Reglas insensatas

48 “Strangely, perhaps, it was a country led by a figure totally untroubled by naïve liberal hopes for especially good behavior at home or abroad -namely, Joseph Stalin- that was almost fatally caught out. Stalin allowed his hopes to overwhelm what he was hearing from his own Soviet intelligence assets, as well as useful foreign ones, about the very near-term German intentions to invade. The Soviet Union was fortunate to survive the German attacks launched on 6 June 1941. The invasion was a genuine surprise, at least to Stalin, who had persuaded himself that such an assault would not occur” (Gray, 2018, p. 87).

49 La idea de Rockefeller de emplear el “trust” para evadir la aplicación de remedios antimonopolio resulta transformacional, en la medida en que otorga a esta figura “alcances organizacionales”. A raíz de esa idea el “trust” pasa a ser una “forma organizacional” alternativa a las tradicionales (p.e. “corporation”).

50 Como afirma Freedman: “Plans may be hatched by the cool and the calculating but they are likely to be implemented by the passionate and the unpredictable” (Gray, 2018, p. 16).

51 La decisión del Imperio Austrohúngaro de anexar los territorios de Bosnia y Herzegovina (1908) frustra el proceso de creación de la “Gran Nación Serbia”, razón por la cual diversos sectores de la sociedad Serbia complotan (con la colaboración directa de Rusia) para iniciar un conflicto armado en contra aquel Imperio.

52 “The cars rolled past houses and shops decked with Habsburg black-and-yellow and Bosnian red-and-yellow banners, towards the Sarajevan Muhamed Mehmedbasic, who had taken up a position by the Cumurija Bridge. As the cheers rose from around him he prepared to prime and throw his bomb. It was a tense moment because once the percussion cap on the bomb was cracked (…) there was not going back (…) The next assassin in line (…) was the Bosnian Serb Nedeljko Cabrinovic, who had places himself on the river side of the Quay. He freed his bomb and broke a detonator against a lamppost (…) Instead of leaving the danger zone immediately, the archduke saw to the treatment of the wounded and then ordered that the cavalcade should continue to the Town Hall (…) ‘Come on’, he said. ‘That fellow is clearly insane; let us proceed with our programme’ (…) The archduke asked Potoriek whether he thought a further attack was likely (…) Potoriek made a disheartening reply that he ‘hoped not, but that even with every possible security measure, one could not prevent such undertaking launched from close quarters’ (…) It was agreed that the tour of the museum should be cancelled, and the motorcade should proceed straight back to Apple Quay rather than up Franz Joseph Street as any further prospective assassin would presumably be expecting (…) The motorcade rolled back though the city in the gathering heat, westwards now, away from the City hall. But no one had informed the drivers of the changed itinerary. As they passed the bazar district, the lead vehicle swung to the right into Franz Joseph Street and the car carrying Franz Ferdinand and Sophie made the follow suit. Potoriek upbraided the driver: ‘This is the wrong way! We are supposed to take the Appel Quay!’ The engine was disengaged and the car (which had no reverse gear) pushed slowly back on the main thoroughfare. This was Gavrilo Princip’s moment. He had positioned himself in front of a shop on the right side of Franz Joseph Street and he caught up with the car as it slowed almost to a stop. Unable to disentangling in time the bomb tied to his waste, he drew his revolver instead and fired twice (…)” (Clark, 2013, pp. 370 – 374).

53 El asesinato del Archiduque Franz Ferdinand es el resultado de una serie decisiones desafortunadas. La visita a Sarajevo es altamente riesgosa, pues existe información (conocida por el propio archiduque) acerca de posibles atentados terroristas. La fecha elegida para dicha visita es inconveniente, pues en Sarajevo se recuerda la derrota que Serbia sufre a manos de los otomanos en 1389. La continuación de las actividades oficiales programadas es, cuando menos, negligente, pues la delegación del archiduque sufre un primer atentado a manos de los terroristas serbios. Finalmente, la omisión de informar de manera oportuna a los conductores de los vehículos de la caravana oficial el cambio de itinerario (utilizar la calle “Appel Quay” en lugar de la calle “Franz Joseph”) es trágicamente desafortunada, pues expone al archiduque a la acción de Gavrilo Princip (que espera en la calle “Franz Joseph”).

