Notes and Queries, Number 186, May 21, 1853

LORD BACON'S "ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING."

Considering the large number of quotations from previous writers which occur in Lord Bacon's works, and especially in his most popular and generally read works—his Essays and his Advancement of Learning—it is remarkable how little his editors have done for the illustration of his text in this respect. The French editors of Montaigne's Essays, who is likewise a writer abounding in quotations, have bestowed much care on this portion of their author's text. The defect in question has, however, been to a great extent supplied in a recent edition of the Advancement of Learning, published by Mr. Parker in West Strand; and it is to be hoped that the beginning, so usefully made, may be followed up by similar editions of other of Bacon's works.

The edition in question, though it traces the great majority of Bacon's quotations, has left some gleanings to its successors; and I propose now to call attention to a few passages of the Advancement of Learning which, after the labours of the late editor, seem still to require further elucidation. My references are to the pages of the new edition:—

P. 25. "Then grew the flowing and watery vein of Osorius the Portugal bishop to be in price."

The editor prints Orosius for Osorius, and adds this note:

"All the editions have Osorius, which, however, must be a mere misprint. He was not a Portuguese, but a Spaniard, born at Tarragona, nor indeed ever a bishop. He was sent by St. Augustine on a mission to Jerusalem, and is supposed to have died in Africa in the earlier part of the fifth century."

The text of Bacon is quite right. The allusion is not to Paulus Orosius, a Spaniard, who flourished at the beginning of the fifth century; but to Jerome Osorio, who was born at Lisbon in 1506, afterwards became Bishop of Silves, and died in 1580. His works were published at Rome in 1592, in 4 vols. folio. His principal work, De rebus Emanuelis Virtute et Auspicio gestis, which first appeared in 1571, was several times reprinted, and was translated into French and English.

P. 31. "Time, which is the author of authors."

In Nov. Org., i. 84., Time is called "Auctor auctorum, atque adeo omnis auctoritatis."

P. 34. "But of these conceits Aristotle speaketh seriously and wisely, when he saith, 'Qui respiciunt ad pauca de facili pronunciant."

The editor does not attempt to trace this passage. Query, If it is not in Aristotle, where is it to be found?

P. 60. "Ulysses, 'Qui vetulam prætulit immortalitati' is a figure of those which prefer custom and habit before all excellency."

The editor refers to Cic. de Orat., i. 44., where it is said that such is the love of country,

"Ut Ithacam illam, in asperrimis saxulis, tanquam nidulum, affixam, sapientissimus vir immortalitati anteponeret."

Another application of the saying is made by Bacon in his Essay VIII., "On Marriage and Single Life:"

"Grave natures, led by custom, and therefore constant, are commonly loving husbands, as was said of Ulysses, 'vetulam suam prætulit immortalitati.'"

The passage in Cicero does not agree with the dictum quoted by Bacon, which seems to be a reference to the Odyssey, v. 136. 208-10.

P. 62. "Claudus in vià antevertit cursorem extra viam."

The same proverb is quoted in Nov. Org., i. 61.

P. 85. "Omnia mutantur, nil interit"—

from Ovid, Met., xv. 165.

Several passages are cited by Bacon from Seneca, which the editor does not trace. Thus, in p. 146., it is said,—

"Nocet illis eloquentia, quibus non rerum cupiditatem facit, sed sui."

Page 147.,—

"Vere magnum habere fragilitatem hominis, securitatem Dei."

The same passage is also quoted by Bacon in Essay V., "On Adversity," and in the treatise De Sap. Vet., vol. x. p. 343., edit. Montagu.

Again, p. 159.:

"De partibus vitæ quisque deliberat, de summâ nemo."

Page 152.,—

"Cogita quamdiu eadem feceris," &c.,

repeated in part in the "Essay on Death."

This last passage is taken, with considerable verbal variations, from Epist. 77. § 6.

"Therefore Aristotle, when he thinks to tax Democritus, doth in truth commend him, where he saith, If we shall indeed dispute, and not follow after similitudes," &c.

