, Part I: Theoretical Considerations,” Ethology and Sociobiology 10, no. 1–3 (1989): 29-49, 34f.
38 Pinker, Blank, 143. For a problematization of that description, see David Reich, Who We Are and How We Got Here: Ancient DNA and the New Science of the Human Past (New York: Pantheon Books, 2018).
39 For a discussion on replicators versus vehicles and ‘survival machines’, see Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene, 30th Anniversary ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 19.
40 Conor Cunningham, Darwin's Pious Idea: Why the Ultra-Darwinists and Creationists Both Get It Wrong (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 2010), 42. See also David L. Hull, Science as a Process: An Evolutionary Account of the Social and Conceptual Development of Science (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988).
41 Although, as Cunningham argues, if one maintains the replicator/vehicle dualism as part of the theory of evolution then, as he phrases it, one introduces a “pre-Darwinian essentialism” (Cunningham, Darwin's, 67) into the theory of evolution that is in conflict with, in Cunningham’s words, the “very dynamic nature of the biological world, spelled out so well by Darwin” (Cunningham, Darwin's, 58). For how this anti-essentialist understanding has emerged in the last three decades and its implications for the view of nature/nurture, see Maurizio Meloni, “How biology became social, and what it means for social theory,” The Sociological Review 62, no. 3 (2014): 593-614 and further developed in Maurizio Meloni, Impressionable Biologies: From the Archeology of Plasticity to the Sociology of Epigenetics (New York: Routledge, 2019).
42 Jaime C. Confer et al., “Evolutionary Psychology: Controversies, Questions, Prospects, and Limitations,” American Psychologist 65, no. 2 (2010): 110-126, 116. Rightly, David Bjorklund and Anthony Pellegrini state that evolutionary developmental psychology has “come to rephrase the nature-nurture issue, asking not ‘how much’ of any characteristic is due to nature or nurture but rather ‘How do nature and nurture interact to produce a particular pattern of development?’” But, as they continue, “simply restating the question in this way advances the argument little. The developmental systems approach specifies how biological and environmental factors at multiple levels of organization transact to produce a particular pattern of ontogeny” (David F. Bjorklund & Anthony D. Pellegrini, The Origins of Human Nature: Evolutionary Developmental Psychology (Washington: American Psychological Association, 2002), 335).
Similar claims were made for the theory preceding evolutionary psychology, namely that of sociobiology. There was a lively debate about the claims of sociobiology in the late 1970s and early 1980s and much attention was placed on the issue of nature and nurture. See Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology: The New Synthesis (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1975); George W. Barlow & James Silverberg, Sociobiology, Beyond Nature/Nurture?: Reports, Definitions, and Debate (Boulder: Westview Press for the American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1980); Michael Ruse, Sociobiology: Sense or Nonsense? (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1979); Ashley Montagu & Jerome H. Barkow, Sociobiology Examined (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980); John D. Baldwin & Janice I. Baldwin, Beyond Sociobiology (New York: Elsevier, 1982); Marshall Sahlins, The Use and Abuse of Biology: An Anthropological Critique of Sociobiology (London: Tavistock Publications, 1977); and Ullica Segerstråle, Defenders of the Truth: The Battle for Science in the Sociobiology Debate and Beyond (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
43 Michelle Voss Roberts, Body Parts: A Theological Anthropology (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2017), xxiii.
44 John Webster, “Eschatology and Anthropology,” in John Webster, Word and Church: Essays in Christian Dogmatics, 2nd ed., vol. I (London: T&T Clark, 2016), 263; Webster, “Theological,” 24ff.
45 Wolfhart Pannenberg, Anthropology in Theological Perspective, trans. Matthew J. O'Connell (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1985), 16.
46 Ludwig Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, trans. George Eliot (New York: Harper & Row, 1957 [first published 1841]). See also Friedrich Schleiermacher, On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers, trans. Richard Crouter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996 [first published 1799]).
47 For this, see also John Macquarrie, Principles of Christian Theology, revised ed. (London: SCM Press, 1977).
48 See F. LeRon Shults, Reforming Theological Anthropology: After the Philosophical Turn to Relationality (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 2003) and Bo Sandahl, Person, relation och Gud: Konstruktionen av ett relationellt personbegrepp i nutida trinitarisk teologi (PhD, Centrum för teologi och religionsvetenskap, Lunds universitet, 2004).
49 As only one example by a former PhD student of Colin Gunton, see Stephen R. Holmes, The Holy Trinity: Understanding God's Life (Milton Keynes: Paternoster, 2012).
50 Marc Cortez, Theological Anthropology: A Guide for the Perplexed (London: T&T Clark, 2010), 27.
51 Marc Cortez, Christological Anthropology in Historical Perspective: Ancient and Contemporary Approaches to Theological Anthropology (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2016) and Marc Cortez, “The Madness in Our Method: Christology as the Necessary Starting Point for Theological Anthropology,” in Joshua Ryan Farris & Charles Taliaferro (eds.), The Ashgate Research Companion to Theological Anthropology (Farnham: Ashgate, 2015).
52 Kathryn Tanner is just one example, but her impressively concise book, Jesus, Humanity and the Trinity: A Brief Systematic Theology, sums it up well, together with relevant historical references (Kathryn Tanner, Jesus, Humanity and the Trinity: A Brief Systematic Theology (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2001)).
53 Colin E. Gunton, The One, the Three, and the Many: God, Creation, and the Culture of Modernity, The Bampton Lectures 1992 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), xiii. Gunton views “culture” as the result of “human activity” and the relationship between “culture’ and ‘nature” is that “culture takes shape in the context of what is sometimes called nature.” So that, for Gunton, “[t]he created world provides the framework within which human activity takes place” (Gunton, The One, xiii).
54 Gunton, The One, 28. Gunton’s view of Modernity is one that states that Modernity in its very definition should be understood as the rejection of God. As numerous thinkers have pointed out, the view that Modernity is anti-religious and necessarily secularist is more a part of a secularist self-understanding itself rather than an accurate description of the development of Modernity. See Taylor, Secular; Michael Allen Gillespie, The Theological Origins of Modernity (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008); Martinson, Postkristen, 12, 69ff; Sigurdson, Postsekulära; Jayne Svenungsson, Guds återkomst: En studie av gudsbegreppet inom postmodern filosofi (Göteborg: Glänta Produktion, 2004) and Joel Halldorf, Av denna världen? Emil Gustafson, moderniteten och den evangelikala väckelsen (Skellefteå: Artos & Norma bokförlag, 2012).
Конец ознакомительного фрагмента.
Текст предоставлен ООО «ЛитРес».
Прочитайте эту книгу целиком, купив полную легальную версию на ЛитРес.
Безопасно оплатить книгу можно банковской картой Visa, MasterCard, Maestro, со счета мобильного телефона, с платежного терминала, в салоне МТС или Связной, через PayPal, WebMoney, Яндекс.Деньги, QIWI Кошелек, бонусными картами или другим удобным Вам способом.