54 “(…) Alexander (…) understood that Napoleon wanted battle. If that was he wanted, that was exactly what he should not have. The Russians plan therefore was to fall back (…) By trading space for time, they would gain strength (…) As Napoleon chased the Russians in search of a battle, he exhausted his men and particularly his horses (…) By the time of the battle, the Grand Armée had already lost a third of its original 450,000 men –without a proper fight” (Freedman, 2013, p. 79).

55 “While Ford stuck with the Model T, the others set the pace with a greater range of new cars (…) He did not even appreciate how costumers, whose aspirations he had championed, were becoming more demanding about products, fickle in their tastes, interested in style, and self-indulging in their spending. He assumed that low prices would continue to persuade costumers to forego the novelties and gadgets offered by his competitors” (Freedman, 2013, pp. 481 y 482).

56 “Thomas Hobbes famously claimed that the state of nature –that is, the social condition without law and government- would be a ‘war of all against all’ in which life would be ‘solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short’ (…) It turns out that Hobbes was doubly wrong. His first mistake was relatively minor. Anthropologists now believe that humans mostly lived without law for the vast majority of their time on earth (…) Hobbes’s second, more serious mistake was to assume that the state of nature was a state of war. Although almost certainly brutish and short, human life, at least within the band themselves, does not appear to have been specially solitary or nasty. Human beings are social creatures and as such they worked together more or less peacefully in groups to collect food, raise children, and protect one another from outside predators (…) In other words, cooperation and order have not only been possible throughout human prehistory: they have been the norm (…) Hobbes was right when he claimed that without law there would be “no culture of the earth; no navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by sea; no commodious building; no instruments of moving, and removing, such things as require much force; no knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of time; no arts; no letters; no society”. Civilization is possible only with a very high degree of social cooperation and interdependence, which, in turn, is possible only when a community has the ability to regulate social relations efficiently and effectively” (Shapiro, 2011, pp. 35 y 36).

57 “Power alone without some support from the people cannot ensure the survival of Leviathans. The Roman Empire lasted as long as it did because it replaced a collection of often-quarreling states and because, within its borders, peoples, foods and goods could travel freely along its well-built roads or across the Mediterranean, which had been cleared of pirates. Within the empire economic prosperity grew and people lived longer. Indeed foreigners moved into the Roman Empire rather than Romans moving away (…) The better Leviathans have consistent laws, reasonable taxes and security of property, and sometimes even, as the Roman Empire, a tolerance of different costumes and religions” (MacMillan, 2020, pp. 17 y 18).

58 “The ‘realization’ (i.e. the making real) of the legal system involves inscribing its categories and logics within the political, social, and economic realm. Viewed solely from the standpoint of realization (and, relatedly, efficacy, legitimization and domination), modern legal systems can be described in terms of various stages of development (…) In this first stage, positive laws are enacted on paper and applied by able and willing legal officials to citizens who obey for instrumental reasons (…) In the second stage, both legal officials and the citizens obey the law –precisely because they understand that law poses obligations for them (e.g. internalization). The third stage, the most advanced, is achieved when both legal officials and the citizenry unconsciously deploy legal categories and logic, not just because they are the law, but because they are experienced as simply the way things are (e.g. naturalization)” (Schlag y Griffin, 2020, pp. 14 y 15),

59 “(…) when legal rules do have distributive effects, the effect usually should not be counted as favoring or disfavoring the rules because distributional objectives can often be best accomplishes directly, using the income tax and transfer (welfare) programs. One reason economists have tended to favor this direct means of redistribution is that they reach all individuals and are based explicitly on income. In contrast particular rules affect only a relative small fraction of the population and ordinarily constitute relatively crude means of redistribution. For example, a pro-plaintiff tort rule will affect only people involved in accidents, and the resulting redistribution will be haphazard because whether and to what extent plaintiffs are poorer than defendants will vary greatly from context to context. In addition the income tax and transfer programs tend to involve less distortion and inefficiency than does redistribution though legal rules. The reason is that redistribution to legal rules entails both the inefficiency of redistribution generally (due to adverse effects on work incentives) and the additional cost involved in adopting less efficient legal rules.” (Kaplow y Shavell, 2002, pp. 33 y 34).

60 Las herramientas constituyen los medios que el legislador tiene para obtener los fines deseados (resolución de los desafíos funcionales). La forma en la que estas herramientas han de ser empleadas constituye los planes que el legislador diseña para obtener los fines en cuestión.