The passage referred to is in Eth. Nic., vi. 3.; but it contains no allusion to Democritus, who is not even named in the Ethics; and the word which Bacon renders dispute (ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι) means to speak with precision.

P. 163. "For as the ancient politiques in popular states were wont to compare the people to the sea, and the orators to the winds."

The allusion is to a couplet of Solon:

And to a passage of Livy (xxviii. 27.):

"Multitudo omnis, sicut natura maris, per se immobilis est, venti et auræ cient."

Compare Babrius, fab. 71.

P. 165. "Did not one of the Fathers, in great indignation, call poesy vinum dæmonum?"

The same citation recurs in Essay I., "On Truth:"

"One of the Fathers, in great severity, called poesy vinum dæmonum."

Query, Who is the Father alluded to?

Page 177., the sayings, "Faber quisque fortunæ propriæ" is cited; and again, p. 178., "Faber quisque fortunæ suæ." In Essay XL., "On Fortune," it is quoted, with the addition, "saith the poet." The words are to be found in Sallust, Ad Cæsar. de Rep. Ord., ii. 1.:

"Sed res docuit, id verum esse, quad in carminibus Appius ait, fabrum suæ esse quemque fortunæ."

The Appius alluded to is Appius Claudius the Censor.

Bacon proceeds to say:

"This conceit or position [viz. 'Faber quisque,' &c.], if it be too much declared and professed, hath been thought a thing impolitic and unlucky, as was observed in Timotheus the Athenian, who, having done many great services to the estate in his government, and giving an account thereof to the people, as the manner was, did conclude every particular with this clause, 'And in this Fortune had no part.' And it came so to pass, that he never prospered in anything he took in hand afterwards."

The anecdote is as follows:—Timotheus had been ridiculed by the comic poets, on account of the small share which his own management had had in his successes. A satirical painting had likewise been made, in which he was represented sleeping, while Fortune stood over him, and drew the cities into his net. (See Plutarch, Reg. et Imp. Apophth., vol. ii. p. 42., ed. Tauchnitz; Ælian, V. H. xiii. 42.) On one occasion, however, having returned from a successful expedition, he remarked to the Athenians, in allusion to the previous sarcasms, that in this campaign at least Fortune had no share. Plutarch, who relates the latter anecdote in his Life of Sylla, c. 6., proceeds to say, that this boast gave so much offence to the deity, that he never afterwards prospered in any of his enterprises. His reverse of luck, in consequence of his vainglorious language against Fortune, is also alluded to by Dio Chrysost. Orat., lxiv. § 19., edit. Emper. It will be observed that Plutarch refers the saying of Timotheus to a single expedition; whereas Bacon multiplies it, by extending it over a series of acts.

P. 172. "Cicero reporteth that it was then in use for senators that had name and opinion for general wise men, as Coruncanius, Curius, Lælius, and many others, to walk at certain hours in the Place," &c.

The passage alluded to is De Orat., iii. 83. The persons there named are Sex. Ælius, Manius Manilius, P. Crassus, Tib. Coruncanius, and Scipio.

P. 179. "We will begin, therefore, with this precept, according to the ancient opinion, that the sinews of wisdom are slowness of belief, and distrust."

The precept adverted to is the verse of Epicharmus:

"νᾶφε καὶ μέμνασ' ἀπιστεῖν· ἄρθρα ταῦτα τῶν φρενῶν."

P. 180. "Fraus sibi in parvis fidem præstruit, ut majore emolumento fallat."

Query, Where does this passage occur, as well as the expression "alimenta socordiæ," which Demosthenes, according to Bacon, applies to small favours.

