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Prudence or Practical Wisdom (phronesis): This is one of the most important virtues which helps us to balance our interests with the interests of others. This is the virtue, for example, which helps us to make the decision whether or not to purchase the colour television with stereo sound, or whether to buy the small black and white portable and give the rest of the money to Oxfam. Arguably, without phronesis the remainder of the virtues revert to being mere skills.
Intelligence or Intuition (nous): This is perhaps the basic intellectual virtue in the sense that without it probably few other intellectual virtues could get going. Arguably, without intelligence or intuition nothing else can happen in the mind!
Wisdom (sophia): This is the finished form of all the virtues. Generally speaking, one must have lived to a good age, experienced many things and learned a number of lessons before wisdom is finally cultivated.
The four secondary intellectual virtues are:
Resourcefulness or Good Deliberation (euboulia): This is a form of practical wisdom, and involves knowing where and how to enquire about something so that the best decision can be made. For example, suppose I need a new refrigerator. At the outset this seems to be a perfectly innocuous issue almost completely unconnected with moral concerns. Its relevance, however, will soon be made clear. Resourcefulness will prompt me to examine Which?, the popular consumer guide. This will help me to make a more informed decision about the best fridge to buy.
Understanding (sunesis): This goes beyond the ability to know external facts about the world. To understand something is to recognise all the difficulties and perplexities associated with decision-making. I might choose the best fridge recommended by Which?, but when I get it home it may not fit into my kitchen! In order to understand things I am obliged to deliberate over many interrelated issues.
Judgement (gnome): For a judgement to be a good one it has to take account of what is right and just for all concerned. Suppose, after examining all of the fridges on offer, after measuring my kitchen and so on, I find that my chosen fridge is called ‘The Philippino Special Exploiter’. Its high quality and low price depend upon the poverty and squalid conditions of the Third World workers who help manufacture it. My sympathetic judgement will be not to purchase the fridge and perhaps to begin campaigning on behalf of the exploited workforce.
Cleverness (deinotes): the last of the secondary intellectual virtues. On its own, however, it can hardly be said to be a virtue in the true sense of the word. Cleverness unconnected with judgement can be unscrupulous. A shady second-hand car dealer may be said to be clever, but we would hardly say that he was in possession of a virtue.
Doctrine of the mean
According to the Aristotelian argument we all have the potential to develop these moral and intellectual virtues. However, it is likely that only a few people will be able to cultivate the potential virtues into actual virtues. Similarly, all acorns have the potential to become actual oak trees, but only some of them will become so. Moreover, if we are to cultivate our virtues, particularly our moral virtues, we must be aware of the doctrine of the mean. Put simply, we must regulate our emotions and responses to people and situations so that we are eventually able to conduct ourselves with dignity. We must try to ensure that we veer away from either the excess or deficiency, and so hit the ‘mean’ or midway point, although Aristotle is quick to mention that the midway point is not just a numerical halfway house.
For example, I have the clear capacity to feel intense anger at my computer when it fails to work. I accept my anger for what it is – a natural feeling or emotional response. However, it is my attitude towards that feeling which is crucial. I could, for example, set about my computer with a hammer in order to release my feelings. But this would be to exhibit a poorly developed virtue. On the other hand, I could simply not bother about the failure of my computer, do nothing about it and give up on writing altogether. This would be an equally poor response. The right response would be to control the anger, take the computer to a repair shop, and then hire or borrow another one for the intervening period. My feelings, no matter how overwhelming they are, should not drown my reason. Feelings are clearly important, but our virtues – our attitudes towards our feelings – are more important. What matters is what we do with our feelings so that eventually they can conform naturally to that which reason would advocate. Aristotle makes the point that children have to learn the virtues through habit. They must learn that they cannot simply give vent to all their feelings in whatever way they wish and whenever they want. Although the six-year-old may initially give vent to her emotions in the supermarket by screaming that she wants the chocolate bar, she must gradually learn that the feelings of anger and resentment at being denied it are perfectly natural. However, she must control that anger and resentment and develop a sense of patience instead. Arguably, adulthood is about learning to control and direct one’s emotions. In other words, it is about developing the moral virtues.
By constantly learning through habit to control our feelings we should, according to Aristotle, begin to:
have these feelings at the right times on the right grounds towards the right people for the right motive and in the right way … (this is) … to feel them to an intermediate, that is, to the best degree; and this is the mark of virtue (p. 101).
There is the obvious criticism that this approach to moral reasoning leads to a kind of blind uniformity of belief, desire and behaviour. The intention, it would seem, is to produce an automatic response in people to other people and to situations. This would perhaps be so, if Aristotle had not emphasised the importance of the intellectual virtues along with the moral virtues. Not only is it necessary for us to feel and behave in the right or appropriate manner, but we should also understand and know why it is important that we feel and act in these ways.
Friendship as the main aim of a moral life
Finally, without friendship none of the virtues – either moral or intellectual – would be of any value. For Aristotle, friendship is essential. We are social and political beings.
Nobody would choose to live without friends even if he had all the other good things (p. 258).
A community, a society, a state, any gathering of two or more people presupposes a notion of friendship, and depends upon it. Households, marriages, partnerships, clubs, societies, etc, all depend upon sustaining a forum within which friendships can be fostered and maintained. Again, Aristotle makes the point that:
Friendship also seems to be the bond that holds communities together … (p. 258).
Indeed, friendship is of such primary importance that it comes before justice itself. In fact without friendship there could be no sense of justice. The lawmaker, the lawgiver and the law-enforcer all derive their rationale from acting as the supposed legally-appointed ‘friend’ of everyone in the community, and of ensuring that the community fosters the right conditions under which friendship may flourish.
… lawgivers seem to attach more importance to it than to justice; because concord seems to be something like friendship, and concord is their primary object – that and eliminating faction, which is enmity … indeed friendliness is considered to be justice in the fullest sense (p. 258–9).
Briefly, there are three kinds of friendship, according to Aristotle: based on utility, pleasure and goodness.
Utility friendships are those which are, as the name suggests, simply useful to us. Utility friends are those with whom we find ourselves in company at work, those next to us on the factory assembly line. It is convenient for both parties to engage in pleasant and friendly conversation in order to while away the time whilst doing something tedious and dissatisfying. The friendship is useful in that it is an aid to comfort. Moreover, there may be more than just pleasant mutual gain in the friendship; it may be useful for the completion of a game or a project. For example, it clearly helps if team members do actually get on with each other when a cricket or netball tour is arranged. Or the friendship may be formed deliberately to cater for plain personal need. Here Aristotle cites the elderly as a group who form utility friendships. For example, someone is needed to push the wheelchair or fetch the shopping. Or again, friendship may be sought in order to further one’s own personal advantage. Here it is the middle-aged who actively cultivate utility friendships – perhaps the businessman who purposefully cultivates a friendship with a local bank manager in order to secure a business loan. According to Aristotle, most friendships in the worlds of industry, business and commerce are utility friendships.
Pleasurable or Erotic friendships are slightly better than the first type. Here, friends give us pleasure, and the friendship evolves through feelings and emotions. The relationship is governed more by the heart than by the head. Friends are pleasurable to be with because they may be witty, amusing or attractive. Friendships between the young are generally of this kind. They tend to be impermanent, and are often based on sexual attraction.
Perfect friendships are based on goodness and are obviously the most valuable. Here friends care more about the other person than about themselves. Moreover, it means liking or loving the other person for what she/he is, not for any incidental quality that they might possess, such as beauty. Such friends have similar attributes, and such friendships only occur after a long while. The relationship needs time to develop. According to Aristotle, ‘You cannot get to know each other until you have eaten the proverbial quantity of salt together.’ This apparently is a medimnos or one and a half bushels. In other words, the friends need to share many meals together; mealtimes traditionally being times of social chatting, anecdote-telling and story-swapping. Finally, there are few truly good friendships for there are few truly good people.
Criticisms
According to some scholars (e.g. Ackrill 1981; Lloyd 1968; Taylor 1955), Aristotle’s account of ethics is, in fact, simply a detailed elaboration of a very orthodox Greek view of aristocratic living. It is easy to cultivate the virtues when the mortgage is fully paid up, the children are looked after by a nanny, and one’s inheritance pays for the daily needs and wants. Life for the Athenian (or Macedonian) aristocrat was relatively easy, being purchased with the help of a slave population and an underclass of women.
And so, from a singular and contemporary vantage point it would not be too difficult to savage Aristotle’s entire system by a process of selective analysis. Firstly, he is, through modern eyes, overtly racist. Any non-Greek is likely to be barbarous and sub-human, and therefore, a clear candidate for slavery. Friendships of utility are the only kinds of friendships one could have with ‘a foreigner’. Secondly, Aristotle appears blatantly sexist. He accepts unquestioningly the supposedly natural, paternalistic hierarchy of relationships in which ‘man rules by merit but hands over to his wife such duties as are best suited to her’(!) (p. 276). Thirdly, he is what Singer would call speciesist. Animals exist on an ontological level clearly below humans and barely above plants. ‘Animals have no share in happiness, being completely incapable of such activity’ (p. 333). According to Aristotle, animals cannot be happy because happiness depends upon the exercise of reason in order to pursue the virtuous life. As animals do not possess reason they, therefore, are incapable of achieving any happiness. However, what we now know of animals’ physiology and behaviour leads us to suspect that, to a degree, they can reason about their environment, and often do exhibit many of the signs of being happy. But, as with all issues in philosophy, it rather depends upon the meanings we wish to attach to words, in this case ‘reason’ and ‘happiness’. Fourthly, Aristotle is ageist given his clear dictum that no one would want to befriend the old and the sour-tempered, the one being synonymous with the other. And fifthly, his moral theory is élitist, in that only magnanimous men, honourable politicians and philosophers can truly know and exercise all of the virtues, and are therefore the only ones to appreciate fully the Good Life.
However, such a critique is unfair. Aristotle was ‘culture-bound’ and could not have transcended all of the conceptual constraints of his time and culture. Our criticism must be tempered by historical understanding. Such a defence cuts no ice with Russell, however, who stated:
The book (Ethics) appeals to the respectable middle-aged, and has been used by them, especially since the seventeenth century, to repress the ardours and enthusiasms of the young. But to a man with any depth of feeling it is likely to be repulsive … There is … an almost complete absence of what may be called benevolence or philanthropy. The sufferings of mankind … do not move him … More generally there is an emotional poverty in the Ethics (B. Russell History of Western Philosophy, p. 195).
Questions for discussion
1 Argue either for or against the view that the moral life consists in ‘feeling the right things at the right times, on the right grounds, towards the right people for the right motive …’
2 What additions, subtractions and/or modifications would you wish to make to Aristotle’s list of intellectual and moral virtues?
3 Is happiness the Supreme Good? If so, in what does happiness consist?
4 How far does Aristotle’s classification of friendship correspond with what we know about human relationships?
5 Is Russell’s criticism of Aristotle fair? How might the criticism be rebutted?
6 Analyse critically Aristotle’s theory of the soul and his doctrine of the mean.
FOUR
Aquinas, Natural Law and Proportionalism
To disparage the dictate of reason is equivalent to condemning the command of God.
St Thomas Aquinas
The Natural Law approach to morality has a long history. Cicero in De Re Publica describes natural law as follows:
True law is right reason in agreement with nature. It is applied universally and is unchanging and everlasting … there will be no different laws in Rome and in Athens, or different laws now and in the future, but one eternal and unchangeable law will be valid for all nations and all times, and there will be one master and ruler, that is God …
However, it was Aristotle who really developed this approach and Aquinas (1225–74) built on his thought. The writings of Aristotle had been lost in the West and preserved amongst the Islamic scholars of the East. They were reintroduced into Western thought shortly before Aquinas took up his position as a professor at the University of Paris.
Aquinas considered that natural law was the moral code which human beings are naturally inclined towards. God reveals specific commands but these do not go against natural law but rather further and develop it. This reflected Aquinas’ approach to theology generally by which natural theology (which was based on human reason) did not go against revealed theology (which was based on revelation by God). Aquinas said that the moral life is the life which is lived ‘according to reason’ and, indeed, acting in accordance with reason was the same as acting as a Christian would act. Aquinas’ main difference from natural law philosophers who did not believe in God was that he considered that human beings were immortal and any moral theory and understanding of natural law had, therefore, to take account of the belief that the purpose of human existence did not lie entirely in this life.
Aquinas argued that the first priority laid down by natural law was that the self had to be preserved not just in this life but beyond the grave. If the self gave in to non-rational desires, then it became enslaved. It was possible to arrive at the natural or cardinal virtues (prudence, temperance, fortitude and justice, taken from Aristotle) by the use of reason alone. The Ten Commandments (with the exception of the command to keep the Sabbath day holy) were held to be examples of natural virtues. These natural virtues are expanded by the revealed virtues (of faith, hope and charity – derived from St Paul, cf. 1 Corinthians 13:13) and Aquinas held that the greater the extent to which these are developed by the individual, the greater will be the obedience to natural law.
The starting point for all advocates of natural law is to work out the purpose of human life. For Aquinas, this purpose included to live, to reproduce, to learn, to have an ordered society and to worship God. Reason is used to find out God’s intention and the purpose of human existence and this will enable one to arrive at the principles of natural law.
Unlike Augustine and some of the later Christian reformers such as Calvin, Aquinas did not consider that human nature was totally corrupted. He considered that human nature, even though imperfect, was a reasonable guide to what human nature should be – since it was created by God. For Aquinas, there is no category of human beings that are in some way enslaved by a depraved nature – there is an equality of all human beings and in all human beings there is a necessary link between their happiness and their virtuous behaviour. Aquinas therefore starts from his experience of people and he expects to find natural law at work in every society in the world since all societies are made up of human beings who share a common nature. Natural law can be deduced from an examination of human nature and the ends for which human beings are created.
When we term God as good from our human perspective, Aquinas maintained that we name him as the goal of all desires or that to which all desires tend. Natural law can show all human beings what is good – religion is not needed for this and this is similar to St Paul’s claim that the law is written in the hearts of all men (Romans 2:14ff). Reason can bring people to act rationally to develop the virtues. For Aquinas, ‘God is good’ is analytic in that it expresses a truth about God (that God is fully whatever it is to be God), but it is also synthetic as God represents the goal and destiny of all human beings, even though human beings may not recognise this. Aquinas based this idea on ‘fitness for purpose’ – since he held that humans were made by God for fellowship with God it follows that God, as their creator, must be the means by which human happiness will be found. Aquinas did not consider that morality was based on commands from God – a position which William of Ockham held as he considered that morality was based on revelation – Ockham held that if God commanded adultery then this would be right because of the command. Aquinas considered that if this was the case then God’s commands could be irrational and arbitrary. Instead God makes human beings with a certain nature and this nature enables human beings to use their reason and their experience to understand what is right.
Aquinas considered, following Aristotle, that all men will the good. Human beings may seek some apparent good, but this is not a true good – it is only an apparent good because it does not conform to the perfection of the human nature which all human beings share. Aquinas considered that there is an ‘ideal’ human nature which we all have the potential to live up to or to fall away from and our moral actions are crucial in determining where we stand in this respect. If a person does something that is morally wrong, he or she will do this because they consider this to be a good although the possibility of the individual being mistaken certainly exists (examples might include smoking, drinking too much or even taking drugs). Aquinas says that: ‘A fornicator seeks a pleasure which involves him in moral guilt’ (Summa Theologica 1a, 19, 9). The fornicator seeks a pleasure which he thinks is a good, but this is only an apparent good as it diminishes a human being’s nature.