61 “Los sistemas legales operan con dos tipos de normas: reglas y estándares. Las reglas establecen ex ante qué se debe hacer o qué no se debe hacer. La norma legal que dispone que no se debe conducir en la Calle C a más de 50 kilómetros por hora contiene una regla, pues los conductores saben, desde un primer momento, que incurrirán en una situación de incumplimiento si conducen a 60 kilómetros por hora. Los estándares, por su parte, establecen ex post qué se debe hacer o qué no se debe hacer. La norma legal que dispone que en la Calle C se debe conducir a ‘velocidad prudente’ contiene un estándar, en tanto que los conductores no saben, desde un primer momento, que incurrirán en una situación de incumplimiento si conducen a 60 kilómetros por hora. La configuración de dicha situación dependerá de la interpretación que tenga el juez del concepto ‘velocidad prudente’. Esa interpretación estará sustentada en los hechos particulares del caso (p.e. ¿el conductor transitaba de día o de noche?). Por consiguiente, solo después de concluido el respectivo proceso judicial, un conductor sabrá si 60 kilómetros por hora constituye, para ese caso, ‘velocidad prudente’” (Escobar, 2020, p. 156).

62 Incluso la interpretación textual es contextual. Como indica Slocum: “[c]onsideration of context is appropriate and often necessary in determining the ordinary meaning of the textual language. To interpret acontextually is, often, to misinterpret” (Slocum, 2017, p. 29).

63 “Meta-interpretative debates cover a wide range topics, including whether to rely on parliamentary intent and legislative history, defer to administrative agencies, follow judicial precedent in constitutional and statutory interpretation, recognize evolving social mores, accept authority of treatise writers, and so on. But the principal disagreement over interpretation methodology has always been between those who favor stricter forms of interpretation versus those who prefer looser ones. Advocates of textualism insist that the plain meaning of legal text be followed. For them, the letter of the law controls. By contrast, those who favor some form of purposivism maintain that it is proper in some instances for interpreters to bypass the literal reading of an authoritative text. When the text recommends a course of action that is contrary to the purpose for which it was enacted, purposivists believe it a dereliction of duty to follow the letter of the law. Nonlawyers are often perplexed at this debate. Some think that it is obvious that legal texts ought to be construed strictly. If the law says ‘No vehicles are permitted in the park’, then no vehicles are permitted in the park – end of story (…) Others take the opposite tack. They cannot see the point of sticking to the letter of the law when doing so would be counterproductive. The function of the law, to them is to make our lives better off. What justification could there possibly be, on this view, for not letting an ambulance though a park if that is the quickest route to the hospital?” (Shapiro, 2011, p. 353).

64 “The training of lawyers is a training of logic. The process of analogy, discrimination, and deduction are those in which they are most at home. The language of judicial decision is mainly the language of logic. And the logical method and form flatter that longing for certainty and for repose which is in every human mind. But certainty generally is illusion, and repose is not the destiny of a man. Behind the logical form lies a judgment as to the relative worth and importance of competing legislative grounds, often an inarticulate and unconscious judgment, it is true, and yet the very root and nerve of the whole proceeding. You can give any conclusion a logical form. You always can imply a condition in a contract. But why do you imply it? It is because of some belief as to the practice of the community or of a class, or because of some opinion as to policy, or, in short, because some attitude of yours upon a matter not capable of exact quantitative measurement, and therefore not capable of founding exact logical conclusions. Such matters really are battle grounds where the means do not exist for determinations that shall be good for all time, and where the decision can do no more than embody the preference of a given body in a given time and place” (Holmes, 1897, p. 460)

65 La organización política de las ciudades griegas requiere la participación activa de los ciudadanos en las asambleas y en las cortes. Estos últimos, por tanto, precisan desarrollar una habilidad especial: convencer a la audiencia. En este contexto florece una singular actividad profesional dirigida a transmitir la habilidad de la “persuasión”. Los primeros “retóricos” se concentran en explorar las formas de convencer a la audiencia a través de las emociones. Posteriormente, Platón y Aristóteles amplían el espectro de la retórica, al considerar la necesidad de desarrollar argumentos lógicos, a través del dominio de dos tipos de conocimiento: (i) el conocimiento formal (dialéctica), que permite realizar juicios inductivos y deductivos; y, (ii) el conocimiento sustancial (ética), que permite desarrollar ideas sobre lo justo, lo injusto, etc. En esta línea, en “Rhĕtorikĕ” Aristóteles propone tres métodos técnicos de persuasión. En orden de importancia, el primero se sustenta en la autoridad del argumento (“logos”). El segundo se sustenta en la personalidad del orador (“ethos”). El tercero se sustenta en la emoción generada en la audiencia (“pathos”). Posteriormente, los filósofos estoicos desarrollan con mayor énfasis el método de la autoridad del argumento. Así, en “De Inventione” Cicerón desarrolla diversas fórmulas conceptuales para elaborar argumentos (i) sobre cualquier materia y (ii) en favor de cualquier posición.

