Anglo-Dutch Rivalry during the First Half of the Seventeenth Century

PREFACE

The varying fortunes of the obstinate and fiercely contested struggles with the Dutch for maritime and commercial supremacy in the days of the Commonwealth and the Restoration are familiar to all readers of English history, and especially of English naval history. Never did English seamen fight better than in these Dutch wars, and never did they meet more redoubtable foes. The details of the many dogged contests marked by alternate victory and defeat are now more or less unintelligible save to the expert in the naval strategy and tactics of the times, but legends have grown round the story of Martin Tromp sailing down the Channel with a broom at his mast-head, and of the exploit of Michael de Ruyter in burning the English ships at Chatham, which are never likely to be forgotten. The names of these two famous seamen are probably better known to Englishmen than those of any of the contemporary English admirals save that of Robert Blake alone. This fact should bespeak for the attempt that is here made to trace the causes and the growth of the Anglo-Dutch rivalry at sea and in commerce, which culminated in the collision between Blake and Tromp off Dover on May 29, 1652, and the declaration of war that followed. It has been my object in these Ford Lectures to treat of the relations between England and the United Provinces during the half-century that preceded the first outbreak of hostilities, and to make it clear that these wars of 1652-4, 1665-7, 1672-4 were the inevitable outcome of a long-continued clashing of interests, which were of fundamental importance and indeed vital to the welfare of both nations.

The first half of the seventeenth century was one of the most critical periods in English history. In any account of the reigns of the first two sovereigns of the House of Stewart political and religious questions of primary significance thrust themselves into the foreground of a picture full of deepening dramatic interest, with the result that other questions, apparently subordinate but in reality closely bound up with the national destinies, have been either relegated to the background or wholly overlooked and neglected. It has been so in regard to the questions dealt with in these pages.

The history of the revolt of the Netherlands and of the rise of the Dutch Republic shows to us Englishmen and Dutchmen united by bonds of sympathy and fighting side by side against a common foe. To both alike the Spaniard and the Inquisition were hateful, and in shedding their blood freely for the cause of Dutch freedom Englishmen were in fact acting in their own self-defence against the ambitious projects of Philip II. At first sight then it appears strange that the conclusion of the truce for twelve years in 1609 should have been followed by a coolness and growing estrangement in the relations between the two countries, and by a series of endless bickerings, grievances, and disputes which all the resources of diplomacy in protracted negotiations proved unable to settle amicably to the satisfaction of both parties. The truth is that the very points of resemblance in the racial characteristics of the English and the Dutch brought them into collision in almost every part of the world. Born colonizers, traders, and explorers, each people was instinctively conscious that its destiny was upon the water, and that mastery of the seas was a necessity of national existence. Hence a rivalry which was unavoidable, inexorable, a rivalry which could eventually have only one of two issues, either the voluntary submission of one of the rivals to the other, or a trial of strength by ordeal of battle.

James I and Charles I, whatever the deficiencies and mistakes of their foreign policies, were not blind to the significance of the appearance of this new sea-power on the other side of the 'narrow seas', and were quick to recognize that the Dutch menace to the essential interests of their island kingdom was at least as formidable as the Spanish menace had ever been. The diplomacy of both these kings was on the face of it vacillating, uncertain, and opportunist, but it is unjust to attribute this wholly to constitutional infirmity of purpose, or to an innate propensity to carry through their schemes by tortuous by-ways and dubious intrigues. There was no lack of steadfast determination on the part either of James or Charles in their resolute attempts to conduct the government and administration of their kingdoms autocratically without that adequate financial aid which Parliament alone could grant. But in consequence their treasury was generally empty, and it is therefore not surprising that, confronted with the constant fear of imminent bankruptcy, they were compelled to be shifty in their dealings with foreign powers, and to work for the achievement of their ends by the processes of a devious diplomacy rather than risk the costly charges of an appeal to arms. Nevertheless it will be seen that in their negotiations with the United Provinces never for a single moment would either James or Charles make the slightest concession in regard to the claims of the British Crown to undisputed sovereignty 'in the narrow seas', and they insisted that every foreign vessel should recognize that sovereignty by striking its flag when meeting a British war-ship in those waters.

The period with which I am dealing was one of chartered companies, of trade monopolies, and of commercial protection in its most aggressive form. Probably at that stage in the world's history no other economical system was conceivable or would have proved workable. In any case most of the disputes and differences between the English and the Dutch at this time arose from questions connected with trading privileges, and these lectures contain much concerning them. It is still, however, extremely interesting and not without instruction to read the arguments that were used and the principles that were upheld by these statesmen and diplomatists of former days. Economical questions are always with us, and men's opinions differ now as to their right solution as much as they did three centuries ago.

11 Sumner Place, S.W.

May 24, 1911.