ERECTION OF FORTRESS AT MICHNEE AND PYLOS

Mr. Dartnell, Surgeon of H. M. 53rd regiment, gives the following account of the building of a fort which has lately been erected at Michnee to check the incursions of the Momunds into the Peshawur Valley:

"There was little to be done, except to build a fort, and here the officers had to superintend and direct the working parties which were daily sent out.... Laborers from far and near, Cashmerees, Caboolees, men from the Hindoo Koosh, Afreedees, Khyberees, &c., all working together with hearty goodwill, and a sort of good-humoured rivalry.... It is only when working by contract, however, that the Cashmeree displays his full physical powers, and it is then perfectly refreshing, in such a physically relaxing and take-the-world-as-it-goes sort of a country as this, to observe him.... And then to see him carry a burden! On his head? No. On his back? Yes, but after a fashion of his own, perfectly natural and entirely independent of basket, or receptacle of any kind in which to place it. I have now in my garden some half-dozen of these labourers at work, removing immense masses of clay, which are nearly as hard as flint, and how do they manage? My friend Jumah Khan reverts his arms, and clasping his hands together behind his back, receives the pyramidal load, which generally overtops his head, and thus he conveys it to its destination," &c.—Colburn's United Service Magazine, December, 1852, pp. 514, 515.

Thucydides tells us that as soon as the crews of the Athenian ships, weatherbound at Pylos in the spring of the year B.C. 425, had made up their minds to kill time by fortifying their harbour of refuge,—

"They took the work in hand, and plied it briskly.... The mud that was anywhere requisite, for want of vessels, they carried on their shoulders, bending forwards as much as possible, that it might have room to stick on, and holding it up with both hands clasped fast behind that it might not slide down."—Book iv. chap. 4. (Smith's Translation.)

Temple.

HOVEDEN'S ANNALS—BOHN'S "ANTIQUARIAN LIBRARY."

Considering the cheap issue of all standard works of reference a great boon to the general student, I was predisposed to welcome heartily Mr. Bohn's Antiquarian Library. If, however, cheapness be accompanied by incorrectness, the promised boon I conceive to be worthless; even one or two glaring errors rendering the student distrustful of the entire series. I was led to form the first of these conclusions on receiving vol. i. of a translation of the Annals of Roger de Hoveden, by Henry T. Riley, Esq., barrister-at-law; who introduces the work by a flourish of trumpets in the Preface, on the multifarious errors of the London and Frankfort editions, and the labour taken to correct his own; to the second by observing, whilst cutting the leaves, the following glaring errors, put forward too as corrections:—Vol. i. p. 350., Henry II. is stated by the Annalist to have landed in Ireland, A.D. 1172, "at a place which is called Croch, distant eight miles from the city of Waterford." Here Mr. Riley, with perfect gravity, suggests Cork1 as the true reading!! Can it be, that a barrister-at-law, with an ominously Irish-sounding name, is ignorant that the city of Cork is somewhat more distant than eight miles from the urbs intacta, as Waterford loves to call herself? The fact is, however, that Hoveden and his former editors were nearly correct: on old maps of the harbour of Waterford, Crook Castle is laid down inside Creden Head, on the Waterford side of the harbour; and Crook is still the name of a place at the point indicated, somewhat more however than eight miles from Waterford.

Again, at p. 351. occurs Hoveden's well-known and valuable enumeration of the Irish episcopal sees at the same period, of which Mr. Riley observes: "Nearly all these are mis-spelt … they are in a state of almost hopeless confusion." And then, to make confusion worse confounded, his note on the Bishop of Ossory (p. 352.) says "In the text, 'Erupolensis' is perhaps a mistake for 'Ossoriensis.'" Now, Erupolensis happens to be a correct alias of Ossoriensis: the former characterising the diocese from Kilkenny, the cathedral city, which being seated on the Nore, or Neor—Hibernicè Eoir, Latinè Erus, was sometimes called Erupolis—the latter from the territory with which the see was and is co-extensive, the ancient kingdom of Ossory.

How many more errors there may be in the first volume of the work, I cannot say: but, at all events, what the reader has to complain of is, not that the translator was unable to tell all about "Croch" and "Erupolis," but that, not knowing, he has made matters worse by his hardy elucidations. Truly, at this rate, it were better that no cheap edition of Hoveden were vouchsafed to the public.

Kilkenny.

FOLK LORE

Raven Superstition.—On a recent occasion, at an ordinary meeting of the guardians of the poor, an application was made by the relieving officer on behalf of a single woman residing in the church village at Altarnun. The cause of seeking relief was stated to be "grief," and on asking for an explanation, the officer stated that the applicant's inability to work was owing to depressed spirits, produced by the flight of a croaking raven over her dwelling on the morning of his visit to the village. The pauper was by this circumstance, in connexion with its well-known ominous character, actually frightened into a state of wretched nervous depression, which induced physical want.