66 Arts. 1138, 1154, 1155, 1156, 1160, 1316, 1431, 1432, 1433.

67 El sentido común permite anticipar que bajo la FSFC tanto los costos de transacción como las rentas se incrementarán, pues los arrendadores razonablemente exigirán el pago de una “prima” a cambio de asumir el riesgo de la terminación del contrato a causa de la imposibilidad de los arrendatarios de obtener los beneficios que esperan.

68 “In drawing analogies, we say that some aspect of a current problem is similar to some aspect of a past problem, and thus we should learn -sometimes to follow sometimes to avoid- from the previous event. When, for example, it was argued at the time of the first Iraq war, in 1991, that Sadam Hussein was “like” Adolf Hitler, the point was to show that because Hitler was a dangerous dictator who invaded other countries and needed to be stopped, it followed that Sadam Hussein, also a dangerous dictator who invaded other countries, needed to stopped as well (…) The analogical argumentative structure was the same for those who argued against the second Iraq war, in 2002, by using than analogy between that war and the war in Vietnam. Then the crux of their argument was that Iraq and Vietnam were both situations in which conventional warfare was impossible and in which American military knowledge of the culture, terrain, and language was minimal. Because Vietnam turned into a long, costly and ultimately unsuccessful military venture, so the argument went, the similar situation in Iraq presented similar dangers and should therefore be avoided” (Schauer, 2009, p. 86).

69 “Implicit in this standard picture of analogy is that the person drawing the analogy has a choice of source analogs and selects one from among multiples possibilities on the basis of its being the most useful in making a decision or the most valuable for persuading someone else of the wisdom of a decision already made (…) lawyers do not select analogies that they believe will not lead someone –judge or jury- to the conclusion that they are advocating, and judges do not select analogies that they believe will not help the reader of an opinion see the wisdom in their conclusion” (Schauer, 2009, pp. 87 y 88).

70 “El art. 106 de la LGS establece con meridiana claridad una prohibición absoluta: ‘en ningún caso la sociedad puede otorgar préstamos o prestar garantías (para que un tercero adquiera acciones de propia emisión)’. Si es que el target otorga un préstamo a la shell company, la finalidad de dicho préstamo es ilícita, pues existe una norma que establece que no se puede financiar la adquisición de acciones de propia emisión. Si es que el target otorga una garantía en respaldo de la shell company, el objeto de dicha garantía es jurídicamente imposible, pues existe una norma que establece que no se puede garantizar el financiamiento de la adquisición de acciones de propia emisión. Las reglas de nulidad por ilicitud de causa e imposibilidad de objeto son aplicables a ambos supuestos” (Escobar, 2019, p. 435).

71 Las operaciones de asistencia financiera permiten que el adquirente de acciones representativas del capital social de una empresa (“target”) reciba financiamiento directo o indirecto de esa empresa para pagar el precio de adquisición o el valor de suscripción de tales acciones.

72 “The leverage buyout can take on many patterns. The typical one (in simplified form) involves the creation of a Shell corporation that later merges with the Firm being bought out. The managers form Shell Corporation. They contribute its initial capital and receive all of its stock (…) Shell Corporation borrows from banks and other lenders (or, more precisely, negotiates agreements with them to lend if its offer to buy Firm is successful). Shell Corporation then purchases all the stock in the hands of old shareholders of Firm. Shell Corporation pays a premium that is perhaps as much as 50 percent above Firm’s’ market price before the buyout. Firm is now a subsidiary if Shell Corporation. The only asset of Shell Corporation is its stock in Firm Shell Corporation is then merged into Firm. As a result of the merger, Firm assumes all the obligations of Shell Corporation, including the obligations owed to Bank and other lenders who financed the buyout” (Baird, 1991, pp. 3-4).

73 Arts. 356 y 359 de la LGS.

74 “Las OAF que culminan con una fusión entre el target y la shell company no transgreden la finalidad contemplada por el art. 106 de la LGS. En efecto, esa finalidad es otorgar protección tanto a los accionistas minoritarios como a los acreedores. Si ambos grupos de interesados no tuvieran la posibilidad de emplear un remedio legal que impida que la fusión lesione sus intereses, entonces las OAF indicadas vulnerarían la finalidad contemplada por el art. 106 de la LGS. Ocurre, sin embargo, que la propia LGS otorga a ambos grupos de interesados la posibilidad de emplear un remedio legal que impida que la fusión lesione sus intereses. En efecto, el art. 356 de la LGS concede el derecho de separación a los accionistas minoritarios que consideren que la fusión resulta perjudicial. De otro lado, el art. 359 de la LGS concede el derecho de oposición a los acreedores que consideren que la fusión resulta perjudicial. En la medida en que la fusión entre el target y la shell company no puede generar pérdida alguna a los accionistas minoritarios y a los acreedores, es evidente que las OAF que culminen con una fusión no pueden transgredir la finalidad contemplada en el art. 106 de la LGS. Siendo esto así, las OAF que culminan con una fusión no pueden ser consideradas ‘fraudulentas’” (Escobar, 2019, pp. 435 y 436).

75 Los costos involuntarios impuestos por las OAF toman la forma de “potenciales perjuicios”. En el caso de los accionistas minoritarios existen hasta tres potenciales perjuicios: (1) pérdida de la opción de recibir dividendos; (2) insolvencia del “target”; y (3) expropiación de valor patrimonial. Por su parte, en el caso de los acreedores no garantizados, existen hasta dos potenciales perjuicios: (1) incremento no remunerado del riesgo crediticio (por sustitución ineficiente de activos); e, (2) incremento del riesgo moral.

76 Según este concepto, las prestaciones han de tener y mantener el mismo valor, y las reglas contractuales han de ser equilibradas. Como es evidente, este concepto aplica, de forma acrítica, la idea aristotélica de “justicia distributiva”. Según esa idea, es preciso asignar los beneficios sociales en función de un criterio que cumpla con la “máxima de la equidad”. La aplicación de la máxima indicada requiere considerar tres elementos: (i) los beneficios; (ii) las personas; y, (iii) los criterios (equitativos) de asignación. Asimismo, la aplicación de la máxima indicada requiere garantizar que (a) la participación que las personas obtengan en los beneficios responda, en términos matemáticos, (b) al resultado generado por el criterio de asignación elegido (equidad geométrica). Imaginemos que B, C, D y E logran generar de manera conjunta ganancias por $100 y que el criterio elegido es la “cantidad de horas trabajadas”. Imaginemos, además, que B trabaja 40 horas, C trabaja 30 horas, D trabaja 20 horas y E trabaja 10 horas. En este caso la distribución de las ganancias será justa si a B le corresponde $40 ($100x40%), a C le corresponde $30 ($100x30%), a D le corresponde $20 ($100x20%) y a E le corresponde $10 ($100x10%) (Aristóteles, 2002, pp. 74 y 75).

77 “Entonces, aquellos que proponen un uso de la buena fe en función solidarista, lo hacen para introducir en el contrato, por vía interpretativa/integradora/completiva, un contenido económico diferente de aquel que las partes han delineado; diferente, porque no desequilibrado, es decir, más justo, conforme a ciertos valores, como aquel de la solidaridad y de la proporcionalidad entre las prestaciones y aquel de la igualdad entre los individuos, destinados a prevalecer, como consecuencia de una ponderación axiológica, sobre aquel de la libertad de autodeterminación contractual; diferente, porque no conforme a la economía del contrato, porque no conforme al plan económico y al plan de los riesgos que las partes buscaron construir con el reglamento contractual (…) Así, la cláusula general de buena fe, interpretada a la luz de los principios de solidaridad, igualdad sustancial y proporcionalidad, de ser un instrumento (prevalentemente descriptivo) de verificación y consiguiente valoración de la conducta contractual de las partes (…) se convierte en un instrumento (prevalentemente constructivo) de corrección y de control del reglamento contractual” (Grondona, 2011, pp. 283 y 284).