I: 1600-1610

The last two decades of the sixteenth century hold a place apart in English History. The exploits of the great Elizabethan seamen helped to shatter the supremacy of Spain upon the sea, but they did more than this. They aroused in the English people the instinct of their true destiny, as a maritime, trading, and colonizing power. The granting of Charters to the Eastland (Baltic) Company (1579), to the Levant Company (1581), to the Guinea Company (1588), the foundation of the great East India Company (1600), the opening out by the Muscovy Company of a new trade route to Persia by way of Astrachan, the daring efforts to discover a North-West and a North-East passage to Cathay and the Indies, the first attempts to erect colonies in Virginia and Newfoundland, all testify to the spirit of enterprise which animated the nation, a spirit whose many-sided activity never failed to command the Queen's sympathy and encouragement. In thus entering, however, upon that path of colonial and commercial expansion which in later times was to become world-wide, the Englishman found himself in the first half of the seventeenth century confronted by a more formidable rival than the Spaniard. The defeat of the Invincible Armada was followed1 by the rise of a new Sea-Power. At the opening of the seventeenth century the Dutch Republic had not only succeeded in resisting all the efforts made for its subjugation to Spanish rule, but, after more than thirty years of continuous and desperate struggle, was thriving in the midst of war. In the course of that struggle much help had been given, both in money and men, by Elizabeth. But the English Queen was not for many years whole-hearted in her support. She saw in the revolt of the Netherlands a means for draining the resources of a dangerous adversary. It was no small relief to her that the coast lying opposite to the mouth of the Thames, with its many ports and hardy sea-faring population, should no longer be at the disposal of the master of the strongest navy in the world. She felt a certain amount of sympathy with the Dutch on religious grounds, but a sympathy tempered by political considerations, and strictly subordinated to them. To support the rebellion of subjects against their legitimate ruler was to the instincts of the Tudor Queen a course which only necessity could justify. Hence her repeated refusal of the proffered sovereignty, her niggardly aid, her temporizing and apparently capricious attitude. As a matter of fact, throughout this critical period of her reign the policy of Elizabeth was not governed either by sentiment or by caprice. She always kept steadily in view the welfare and the security of England, with whose interests those of her own throne were identified, and she held aloof from entanglements which might be dangerous to the safety of her kingdom. Not until after the assassination of William the Silent, followed by the success of Parma in capturing Antwerp, August, 1585, did she make reply to the threatening attitude of Spain by openly taking sides with the rebel provinces. Still refusing the sovereignty, she sent Leicester at the head of a strong body of English troops to act in her name, as Governor-General, at the same time characteristically bargaining that the seaports Flushing and Brill with the fort of Rammekens should be delivered to her in pledge for the repayment of her costs. The mission of Leicester was a failure, whether it be regarded from the military or the political standpoint, but it gave the Dutch at a transition period of disorganization and pressing peril a disciplined force to assist in their defence, and a breathing space for recuperation.

The resignation of his post by Leicester (April, 1588) may be taken as the date at which the history of the United Netherlands as a self-governing State really begins. The treaty with England still subsisted by the terms of which the Commander of the English auxiliary troops with two colleagues had seats in the Council of State, but the Council of State ceased ere long to have any but executive functions. The conduct of affairs affecting the whole Union was vested in the States-General as representing the States of the seven sovereign provinces from which its authority was derived. A more cumbrous system of government than that under which the United Provinces were now to develop rapidly into a powerful and flourishing State, probably never existed. That it was workable was due to two facts. The voices of the provinces were nominally of equal weight in the States-General, in reality that of Holland was dominant. Holland contributed 60 per cent. of the general expenses and contained about one-half of the entire population of the Union. With Zeeland she furnished almost the whole of the navy and was already becoming one of the most thriving centres of commerce in the world. At this time the influence of an exceptionally able statesman, John van Oldenbarneveldt, who filled the office of Advocate of Holland, was supreme in the States of that province, and as their representative and spokesman he was able to exercise an authority in the States-General which placed for thirty years in his hands the general administration of the country and the control of foreign affairs. By his side stood Maurice of Nassau, respected and honoured as the son of William the Silent, wielding as Captain and Admiral-General authority over all the armed forces of the Republic, and exercising as Stadholder of five provinces large executive powers. A consummate general but no politician, Maurice was content to leave the business of administration and the conduct of diplomacy in the hands of the statesman who had been his father's friend. Thus by the efforts of these two men, each eminent in his separate sphere, the youthful Republic, despite the inherent weaknesses of a confederacy so loosely compacted as that of the United Provinces, was able to carry out a wise and consistent foreign policy, to defend its borders, and meanwhile to thrive and flourish.

