Divided We Stand: Discourses on Identity in ‘First’ and ‘Other’ Serbia
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ibidem Press, Stuttgart
What shall now become of us, without any barbarians? Those people were a kind of a solution.
Constantine Kavafi (1904) Waiting for the Barbarians
Integration and exclusion are two sides of the same coin, so the issue here is not that exclusion takes place but how it takes place.
Iver B. Neumann (1999)
The Uses of the Other
'Basic social conflict…has spread through all areas of politics, society, culture and agriculture. Conflict is taking place between the 'European' and 'an (old) Balkan civilisation' that has resulted in division between 'Westerners and 'anti-Westerners'.
Holm Zundhausen (2008) History of Serbia
To the lost generations
List of abbreviations
Preface and Acknowledgements
Introduction:Serbia, Europe and National Identity
The object of study
Europe and national identity
Aims of this book
Methodological approach
“First” and “Other” Serbia discourses on Europe and identity
Conclusion
Chapter 1:Theory and Method
Introduction
The first layer: discourse analysis
Why discourse analysis?
How to find meaning in discourse
The second layer: Self/Other analysis
The assumptions of Self/Other analysis and theories of alterity
Friendly, non-radical and radical Others
Debates and historical events
Official discourses and textual material
Serbian national identities
Interpreting history
Yugoslavia and Serbia
Chapter 2:Brief Historical Context (1987–2012)
The 1990s: the nationalist-authoritarian regime
Serbia’s road to war: misuse of political symbolism
Political discontent: crises and the call for democratization
The opposition unites: Bulldozer Revolution
Milošević's legacy
Transitional adjustments and the perspective of EU accession
Chapter 3:Best of Enemies: “First” and “Other” Serbia
Introduction
The Evolution of “First” and “Other” Serbia
“First” Serbia’s evolution in the 1980s and 1990s and the SANU Memorandum
“First” Serbia vocabulary
“First” Serbia after 2000
The post-2000 “Kosovo or Europe” debate
“Other” Serbia: beginnings and self-identification
Traitors and heroes
The organizations and social actors until 2000
“Other” Serbia’s rift after 2000
Conclusion
Chapter 4:The Construction of “Europe”
The “Idea of Europe”: Inclusion and exclusion
Representation of Europe in the “First” Serbia discourse
Nation and Church
Geography: “East for the West, and West for the East”
Military neutrality: Russia as part of the Self?
Srpski Sabor Dveri
Anti-occidentalism: The West as decadent
The “Europe or Kosovo” dilemma
Discursive constructions of in- and out-groups in the “First” Serbia
Positive self-presentation and national self-glorification
The difference attributed to Europe and Other-Serbians
The representation of Europe in “Other” Serbia discourse
The disagreement between soft liberals and hard-liners
On Serbia’s duty to recognize its past
The nature of crimes
The discursive construction of in and out-groups in “Other” Serbia
The production of negative self-presentation
The Serbian Self is inferior to the European other
The hard-liners’ variant: Balkanist discourse
Serbian identity (in)capable of change
Positive identification of the European Other
Absence of development discourse
Conclusion
Chapter 5:Mapping the Debates: “Point of Departure” and “Missionary Intelligentsia”
Mapping debates
The background to the debate: “Coming to the terms with the past”
Point of Departure: Serbian guilt
Hard-line liberals: Responsibility for war crimes
Departure on issue of gender
The Orthodox Church: Changing the cultural model
Re-conceptualized “discourse of non-interference”
The Missionary Intelligentsia Article
Other Serbia as the “enemy within”
Anti-liberal stance
“First” Serbia significant others
The construction of Serbian identity in the Missionary Intelligentsia debate
The civilizational difference
The concept of “good” and “bad” nationalism
Manufacturing nationalists
The cultural war in Serbia
The “Other” Serbia response
Let us be human, even if we are Serbs
Image of the Serbs as brutal and violent
“First-Serbian” as a radical Other to being European
Chapter 6:Serbian “Auto-chauvinism” or “Identification with the Aggressor”
Program-based destruction of national culture
The Communists
Identification with aggressors
Loyalty to foreign masters
Patriotism, national self-image and Kosovo
Conclusion
Conclusion
Is the past over yet? The evolution of Serbian national identities
Results of research
“First” Serbia's return to national symbols during transition
“Other” Serbia: Sustaining the anti-nationalist orientation
Disparate visions of “Europe” in the Serbian elites: change and continuity
Direction for further research
Bibliography
Primary Sources
Articles
Chapters
Books
List of abbreviations
BIH Bosnia and Herzegovina CDA Critical Discourse Analysis DS Democratic Party DOS Democratic Opposition of Serbia DSS Democratic Party of Serbia EU European Union ICTY The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia LDP Liberal Democratic Party LGBT Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Community JUL Jugoslavian Leftists KLA Kosovo Liberation Army NAM Non-Aligned Movement NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NDH Nezavisna Drzava Hrvatska/Independent State of Croatia NSPM New Serbian Political Thought OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe RTS Radio and Television of Serbia SAA Stabilisation and Association Agreement SANU Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts SFRY Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia SNS Serbian Progressive Party/Srpska Napredna Stranka SOC Serbian Orthodox Church SPO Serbian Renewal Movement/Srpski Pokret Otpora SPP Serbian Progressive Party SRS Serbian Radical Party/Srpska Radikalna StrankaPreface and Acknowledgements