African Folk Lore.—The following curious piece of folk lore is quoted from an extract in The Critic (of April 1, 1853, p. 172.), in the course of a review of Richardson's Narrative of a Mission to Central Africa, &c.:

"To avert the evil eye from the gardens, the people (of Mourzak) put up the head of an ass, or some portion of the bones of that animal. The same superstition prevails in all the oases that stud the north of Africa, from Egypt to the Atlantic, but the people are unwilling to explain what especial virtue there exists in an ass's skull."

Funeral Custom.—In some parts (I believe) of Yorkshire, and perhaps elsewhere, it is customary to send, immediately after a death, a paper bag of biscuits, and a card with the name, &c. of the deceased, to his friends, be they many or few. Can any of your readers explain the matter? I have more than once seen the card, but not the biscuits.

SHAKSPEARE READINGS, NO. VII

"What are 'Aristotle's checks?'"

This is the question that Mr. Collier proposed in support of the alteration of checks into ethics, at p. 144. of his Notes and Emendations. He terms checks "an absurd blunder," and in the preface he again introduces it, passing upon it the same unqualified sentence of excommunication, as upon "bosom multiplied," viz. "it can never be repeated." In this opinion he is backed by most of the public scribes of the day, especially by the critic of the Gentleman's Magazine for April, who declares "we should be very sorry to have to discover what the editors have understood by the checks of Aristotle." Furthermore, this critic thinks that "it is extremely singular that the mistake should have remained so long uncorrected;" and he intimates that they who have found any meaning in checks, have done so only because, through ignorance, they could find no meaning in ethics.

Hence it becomes necessary for those who do find a meaning in checks, to defend that meaning; and hence I undertake to answer Mr. Collier's question.

Aristotle's checks are those moral adjustments that form the distinguishing feature of his philosophy.

They are the eyes of reason, whereby he would teach man to avoid divergence from the straight path of happiness.

They are his moderators, his mediocrities, his metriopathics.

They are his philosophical steering-marks, his moral guiding-lines, whereby the passions are to be kept in the via media; as much removed from total abnegation on the one hand, as from immoderate indulgence on the other.

Virtue, according to Aristotle, consists in checked or adjusted propensities. Our passions are not in themselves evil, except when unchecked by reason. And inasmuch as we may overeat, or underfeed ourselves (the check being temperance), so may we suffer our other propensities to deviate from the juste milieu, either in the direction of indulgence or of privation.

The art of adjusting the passions requires an apprenticeship to virtue. The end to be attained is the establishment of good habits. These good habits, like any other skill, can only be attained by practice. Therefore the practice of virtue is the education of the passions.

Ethics is the doctrine of habits; but habits may be good or bad. When good, they constitute virtue; when bad, licentiousness.

The doctrine of checks is that branch of ethics which teaches moral adjustment and restraint.

Therefore checks and licentiousness are in better antithesis to each other, than ethics can be to either, because ethics includes both.

The Aristotelian idea of adjustment, rather than denial, of the passions, is well illustrated in the following passage from Plutarch's Morall Vertue, by Philemon Holland, a contemporary of Shakspeare:

"For neither do they shed and spill the wine upon the floure who are afraide to be drunke, but delay the same with water: nor those who feare the violence of a passion, do take it quite away, but rather temper and qualifie the same: like as folke use to breake horses and oxen from their flinging out with their heeles, their stiffenes and curstnes of the head, and stubburnes in receiving the bridle or the yoke, but do not restraine them of other motions of going about their worke and doing their deede. And even so, verily, reason maketh good use of these passions, when they be well tamed, and, as it were, brought to hand: without overweakening or rooting out cleane that parte of the soule which is made for to second reason and do it good service.... Whereas let passions be rid cleane away (if that were possible to be done), our reason will be found in many things more dull and idle: like as the pilot and master of a ship hath little to do if the winde be laid and no gale at all stirring … as if to the discourse of reason the gods had adjoined passion as a pricke to incite, and a chariot to set it forward."

