How the Social Sciences Think about the World's Social

ibidem Press, Stuttgart

Acknowledgements

Preface

Why a theory about social sciences?

Chapter A The world's social in social science thinking

Social sciences detect the world's social beyond the national biotopes…

…by assembling theories about nation state social biotopes….

…off-thinking the world's social…

… reflected on through the nation state constructs

…ever critically measured against idealized nation state rationales

The universalization of social science thinking…...

….completing the globalization of social science theorizing as a multiplicity of scientific patriotisms

From Marx to Heidegger: Critical theorizing in the anti-colonial movements—self-purified for constructive imperial nation state views

…opposing a monopoly on spatiological thought in the "centres"

…. liberating global social thought from scientificy for creating patriotic theories

… and anti-scientificy to practice global social sciences

From patriotic to imperial social science thinking

Nationalism: A service for imperial social science theorizing

…thought back by alternative imperial social science models

...critiquing an unequal knowledge imperialism

The world's nation states serving the world's mankind

Chapter BCategorical essentials of disciplinary thinking Unlike the distinction among the social sciences into disciplines, the distinction between social science and natural sciences is a matter of the object of theorizing. Their division, however, is due to the view the state gained on both sciences to separate them: It is the very same instrumentalism of this utilitarian view on the society and the nature, using both for the purposes of the privates, that results in rationale natural sciences and in the idealization of the society of privates presenting the society as a means for the privates in their categorical essentials, the ideas about the homo economicus and politicus, as a means for pursuing the interests of the private property owners as the nature as a means for pursuing these interests.

The cognitive architecture of disciplinary thinking These reflections about disciplinary thinking focus on the classical social science disciplines, that is on anthropology, economics, sociology, political sciences and psychology.

Essential concepts founding theorizing in the classical social science disciplines

Anthropology—Regimen as the demand of man's nature

From anthropological thinking to cultural theories—nation states as cultural artefacts completing man's unfinished nature

Economic thinking in the social sciences—The bane of scarcity

Sociological thinking—The blessing of the "community"

Political theory—political power for the politically disempowered

Psychological thinking—the mythologization of the mind

Essentials of social sciences disciplinary thinking

1. The common cognitive lie founding the categories of disciplinary thinking

2. The shared metaphysical nature of the disciplines and their speculative way of theorizing

3. Disciplinary social thought cannot think other about the social but as an idealized nation state social

4. The categorical essentials: Critically affirmative and idealistically domesticative

5. The world's social in disciplinary thinking—absent

Chapter CThe social science approach to scientific thinking—advancements of teleological theorizing

The social science mode of thinking—cognitive operations of a methodological idealism

Social sciences theorizing about social science thinking

Why teleological thinking must be the nature of thinking

The stigma of the natural sciences—and the self-destruction of an envied hero

The envied hero….

…and his self-destruction

The decline of scientific knowledge towards ephemeral knowledge

Chapter DThe discourse about and the progress of social science knowledge

The discursive creation of acknowledged true knowledge

Paradoxes of acknowledged knowledge in the global social science discourse

Global discourse about acknowledged knowledge ruling social science theorizing

Arguing about the position national knowledge bodies hold

The progress of acknowledged knowledge

How to create a globally shared truth ruling global theorizing

The ephemeral progress of ephemeral knowledge

Chapter EGoing beyond the social sciences

Postscript

Acknowledgements

This book is an outcome of the project "Social Sciences in the Era of Globalisation", funded by the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation in Lisbon.

It was only possible to write it thanks to all the controversial discourses with numerous colleagues around the world committed to discuss the issue of the above project.

Preface

Outlining a theory about the social sciences and critiquing social science thinking as thinking that creates false theories must fail—according to social science thinking. Thanks to their concept of critique social science thinking is immune against a critique that critiques false thought. Since social sciences deny that theorizing about the social—and since T. Kuhn's book interpretation through the social sciences also theorizing in natural sciences about the nature—are able to create right theories, there cannot be any critique that a theory is a false theory. Social science theories may well be critiqued, but this critique is not a critique of any false theory, but a critique that argues against all the ex-ante definitions any social science theorizing requires to reveal all its ethical, ontological and methodological choices theorizing must make, choices of what a theory is about and how a theory intends to think about any object of thinking. It is not at all the case that social sciences are not inviting critique. However it is a critique that does not allow critiquing theories as false theories. It is the ex-ante definitions and choices which open a wide field for critique about all those choices and definitions, however, a critique that a theory creates false thought is no option in this kind of critique, since any theory can be only false in relation to the choices and definitions it must make for theorizing. Nevertheless, since even all these tautological cognitive operations of a critique of in this sense false thought in social sciences, like any scientific thought, require to be made plausible, because they are cognitive operations of scientific thinking, they need to be founded with reasons. Though some social sciences meanwhile simply present data and consider this as having created a founded theory, creating scientific thought cannot just state what a scientist thinks without any arguments reasoning why he thinks what he thinks. And this is the weak point in this very immune system of social sciences critique against a critique of false thought, because even the immune system of criticism, immune against a critique of false thought, must argue why there is no false and right thought and why the thought that there is no right thought making social science immune against the critique of false thought, is right thought. This is why it is worth trying to critique social sciences thought where they create false theories, though such things like false thought—according to the social sciences theories about social sciences theorizing—do not exist in social science theorizing.

Why a theory about social sciences?

'Globalization' is—according to the social sciences—not only the essential, crafting the contemporary social life, but also the reason urging the 'internationalization' of the social sciences. This statement contains at least two false thought and one odd confession, bought with a discreet myth, a self-deception about the social sciences.

To start with the confession: The fact that contemporary social sciences are quite heavily engaged in discussing the need to internationalize thinking about the social, is as odd as telling, since it confesses that thinking about the social beyond individual nation state socials at least until now was not at all a topic for social sciences.

This confession contains the false thought, that the today's discovered "globalization" of the social means that there was no global social before social sciences found out that there is global social. It is only the discovery for the social sciences that there is a social world beyond what their theories are normally about, which have obviously so far been focusing on any nationally confined objects of thinking, just as if there was no global social in the previous—colonized—world's social. It needed the global spread of nation state socials to make social sciences detect a 'globalization' of the social beyond the individual national social entities. A social world that is not a world of nation state socials for social sciences obviously is no global social. Only the postcolonial transformation of the world into a world of nation states makes the social sciences realize that there is a world social beyond the secluded national socials.

And this, recognizing a global social after the world became a world of nation states is a discreet myth of the social sciences about the social sciences, since the social sciences did very well know a social world beyond the nation state socials; they even created a particular discipline, anthropology, that was and is in charge of the "non-civilized" social, that is all socials which were no nation state social.[1] It is though telling that with the exception of anthropology, reserved for the non-nation state socials, a world social did not exist for the social sciences until the world was made a world of nation state socials.

The notion 'globalization' articulates this image of a detected world's social, social sciences identify with the agglomeration of individual nation state socials, just as if a world of nation state socials was the final completion of the world's social nature: 'Globalization' is the world-wide spatial spread of something, which does neither have any subject that makes anything global, nor any object, any what that is globalized, nor does the notion reveal any forces or reasons, which are responsible for this mysterious global spread of a subject—and objectless something, just as if the world finally be came what it ever quasi naturally was.

From the fact that social sciences are advocating the need for internationalizing social science thinking today, one must in fact conclude, that it took 200 years to make the social sciences in the imperial world notice that there was and is a world beyond the nation state social of the imperial nation states. As if the establishment of the imperial countries was not the result of the colonial subjugation of the world by the imperial nation states, exploiting the colonized world and setting the economic basis for the economic wealth and the global power of the imperial world, as if the world of nation states and their imperialism subordinating the world under their command was not the way the global social was and is made, the social sciences, more precisely the social sciences in the imperial nation states, apparently only noticed that there is a social world outside of their national social biotopes, after their national science policies detected science as a means for the global competition about economic growth and political power and therefore forced the sciences to pay more attention to the world beyond the national socials. The fact that it was indeed national science policies that "encourage" social sciences to work internationally is telling. It obviously needed and needs such political "incentives" to make social science detect an era of "globalization", just as if the world before consisted only of their secluded national social biotopes.[2]

For social sciences, their discovery of a world's social, therefore, still is rather the detection of an exotic elsewhere. Despite all the debates on the need to internationalize social thought, the main social sciences theory production is yet to be bothered by such debates and continues their routine work creating knowledge not only confined to nation state socials, but knowledge constructed through the perspectives of the peculiarities of individual nation states socials, namely those of the imperial world. Still, thinking beyond a nation state social, is a rather exceptional and adventurous scientific undertaking, despite all the debates about internationalizing social sciences.

Not that much inspired by their own intellectual curiosity about what is happening in the world, not to mention any theoretical needs to understand any social phenomena in an imperial world, social sciences, asked and pushed by the political elites, of course, not to pay more attention to the world beyond their national social islands, but to take part in profiling the national knowledge resources as an appealing resource for the global capital, calling this the need of "globalization" for globalizing social sciences, reveals that not only the existence of a world of nationally constructed socials was a new phenomenon for social sciences, namely in the imperial world.

Consequently, the international or global knowledge responding to their new discovery of a world's social still continues to consist of nationally constructed knowledge: The main way that comes to the mind of social science thinkers to look at the world's social, is to compare their knowledges about the confined national socials. It seems, social sciences, confronted with their enforced detection of a world's social beyond their theoretical constructs of secluded national social biotopes, apparently do not know anything else but theorizing about the world's social other but as a multiplicity of national socials and cannot interpret thinking about the global social other but accumulating nationally constructed social thought. Just as if they would simply not know how else they could theorize about a world's social other than assembling nationally confined social thought.

However, there are a few social sciences, mainly from the "developing" world, which insist that there is a view of the world's social beyond the illusionary construct of national socials and which very well know that constructing a world of secluded national socials, is an imaginary image of the social sciences in the imperial world.

Such an odd imaginary construct, thinking about any social only as nationally confined biotopes, could certainly hardly happen to scientists in those parts of the world, where the dependence of any aspect of the very national social reality from imperial countries would hardly allow such a "zombie" [3] science, presupposing this national social as a secluded national biotope unaffected by the world's social, and that detects the world's social only once it became a world of nation state socials.

From their point of view, creating such an illusionary knowledge view on the social is too odd when thinking about national socials, which are—though in a rather formal sense—also nationally constructed, but are national socials where the political and economic substance of these nation state socials are entirely under the command of and for the service of the imperial nation state and do not allow the illusion of individual nation states as the exclusive agent crafting a secluded social, as the social sciences in the imperial world want to believe.

However, rather than being irritated about the explanatory abilities of such illusionary social thought, it seems that theorizing in any social sciences anywhere simply does not know what knowledge that is not constructed about nation state socials and not seen through the parochial view of nationally confined theorizing, could be at all about. It seems that it is the nature of social science thinking that thinking about the social must be nothing but thinking about and through the constructs of nation state socials and that the only way for social thought in the social sciences to recognize the world beyond national socials is, therefore, the aggregation of nationally constructed social thought.

Hence, despite of the difficulties, to think the former colonial nation state socials as secluded national biotopes, applying social science thinking to the former colonies the social sciences in the new nation states also think about the world's social through such national constructs. Indeed, observing the global debates about the globalizing social sciences, their main arguments about "scientific power", the "in-equalities", "scientific imperialism" and alike, are also always discussed along nationally constructed entities, may this be a "North" versus a "South", local versus global, Eurocentrism or Occidentalism, rather than having any hesitations about the preoccupations of ever nationally constructed global social thought, always assuming the national social could be understood as nationally constructed social. Practicing the newly detected mission to "globalize" social thought, under the regime of social sciences is ever interpreted as the need for more "local" thought, more nationally constructed theories, to take part in the creation and debates about global social thought as an "equal" contribution to the assemblage of nationally constructed theories.

Thus, strikingly, the more social sciences strive for internationalizing social thought, the more they devote social thought to the world's social, the more they stress the need for thinking about national socials, not only as their unit of analysis, but as their way of thinking about the world's social as an collection of theories about national socials. To create global social thought, social sciences not only think about their nation state socials, they understand the creation of global social thought as to look at their national socials through an exclusive national perspective that only works for thinking about the social within these nation state social islands and, thus, making it even impossible, to share and assemble all those parochially constructed knowledges across these clandestinely constructed local/national knowledge bodies.