So many books have been written about the dissolution of Yugoslavia. This is not one of them. This book is about the hearts and minds of the people who need to fathom what has happened and why and who need to take responsibility for their part. Since Yugoslavism failed as a project, new national identities needed to be formed. I understand that many years have passed since the Milošević regime was ruling Serbia, and the horrors of war were visited upon the people. First, however, that is a matter of modern history, and until the Serbian people willingly make sense of what happened in the 1990s the ghosts of that time will haunt us forever. Not to mention that certain elements of his apparatus are still in power. Second, the traumatic experience of the Yugoslav conflicts is still incomprehensible to most Serbs and needs to be examined and understood, before it can be resolved. A survey conducted in 2001 revealed that most of the Serbian citizens who participated in the survey blamed the US and the West for the dissolution of Yugoslavia. Today, more than 20 years after the Dayton agreement, the situation is not that much different. Interest in the Yugoslav break up and its consequences may never end. In order to progress toward a resolution, the role of the elites and social groups in these traumatic events, and their aftermath, needs to be examined in a narrative way. Such academic examinations must lead to understanding, rather than perpetuate confusion and antagonism. The question of the Serbian national identity still needs to be answered. This book reveals a society that has been formed during times of war, conflict and authoritarianism and has, as a result, indeed struggled to leave the past behind, as its internal structure still is largely founded on pro-war and anti-war positions. Once the past is examined, and the roles of Milošević and his cronies are determined, I am hopeful that Serbia will be able to move into the future free from the damaged perception of its own identity which it currently holds. It is important to emphasize that I do not intend to present the one true characterization of Serbian national identity. And I do not argue that ‘the Serbs’ are basically not horrid but delightful people, nor do I seek to add to the on-going debates as to whether ‘the Serbs’ should be proud or ashamed to be Serbs, or just be allowed to be a normal nation. Rather, the purpose of this book is to examine the peculiar ‘First’ and ‘Other’ Serbia as fractured constructions of national identity which have been developed to different effects during, and in the aftermath of, the dissolution of Yugoslavia.
I also seek to illustrate a range of facets of the problem of dealing with the past in Serbia, including extensive quotations translated from a variety of primary sources, for the purpose of informed debate among English-speaking readers to whom all the original Serbian sources may not be entirely accessible. More importantly, this book tries to do this from a vantage point of relatively objective insider. Although I do hold views on the topics explored in this book, I believe I have stayed impartial, to the extent possible, and I sought to neither construct nor denounce an ‘acceptable’ Serbian identity, which is a constant characteristic of so much literature on this subject. Finally, the starting point for this book was my doctoral thesis entitled, “‘Constructing the Other/s: “First” and “Other” Serbia discourses on identity and Europe”. While the majority of my research findings were retained, much of the theory, literature review and methodology was omitted in the interests of brevity. Instead, I follow Fulbrook who argues that what is most needed is analysis of the factual. Since finishing the research for this manuscript, the political situation in Serbia has changed somewhat, with Aleksandar Vučić leaning towards Western Europe and the EU, nevertheless many “First” Serbia actors do not support it. In doing this, Vučić employs somewhat authoritarian methods, which could be seen as traditionally Eastern European, and which are opposed by the pro-Western elite of ‘Other’ Serbia. When I started to write my doctoral thesis I could scarcely have dreamt that the recurring game of the Serbian intellectual classes, “Who is more Serbian and what it means to be a Serb today” would enter a new phase, as EU accession comes ever-closer to becoming a reality. Finally, this project was inspired by the phenomenon of “dying from otherness”, as one prominent scholar put it,[1] and as is so present in the discourses on identity in the Balkans. The eternal pursuit of enemies within ‘First’ and ‘Other’ Serbia discourses raises the question of whether living in diversity is possible without difference deteriorating into hostility, animosity and hatred. To summarize, the Serbian “we-feeling” with Europe is likely to always be claimed by governments, yet Serbs and Serbian elites continue to be reluctant Europeans.
