Imperialism and Mr. Gladstone

BEACONSFIELD KEEPS COOL

It certainly is a relief that the drenching rhetoric has at length ceased – but I have never read a word of it. "Satis eloquentiæ sapientiæ parum."

THE MAIWAND DISASTER (1880)

Telegram from Thomson at Teheran says: Ayub Khan marching against Candahar with large force. I think we should leave Shere Ali to defend himself beyond the Helmund, but it seems to me, after communicating with Stewart, that it would be inconsistent with security of our military position at Candahar to allow hostile forces to cross that river. I propose, therefore, to instruct Primrose, if Ayub reaches Furrah, to advance towards Girishk with sufficient force to prevent passage of Helmund…

29th.– Arrived here yesterday afternoon with General Burrows and Nuttall and remnant of force. Telegraph has been interrupted ever since my arrival. No chance of restoration, so send this by messenger to Chaman. Burrows marched from Kushk-i-Nakhud on morning 27th, having heard from me that Ayub's advanced guard had occupied Maiwand, about three miles from the latter place. Enemy's cavalry appeared advancing from direction of Haidrabad, their camp on Helmund ten miles above Girishk. Artillery and cavalry engaged them at 9 a.m., so shortly afterwards whole force of enemy appeared, and formed line of battle – seven regiments, regulars in centre, three others in reserve; about 2,000 cavalry on right; 400 mounted men and 2,000 Ghazis and irregular infantry on left; other cavalry and irregulars in reserve; five or six batteries of guns, including one of breechloaders, distributed at intervals. Estimated total force, 12,000. Ground slightly undulating, enemy being well posted. Till 1 p.m. action confined to artillery fire, which so well sustained and directed by enemy that our superior quality armament failed to compensate for inferior number of guns. After development of rifle fire, our breechloaders told; but vigorous advance of cavalry against our left, and Ghazis along the front, caused native infantry to fall back in confusion on 66th, abandoning two guns. Formation being lost, infantry retreated slowly; and in spite of gallant efforts of General Burrows to rally them, were cut off from cavalry and artillery. This was at 3 p.m., and followers and baggage were streaming away towards Candahar. After severe fighting in enclosed ground, General Burrows succeeded in extricating infantry and brought them into line of retreat. Unfortunately no effort would turn fugitives from main road, waterless at this season. Thus majority casualties appear to have occurred from thirst and exhaustion. Enemy's pursuit continued to ten miles from Candahar, but was not vigorous. Cavalry, artillery, and a few infantry reached banks of Argandab, forty miles from scene of action, at 7 a.m., many not having tasted water since previous morning. Nearly all ammunition lost, with 400 Martini, 700 Sniders, and 2 nine-pounder guns. Estimated loss, killed, and missing: 66th, 400; Grenadiers, 350; Jacob's Rifles, 350; artillery, 40; sappers, 21; cavalry, 60… Preparations being now made for siege…

… Between two and three o'clock the fire of the enemy's guns slackened, and swarms of Ghazis advanced rapidly towards our centre. Up to this time the casualties among the infantry had not been heavy, and as the men were firing steadily, and the guns were sweeping the ground with case shot, I felt confident as to the result. But our fire failed to check the Ghazis; they came on in overwhelming numbers, and, making good their rush, they seized the two most advanced horse artillery guns. With the exception of two companies of Jacob's Rifles, which had caused me great anxiety by their unsteadiness early in the day, the conduct of the troops had been splendid up to this point; but now, at the critical moment, when a firm resistance might have achieved a victory, the infantry gave way, and, commencing from the left, rolled up, like a wave, to the right. After vainly endeavouring to rally them, I went for the cavalry… The 3rd Light Cavalry and the 3rd Sind Horse were retiring slowly on our left, and I called upon them to charge across our front and so give the infantry an opportunity of reforming; but the terrible artillery fire to which they had been exposed, and from which they had suffered so severely, had so shaken them that General Nuttall was unable to give effect to my order. All was now over…

I would most respectfully wish to bring to the Commander-in-Chief's notice the gallant and determined stand made by the officers and men of the 66th Regiment at Maiwand… 10 officers and 275 non-commissioned officers and men were killed, and 2 officers and 30 non-commissioned officers and men wounded. These officers and men nearly all fell fighting desperately for the honour of their Queen and country. I have it on the authority of a Colonel of Artillery of Ayub Khan's army that a party of the 66th Regiment, which he estimated at one hundred officers and men, made a most determined stand in a garden. They were surrounded by the whole Afghan Army, and fought on until only eleven men were left, inflicting enormous loss upon the enemy. These eleven charged out of the garden, and died with their faces to the foe, fighting to the death. Such was the nature of their charge and the grandeur of their bearing that, although the whole of the Ghazis were assembled around them, not one dared approach to cut them down. Thus standing in the open, back to back, firing steadily and truly, every shot telling, surrounded by thousands, these eleven officers and men died; and it was not until the last man had been shot down that the Ghazis dared advance upon them.

THE BRADLAUGH CASE (1880)

We may regard the episode of Tuesday's resolution, and its natural sequence in the imprisonment of Mr. Bradlaugh for defying the authority of the House, as now at an end… We regret unfeignedly, as we have all along done, that Mr. Bradlaugh was not permitted to make affirmation, instead of taking an oath, when he first asked to be allowed to do so… But opportunity of creating a precedent consonant with reason and common sense has been let slip, and in default of a reasonable precedent the only manly course now seems to be to supply its place by fresh legislation. If the personal question of Mr. Bradlaugh and his very unsavoury opinions can once be got out of the way, there are probably very few members of the House of Commons, and very few sensible Englishmen, however strong their religious opinions, who would not acknowledge the anomaly, the inexpediency, and the injustice of making the Parliamentary oath of allegiance more stringent and more exclusive than the existing statutory provisions for securing truth of testimony and uprightness of conduct.

SOCIAL AMELIORATIONS (1880)

PARNELL AND THE LAND LEAGUE (1880)

Depend upon it that the measure of the Land Bill of next session will be the measure of your activity and energy this winter; it will be the measure of your determination not to pay unjust rents; it will be the measure of your determination to keep a firm grip of your homesteads; it will be the measure of your determination not to bid for farms from which others have been evicted, and to use the strong force of public opinion to deter any unjust men among yourselves – and there are many such – from bidding for such farms. If you refuse to pay unjust rents, if you refuse to take farms from which others have been evicted, the Land Question must be settled, and settled in a way that will be satisfactory to you. It depends, therefore, upon yourselves, and not upon any Commission or any Government. When you have made this question ripe for settlement, then, and not till then, will it be settled… Now what are you to do to a tenant who bids for a farm from which another tenant has been evicted? [Several voices, "Shoot him!"] I think I heard somebody say, "Shoot him!" I wish to point out to you a very much better way – a more Christian and charitable way – which will give the lost man an opportunity of repenting. When a man takes a farm from which another has been unjustly evicted, you must show him on the roadside when you meet him, you must show him in the streets of the town, you must show him in the shop, you must show him in the fair-green and in the market-place, and even in the place of worship, by leaving him alone, by putting him into a moral Coventry, by isolating him from the rest of his country as if he were the leper of old – you must show him your detestation of the crime he has committed.

CAPTAIN BOYCOTT (1880)

Captain Boycott's case, from the time when attention was first drawn to it, has inspired general and increasing interest, which in the north of Ireland has taken the practical form of the relief expedition despatched yesterday to the shores of Lough Mask. It is well understood on both sides that the persecution of Captain Boycott is only a typical instance of the system by which the peasantry are attempting to carry into effect the instructions of the Land League. Into the merits of Captain Boycott's relations with the tenants on Lord Erne's estates it is quite unnecessary to enter. He has been beleaguered in his house near Ballinrobe; he is excluded from intercourse, not merely with the people around him, but with the neighbouring towns; his crops are perishing, because such is the organized intimidation in the district that no labourers would dare to be seen working in his fields. It is certain that any ordinary workman whom Captain Boycott might hire would be subjected to brutal violence, as indeed has already happened to servants and others who ventured even to fetch his letters for him from the nearest post-office.

THE BOER RISING (1880)

BEFORE MAJUBA (1881)

We give this morning an account from our correspondent at Pretoria of the meeting held by the Boers last month for the purpose of protesting against the annexation of the Transvaal. The report of the proceedings leaves no doubt of the extent and nature of Boer disaffection… That the annexation of the Transvaal may have been necessary when the step was taken may be admitted without prejudice to the question whether its permanent occupation and administration by British authority is desirable or not. When Sir Theophilus Shepstone annexed the territory, the Government was disorganized, the Treasury was bankrupt, the Republican troops were hopelessly demoralized, and the whole district was threatened by two powerful native chiefs, the weaker of whom had proved his superiority to any force which the Boers could bring against him. Now Cetywayo and Secocoeni are captives, and the whole border is tranquil. We have done for the Boers what it is certain they could not have done for themselves, and we have placed the security of the South African Colonies beyond all reasonable fear. Hence it might be argued that the reasons which compelled the temporary annexation of the Transvaal are no longer applicable in favour of its permanent occupation. It may be argued that we cannot recede where we have once advanced; certainly we cannot, where we have good reason to believe that our security requires that we should maintain our hold. But when our presence is manifestly unwelcome, and when the question of the best mode of guarding our security in future is at least an open one, it would be a very contemptible piece of national vanity to refuse to recede, simply because we had once found it necessary to advance in very different circumstances.

AFTER MAJUBA

RITUAL CONTROVERSY (1881)

… The immediate need of our Church is, in our opinion, a tolerant recognition of divergent ritual practice; but we feel bound to submit to your Grace that our present troubles are likely to recur, unless the Courts by which ecclesiastical causes are decided in the first instance and on appeal can be so constructed as to secure the conscientious obedience of clergymen who believe the constitution of the Church of Christ to be of Divine appointment, and who protest against the State's encroachment upon Rights assured to the Church of England by solemn Acts of Parliament…