The relations between England and the States required the most careful handling during the whole of the period that intervened between the return of Leicester and the death of Elizabeth. The assistance given by the English Queen had not been without a return: it had been fully repaid by the services rendered by the Dutch fleet during the spring and summer of 1588 in blockading the ports in which lay the transports collected by the Duke of Parma for the invasion of England. When the Armada entered the Channel, Parma with his splendid veteran army was thus compelled to remain a helpless spectator of events, unable to take any part in promoting the success of the great enterprise which Philip had been so long preparing. But Elizabeth had been piqued by the opposition that Leicester had encountered, and by the evident determination of the States, under the leadership of Holland, not to permit any interference on the part of the representative of a foreign power with their provincial rights and privileges. She did not withdraw her help, but it was given from motives of pure self-interest rather than from any love for the cause she was supporting, and in a huckstering spirit. With her it was a question of give and take, and the military successes of Maurice, accompanied as they were by the rapid growth of commercial prosperity in Holland and Zeeland, only encouraged her to drive a harder bargain in her negotiations and to press for repayment of the loans she had advanced.

In these circumstances friction in the relations between England and the Republic was at times inevitable, but the community of interests was so strong that friendly co-operation never ceased. An English contingent took part in the campaigns of Maurice; a powerful Dutch squadron sailed with the fleet of Essex to the sack of Cadiz in 1595. The conclusion of peace between France and Spain in May, 1598, brought about a fresh treaty between England and the United Provinces, the terms of which point clearly to the great change which had taken place in the relative position of the two States since the time of Leicester's mission. The Dutch were now in a position to promise the repayment of their debt to Elizabeth by equal annual instalments2 and to undertake in case of a Spanish attack upon England to come to the assistance of their allies with thirty ships of war and a force of 5,000 infantry and five cornets of cavalry. On the other hand, only one Englishman henceforth was to have a seat upon the Council of State, and the English auxiliary troops in the Netherlands were transferred to the service of the States as their paymasters and were required to take an oath of allegiance to them. This English brigade in the Dutch service, now first formed, was to have a long and honourable career. It was speedily to prove its worth and gain immortal fame by the share that it took in winning the great victory of Nieuwport (July 2, 1600), and in the heroic defence of Ostend (1601-4).

Such was the state of things when James I ascended the English throne. From him the Netherlands could hope for little active aid. The chief aim of James's policy from the first was to live on friendly terms with Spain, and in 1604 he concluded a treaty of peace with Philip III and with the Archdukes, as sovereigns of the Netherlands. His attitude to the United Provinces was not indeed unfriendly. He still retained the cautionary towns, as a pledge for the debt, and his representative sat in the Council of State, but as one of the conditions of peace he promised to lend no assistance to the Dutch. The privilege of recruiting in England for the regiments in their service was not withdrawn, but in return a like privilege was extended to the Spaniards. Thus there were occasions on which Englishmen were found fighting against one another on opposite sides. The Court of Madrid on their part, exhausted by the long and costly struggle, were already in 1606 making tentative proposals to the rebel provinces for the conclusion of a peace or truce, and meanwhile spared no efforts to prejudice the mind of James against a people for whose cause as a stanch Protestant it was feared he might have secret leanings, and at the same time to secure his benevolent support in the coming negotiations. The arguments that were used and their effect upon the King are well summed up in the words of the keen-eyed Venetian Ambassador, Nicolò Molin, who in 1607 thus reports: —

'The Spaniards are ceaselessly urging upon the King that for his own interests he ought to use his utmost endeavours in this negotiation in order to bring it to some conclusion, since by continuance of the war the Dutch might come to make themselves masters of those seas. Having their fleets ordinarily of a hundred or more ships, and these widely scattered in different places, they can thus say, and with truth, that they are masters of those seas for the possession of which the ancient kings of England have made very long and very costly wars against the princes of Europe. The King knows all this to be true, but is likewise of opinion that at a single nod of his the Dutch would yield to him all that dominion that they have gained; which without doubt would follow so long as the war with the Spaniards lasted, since they are not able at one and the same time to contend with two of the greatest princes of Christendom. But if with time that ripens affairs peace should be effected between them and the Crown of Spain, I do not know if they would be so ready to yield as the King of England promises himself; since just as this profession of the sea is manifestly more and more on the wane in England, so more and more is it increasing and acquiring force and vigour among the Dutch.'

The perspicacity of this review of the situation was completely justified by the events. On April 9, 1609, after prolonged and acrimonious negotiations, a treaty for a truce of twelve years between the belligerents was signed, but on conditions imposed by the Dutch. To the Spaniards the terrible drain on their resources made a respite from war a matter not of choice, but of necessity. To obtain it they had to treat with the United Provinces 'as if they were an independent State', and, worst of all, they had by a secret clause to concede liberty of trading in the Indies. From this moment the relations of the States with England were sensibly changed. The attitude of King James had hitherto been a mixture of condescension and aloofness, and he had not troubled himself to consider seriously the question of Dutch rivalry upon the seas and in commerce, which had so profoundly impressed the Venetian envoy. Nicolò Molin was in 1607 undoubtedly correct in his supposition that at that date James still looked upon the Dutch as dependents on his favour, who would not venture to run counter to any expression of his will. The course of the negotiations for the truce must have gradually undeceived him, and their issue left him face to face with a power compelled to maintain to the utmost the interests of the extensive commerce on the proceeds of which its very existence as a State depended.

No sooner were the signatures appended to the treaty than James took a step which exposed to a very severe strain his relations with the people whose emancipation from Spanish rule he had, ostensibly at least, worked hard to accomplish. Many indeed in Holland had been suspicious of the real friendliness of his attitude during the negotiations, but very few probably imagined that he was preparing, as soon as they were ended, to put to the test their sense of the value of his services and of his alliance by striking a deadly blow at the most important of their industries. On May 16, 1609, the King issued a proclamation, in which, after stating that though he had hitherto tolerated the promiscuous liberty that had been granted to foreigners to fish in the British seas, he has now determined, seeing that this liberty

'hath not only given occasion of over great Encroachments upon our Regalities, or rather questioning of our Right, but hath been a means of daily Wrongs to our own People that exercise the Trade of Fishing … to give notice to all the World that our express Pleasure is, that from the beginning of the Month of August next coming, no Person of what Nation or Quality soever, be permitted to fish upon any of our Coasts and Seas of Great Britain, Ireland and the rest of the Isles adjacent, until they have orderly demanded and obtain'd Licences from us…'

The news of the publication of this edict caused in Holland no small surprise, not unmingled with indignation. On June 12 the matter was discussed in the States of that Province, and it was resolved3 that the States-General be requested to adopt measures for the vigorous defence of the land's rights as based upon the treaties. The States-General on their part resolved4 that a full inquiry should be made into the question of treaty rights and a special embassy be sent to London, and as early as July 6, King James agreed5 to receive such a deputation, and to appoint commissioners to enter into conference with it on the subject of the privileges and immunities for freedom of commerce claimed in virtue of ancient treaties. Meanwhile the States-General promised the fishermen their protection, at the same time bidding them to be very careful not to give any cause for new complaints on the part of the King. So far indeed were the Dutch from yielding immediate submission to the demand of James, or from admitting its justice, that Sir Ralph Winwood (the resident English ambassador at the Hague), reporting to the Secretary of State, Lord Salisbury, the results of an interview he had had with Oldenbarneveldt September 16, 1609, informs him: —

'the States do write expressly to their ambassador [Noel Caron] urging him to advertise his Majesty their purpose to send to beseech him upon the necessity of this affair [i.e. liberty of fishing] in the meantime to have patience with their people trading upon his coast that without impeachment they may use their accustomed Liberty and antient Privelidges; which he [Oldenbarneveldt] said they were so far from fear that his Majesty upon due consideration will abridge, as that they hope he will be pleased to inlarge and increase into new ones.'6

For a right understanding of the importance of the fisheries question and of the reasons which led King James at this particular time to issue his proclamation, a short retrospect is necessary.

Special rights of free fishing in English waters had been granted to the Hollanders and Zeelanders, as early as 1295, by King Edward I, and afterwards renewed by several of his successors. Finally a treaty was concluded, dated February 24, 1496, known as the Magnus Intercursus, between Henry VII and Philip the Fair, Duke of Burgundy, which was destined to regulate the commercial relations between England and the Netherlands during the whole of the Tudor period, and was still in force in 1609. Article XIV of this treaty ran as follows: —

'Conventum, concordatum et conclusum est quod Piscatores utriusque Partis Partium praedictarum (cujuscunque conditionis existant) poterunt ubique Ire, Navigare per Mare, secure Piscari absque aliquo Impedimento, Licentia, seu Salvo Conductu.'

Nothing could be more explicit or complete, and it was to this clause of the Magnus Intercursus and the rights it had so long recognized that Oldenbarneveldt referred when he spoke to Winwood of the Dutch fishermen's 'accustomed Liberty and antient Privelidges.'

The rights of the Netherlanders to trade and navigate in Scottish waters, 'sine aliquo salvo conductu aut licentia generali aut speciali', were guaranteed by the Treaty of Binche, dated December 15, 1550, which had been confirmed by James himself, as King of Scotland, in 1594. But neither in this treaty of 1550, nor in an earlier treaty of 1541 to which it expressly refers, 'circa Piscationem et liberum usum Maris, ea quae per Tractatum anno 1541 … inita, conclusa ac conventa fuerint debite ac sincere observari debebunt', is there any definite statement that the free use of the sea carried with it the right to fish without payment, though undoubtedly that right seems to be implied, and was certainly exercised without let or hindrance before 1609.