This book was envisaged during my doctoral work at the School of Politics and International Relations at Reading University (SPIRS). I am grateful to SPIRS for the support which they gave me in the form of necessary funding for my doctorate. I would like to take this opportunity to thanks my supervisor, Dominik Zaum and my external supervisor, Jelena Obradović-Wochnik, who provided me with expert guidance and insightful comments - our regular meetings were a great source of motivation. I also owe a debt of gratitude to numerous individuals who offered their intellectual support and expertise at critical moments. My work benefitted greatly from the insight of my professors at Reading University, Alan Cromartie and Beatrice Heuser. I would also like to give special thanks to Jasna Dragović-Soso who provided me with exemplary inspiration, and whose ideas shaped my thinking at a critical juncture. Special thanks are also due to colleagues in various institutions across Europe whom I consulted and who kindly agreed to talk to me about my topic, share their passion about these ideas, and suggest reading material that was of great use.
I offer sincere thanks to some dear people who understood the headaches that writing a book on Serbia can bring. Some deserve particular recognition for their willingness to spend hours discussing the subject of ‘First’ and ‘Other’ Serbia. I am further indebted to Matthew White for his contribution in making this work comprehensible. In this respect, I would also like to give honest thanks to Daniel Russell, Mladen Ostojić and Marko Luković. Sincere gratitude goes to some dear people around me, such as Bojan Marković, Nadya Herrera Catalan, and Birte Gippert for their endless support and hospitality. I am also indebted to the Centre for Empirical Cultural Studies of South-East Europe and the Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory of the University of Belgrade, who published a chapter of my doctoral thesis in their volume “Us and Them – Symbolic Divisions in Western Balkan Societies.” Crucially, I have been fortunate enough to have a supremely supportive family. I wholeheartedly thank them: my parents Žiža and Milan Omaljev, and my brother Dejan, for having always been there for me. While my greatest debts are to my family, the dedication of this book goes to that Yugoslav generation born in the 1950s and 1960s, who created one world and then destroyed it, and ”did not see its downfall coming.”
Ana Russell-Omaljev, London, 2015
Introduction:
Serbia, Europe and National Identity
How has Serbia, its people and its place in the world, been seen in recent decades by its respective public figures and political leaders? There is a vast literature in the fields of sociology, political science and anthropology written on the subject of Serbia being in between two worlds, between East and the West, between Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires and between Western level-headedness and Eastern irrationality. This book is a much-needed effort to understand how such an “in-between” narrative is played out in contemporary Serbian politics and society. The friction between the two most common conceptions of Serbian national identity in response to this question, which have come to be known as “First” and “Other” Serbia, is by now a familiar topic. It can be said that these two camps are conceptualized as two responses to the idea of the modern political community and offer two different narratives of Serbian collective identity. More specifically, after the fall of Slobodan Milošević in October 2000, the groups self-identifying as the First and Other Serbia opened an ongoing dialogue in the public sphere about many topics, including the dissolution of Yugoslavia, Serbia’s obligations to the Hague Tribunal, and the future of Kosovo. This book takes First and Other Serbia public discourses[2] and their construction of “Europe” as two case studies. I have been concerned for some time now with discourses that explore Serbia’s identity, mission and place in the world, as well as that of Europe. So far, such empirical scrutiny of Serbian national identity as has been conducted would appear to largely confirm Ole Wæver’s comment that a nation or a state’s vision of Europe has to be compatible with its vision of itself.[3] Do First and Other Serbia[4] political approaches to Europe differ significantly? When did Serbia become a democracy and establish its first government? Do its culture, sport and music possess any significant weight of soft power in terms of Europe? In simple terms, does the vicinity of Europe bring Serbia more harm than good? This book will consider these questions.