Rather than questioning the national knowledge constructs, globalized social science thinking that confines thinking to individual nation state socials, in a world consisting not only of a multiplicity but also of an essential diversity of nation state socials, introduces and insists on a distinction between the epistemological impacts of the many 'wheres' of knowledge. To join global social thought under the regime of the social sciences, social sciences in the decolonized world create all kinds of spatially distinguished knowledges, local, global, southern, northern, universal and alike knowledges—and wonder about a reciprocal ignorance about what is going on beyond their individual secluded "wheres".

Not only is the contemporary detection of a global social and the illusionary way of theorizing in the social sciences about the world's social, a way of thinking that seemingly is not able to think about the world's social other than through constructing a world of secluded national islands, even when the social reality in the ever "developing" world obviously disobeys this way of thinking about the social are enough reason to urge thinking about social thought under the global regime of the social sciences and to find out what the nature of social science thinking is

Yet, there is another observation regarding the theoretical substance of the knowledge social sciences create since now more than 200 years of social science theorizing that also urges to think about social thought under the global regime of the social sciences and this is to wonder what the influence is that the always critical knowledge social sciences create has on the social world?

What do the social sciences let us know about the world's social, a world's social which is, since the social science create knowledge, a world of war and the coexistence of growing wealth and growing poverty[4] and it is this for more than 200 years of social science thinking? Certainly, one cannot make the social sciences responsible for what is happening in the world: the globe, social sciences call "modernity", a place characterized by war, poverty and wealth. Is there any place on the globe that is not involved in any wars? Is there any place in the world, where the growth of wealth does not co-exist with to the growth of poverty? Certainly, war, wealth and poverty are the essentials of "modernity" and they have been this for more than 200 years.

And, not to forget, for more than 200 years the social sciences think about the social world with an army of professional thinkers and create ever critical theories. Has the knowledge they have created and create at least helped to make anything to the better or at least to reduce wars and the co-existence of wealth and poverty? Obviously, not, rather the opposite is the case: There are increasingly more wars and there is a growing gap between wealth and growing poverty and this, where ever, across the whole world.

Again, one cannot blame the social sciences for this, after all, knowledge is knowledge, but what is the impact on the social world of all the mainly critical knowledge these armies of professional thinkers create about the social world? Nothing much, one must conclude, if one assumes that social sciences aim at reducing wars and poverty[5]. And since it is also sure, that social sciences do not propagate war and poverty, but rather critique them, one must raise the question, what the impact of social thought under the regime of the social science, what the impact of all the critical knowledge the armies of social scientists create about the world's social since 200 years, is after all? Still, it is the social science theories not only providing their societies with the knowledge they have about themselves, it is also this knowledge the society acquires through education and it is this education system from which they recruit all the governing positions. What is the role social sciences play in the reproduction of the nation state societies and their market economy, why does 200 years of researching the world of nation states and market economies and all the critical theories about them obviously have no impact on a world ruled by wars, wealth and poverty—again, assuming that social sciences not only critically argue about, but really aim with their knowledge at reducing wars and poverty, as in our example from Skinner, not to mention at abolishing both. Or is this anyway already a wrong assumption, considering how the world is developing—despite the critical social science knowledge? Or is it because of all its critical knowledge or neither nor?

Distinguishing in the following reflections in this book about social thought under the global regime of the social sciences between social thought and the social sciences, theorizing about the social, implies, in fact, that the social sciences are only a particular historical form of social thought. Indeed, the reflections in this theory about the social sciences, about global social thought[6] under the regime of the social sciences, hold that the way social sciences think about the world's social not only results in particular theories about the world's social, but that the way they reflect on social phenomena is a very particular way of theorizing, typical for how only social sciences theorize and typical for the role the knowledge they create plays in the social world. In fact, this implies that social sciences are only a particular interpretation of theorizing about the social, not at all congruent with the nature of scientific thinking, and that it is only the social sciences way of theorizing that is responsible for the phenomena only social science thinking creates and that is responsible for the knowledge the social science approach to social thought contributes to the world's social, a world ruled by wars and poverty.