Sin, for Aquinas, involves a falling short from the good – it means a human being becoming less than he or she is intended by God for him or her to be. To pursue an apparent good rather than the real good is to fall short of our real potential – it is to ‘get it wrong’ and to be mistaken. No one seeks evil for itself, it is only sought as an apparent good and therefore rests on a mistake. Hitler and Stalin did not seek to do evil – they sought what they thought were goods but they were mistaken – they strove for apparent rather than real goods. Sin is a theological word but there is no real difference between this theological idea and acting against reason. Aquinas says: ‘the theologian considers sin principally as an offence against God, whereas the moral philosopher considers it as being contrary to reason’ (S. T. 1a, 11ae, 71, 6, ad 5).
Since Aquinas argued that it is possible to be mistaken in which goods are chosen, it is obviously necessary to determine what is the right thing for a person to aim for. In essence, this is what discussion of natural law is about – seeking to explore what is the right good to aim for. Human beings have the ability, using their will and reason, to make deliberate moral choices (S. T. 1a, 11ae, 1, 1) which Aquinas terms ‘human acts’ to distinguish them from those acts performed by a person which are based on instinct. However, human reason must be used correctly, which leads Aquinas to talk of the ‘right use of reason’ – reason may be used to plan a murder or to decide to be virtuous, but only in the second case is reason being used ‘rightly’. This obviously raises the problem of how one determines what is the ‘right’ use of reason when there are genuine differences of opinion as to what is good in a particular situation. A person’s reason and their will both work together to help determine the choice they will make – if a person uses their reason correctly to determine what is right and then wills to do it this is, according to Aquinas, a free choice.
A person may will to make a morally wrong choice which he or she does not carry through – perhaps because the choice is not available. A man may, for instance, decide to defraud his employer of a substantial sum of money but he never gets the chance because he is moved to a new job.
Aquinas distinguished ‘interior acts’ and ‘exterior acts’ and is clear that the former are the most important – indeed morally good or bad acts are generally interior acts. An act may be good in itself but done for a wrong intention – for instance giving to charity may be good in itself but if it is done in order to attract praise then there is a bad intention (‘for instance, we say that to give alms for the sake of vainglory is bad’ (S.T., 1a, 11ae, 20, 1)). This does not entail that intention alone is decisive. As Copleston says in his book Thomas Aquinas:
As Aquinas says, there are some things which cannot be justified by any alleged good intention … If I steal money from a man in order to give it to someone else, my action is not justified by my good intention … It is not possible to father on Aquinas the view that the end justifies the means … (p. 207).
In every act or proposed act, Aquinas considers that the will aims towards some end – in other words there is something which is considered to be a good (whether it is, in fact, a good or not). Aquinas needs, therefore, to establish the aim or end towards which human actions are to be directed.
Aquinas’ answer is, perhaps, not unexpected. Considering that he was a Christian theologian writing from a world that was steeped in Christian thought only one final end could possibly be posited – and that is God. This raises the obvious question of those people who do not accept the existence of God and it might seem that their ends or aims would be different from those of the believer. Aquinas is by no means the only advocate of a natural law approach to morality and his understanding differs from others such as Aristotle due to his belief in a personal God. This leads Aquinas to maintain that not only do human beings in general have a purpose beyond death, but each individual also has a particular purpose which is directly related to each person’s talents and abilities. Hugo Grotius claimed in 1625 (in Prolegomena II) that the foundations of natural law would be valid even if there was no God and Aristotle would have agreed with this, but in the absence of God the understanding of natural law would be significantly different as there would then be no life after death and thus the purpose of human existence would be changed. In addition, if God did not implant natural law in human beings then it might be argued that there was no reason why an individual should obey natural law.