Since the wars of the 1990s Serbia has attempted to regenerate itself as the antithesis of the hostility, bloodshed and loss of war. But has that been the experience of Serbians? In fact, was Serbia officially even involved in the war? How, then, does a country deal with the legacy of a war that it was not officially involved with? The hasty exercise of democracy just after 2000 generated a sense of Self among Serbians, and particularly a Self that desires democracy, but it also resulted in social relations being reorganized in a dichotomized way, reducing the relationship between pro-European and anti-European groups to one of enmity. In recent years, with the changes of the very framework of international politics wrought by the economic recession in 2008 and the rise of the Middle and Far East, it has become increasingly clear that the world stage is again shaped by international superpowers. Serbia, as a successor to Yugoslavia, wishes to be taken seriously again on the world stage, yet realistically will only achieve that aim through attachment to one or more powerful states or blocs. This book considers that Serbia’s best hope for such an alliance lies with Europe. Serbia might also take into account certain other options, especially given that it had, at one point, four pillars of foreign policy: the EU, Russia, the US and China. By way of illustration, the current US Ambassador to Serbia Michael Kirby notes that “Alexander Vučić is trying to lead [Serbia] onward toward the European Union but the Serbs are slightly schizophrenic—their heart pulls them toward the East, while at the same time their head pushes them toward the West.”[5] A certain representation of Serbian national identity in terms of being truly part of neither the East nor the West but, rather, being considered by the West as being part of the East and being considered by the East as being part of the West (“East for the West, West for the East”), is not difficult to find as these images and ideas are commonly employed both in diplomatic and common speech. Also, perspectives on Serbia’s belonging either to the East or the West differ significantly whether they come from First or Other Serbia. First Serbia wishes Serbia to be a particular type of entity: turbulent but with a clear desire to be economically and politically stable; defeated in the last wars but still dignified and proud; tolerant but only toward those we see as “ours”. It wishes Serbia to be rather isolationist and neutral, not global enough in its outlook to integrate with the modern globalized economy nor European enough in the modern sense to meet the expectations demanded of an aspiring future EU member state. It sees Serbia as part of Old Europe, and implores Serbs not to let themselves lose their identity. Nonetheless, First Serbia recognizes Serbia as dominant in the Balkan region, with such dominance exerted principally through soft power in Serbian-populated parts of Bosnia and Croatia, the so-called our lands.
In contrast, Other Serbia understands Serbia to be a defeated country: still too hesitant and apprehensive to repent for its recent sins; bellicose toward its closest neighbors. For Other Serbia, the answers to Serbia’s woes lie in winning over allies outside Serbia, for fear that by itself Serbia might not succeed in fully democratizing itself, facing corruption, improving its bureaucratic apparatus and conducting other necessary reforms. Other Serbia argues that, because the whole Balkan region is so turbulent and explosive, joining Europe is the only hope for redemption through positive change.
Additionally, it is important to recognize that these disparate political visions are each a product of the manner in which other states and political actors recognize Serbia. Does the European perception of Serbs differ or overlap with their own self-understanding? Malksoo maintains that Eastern Europe has often been seen by the Western states of the continent as being in many ways different and inferior, and that this has in part constituted the image that elites in Eastern European states have of themselves and their position in the modern European polity.[6] The principal focus of this book is the examination of one such dominant perception: how Serbs see and understand Europe. As a result of such “politics of becoming European”[7], one needs to ask if Serbia wants to be part of the EU? If Serbia considers itself as already part of Old Europe? Do Serbs desire to be “proper” Europeans? This book will explore the various practices of differentiation employed by First and Other Serbian actors with regard to the nation, Europe[8] and the EU, and analyze the inter-relationships between these groups of actors. I will explore the practices of differentiation implicated in the confrontation between Self (Serbian Subject/State) and Other (Europe), and reveal the representational paradigms used by both the First and Other Serbia groups which, in Hamilton’s view, represent the whole repertoire of imaginary effects through which difference toward Europe is represented at any historical moment.[9] The operation of exclusionary practices by both First and Other Serbia groups, which will be analyzed in Chapters 3, 4 and 5, are fundamentally at odds with the declared motivation for positive and enduring European integration professed by both major political groupings in Serbia: the Progressives and the Democrats. These arguments about Europe, and Serbia’s place in it, are not only arguments about the Serbian nation, its national self-reflection and its territorial integrity, but also about the value of the form of governance that the EU tends to promote as the ideal, and about the value that is placed upon European ideals by Serbians.