Again, in describing the "Meanes," he says—

"Now to begin with Fortitude, they say it is the meane between Cowardise and rash Audacitie; of which twaine the one is a defect, the other an excesse of the yrefull passion: Liberalitie, betweene Nigardise and Prodigalitie: Clemencie and Mildnesse, betweene senselesse Indolence and Crueltie: Justice, the meane of giving more or lesse than due: Temperance, a mediocritie betweene the blockish stupiditie of the minde, moved with no touch of pleasure, and all unbrideled loosenes, whereby it is abandoned to all sensualitie."– The Philosophie of Plutarch, fol. 1603.

It really does appear to me that there could not be a happier or more appropriate designation, for a philosophy made up in this way of "meanes" and adjustments, so as to steer between the plus and minus, than a system of checks—not fixed, or rigid rules, as they are sometimes interpreted to be, but nice allowances of excess or defect, to be discovered, weighed, and determined by individual reason, in the audit of each man's conscience, according to the strength or weakness of the passions he may have to regulate.

I therefore oppose the substitution of ethics—

1. Because we have the primâ facie evidence of the text itself, that checks was Shakspeare's word.

2. Because we have internal evidence, in the significance and excellence of the phrase, that it was Shakspeare's word.

Ethics was the patent title by which Aristotle's moral philosophy was universally known; therefore any ignoramus, who never dipped beyond the title, might, and would, have used it. But no person, except one well read in the philosophy itself, would think of giving it such a designation as checks; which word, nevertheless, is most happily characteristic of it.

3. Because, as before stated, Aristotle's checks, being the restrictive and regulating portion of Aristotle's Ethics, is necessarily a more diametrical antithesis to Ovid (and his laxities).

4. Because I look upon the use of this phrase as one of those nice and scarcely perceptible touches by which Shakspeare was content rather to hint at, than to disclose his knowledge,—one of those effects whereby he makes a single word supply the place of a treatise.

With these opinions, I cannot but look upon this threatened change of checks into ethics, as wholly unwarrantable, and I now protest against it as earnestly as, upon a former occasion, I did against the alteration of sickles into shekels, or, still worse, into cycles or into circles. It is with great satisfaction I compare four different views taken of this word by Mr. Collier, viz.—in the note to the text of his octavo edition of Shakspeare;—in an additional note in vol. i., page cclxxxiv. of that edition;—in the first announcement of his annotated folio in the Athenæum newspaper, Jan. 31st, 1852,—and finally (after my remarks upon the word in "N. & Q."), his virtual reinstatement of the original sickle (till then supposed a palpable and undeniable misprint) at page 46. of Notes and Emendations, together with the production, suo motu, of an independent reference in support of my position.

To return to this present substitution of ethics for checks, a very singular circumstance connected with it is the ignoring, by both Mr. Collier and by the critic in the Gentleman's Magazine, of Sir William Blackstone's original claim to the suggestion, by prior publication of upwards of half a century. At that time, notwithstanding the great learning and acuteness of the proposer, the alteration was rejected! And shall we now be less wise than our fathers? Shall we—misled by the prestige of a few drops of rusty ink fashioned into letters of formal cut—place implicit credence in emendations whose only claim to faith, like that of the Mormon scriptures, is that nobody knows whence they came?

In the passage I have quoted from Philemon Holland, there may be observed two peculiarities which are generally supposed to be exclusively Shakspearian: one is the beautiful application of the word "touch"—the other the phrase "discourse of reason." Where this last expression occurs in Hamlet, it narrowly escaped emendation at the hands of Gifford! (See Mr. Knight's note, in his illustrated edition of Shakspeare.) It is the true Aristotelian διάνοια.

There is also a third peculiarity of expression in the same quotation, in the use of the word delay in the sense of diluere, to dilute, temper, allay. There are at least two passages in Shakspeare's plays where the word is used in this sense, but which appear to have been overlooked by his glossarists. The first is in All's Well that Ends Well, Act IV. Sc. 3., where the French locals are moralising upon Bertram's profligate pursuit of Diana: